MEDICAL NEG

Facts: The plaintiff is the biological mother of the minor child who was born at the Themba Hospital, a health facility that falls under the control, management and authority of the Department. The plaintiff’s pregnancy progressed uneventfully and without apparent complications. The plaintiff’s baby was delivered 2 hours and 45 minutes after the decision had been made for caesarean section, and over 5 hours since the caesarean section was indicated. There is no evidence that contractions were tocolysed while awaiting caesarean section or that intrauterine resuscitation was performed. It is accepted that the available evidence supports the premise that the brain injury was caused by hypoxia and that this hypoxia most likely occurred during labour because of the prolonged nature of the advanced stages of labour. The minor child has since been diagnosed with severe mixed-type cerebral palsy. The plaintiff testified that she had taken "isiwasho" the day before the birth of the child.  She said that in consequence of her having been to the hospital and having been sent home because she was not in labour, she felt that her luck was bad. The iziwasho was taken to change her luck and that the specific preparation she had taken was in fact called "luck".

Application: The action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant arises out of what is contended by the plaintiff to be the negligent conduct of the medical staff at the Themba Hospital. Two issues are to be decided. Firstly, whether the alleged taking of "isiwasho" or "imbita" by the plaintiff to speed up labour had any impact upon her child’s subsequent birth injury. Secondly, whether the Themba Hospital facilities and relevant budget, including for the period relating to the weekend of 18 and 19 December 2010, was causally related to the delay in the carrying out of the caesarean section for the delivery of the plaintiff’s child.

The mixture: The plaintiff’s evidence was that she had mixed the "luck" with some water and then taken two teaspoons of the mixture, put them into her mouth and then spat the mixture onto her stomach. The plaintiff was adamant that she had neither drank nor swallowed the mixture. The plaintiff denied taking "imbita". She testified that the former was to bring luck and was not ingested whereas the latter was a herbal mixture which was ingested. They were two different things. The plaintiff testified that she had informed the experts with whom she had consulted, that she had taken the isiwasho. The evidence of the plaintiff that she neither took imbita nor told the doctor that she had, was not disputed and is accepted. The whole question of whether she took isiwasho and/or imbita is a red herring. The first reason is that the claim of the plaintiff was brought against the defendant in a purely representative capacity. The plaintiff was never joined as a wrongdoer in her personal capacity and so it does not now afford the defendant succour to raise as a defence to the claim, that the plaintiff’s conduct was in any way the cause of her child’s misfortune. The second reason arises out of the undisputed entries in the hospital records. The recording of the use of isiwasho (and allegedly imbita) was accompanied by a caution recorded by the doctor that in consequence of this, the plaintiff was at high risk for a ruptured uterus and required close monitoring. Throughout the period of monitoring, neither the plaintiff nor the child demonstrated any distress which could be attributable to the isiwasho (or the imbita).

Findings: Despite the recognition that the plaintiff was in obstructed labour and required a caesarian section, inexplicably, and for a 4,5-hour period, monitoring of the foetus ceased. It is self-evident that if the monitoring of the plaintiff and foetus had continued, then distress in the foetus would have been detected earlier and the caesarean section performed earlier. In the absence of any adverse effect on the foetus being established in consequence of the use by the plaintiff of iziwasho (or imbita) or of the Themba Hospital being without the staff or facilities to properly care for the plaintiff and the foetus, that the sole cause of the injury to the foetus (the child once he was a newborn) is the negligent failure on the part of the staff of the Themba Hospital to timeously deliver him when by the exercise of reasonable care, they could and should have done so. There is no merit in the defendant’s argument that the taking of iziwasho (or imbita) played any role in the birth injury.  Additionally, no merit is found in the argument that due to a lack of resources the staff at the Themba Hospital were unable to provide a minimum standard of care which would have obviated the birth injury. The injury to the plaintiff’s child was entirely avoidable.

Order: The defendant is liable for the payment of 100% of the proven or agreed damages of the plaintiff’s minor child. The defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party-and-party costs.

MILLAR J

Facts and issue: The plaintiff instituted a claim for damages against the defendant, the MEC for Health, arising from an incident of an alleged medical negligence which occurred during her admission at Zeerust Hospital. The plaintiff alleges that the doctors and nursing staff failed in their duty to care to the plaintiff because of which the plaintiff suffered a miscarriage and further that a deceased foetus was left inside the plaintiff for a period of over 30 days.

Expert evidence: The expert’s opinion is based on the “say-so” of the plaintiff, no research had been done to assist the court on the medico-legal understanding of the concepts of twin pregnancy, miscarriage vis-à-vis stillbirth given the period of gestation. The expert report says nothing about the personal qualifications and experience experts, and particularly the specialized experience concerning the matter before the court. The unsubstantiated opinion of Dr Amoko is rejected as he also failed to give oral evidence of his opinion technically leaving the court with no opinion at all.

Evidence: Dr Amoko stated that the plaintiff ‘aborted a foetus and was done womb cleaning’. No evidence was led by the plaintiff that the medical staff caused her to suffer miscarriage as averred in the particulars of claim. This issue was also not dealt with during argument on behalf of the plaintiff. The only information concerning the medical treatment of the plaintiff at Zeerust hospital is what is termed “Patient Discharge Report” which states that the plaintiff was admitted at hospital and discharged and was diagnosed on discharge of incomplete miscarriage. The plaintiff’s cause of action is dependent on what transpired at Zeerust hospital, yet no attempts were made on both sides of the litigants to assist the court with the medical records from Zeerust hospital or witnesses who offered the plaintiff the medical treatment. The evidence before the court is insufficient to attract delictual liability in general. The lack of medical records and a well-reasoned expert opinion left the court with general assumptions as to the cause of negligence and this militate against the plaintiff’s case.

Order: The plaintiff’s case is dismissed.

Facts: In 2015 the plaintiff was aged 74 and living on her own when she suffered a stroke. She was first taken to a private hospital but since she did not have medical aid she was moved to a State hospital. That hospital did not have the facilities to treat a stroke patient, so she was taken by ambulance to George Mukhari Hospital (GMH). She was examined and there is no report of her having bedsores. She did not receive any treatment according to the hospital’s own protocols in relation to the possibility of bedsores whilst in the emergency section. When she was admitted to the ward, a note was made that she had an old bedsore. The plaintiff was later sent to a private hospital and then to a special rehabilitation hospital. Whilst at home she was seen by a wound specialist who advised the family that they see an attorney, given the state of the plaintiff’s bedsores, which they duly did.

Appeal: The plaintiff’s principle contention is that her bedsores were caused by sub-standard treatment whilst she was being treated at GMH. The High Court found against the MEC and declared that the employees of GMH were negligent in relation to the injury sustained by the plaintiff in the form of a bedsore. Such negligence was declared to have been a cause of the plaintiff’s injury.

Discussion: Both experts agreed that the plaintiff had co-morbidities that made it more likely that she would be susceptible to bed sores. These were her age, hypertension and because she had been lying in the same position for some time. The issue of causation in this case is difficult. It is possible that the plaintiff could have developed her bedsore if she had been lying on the floor of her home for some time before she was discovered by her helper. It is also possible, given that the plaintiff had suffered a stroke and had to be intubated urgently, that the staff were not focussed on examining her body for bedsores and this may have been missed. However, the court a quo held, correctly, that even if the bedsore had been brought into existence prior to the plaintiff's admission to GMH, this did not exonerate the defendant. The hospital had a protocol for bedsores and this was a standard the hospital itself had adopted and it can be expected that its nursing staff would have been trained in it.

Findings: The hospital had an ongoing duty of care to the plaintiff from the time of her admission to prevent the bedsore deteriorating or developing. Given the plaintiff’s condition at the time of admission, the fact she was a stroke patient who had been moved to GMH from two prior facilities, her age at the time of 72, the history given by the family of how she had been found, the length of time spent in the emergency ward without being moved, the close link between the harm and the unreasonable omission can be established on these facts. Although the plaintiff was seriously ill, there was no medical reason why the plaintiff could not have been treated in terms of the protocol for bedsores and been turned in intervals of two to four hours. Whatever resource constraints GMH faces as a public hospital, this was not an issue relevant to the treatment required by the protocols. The defendant’s hospital staff failed in their duty of care to the plaintiff to prevent the onset or spread of the bedsore she sustained.

Order: The appeal is dismissed. The plaintiff is awarded costs including costs of one counsel on Scale C.

MANOIM J (MAKUME J and SENYATSI J concurring)

Facts and issue: This case involves a claim for damages due to alleged medical negligence by the staff of the Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape. The plaintiff, acting on behalf of herself and her minor child, Linamandla, claimed that the negligence of the medical staff during her labour and the birth of Linamandla at Nelson Mandela Academic Hospital (NMAH), led to Linamandla's cerebral palsy. The primary issues are whether the cerebral palsy was caused by a pre-partum or intrapartum event, and whether the negligence was causally connected to the cerebral palsy.

Discussion: It was conceded that the actions of the defendant’s employees were substandard, amounting to negligence. There existed substandard care amounting to negligence in that there was poor monitoring of the foetal heart rate (FHR) and that, as Canzibe Hospital was a district hospital, it should have been able to perform a caesarean section, but it did not. It seems that Dr. Swan further conceded that in the circumstances prevailing, that is where Canzibe could not perform such a caesarean section, more should have been done by the medical staff, including regular monitoring, to prevent foetal stress over the many ensuing hours until when Linamandla was born. On the evidence of the plaintiff, and in particular the expert evidence of Drs Murray and Kara, the plaintiff made out a strong prima facie case that the injury to Linamandla’s brain occurred intrapartum because of the extended labour due to the delay in getting the plaintiff on to the theatre table at NMAH.

Findings: The plaintiff presented evidence from four witnesses, including medical experts, who supported the claim that the injury to Linamandla's brain occurred intrapartum due to prolonged labour and delayed caesarean section, leading to hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy (HIE). The defence presented four witnesses but relied heavily on Dr. Keshave, whose theories about possible pre-existing conditions causing the HIE were not sufficiently substantiated. The negligent monitoring and delayed intervention by the defendant's medical staff were the probable causes of Linamandla's HIE and subsequent cerebral palsy.

Order: The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s agreed or proven damages both in her personal and in her representative capacities for and on behalf of her minor child, Linamandla.

Facts and issue: The plaintiff’s claim is that the defendant is in breach of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant acting through its employees failed to exercise the degree of care and skill required. The plaintiff contends that in the process of the medical practitioner alternatively nursing staff inserting the intravenous drip, a portion of the drip broke off and remained in his bodily tissue. This portion of the drip is referred to as a foreign body. The medical practitioner alternatively nursing staff are alleged to have been unable to retrieve the foreign body.

Discussion: The defendant pleads that when the incident occurred, the medical practitioner believed that a part of the intravenous drip remained in the body (arm) of the plaintiff. However, following necessary medical procedures and scans to investigate whether the foreign body was in the body of the plaintiff, nothing was found. The defendant further pleads that its medical staff took reasonable medical precautions and conducted an exploration through surgery, which revealed no foreign body. The evidence of the plaintiff did nothing to advance the cause of action posited in the particulars of claim. The attending doctor, Dr Breytenbach, immediately called for assistance from Dr de Hill, a surgeon, and a decision was taken to take the plaintiff to surgery. The notes of Dr de Hill reflects that no Jelco from the intravenous drip was found in the arm of the plaintiff. The medical staff went further and sought expert opinion from specialists at Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital in Gauteng. The plaintiff was consequently referred for CT scans to trace the foreign body. The reports from Dr TC Sefanyetso, based on the CT Venogram of the right upper limb of the plaintiff and a CT Pulmonary Angiogram emphatically shows no presence of any foreign body in the plaintiff.

Findings: All steps taken by the medical staff upon suspecting that the Jelco part of the intravenous drip had broken off, speaks to medical care diligently provided to the plaintiff, rather than negligence of any degree. The case for the plaintiff is predicated on the strength of the Jelco part of a drip remaining in situ in his bodily tissue. The hospital records with the surgery performed by Dr de Hill found no presence of any part of an intravenous drip in the identified vein of the right arm of the plaintiff. The two CT Venograms and a Pulmonary Angiogram found no presence of any intravenous drip. The body of medical evidence militates against the cause of action relied on by the plaintiff.

Order: The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs.

Facts and issue: The plaintiff was admitted to the Gelukspan Hospital for stab wounds he sustained to his left upper thorax and left upper arm. The claim for damages arose from medical treatment received by the plaintiff from the date of his admission on 28 June 2014 which traversed to at least 21 July 2014 at the Mafikeng Hospital. He instituted an action against the defendant (MEC) based on the treatment received at both hospitals. The MEC contended that the care that was administered complied with what was reasonably expected of its medical staff.

Discussion: The alleged failure to first have an X-ray taken upon admission, and second to refer the plaintiff from the District Hospital to the Provincial Hospital for specialised observation, assessment and treatment is the nub of the plaintiff’s claim. A fact which speaks for itself is that an X-ray was not obtained immediately upon assessment of the plaintiff. This was on value judgment by Dr Motsei. The decision of Dr Motsei whilst susceptible to being labelled wrong, does not mean that it axiomatically was substandard in lacking the necessary care and skill required of a general practitioner. What remains is the question of referral of the plaintiff to Mafikeng Hospital for specialized assessment and treatment. The plaintiff was able to appreciate the seriousness of his condition and the procedure which was to be performed to evacuate the mass from his chest. To that end, he signed a consent to surgery form as an elective procedure. This is a clear indicator that notwithstanding an error of judgment and not a negligent act, the treatment that the plaintiff was subject to was reasonable and of a legally acceptable standard at Gelukspan Hospital.

Findings: The surgery to remove the mass from the plaintiff’s chest was successful and otherwise uneventful. The court can find no negligence on the part of Dr Sithole or his team at Mafikeng Hospital from the time the plaintiff was admitted until the thoracotomy was performed. The proverbial elephant in the room is what transpired post operatively, which implicates the question of causation rather than negligence. The issue as to what transpired with the urethral catheter of the plaintiff which necessitated it being re-inserted remains unclear. The plaintiff failed to prove any causal link between the alleged negligent conduct of the medical staff at both Hospitals.

Order: The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs.

Facts and issue: The plaintiff institutes a claim for damages against the defendant arising from the alleged medical negligence of its employees at the hospital. The plaintiff after giving birth to a baby through cesarean section was given a removal of her uterus operation. The cause of the hemorrhaging that led to the emergency removal of the uterus remains unknown. The plaintiffs second claim relates to the failure to provide her with counselling after the removal of her uterus.

Discussion: There is no acceptable explanation for the missing records. The plaintiff obtained a court order requesting the record, but it was not discovered. There is no explanation for the hemorrhaging leading to the removing of the plaintiff's uterus. The defendant failed to call any witness, who had knowledge and was in the defendant's employ at the time. When the factual evidence is compared with all opinions of the experts the most plausible inference is that the injury suffered by the plaintiff was due to some mistake or negligence created by the defendant. The piecemeal records do not explain the critical treatment and care of the plaintiff. The hospital records are missing and this onus rests on the defendant to provide the answers. The defendant failed to discharge the onus by not providing the cause and there is no explanation for the hemorrhaging leading to the removing of the plaintiff's uterus or led any conclusive literature on this aspect. The probable inference is that there was no justifiable explanation other than a negligent failure to perform the caesarean section without mistake and timeously, despite the meconium discharge and a full-term rapture of membranes.

Findings: According to the defendant its justifiable cause is the plaintiff's life was saved by removing her uterus. However, this does not mitigate the mistake or error of its clinicians and staff. For these reasons an adverse inference on the assessment and management of the labour and what transpired during the caesarean procedure is made. The defendant failed to discharge its rebuttal burden of probable negligence. The plaintiff has established on a balance of probabilities, that the defendant's employees were responsible for the care and treatment of the plaintiff. They failed to exercise the degree of skill and expertise with which they could have and should have done. The plaintiff was healthy and did not have any concerning condition with her uterus prior to the performance of the cesarean section that would necessitate the removal thereof, but for the negligent conduct of the defendant.

Order: The defendant is ordered to pay 100% of the plaintiff's proven or agreed damages suffered as a result of the injury sustained by the plaintiff.

Facts and issue: The plaintiff instituted an action for damages in the sum of R28,675,443.02 in her personal and representative capacity as the biological mother and natural guardian of her minor child, C.G. The plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant vicariously liable for an alleged negligence in the management of her labour and sub-standard care by the nursing staff at Holy Cross Hospital, a government hospital. The defendant denied liability.

Discussion: As she was in the waiting room, she felt strong labour pains, and noticed that she was severely bleeding vaginally. She reported that to the nurse. However, the cause of the bleeding was not investigated. Despite her reporting it to the nurses, no action was taken nor was the doctor called to assess and examine her. Dr Ebrahim testified that contractions are stressful to a fetus; hence, the monitoring of the progress of labour is crucial, because it informs the nurses whether the fetus is coping with each contraction. In the absence of monitoring, the opportunity to identify the fetal condition and whether the fetus is in distress would be missed. Had the defendant’s nursing staff properly monitored the plaintiff during her labour, they would have identified the fetal condition timeously and would have been able to take reasonable and necessary steps in terms of the maternity guidelines to avert the outcome. But because there was neither monitoring of the fetal condition nor an examination of plaintiff, for a considerable period more than 8 hours, the nurses missed the opportunity to pick up that the fetus was in distress and to act thereon. In addition, despite numerous reports from the plaintiff that she was severely bleeding vaginally, the cause of such bleeding was not checked. Negligence has been established.

Findings: From the plaintiff’s evidence, the fetal condition was not monitored, save for that one examination upon admission, until delivery at approximately 22h00. Signs of fetal distress during that period were missed and that on the balance of probability caused the fetus to sustain the brain injury of the partial prolonged nature. The plaintiff has succeeded to prove that her child’s brain injury was on probability caused by the negligence of the defendant’s nursing staff and that such injury occurred intrapartum.

Order: The defendant shall pay 100% of the plaintiff’s agreed or proven damages in her personal and representative capacity for and on behalf of her child.

Facts and issue: The plaintiff, on behalf of her son, (C), previously instituted an action for a claim for damages against the defendant, arising from the negligent conduct of the employees of the defendant, which conduct resulted in C suffering from cerebral palsy. The issue before this court is only for quantification of the plaintiff’s damages in her personal capacity, for general damages, past and future medical and related expenses, as well as past and future loss of earnings.

Loss of income: The plaintiff never repeated a grade. She obtained her Grade 12 Senior Certificate in 2010, qualifying for the minimum requirements for admission to diploma or higher certificate studies. From 2011 to 2014, she was unable to secure employment. She consequently decided to upgrade her Grade 12 marks in 2015 to meet the minimum requirements to study for a degree qualification and improve her chances of securing employment. During this year, she became pregnant, and due to birth complications, her baby was born with Hypoxic Ischaemic Encephalopathy, which resulted in Quadriplegic Cerebral Palsy with Mental Enfeeblement, seizures, and cortical blindness. Since then, she has been mainly responsible for his caretaking and managing his therapies and interventions. He is now five years old, and she wants to find a suitable L.S.E.N. institute to proceed with further studies. However, as he is so young, she prefers that, for the present time, her mother takes care of the child.

Findings: Dr van der Ryst further indicated that based only on her matric certificate, the plaintiff was probably of low average to average intellect with the potential to complete post-school studies to an NQF5 level, possibly NQF6 level depending on opportunity and the availability of funds. Her present cognitive potential and abilities indicated that her cognitive/intellectual potential probably fell within the low average to average range. It was not expected that she would be able to cope with university studies. The actuarial calculations are based on a scenario where the plaintiff would have acquired an NQF5 level after improving her matric results and earning an income with the post-morbid delayed by six years. The court has no grounds not to agree with the plaintiff in this regard. The court is satisfied that a deduction of 20%, as contended by the plaintiff, is justified.

Order: The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff, in her personal capacity, the amount of R5,222,157. Loss of earnings: R4,786,091; Future medical expenses: R36,066; General damages: R400,000.

Facts and issue: This is a medical malpractice matter where the plaintiffs, in their capacity as parents and guardians, sued the defendant for damages suffered by their minor daughter, after having suffered a hypoxic ischemic injury to her brain due to the alleged negligence of the defendant’s employees, the nursing staff and doctors who attended to S's delivery.

Discussion: Professor Anthony's unchallenged conclusion is that in the absence of any other cause for the adverse outcome it is likely that the injury observed by the neuroradiologist developed during labour and would probably have been prevented by adherence to proper, prescribed standards of obstetric care. The plaintiffs have proven the allegation that the nurses and doctors in attendance failed to properly monitor and assess the condition of S’s mother and the unborn S and to administer appropriate medical treatment. This allegation covers the failure to continuously assess the foetal condition, the failure to timeously diagnose the conditions which rendered a caesarean section delivery necessary, the failure to administer appropriate medication, the failure to administer a tocolytic agent, the failure to carry out intrapartum resuscitation of the foetus, the delay in the delivery of S, and the failure to cool S after her birth.

Findings: Reasonable medical members of staff would have foreseen that these failures will cause injury to the foetus and child and would have taken reasonable steps to avoid the injury, by for example regularly monitoring the foetal condition, and expediting the delivery of the baby by caesarean section once foetal distress was diagnosed, considering the theatre that was immediately available. No question of a possible remoteness of damage arises, so legal causation is also established. It is the same staff members in whose trust S's mother placed herself and her unborn child who caused S's injuries.

Order: The defendant is liable to compensate the plaintiffs in their representative capacities as parents and guardians of the minor child, S, for the damages suffered.

Facts and issue: Action for damages by the plaintiff against the defendant for medical negligence during the performance of a hip replacement surgery by the agents and or personnel of the defendant. The defendant was found to be liable to pay 100% of the plaintiff’s agreed or proven damages. The outstanding issue is quantum in relation to loss of income and general damages.

Discussion: The plaintiff went for a hip surgery during which the femoral stem of the prosthesis was inserted far too deep into the femoral shaft. No corrective surgery was done immediately. It is common cause to both parties that there was a further subsidence after the surgery which resulted in the progressive leg shortening and the plaintiff having to receive a built-up shoe. A revision surgery was performed on the plaintiff, but the parties agree that it did not cure the period of two years in which the plaintiff suffered pain form the progressive shortening of the leg. The plaintiff still has a leg length discrepancy of 1cm after the revision surgery. Relevant for the determination of quantum the plaintiff's experts opine that the plaintiff will require a second revision hip replacement, which has been accelerated by the failed primary hip replacement. The experts agree that the plaintiff presented with a major depressive disorder related to the incident. The experts furthermore agreed that the plaintiff's recreational and interpersonal functioning has been negatively affected by the incident related sequelae. The plaintiff has been rendered psychologically more vulnerable. The experts further agreed that the plaintiff's occupational functioning has been negatively influenced by the failed surgeries and the sequelae.

Findings: In respect of loss of earning the parties agreed with the actuarial calculations and the contingency deduction of 10% on past loss was warranted. Having considered the reports of the experts the court agrees that the amount of R1,438,384 is appropriate for loss of earnings. The amount of R203,591 was agreed as median applied between the approaches of the expert orthopaedic surgeons. On the joint minute of the psychiatrists an amount of R19,619 constitutes a fair and reasonable compensation for psychiatric expenses and R28,890 for clinical psychologist expenses. For the biokineticists an amount of R19,334 is reasonable. Having considered the joint minute by the occupational therapists the parties agreed that an amount of R755,260 constitutes fair and reasonable compensation for this future expense. Having regard to the condition of the plaintiff both parties agreed that the fair and reasonable amount for compensation for general damages is R400,000.

Order: The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount R2,865,078 in full and final payment of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant.

Facts and issue: The matter has its roots in a medical negligence claim. The court granted an order by agreement in terms of which the defendant was found liable to pay the plaintiff damages. The parties came before court with a draft order which they said it is taken by consent. Both parties indicated that they sought audience on an issue relating to the manner or method of payment of costs of carers or caregiving. The defendant expressly indicated that they have no issue with the duty to pay costs of carers or care giving, but they must be paid on instalments or on staggered payments.

Discussion: The plaintiff argued that there is no basis for the order sought by the defendant. Once the liability is acceded to, all the damages must be paid. The argument was developed to say payment in instalments is an option only if the public healthcare defence is not excluded. In this case, the public healthcare defence is excluded, so the argument went, therefore there is no basis for the payment in instalments or staggered payments. The defendant did not make submissions to counter-veil the plaintiff’s submissions. The empowering provision, section 3 of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011, requires that the payment of money in terms of a final court order must be made within thirty days of the order becoming final. The provision does not open a room for staggered payment or payment in instalments. Peremptory provision requires exact compliance for it to have the stipulated legal consequences and any purported compliance falling short of that is a nullity. Non-compliance with peremptory provision results in a nullity.

Findings: The provision requires that the defendant must pay all money owing within the prescribed time. It is known that no agreement was reached as contemplated in the empowering provisions between the parties to pay otherwise than in terms of section 3(3)(a)(i) of the State Liability Amendment Act. The defendants seek an order in terms of which the amounts granted in the court order handed up and granted by consent be paid in four equal instalments. The default position is that the amount granted is payable within 30 days of granting of the order. There is no justification for payment in instalments or staggered payments.

Order: The defendant shall pay the plaintiff the amount of R8,660,582 in respect of the minor child’s claim and special damages for caregivers. The amounts shall be paid within 30 days of the date of this order together with interest thereon.