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TODAY'S ALERTS

12 December 2024

22 November 2024

STRIJDOM J

COMPANY – Winding up – Business rescue – Whether applicants established a reasonable prospect of achieving any one of two goals contemplated in section 128(1)(b) on the facts – Founding affidavit lacking critical information – No mention of who creditors are and what amounts are due – Applicants failed to place factual foundation for existence of a reasonable prospect of achieving any one of two goals – Not just and equitable to place company under supervision – Application dismissed – Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 128(1)(b).

Facts and issue: Amogelang (in liquidation) was finally liquidated on 10 April 2024. An application to rescind the final liquidation order was issued on 7 August 2024. The crisp issue in this matter is, did the applicants establish a reasonable prospect of achieving any one of the two goals contemplated in section 128(1)(b) on the facts of this case? The applicants must establish grounds for the reasonable prospect of achieving one of the two goals in section 128(1)(b).


Discussion: The applicants argued that there still exists a reasonable prospect of Amogelang continuing running a profitable business, alternatively rescuing the business of Amogelang, if action is taken immediately and such action being the commencement of business rescue proceedings. It was argued by the first intervening creditor that there are no details or plan provided by the first applicant (Mr Mere) in how he proposes or assumes that there would be any reasonable prospects of success that would either save Amogelang from its current financial predicament or which will result in a better return for creditors. Mr Mere stated that the respondent has employees but does not provide any information or list of names, their income or their period of employment. It was only stated that Amogelang had not paid the PAYE related to their employees to SARS for a considerable period and is indebted to SARS for outstanding PAYE to the amount of R1,100,000. Mr Mere provides no list of available assets which can serve as security for their indebtedness to creditors except for one stand purchased for R850,000 in 2014 registered in his name.


Findings: Despite mentioning contracts with the Department of Education, Mr Mere did not attach these contacts to determine their value or if these contracts and income earned from same will be sufficient to pay all creditors and expenses on a monthly basis. The applicants failed to place a factual foundation for the existence of a reasonable prospect of achieving any one of the two goals contemplated in section 128(1)(b). It is not just and equitable to place Amogelang under supervision.


Order: The urgent application is dismissed with costs. The Master of the High Court is requested to appoint a Provisional Liquidator in the insolvent estate of Amogelang Logistics CC.

20 November 2024

DAFFUE J

COSTS – Taxation – Discovered documents – Defendant filed application including exception to plaintiff’s particulars of claim – Exception succeeded but two applications for striking out were dismissed – Taxing master was wrong in considering that successful party in exception was entitled to fees and expenses relating to pages which did not form part of particulars of claim – Discovered in accordance with rule 35 procedure – Items 5 to 14 of bill of costs are disallowed and shall be taxed off – Uniform Rule 48.

Facts and issue: This is a review of taxation contemplated in Rule 48(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court. Having been dissatisfied with the ruling of the taxing master for allowing several items on the taxed bill of costs presented by Joubert, Kramer Weihmann initiated proceedings in accordance with the aforesaid rule. In response to the taxing master’s stated case, Kramer Weihmann filed its submissions in terms of rule 48(5)(a). Joubert did likewise. The taxing master filed the required report in accordance with the provisions of rule 48(5)(b), whereupon the parties filed their further submissions in terms of rule 48(5)(c). The court is now called upon to adjudicate the review in accordance with rule 48(6)(a).


Discussion: The first and most crucial aspect to be considered in this review application is the taxing master’s conclusion that the additional 7 000 pages of documents were relevant in the exception proceedings and that all fees and expenses relating thereto should be allowed on taxation. An excipient who alleges that the plaintiff’s particulars of claim does not disclose a cause of action must establish that upon any construction of the particulars of claim no cause of action is disclosed. No further documents, not attached to the particulars of claim and no extraneous facts, should be considered. Items 5 to 14 of the bill of costs deal exclusively with discovery which has absolutely nothing to do with the exception process. To decide whether any of the exceptions should succeed, the learned judge was bound to accept the allegations of fact pleaded by Kramer Weihmann as true and correct and could not have regard to any other extraneous facts or documents. She complied with the trite principles.


Findings: The taxing master made a material mistake in submitting that Rantho AJ stated, with reference to paragraph 55 of the judgment, that a reading of these extra papers were necessary. The learned judge did not state that it was necessary to obtain the further documents, i.e. the additional 7 000 pages. The reliance on paragraph 55 of the judgment is totally wrong. Unfortunately, the taxing master did not properly consider the judgment in context. The additional 7 000 pages were not required in order to consider and/or adjudicate the applications for striking out. The fees and expenses referred to in Items 5 to 14 of the bill of costs were not reasonably incurred by Joubert in relation to the specific matter. The taxing master must properly consider and assess all relevant facts and circumstances relating to a particular item in the bill of costs. The taxing master was wrong. Interference is therefore required in respect of items 5 to 14.


Order: Items 5 to 14 of the bill of costs are disallowed and shall be taxed off.

4 December 2024

MULLER J

CRIMINAL – Fair trial – Questioning by magistrate – Questioning accused in relation to his previous convictions and pending cases – Commenced with pre-trial procedure without first explaining rights of legal representation – Not asked whether accused is holder of permanent residence permit – Criminal proceedings failed to meet basic tenets of fair trial – Conviction and sentence set aside –Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, ss 60(11)(B) and 112(1)(b).

Facts and issue: This case is subject to automatic review. The accused was convicted of contravening section 9(3)(a) of the Immigration Act in terms a plea of guilty after being questioned in terms of section 112(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. A sentenced of 6 months imprisonment was imposed.  An order in terms of section 34 of the Immigration Act that the accused is subjected to deportation after serving his sentence was added. The accused was not legally represented.


Discussion: When the case was submitted for review, the magistrate was requested to explain what transpired when the accused appeared in court for the first time after his arrest especially the purpose of questioning the accused in relation to his previous convictions and pending cases under pain of conviction and sentence. A simple reading of the record does not bear out the proffered explanation by the magistrate. The magistrate then commenced with a pre-trial procedure without first explaining to the accused that he has the right to legal representation and without determining if he wishes to obtain the services of a legal representative. The magistrate apparently expected from the interpreter to explain the right to legal representation to the accused in the language that the accused understood. It is prerequisite for an accused to be made aware of his rights prior to him/her making an election that will have legal consequences. It cannot be left to the interpreter to perform that duty on his/her own.


Findings: At the subsequent trial, the magistrate explained the right to legal representation before the accused was requested to plead. The omission to explain the right at his first appearance was sufficiently cured by the explanation given to him at the trial. There could not have been any doubt in the mind of the magistrate, from the particulars of charge put to the accused, that neither Schedule 5 nor Schedule 6 of the CPA were applicable to the bail proceedings in the present case. The accused was not asked when questioned in terms of section 112(1)(b) whether he is the holder of a permanent residence permit, the absence of which is a necessary element of an offence under section 9(4) or 10(1). His answers rather revealed that he entered the Republic at a port of entry with a valid passport, but without a valid visa and that he remained in the Republic after his passport has expired. The conviction cannot stand, the criminal proceedings before the magistrate, cumulatively viewed, failed to meet basic tenets of a fair trial envisioned by the Constitution.


Order: The conviction and sentence are set aside.

18 November 2024

MAHLATSI AJ

CRIMINAL – Discharge – Murder and attempted murder – Quality of State witness’ evidence on who shot complainant on count 3 is not prima facie proof that accused is culprit – Nature of evidence on counts 1 and 2 is completely different – Accused’s own version places him at scene – There is evidence upon which a reasonable person acting carefully might convict – Application in terms of counts 1 and 2 denied – Application in terms count 3 granted – Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s 174.

Facts and issue: The accused is charged with three counts, namely, murder on count one, attempted murder on count 2 and attempted murder on count 3. The accused pleaded not guilty to count one to count three. What is at issue in this matter is the determining question, who fired shots which resulted in the two people seriously injured and one deceased? After hearing the witnesses by the State, an application for discharge was launched by the defence in terms of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 197. The State opposed the application on counts 1 and 2 and conceded to count 3.


Discussion: The issue that requires determination at the end of the State’s case is whether any evidence exists on which the court might convict the accused in relation to the remaining counts, such being murder on count 1 and attempted murder on count 2. The application for discharge at the end of the prosecution’s case is regulated by s 174 of the Act. The State conceded that there was insufficient evidence to oppose the application on count 3. The quality of the State witness’ evidence on who shot the complainant on count 3 is not prima facie proof that the accused is the one who shot him. There is no possibility that the accused may be convicted on the State witness’ evidence, except if the accused implicates himself. It would be unconstitutional to put the accused to his defence in light of the insufficient evidence against him.


Findings: The nature of the evidence against the accused on counts 1 and 2 is completely different. As a point of departure, his own version places him at the scene. For example, the witnesses for the State were told that the accused was involved in a fight with the deceased and others. In addition, he had a firearm with him during the confrontation. The evidence on counts 1 and 2 overlaps in that the complainant on count 2 testified about what befell her and the allegations on count 1. Both the State witnesses were steadfast in their denial of the accused’s version. The accused’s version still lacks detail and is vague and general. There is evidence upon which a reasonable person acting carefully might convict.


Order: The application in terms of s 174 of Act 51 of 1977 on counts 1 and 2 stands to be denied. The application in terms of s 174 of Act 51 of 1977 on count 3 is granted.

22 November 2024

JOLWANA J

CRIMINAL – Rape – Child victim – Sentence – Victim a boy aged 11 – Guilty plea – Remorseful and apologetic – Impact on victim – Life altering effects of rape incident – Trauma and negative behavioural changes – Accused had smoked dagga just before incident – Lengthy sentence of imprisonment warranted – Crime committed opportunistically possibly spurred by effect of dagga – Sentenced to 25 years direct imprisonment.

Facts and issue: The accused appeared in court on one count of rape. The State indicated its intention to ask the court to impose a minimum sentence of life imprisonment in the event of the accused being convicted. The accused pleaded guilty to the charge of rape put to him, which was that he unlawfully and intentionally anally penetrated an 11-year-old boy. The court must now consider an appropriate sentence that must be imposed.


Discussion: The accused testified in mitigation of sentence. His evidence included his expression of his acceptance that what he has done in raping the minor child is wrong. He had smoked dagga on that day which he said was more than he usually smoked.  He knew what he was doing when he raped the victim, and he appreciated that it was wrong. The dagga emboldened him and made him feel like he can do anything. The State called a clinical psychologist who testified in aggravation of sentence bringing to the attention of the court the changes that have been observed in the behavioural patterns of the young complainant since the incident. The complainant has become irritable, hostile and has become an angry child. He has become very disrespectful which manifests itself by speaking out of turn, sometimes hurling insults even to adults and is unapologetic about his unruly behaviour. When he does not get his way, he becomes aggressive, verbally abusive and throws tantrums and would sometimes cry hysterically. He has become wary of male figures, becomes anxious, agitated and suspicious when he meets male persons in the streets. In one instance he was walking with his mother when they came across a male person. On that occasion he started trembling and behaving erratically.


Findings: The life of the complainant was clearly damaged very fundamentally to the extent that he is now confused about his sexual identity as a result of what was done to him by the accused. The accused must be given a sentence that sends a clear message to would be offenders that courts will be unflinching in the exercise of their duty to impose appropriate sentences that acknowledge the seriousness of the offence and take it account not only the pain that the complainant such the one in this matter experienced but also the long term after effects of having been put through this horrendous ordeal. The clinical psychologist has recommended psychotherapy to assist the minor child to deal with the ordeal. However, there does not seem to be any actual road map or plan to ensure that this child and his mother do get the required psychotherapy sessions. Substantial and compelling circumstances exist that justify a departure from the minimum prescribed sentence of life imprisonment.


Order: The accused is sentenced to 25 years direct imprisonment. The Registrar of the National Register for Sex Offenders is ordered to enter the details of the accused in the Register for Sexual Offenders. The investigating officer is directed to serve a copy of the judgment on the Regional Head or head of office of the Department of Social Development.

4 December 2024

SWANEPOEL J

CRIMINAL – Murder – Sentence – When life sentence fitting – Murder of child where premeditation not found – Hacked child to death using garden tool – Horrific and brutal murder – Appellant showed no remorse – No explanation for actions – Minimum sentence is not automatically the appropriate sentence – Aggravating factors justified life imprisonment – Not disproportionate to offence and  does not induce a sense of shock – Appeal dismissed – Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, ss 51(1) and 51(2)(a).

Facts and issue: The appellant was charged in the High Court with one count of murder, read with the provisions of section 51 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 105 of 1997. He was convicted of murder. However, the court a quo could not find that the murder had been premeditated, and consequently, it convicted the appellant in terms of the provisions of section 51 (2) of the Act. Notwithstanding that the minimum sentence prescribed by section 51 (2) of the Act is 15 years’ imprisonment, the court a quo sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment. This is an automatic appeal against the life sentence.


Discussion: The appellant said that he drank a substantial amount of alcohol, and that he was under the influence of alcohol, but the evidence established otherwise. The appellant urged the deceased’s grandmother, Ms. M, to leave the child, a 7-month-old girl, with him. At the appellant’s insistence, Ms. M left the deceased in his care. When she arrived back at home, she came across a horrific scene. The child was lying on the floor, covered in blood. The appellant was in possession of a garden hoe with which he had apparently hacked the child to death. When Ms. M asked the appellant why he had killed the child, he said it was not a child but Satanism. The child had died a most painful death. The State argued that the prescribed minimum sentence was disproportionate to the severity of the offence, and it sought a sentence of life imprisonment. It did so on the basis that the attack was particularly violent and brutal. Furthermore, not only had the appellant shown no remorse, but the State also submitted, he did not even provide an explanation for his actions. The prosecutor also argued that gender-based violence, and especially violence against children, was extremely prevalent in our society. The State argued that in this particular case, notwithstanding the minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment, the aggravating factors justified life imprisonment.


Findings: One cannot simply say that the minimum sentence is automatically the appropriate sentence. The only manner of bringing proportionality to sentencing is to use the minimum sentence as a starting point, and then to consider all other aggravating and mitigating factors. Here the victim, a defenseless baby, was utterly helpless and unable to fight back against the appellant. There could not have been anything motivating the vicious killing of the child. Here the appellant is a mature man who should have been able to control his impulses. Life imprisonment is the harshest sentence that a court can impose and is a sentence that should be imposed only for the most serious offences. The vicious murder of a defenseless baby, for no discernable reason, is such an offence. The sentence of life imprisonment is not disproportionate to the offence, and it does not induce a sense of shock.


Order: The appeal against sentence is dismissed.

26 November 2024

RUSI J

EVICTION – Sale agreement – Breach – Monies paid towards purchase price – Intended to make property the family home – Made attempts to make payments towards purchase price and all associated costs of occupational rental – Agreements do not make provision for forfeiture of monies paid towards the purchase price in case of breach – Eviction application dismissed – Counter application referred to hearing of oral evidence on remaining issues.

Facts and issue: At the centre of this application are two immovable properties which the respondent occupies. The applicants are the trustees for the time being of the UITSUG Trust. The Trustees now seek an order evicting the respondent from these properties in terms of section 4(1) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. Notice was given to the respondent as envisaged in section 4(2) of the same Act, of the Trust’s intention to apply for his eviction from the properties.


Discussion: The respondent states that the settlement agreement is void ab initio, because the Trust incorrectly charged interest on the purchase price whereas the respondent’s obligation to make payment on the purchase price for that property had not yet arisen. It is correct that the payment schedule (FA7) reflects that on 16 July 2020 the purchase price was debited against the respondent with interest, as well as interest on the occupational rental where it was paid out of the agreed time. A closer look at the terms of the settlement agreement reveals that nowhere is it provided therein that the R50,000 monthly instalments would be applied towards the purchase price. As recorded in the introductory portion of the settlement agreement, at the time it was concluded the respondent owed the Trust default interest on the purchase price and occupational rental. This has not been disputed. The settlement agreement is not void but enforceable against the respondent. The point in limine that it is void as it was induced by misrepresentation and by reason of the Trust’s incorrect computation of interest payable in respect of the purchase price, fails.


Findings: In as much as the Trust asserted its contractual right to cancel the agreements and to apply for the eviction of the respondent, it is a disconcerting feature of its case that it makes no undertaking to pay back the monies paid to it by the respondent towards the purchase price. None of the agreements make provision for the forfeiture of monies paid by the respondent towards the purchase price in the case of breach of the agreements. While it is so that the respondent would not be barred from instituting appropriate proceedings in which he claims restitution of the monies paid by him towards the purchase price, an important question which remains whether there is the fairness and reasonableness in his eviction in the present circumstances. When regard is had to the foregoing facts and circumstances, equity and justice demand, that the respondent’s eviction be refused.


Order: The application for the eviction of the first respondent from the property is dismissed, with costs. The counter application is referred to the hearing of oral evidence on a date to be determined by the Registrar, on the remaining issues.

26 November 2024

KUNJU AJ

FAMILY – Customary marriage – Validity – Customary marriage concluded in accordance with bride’s customs and rituals – Deceased formed part of delegation during entire process – Siblings of deceased supported case of applicant that she was married to deceased – Obituary prepared by family of deceased confirms the case of applicant – Customary marriage between applicant and deceased is valid – Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, s 3(1)(b).

Facts and issue: The applicant alleges that on 10 January 2015, she got married in accordance with the customary rites observed and applied by the Bhele Clan based in Tyeni. Due to a dispute mounted by the respondents about the existence of such customary marriage, the applicant relying on the provisions of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, has resorted to this court, seeking a declarator that a marriage between her and the deceased existed. She also seeks for an order directing the Department of Home Affairs to register such marriage, if found to exist.


Discussion: The applicant contends that after she fell in love with the deceased, more particularly during December 2014, the deceased and a certain Mr Mbana had visited her homestead situated in Tyeni to meet up with her family to set up a lobola negotiation date. There in Tyeni, they met up with Mr Ntshiba, the elder brother of the applicant. On this very same day after the intention was conveyed to the applicant, she alleges that she agreed to marry the deceased. To actualise, conclude and perfect the agreement and in keeping with the rituals and customs of the Bhele clan, a date was set for lobola and customary marriage negotiations. The date agreed upon was 10 January 2015. The applicant states she married the deceased in terms of the customary rites and that their marriage was negotiated, entered into and celebrated in terms of the customs and traditions of the Ntshiba family, the amaBhele Clan. A sheep was also slaughtered in so doing acknowledging and symbolising the conclusion of lobola agreement.


Findings: The applicant and the deceased at the time the negotiations ensued, they were both old enough to consent to a marriage relationship. The applicant and the deceased decided to follow the Bhele Clan customs and traditions in concluding their customary marriage. The marriage was negotiated, concluded or celebrated in accordance with customary law of the Bhele clan. There is no countervailing evidence that it was not concluded in accordance with the rituals of the Bhele clan. The uncontested allegation of the applicant is that she met the deceased during year 2010, they fell in love, and they stayed together since then at Bhongweni Location, Mthatha, Eastern Cape. This means that even before they got married on 10 January 2015, they had stayed for five years. The siblings of the deceased have supported the case of the applicant that she was married to the deceased. Also, the obituary prepared by the family of the deceased confirms the case of the applicant. The denial of this marriage is simply a bare denial.


Order: The customary marriage consummated between the applicant and the late Mr Moshoeshoe is valid. The fifth respondent is directed to register and endorse in its records the customary marriage between the applicant and late Mr Moshoshoe within ten days from the date of service of the order.

27 November 2024

NYATHI J

LABOUR – Jurisdiction – Protected strike dispute – Authority to launch application – No resolution that purports to authorise institution of proceedings – High Court has no jurisdiction despite fact that dispute is dressed up as spoliation – Applicant approached wrong court – Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over dispute emanating from protected strike – Rule nisi is discharged – Application dismissed – Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, s 68(1).

Facts and issue: An urgent application was brought by the applicant seeking an order to prohibit certain behaviour by the respondents. The order was granted whereafter several extensions of the Rule Nisi were also sought and granted. The respondent has brought an application in terms of Uniform Rules 30 and 30A, which is to be determined simultaneously with the confirmation or discharge of the rule nisi. It is the applicant's version of events that its property was spoliated, the applicant and its representatives could not access or take possession of the control of the property, a supermarket, and this was solely as a result of the respondents blocking access of the property.


Discussion: The respondent’s contention is that the applicant obtained the order under false pretences by dressing-up a strike as a spoliation complaint, after having failed twice at the Labour Court where it had sought to interdict the strike on an urgent basis. As it turned out, the striking employees have been dismissed subsequent to a disciplinary process. The applicant is a legal entity registered in accordance with the Companies Act. An entity such as the applicant when instituting legal action of this nature, the entity should issue a resolution authorising same. There is no resolution before court that purports to authorise the institution of these proceedings. The former employees of the applicant embarked on a protected and lawful strike, demanding a salary increase of 10% amongst other demands. Eventually, the workers were dismissed by the applicant. The applicant launched an urgent application to the Labour Court. This application was ultimately dismissed as the members were within their rights to embark on a protected strike. The applicant approached the Labour Court with a second urgent application which was struck from the roll due to lack of urgency.


Findings: This Court has no jurisdiction over this matter, even though the dispute before the court is dressed up as spoliation, thus, the applicant approached the wrong court. The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute emanating from the protected strike. The dispute before this court emanates from the protected strike, as alleged by the applicant. The applicant itself was aware of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court; hence they approached it on two occasions. Only when they were unsuccessful due to technical reasons, did they resort to a forum shopping exercise. The rule nisi cannot on this basis be confirmed.


Order: The rule nisi is discharged. The application is dismissed with costs.

6 December 2024

NCUBE J

LAND TENURE – Restitution of rights – Dispossession of land – Assessment of compensation – Valuation method applied by expert witness Stephenson is more reliable than that of expert witness Serfontein – Correctly referred to market value of property which is a considered factor in determination – Calculated solatium based on different scenarios – Award of R13,666,035 – Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.

Facts and issue: Two actions were instituted for the restitution of rights in land in terms of the Restitution of Rights in Land Act 22 of 1994. The deceased were disposed of their rights in land in respect of the property due to racially discriminatory laws or practices applicable at the time of dispossession. The parties signed a statement of agreed facts and facts in dispute. The defendants admitted the claims and their validity and conceded that the plaintiffs are entitled to restitution in the form of equitable redress. What is in issue, is the appropriate amount which should be paid to the Shah family. The second issue is whether solatium should be paid to the claimants and if so in what amount. The last issue is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to costs.


Discussion: There are two expert witnesses who testified. The plaintiff called Mr Stephenson  who is a professional valuer. Mr Stepheson conducted a historical valuation of the property and compiled a report, and he also issued many updated valuations. The defendants led the evidence of Mr. Serfontein who is also a professional valuer. Mr Serfontein compiled four reports based on the investigation which he had conducted. There are few differences between these two experts. The difference is in the calculation method and whether direct financial loss and solatium should be included. Whilst Mr. Serfontein believed the plaintiffs were not entitled to direct financial loss and solatium, Mr. Stephenson opined that the plaintiffs had suffered great hardship as a result of the dispossession, and he calculated the compensation by adding direct financial loss and solatium to the amount to which the plaintiffs are entitled. The valuation method applied by Mr. Stephenson is more reliable than that of Mr. Serfontein. Mr. Serfontein was unwilling even to testify, which might have been an indication that he had no confidence in the integrity of his investigations.


Findings: Mr Serfontein’s calculations can be safely rejected. The plaintiffs have asked for solatium to be included as a form of financial loss. Mr Setephenson has calculated solatium based on different scenarios. Solatium is compensation awarded for injury to the feelings. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that no solatium was paid to the plaintiffs during expropriation. Expropriation of someone’s property, by its very nature causes emotional trauma for which the owner of the expropriated property should be compensated. The Expropriation Act prescribes a fixed formula in terms of which solatium should be determined. According to that formula solatium should be 10% of the first R100,000 plus 5% of the amount by which it exceeds R100,000. Mr Stephenson did the calculations based on market value including land and improvements at R5,500 per m2 plus solatium at 10% as prescribed by the Expropriation Act.


Order: The defendants are ordered to pay the amount of R13,666,035 to the plaintiffs’ attorney of record within 30 days from date of the order. The defendants are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the costs incurred by the plaintiffs.

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