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ACTUARIAL CASE LAW REVIEW

Issue 135 – Monday 23 September 2024

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ACTUARIAL – Loss of income – Productivity as farmer – Self-employed until accident – Currently unemployed – Unable to continue farming business – Extent of negative impact on earning capacity – Expert failed to make necessary inquiries to assist court with its findings – Orthopaedic surgeon’s testimony is unchallenged – Provided a sound medical explanation for why plaintiff sustained injuries – Defendant failed to prove novus actus interveniens defence – R579,587,60.

Facts: The plaintiff is a 57-year-old unemployed female, with her highest qualifications being a Bachelor in Education Honors degree. After 26 years of service, she decided to leave the teaching profession in 2016 to pursue her dream of working for herself. She remained self-employed until the accident occurred in 2018, and due to the injuries sustained, she was not able to continue her farming business for two months due to constant pain. Before the accident, the plaintiff had a garden, where she planted produce for the market, doing most of the farming work herself, from which she generated a monthly income of about R7,000. The plaintiff did not issue any sale invoices, and all her sale transactions were on a cash-only basis. The plaintiff had people helping her with her farming business, but she was unable to retain them following the accident because she lacked the funds to pay them.


Claim: The plaintiff claims against the defendant for losses incurred as a direct result of an accident that happened while the plaintiff was a passenger in a motor vehicle as envisaged by the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996.


Loss of income: The plaintiff provided additional testimony, admitting that she occasionally had to perform physical labour in addition to her supervisory role in her farming business, albeit with some pain, and she disputed her own occupational therapist’s findings that stated she could continue to function as a supervisor in her own business. When questioned by the plaintiff’s counsel about the type of work the plaintiff could do, Dr Oelofse deferred to the occupational therapist while substantiating that the plaintiff could undertake light-duty, back-friendly employment, and under cross-examination, he conceded that the plaintiff could still work. The occupational therapist, Ms Wiltshire, attested to the plaintiff’s pre-morbid medium-duty functional and physical capacities as well as her post-morbid light to sedentary duties. Her employment as a farmer is categorised as being within the medium-duty range of functioning. She further stated that the plaintiff does not meet the full scope of her premorbid functionality as a farmer. Ms Wiltshire conceded that the plaintiff can continue the farm business in a supervisory capacity, during cross-examination. According to the plaintiff’s industrial psychologist, the plaintiff is unemployable for all intents and purposes due to the injuries sustained in the accident, coupled with her age.


Contingencies: For past loss of income, uninjured earnings, a 5% contingency deduction applies. For injured earnings, a 45% contingency deduction applies. For future loss of income, uninjured earnings, a 10% contingency deduction applies. For injured earnings, a 60% contingency deduction is applicable. The total loss of earnings past and future is R579,587,60.


Expert evidence: While the court must consider the plaintiff’s expert evidence, this must be evaluated and legally assessed for its veracity, and whether the experts’ opinions are based on the facts presented to them, or whether the experts tried to make a case where there is none. The discretion of the court cannot be usurped by expert evidence, especially actuaries, as their evidence only serves as a guide. The industrial psychologist has not made the necessary and most-needed inquiries to assist this court with its findings; for example, he conceded during his evidence that he merely based his opinion on the other expert evidence and what the plaintiff intimated to him, without making any further inquiries surrounding the plaintiff’s farming business, a far cry from what is required from him as an expert in his field. During cross-examination, the industrial psychologist admitted that he did not ask the plaintiff where her farm was located, and this could have impacted her farming business income from month to month. For him, the R7,000 income was based on what the plaintiff told him, which he found not to be excessive and within the normal range of income for the business the plaintiff was conducting before the accident. He conceded that he did not receive any proof of income from the plaintiff to verify this amount.


Award: The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff an amount of R579,587,60.

RYNEVELDT AJ

ACTUARIAL – Loss of income – Child – Third degree burns – Mild concussive head injury – Sustained injuries at 5 years old and currently 13 years – Claim based on cognitive sequelae – Significant concentration problems – May have trouble coping with demands of mainstream education – Claim for future loss of earnings established – Vulnerable in open labour market – 20% contingency deduction applied to first stage – 50% deduction regarding stage 2 and 3 applied – R4,624,017.45.

Facts: The minor is currently 13 years old. When he was only 5 years old, he was injured when he fell off the back of a trailer hauled by a tractor, suffering from third degree burns on his back and a mild concussive head injury. On the pleadings, causation, the nature and extent of the minor’s injuries and the sequelae giving rise to a claim for loss of earnings are in dispute. Presently the minor is still in primary school. Notwithstanding, he has progressed scholastically and is presently in the intermediate phase and in Grade 7. He has passed all his grades.


Application: The matter is before court for the determination of future loss of earnings only. The thrust of the minor’s claim for loss of earnings is based on the cognitive sequelae subsequent upon a reactive psychological reaction to the physical injuries he sustained in the accident. His psychological dysfunction is also associated with chronic post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms (PTSD) and attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).


Loss of income: When the minor was in Grade 5, his school reports indicated "that he passed" all his previous grades. However, at the same time, the educational psychologist confirmed that the minor demonstrated significant difficulties in most of the scholastic tests during the assessment. In addition, he had difficulty concentrating on tasks, with retrieval of information, and displayed delayed performance in his present scholastic assessment which, according to the EP, means that he may have trouble coping with the demands of mainstream education, particularly in senior grades. The difficulties identified included emotional, physical, and social difficulties. The outcomes demonstrated again an overall cognitive functioning that was in the low average range. A subject-by-subject analysis illustrated a decline. In Grade 5, the minor passed the year attaining a mark above 50% in all his subjects except 1. However, in Grade 6 he only achieved a mark of 50% and above in 3 out of the 8 subjects. That is a significant decline in a short space of time. The importance of the conclusion lies in the possibility of a causal link between the minor’s poor concentration and behavioural problems, as reactive sequelae subsequent upon the psychological trauma he suffered because of the accident. The court accepts that a claim for future loss of earnings has been established.


Contingencies: The defendant‘s counsel argued that the court should consider a higher pre-morbid contingency by applying a 35% deduction. The counsel argued that because the minor’s father and uncle were truck drivers and that the minor had expressed wanting to be a truck driver himself, that the pre-morbid postulation was too generous. To ensure an appropriate award the court requested the plaintiff’s actuary to provide it with separate calculations for all three stages as postulated pre-morbidly. The first stage is the most probable and as such the normal contingency deduction of 20% remains undisturbed. However, the same cannot be said for him attaining an NQF7 qualification and the projection that followed. This is not to say that he would not have attained it and followed a similar path. The court deems a 50% deduction in respect of the calculation in respect of stage 2 and 3 is to be applied. A 15% post-morbid deduction was applied, accepting that the minor will receive the treatment he requires and be able to function in a semi-skilled working environment in the Western Cape.


Award: The defendant to pay the plaintiff in her capacity as the curatrix ad litem, for and on behalf of the minor, the amount of R4,624,017.45 in respect of the minor’s future loss of earnings.

RETIEF J

ACTUARIAL – Loss of income – Causation – High-earning and successful manager – Faced disciplinary procedure and departed employer with severance package – Expert opinion that pain along with mental and psychiatric issues being interconnected with impaired productivity and memory issues – Plaintiff deteriorated into being highly vulnerable individual – Impairment of abilities and loss of earnings were factually and legally caused by injuries.

Pre-accident: The plaintiff testified that prior to the collision she was an active, health-conscious person who exercised frequently and was involved in body building. She excelled at her employment and pursued various avenues to advance her education and marketability in her field of employment. She was considered to be a dedicated and loyal employee and regularly achieved promotion and financial increases. Her life revolved around her work and the necessity of her being the main breadwinner for herself, her daughter and disabled son. She elected her employer due to its international connections and the opportunities it made available. She earned a lot of money at the time, up to R1,405 million per year, commensurate with the earnings of top management.


Accident: In 2018, the plaintiff was driving a motorcycle and had a collision at the intersection of Empire Road and Jan Smuts Avenue with a Toyota minibus. The plaintiff suffered severe injuries being a comminuted fracture dislocation of her left elbow and comminuted (open book) fractures of her pelvis and sacrum, displacement of her uterus and bladder as well as lacerations and hematomas to her left elbow, groin and both knees. She was hospitalized at the Netcare Milpark hospital where she was resuscitated and received extensive treatment and rehabilitation. The photographs record the severity of the impact. The velocity and force of the minibus in hitting the motorcycle were such as to expel and shatter its windshield, dislodging the front bumper, causing a severe concavity to the front of the minibus and propelling the plaintiff and her motorcycle into Jan Smuts Avenue.


Post-accident: After the collision she experienced degradation of her memory and suffered continuous pain, physical and mental fatigue as well as anxiety. The plaintiff suffered loss of self-confidence and became socially withdrawn and started taking mood stabilizers. She made errors in critical figures she submitted to her London based colleagues and was unable to cope and left her employ. She had faced disciplinary charges and accepted a severance package. She ended up finding alternative employment at a much-reduced salary and with little prospects of improvement. In the industrial psychologist’s expert opinion, incessant pain, depression, mental and psychiatric anguish, post-traumatic stress outcomes as well as impaired productivity and memory are interconnected. These feed into one another. It is permanent in nature and there is no complete cure. The plaintiff has deteriorated into being a highly vulnerable individual. The collision was, as the expert put it, the “primal event” causing the plaintiff’s current circumstances.

Actuarial calculations: The general contingency deductions applied in the actuary’s calculations towards earnings for pre-morbid past and future loss of earnings were both at 5%. For post-morbid earnings a contingency of 5% was applied towards past and 15% towards future loss of earnings. In his opinion, the applied contingency differential of 10% is factually well founded and fair. As regards loss limits provided for in section 17(4)(c) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, the limit of R160,000 per year is adjusted quarterly was taken as R273,863,00 per year with reference to the date of the collision. The actuary testified that the loss limit had been applied in terms of the Sweatman matter. The plaintiff’s income used to compile his report was in accordance with those recorded by the industrial psychologist as well as proven facts. According to the actuary, an upward adjustment of the pre-morbid contingency to 30% would not decrease the plaintiff’s nett recoverable damages.

* See Road Accident Fund v Sweatman [2015] ZASCA 22.


Assessment: Having regard to all the evidence before court, on a balance of probabilities, the impairment of the plaintiff’s abilities and her loss of earnings were factually and legally caused by the injuries suffered by her as a result of the collision and the effect thereof upon her. There is no reason to deviate from the actuary’s report in respect of the contingencies proposed. The nature and extent of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff and its effect on her in future in her employment and in the job market was indisputable on the evidence before court, despite the Fund’s legal representative seeking to cast aspersions upon the plaintiff and the actuary.

* See at para [50] the incomprehensible accusations from the Fund that the plaintiff’s actuary was misleading regarding the contingencies and the RAF cap. At paras [49]-[53] the court mentions that the Fund deviated from the standard required of it to a disturbing degree and that conduct of the Fund in running the process of litigation in anticipation of the trial and the trial itself caused extensive and unnecessary time wastage. A punitive cost order is warranted.

Order: The Fund is to pay R3,032,256 for past and future loss of earnings, R750,000 for general damages, R566,453.10 for past hospital costs and R256,429.33 for past medical and para-medial costs.

KRUGER AJ

6 September 2024

MSIBI AJ

PERSONAL INJURY – Unlawful arrest and detention – Minor child – Arrested and detained together with four months old baby – Both released without appearing in court – Malicious damage to property charge – Reasonable suspicion test – Officer conducted further investigations – Gave alleged suspect an opportunity to explain allegations – Plaintiff uttered threats in presence of officer – Detention of child was unlawful – Plaintiff’s arrest and detention are lawful – Child entitled to proven damages – Constitution, s 28.

Facts and issue: The plaintiff, instituted a claim for damages based on unlawful arrest and detention against the Minister of Police, the National Commissioner of Police, and the Provincial Commissioner. The plaintiff was arrested by a police officer and detained together with her four months old baby. Both were released without her appearing in court. The defendants plead that the officer who effected the arrest acted in terms of section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The court is called to decide whether there was a reasonable suspicion that the accused committed a Schedule 1 offence and if so whether the plaintiff’s arrest and detention was lawful. Secondly whether the child’s detention was lawful.


Discussion: The complainant laid a charge of malicious damage to property against the plaintiff. The complainant took Constable Ndlazi to his house for him to see the damage to his Television screen. On arrival he could see that the television screen was damaged. He could see that it was struck with a rock from the direction of the door. He went to the accused’s home in the company of the complainant. The plaintiff was very angry saying that the complainant who is her ex-boyfriend had bewitched her and as a result she cannot have intimate contact with other men, and that he had to undo what he did to her. The accused admitted to damaging the Television screen, adding that she will continue to trouble and harass him. Constable Ndlazi then arrested her and took her to the police station. He decided to detain her because she was angry, and she was threatening to cause further harm to the complainant. While at her home, Constable Ndlazi asked the plaintiff to leave the child at home, and she refused to do so. He could have taken the child to a place of safety, but the plaintiff refused.


Findings: The officer did not act on the word of the neighbour alone and arrested the plaintiff, he conducted some investigations to satisfy himself if indeed a crime was committed or not. He even gave the alleged suspect an opportunity to explain the allegations against her. He arrested the plaintiff after he had interviewed her and seen the need to stop her from carrying out her threats which she uttered in front of him even though he was a law enforcement officer. Police cells are not homes for children and are thus not equipped to cater for their needs. The detention of the child was unlawful. The same cannot be said to about the plaintiff’s arrest and detention. On the contrary the plaintiff’s arrest and detention are found to be lawful. Only the child is therefore entitled to damages that have been proved.


Order: The plaintiff claim for unlawful arrest and detention is dismissed. The plaintiff’s claim for unlawful detention in respect of her minor child is upheld. The defendant is ordered to pay damages to the plaintiff in the amount of R100,000 occasioned by the child’s unlawful detention.

17 September 2024

WILSON J

PERSONAL INJURY – Unlawful arrest and detention – Assault – Kicked and slapped by officers whilst placed on ground with hands cuffed – Unlawfully detained despite having done nothing to provoke it – Allegations of xenophobic comments by officers – No clear cause for what led to arrest – Humiliation – Assault was partly xenophobic in character – Officer’s lied about assault – Taints their justification of arrest – Claim succeeds – R270,000.

Facts and issue: The plaintiff, Mr. Macamo, sues the defendant, the Minister, for what he says was his unlawful arrest and assault, carried out by Sergeant Maluleke and Sergeant Mutavhatisindi, together with other members of the police officers. Mr. Macamo overtook Sergeant Maluleke’s vehicle shortly before he reached the JMPD roadblock. He stopped at the roadblock. His car licence and his driver’s licence were checked. He was breathalysed, and then allowed to continue. Around 30 metres after the roadblock, he was stopped again by Sergeant Maluleke’s team, hauled out of his vehicle, handcuffed, kicked, slapped and punched. He says that some of the officers taunted him because he is from Mozambique.


Discussion: Mr. Macamo’s account of the assault was corroborated by the evidence of Sergeant Nzimande. Sergeant Nzimande said that he stopped at the scene to see if he could help. He said that he saw Mr. Macamo sitting on the ground with his hands cuffed behind his back. He saw Sergeant Maluleke slap Mr. Macamo. He saw another police officer kick Mr. Macamo in the back of the head. Sergeant Nzimande’s evidence was clear and satisfactory in every respect. Although the doctor did not notice any injuries to the back of Mr. Macamo’s head, the weight of evidence is plainly that Mr. Macamo was assaulted in the manner Sergeant Nzimande alleged. Sergeant Maluleke’s and Sergeant Mutavhatisindi’s version that Mr. Macamo had bottles of beer in his car was a falsehood, made up after the fact. Sergeant Maluleke and Sergeant Mutavhatisindi were, overall, wholly unimpressive witnesses. Their demeanour in the stand was dogmatic and belligerent. Neither man’s evidence is consistent with what was said on their behalf in the Minister’s plea.


Findings: The court rejects Sergeant Maluleke’s and Sergeant Mutavhatisindi’s evidence. On a balance of probabilities, Mr. Macamo was unlawfully detained despite having done nothing to provoke it. It cannot exactly be said what led to the arrest. It may have been because Mr. Macamo had the temerity to overtake a police vehicle, or perhaps it was simply because Mr. Macamo is from Mozambique. On the evidence, the assault was at least partly xenophobic in character. To kick and punch someone under restraint while taunting them about their national origin is despicable. It also adds a dimension of humiliation that cannot but force the value of the award upwards.


Order: The defendant is directed to pay to the plaintiff the sum of R270,000, plus interest at the prescribed rate.

3 September 2024

CRONJE AJ

PERSONAL INJURY – Unlawful arrest and detention – Quantum – Plaintiff unarmed and naked at arrest – Malice – Girlfriend pregnant – Lack of privacy in police and correctional services holding cells – Lack of sheets and blankets – Lack of medical care – Child born when in custody – Injured at time of arrest – Request that his whereabouts on alleged robbery day be verified at hospital fell on deaf ears – Detained for approximately seven months – R1,000,000.

Facts and issue: The plaintiff instituted action against the defendant for his unlawful arrest and his subsequent detention. Only the quantum of the plaintiff’s claim remains to be determined. The plaintiff pleaded that as a result of his unlawful arrest, alternatively apprehension and the unlawful detention by members of the defendant, he suffered damages in the amount of R5 million based on the deprivation of his liberty, the injury to his person, being humiliated and traumatised, his right of security and safety being injured, injury to his reputation, being subjected to adverse circumstances, being detained in a police cell for two days and for approximately seven months in the Grootvlei Correctional Services facility, loss of income for a period of more than seven months, and being offended by acts of the members of the defendant.


Discussion: When the police arrived at his flat, he was upstairs in his room whilst Lerato made breakfast for them. He heard her screaming, and she sounded frightened. He was naked and went downstairs, where he saw the police officers carrying firearms. He was informed that they were there to arrest him. The firearms were pointed at him, and they shouted that he must go down on the floor, to which he complied. The arrest took place not long after he was discharged from the hospital as he had an open fracture to his leg. At the date of his evidence, the wound has not yet healed, and he still has to receive physiotherapy. When he enquired the reason for his arrest, various reasons were mentioned, that there was footage of a robbery that was committed at a certain shop. He told them that it was impossible for him to have been involved in the robbery and showed them the operation he had on his right leg. All three police officers could see the injury and could notice that he was unable to walk properly as he had a limp. He suggested they approach Pelonomi Hospital to see when he was admitted and discharged. The officers did not heed his request.


Findings: Police officials are expected to treat persons suspected of crime with dignity. The plaintiff was vulnerable (naked) when he proceeded downstairs, in his own home, where the police officers were waiting. He was unarmed when he was instructed to lie down; all three officers pointed their firearms at him. His request that his whereabouts on the alleged robbery day be verified at the hospital fell on deaf ears. His pregnant girlfriend was frightened, and this undoubtedly impacted his psychological state. He could not be present when his son was born. He was then taken to a holding cell for two days. The case law is replete with references to the unacceptable conditions in holding cells, especially concerning the lack of privacy. He was then detained at Grootvlei for approximately seven months.


Order: The defendant shall pay the plaintiff R1,000,000 for general damages.

10 September 2024

ANDREWS AJ

PERSONAL INJURY – PRASA – Liability – Pushed from moving train – Open doors while train was in motion – Plaintiff's version corroborated by independent evidence – Defendant has legal duty to ensure train commuters travel safely – Negligently and wrongfully breached legal duty as carriage doors remained open – Established that negligent omission by defendant was closely connected to harm suffered – No contributory negligence by plaintiff – Defendant 100% is liable for proven or agreed damages.

Facts and issue: The plaintiff instituted an action against the defendant for damages suffered because of an accident, pursuant to allegations that the plaintiff was pushed from a moving train carriage, the doors of which remained open while the train was in motion. In consequence of the incident, the plaintiff sustained injuries to his left tibia and fibula and various bruises and abrasions. The claim is predicated on the assertion that the defendant was under a legal duty to take such steps as were reasonably necessary to ensure his safety. The matter proceeded on the issue of merits only.


Discussion: Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff had succeeded in discharging the onus on a balance of probabilities that the incident occurred, as the plaintiff's version was corroborated by independent evidence. Furthermore, it was contended that the defendant has a legal duty to ensure that train commuters travel safely. In failing to do so, PRASA had negligently and wrongfully breached its said legal duty, as the carriage doors remained open. In addition, it was also contended that the defendant failed to make out a case of contributory negligence. The responsibility remained with PRASA to ensure the implementation of a strict safety regime of closing coach doors, when the train is in motion. The traditional but-for test is adequate to establish a causal link between the conduct by omission between the PRASA and the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Likely, the plaintiff would not have been thrown out of the train had the strict safety regime of closing coach doors, when the train is in motion, been observed.


Findings: The plaintiff succeeded to establish that the negligent omission by the defendant was closely connected to the harm suffered by the plaintiff because of the incident. The plaintiff’s choice to remain standing where he did, cannot be regarded as an assumption of risk when it was always the defendant's legal duty to ensure that train doors are closed during the commute for the safety of the commuters. The defendant failed to discharge the onus, as no evidence was adduced to establish negligence on the part of the plaintiff on a balance of probabilities. PRASA had an actionable legal duty to keep the doors of the carriage closed while the train was in motion, to prevent passengers from falling out of the train. The defendant is solely liable for the harm suffered.


Order: The defendant is liable for 100% of the plaintiff’s proven or agreed damages.

13 September 2024

MOSHOANA J

RAF – Serious injury – Tribunal finding – Tribunal refused to uphold appeal against decision of RAF to assess injuries of minor child to be serious injury – Party aggrieved by decision – Proceeded by way of PAJA review – Obliged to allege and prove PAJA grounds – Failed to prove same – Findings that injuries are not serious are incapable of being faulted – Its confirmation of rejection of SAIR by fund is also incapable of being faulted – Application dismissed – Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.

Facts and issue: The applicant, on behalf of a minor child, has launched the present application, effectively seeking to review and set aside a decision made by the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal), in terms of which, the Tribunal confirmed the rejection of the serious injury assessment report (SIAR), by the Road Accident Fund (RAF). The rejected SIAR was prepared by Dr Gavin Fredericks, following an assessment he conducted. The minor child was struck by a motor vehicle while crossing the street on his way home from school. At the time of the collision, the minor child, then seven years old, was rebuttably presumed to be doli incapax.


Discussion: The reasons advanced by the RAF for rejection were recorded in the rejection letter as the whole person impairment (WPI) assessed in the RAF form is not of such a nature and severity to qualify as serious as the plaintiff will not reach 30% WPI; and the injuries sustained currently form part of the list of non-serious injuries. The Tribunal met and considered the dispute. It reached a conclusion that the injuries sustained by the minor child may be classified as non-serious injuries in terms of the narrative test. The ground of inadequate reasons is opportunistic and arose as an afterthought. The review was launched, which in itself suggests that adequate reasons have been furnished. The Tribunal gave detailed reasons for finding that there were no significant Narrative Test issues to justify a classification of the injuries. It must be borne in mind that where reasons are provided, the end point is not an agreement with the view point of the administrator but an understanding of the decision.


Findings: The decision of the Tribunal falls within the bounds of reasonableness. Outside the pleaded case, the applicant introduced a case based on the legality principle. The applicant is not permitted to do so. In an instance where a right to reasons and the record has been waived, it is difficult for a court of review to perform its review functions, particularly when assessing the ground of ignoring relevant considerations and considering irrelevant ones, failure to apply mind. Overall, there is no legal basis to interfere with the findings reached by the Tribunal, particularly considering the nature of the injuries. The injuries sustained by the minor child form part of the list of non-serious injuries. These injuries are incapable of satisfying the narrative test. As a result, the application for review falls to be dismissed.


Order: The application for review is dismissed.

17 September 2024

VAN DER WESTHUIZEN J

RAF – Interest – Judgment debt – Applicant seeking declarator that would end an alleged unwarranted practice relating to levying of interest on amounts – Court order did not specifically provide for levying of interest – Mora – Proposal advanced by applicant is contrary to provisions – Rate and date from which interest is to run is determined ex lege – Application dismissed – Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975, s 2(1) – Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, s 17(3)(a).

Facts and issue: The applicant, the Road Accident Fund, applied for a declarator that would end an alleged unwarranted practice relating to the levying of interest on amounts contained in court orders where the said court order did not provide for the levying of interest on those amounts. Furthermore, the applicant seeks that the practice of indemnifying the Sheriff of the High Court, when holding auctions based on unlawful writs of execution for the payment of interest be declared unlawful. The writs are allegedly unlawful as those are issued without a court order providing for interest.


Discussion: Section 2 of Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975 (PRIA) provides for interest on a judgment debt, unless that judgment or order provides otherwise. Absent an adverse ruling on interest contained in the judgment or order, the judgment debt shall be subject to interest payable thereon, which may be recovered as if it formed part of the judgment debt on which it is due. It is clear from the provisions of section 2(1) of PRIA, that the interest would be from the day on which such judgment debt is payable. The rate of interest is determined in terms of the provisions of PRIA. Upon execution of a writ on a judgment debt, the amount to be paid is certain by way of a simple calculation with reference to the interest payable. There is and can be no ambiguity as to the amount to be recovered from the debtor. Such writs are not unlawful as contended for by the applicant. Furthermore, calculation of the interest on the judgment debt occurs ex lege at the date on which the writ is issued.


Findings: Regarding the applicant's contention relating to the issue of interest, there is equally no merit. Interest is payable on judgment debts as well as claims for payment of monies in general. The proposal advanced by the applicant that the court should determine the rate of interest applicable and the date from which it ought to run in the judgment order, is contrary to the provisions of PRIA and the legal position. Both the rate and date from which it is to run is determined ex lege. The further proposal by the applicant that an affidavit be submitted in which the calculation of interest is calculated to be incorporated into the writ is of no consequence. That issue should be addressed by the Rules Board.


Order: The application is dismissed.

4 September 2024

MDALANA-MAYISELA J

RAF – Liability – Walking in emergency lane – Apportionment – Plaintiff a pedestrian at time of accident – Walked on road with back to traffic without observing vehicles from rear – Failed to keep a proper lookout and observe motor vehicles approaching from behind – Collision was caused by joint and contributory negligence of insured driver and plaintiff – Defendant is liable to pay 80% of plaintiff’s proven damages – R131,100 for future loss of earnings.

Facts and issue: Action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for damages amounting to R1,085,869 for bodily injuries sustained in a collision with the motor vehicle, at which time the plaintiff was a pedestrian. The plaintiff is suing the defendant for past and future medical and hospital expenses, general damages and future loss of earning capacity. The issues for determination are liability, future loss of earnings or earning capacity, and future medical and hospital expenses.


Negligence and causation: No one has an absolute right of way on the public road. The plaintiff also had a duty to avoid the collision. He failed to give evidence showing that he took steps to avoid the collision. He testified that he did not see the insured motor vehicle before the collision. This version implied that he failed to keep a proper lookout and observe the motor vehicles approaching from behind. He was walking in the emergency lane along the converging traffic. The emergency lane is not reserved for the exclusive use by the pedestrians. On the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the insured driver was causally negligent, but he was not solely responsible for the collision. The collision was caused by the joint and contributory negligence of the insured driver and plaintiff.


Findings: The plaintiff has submitted that a contingency deduction of 12% be applied for future loss on the uninjured income and 32% on the injured income. The Actuary has applied the contingency deductions suggested by the plaintiff. The contingency deductions applied by the Actuary on pre-morbid and post-morbid earnings result in a fair and just compensation for the plaintiff’s future loss of earnings.


Order: The defendant is liable to pay 80% of the plaintiff’s proven damages for bodily injuries sustained. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff an amount of R131,100 for future loss of earnings.

 

BOOKS / RESEARCH / ARTICLES

Authors:  Erik Bolviken and Ingrid Hobaek Haff


It is argued that many-parameter families of loss distributions may work even with limited amounts of historical data. A restriction to unimodality works as a stabilizer, which makes fitted distributions much more stable than their parameters. We propose Box-Cox transformed Gamma and Burr variables. Those are models with three or four parameters with many of the traditional two-parameter families as special cases, and there are well-defined distributions at the boundaries of the parameter space, which is important for stability. The approach is evaluated with model error defined though the theory of misspecification in statistics. It is shown that such error is drastically reduced when a third or fourth parameter is added with-out increasing the random error more than a little. It is pointed out that the approach may be a suitable starting point for completely automatic procedures.

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