Facts: Arnott Panels (Pty) Limited (Arnott) and Matucci Farms Limited (Matucci) concluded a written agreement in 2018 for the supply and installation of agricultural equipment for poultry production at a contract price of USD 279,160, payable on order, with performance due within six to eight weeks of payment. Matucci paid the full amount in August 2018. Shortly thereafter, on the instruction of Matucci’s agent, Arnott was told to stop work pending further instructions. No meaningful communication occurred for approximately five years. In late 2023 the parties resumed engagement and met in December 2023, but their versions of what transpired differed. Further engagement in early 2024 revealed that revised drawings materially altered the scope of works. Correspondence between attorneys did not resolve the dispute, and no work was performed, nor invoices rendered by Arnott.

Appeal: Arnott appealed against the order directing it to repay the capital amount with interest from July 2024, contending that the court a quo erred in rejecting a tacit term permitting revision of price in the event of delay and in concluding that the agreement was no longer extant. Arnott maintained it was willing to perform, subject to increased costs necessitated by the passage of time and changed conditions. Matucci opposed the appeal, arguing that no such tacit term existed, that the contract could not be performed in its original form, and that Arnott was unjustly enriched. In a cross-appeal, Matucci sought costs and earlier interest, contending it was fully successful and entitled to interest from August 2018.

Discussion: The main issue concerned whether a tacit term allowing price adjustment could be imported into the agreement. The applicable test, as articulated in Consol Ltd t/a Consol Glass v Twee Jonge Gazellen (Pty) Ltd, requires that the term be so obvious that both parties would have assented without hesitation if asked at the time of contracting. The alleged term was neither clear nor obvious, particularly given the short contemplated performance period of six to eight weeks. The correspondence in 2024 further demonstrated uncertainty as to how such a term would operate, especially in the absence of agreement on a revised price. Arnott’s stance effectively required a new agreement rather than enforcement of the original terms. The doctrine of supervening impossibility was then considered. While mere commercial hardship does not constitute impossibility, the facts demonstrated that the nature and scope of the work had changed fundamentally, and the parties were unable to agree on essential terms. The authorities confirm that objective impossibility, arising without fault and rendering performance in accordance with the original agreement impossible, terminates the contract.

Findings: The contention that a tacit term existed permitting unilateral or negotiated price revision was rejected, as such a term did not satisfy the bystander test and created uncertainty as to its content and application. The agreement, originally intended for prompt execution, could not be revived after five years with materially altered specifications. By February 2024 the parties had reached an impasse, with Arnott unwilling to perform at the original price and Matucci insisting on either performance or repayment. The cumulative effect of the delay, changed specifications, and inability to agree on revised terms rendered performance objectively impossible in the sense required by law. The contract thus terminated by operation of law, and the principle of restitution required restoration of the benefits received. Arnott was therefore obliged to repay the capital amount. As to the cross-appeal, the court a quo exercised its discretion on costs and interest judicially, taking into account the conduct of both parties, and no basis existed for appellate interference.

Order: The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of counsel. The cross-appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of counsel. The order of the court a quo is confirmed.

Facts: The Ad Hoc Central Authority for the Republic of South Africa and the father sought the return of a minor child, H, to Australia under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The child was born in Australia in 2021 to parents who had been in a relationship since 2018 and later separated in 2023. The mother travelled to South Africa with H in January 2025 with the father’s consent for a three-month period ending in April 2025 but failed to return. It was common cause that H’s retention in South Africa thereafter was wrongful, in breach of the father’s custody rights, and that Australia was the child’s habitual residence. The mother opposed the return on two grounds, namely that the father consented ex post facto to the retention and alternatively that a return would expose H to a grave risk of psychological harm due to her mental health issues.

Application: The proceedings were brought in terms of Article 12 of the Hague Convention, requiring the prompt return of a child wrongfully retained. The father sought H’s return to Australia, together with ancillary relief to facilitate that return. The mother raised a defence under Article 13(a), alleging that the father subsequently consented or acquiesced in the child remaining in South Africa, and alternatively under Article 13(b), alleging that returning H would expose him to grave psychological harm or place him in an intolerable situation due to her anxiety and depression. The father denied both defences and contended that no unequivocal consent was given and that adequate safeguards existed to protect the child.

Discussion: The court adopted the approach to evidence mandated by Koch v Koch, rejecting the traditional Plascon-Evans rule in Convention matters and emphasising an evaluative, fact-driven inquiry consistent with the Convention’s objectives of expedition. Considerable correspondence and recorded conversations were analysed to determine whether consent or acquiescence had been established. The legal principles governing Article 13(a) require clear, real, and unequivocal consent. The court also considered Article 13(b), noting the high threshold for establishing a grave risk, requiring more than ordinary emotional or logistical difficulty. Expert evidence from a psychiatrist indicated that the mother’s mental health could deteriorate if she returned to Australia permanently, but did not demonstrate that a temporary return would render her non-functional or expose H to intolerable risk. The court further considered safeguards, including financial, psychological and logistical undertakings by the father to mitigate any potential harm. The distinction between short-term Convention inquiries and long-term custody determinations was central, with the latter reserved for the courts of the habitual residence.

Findings: The mother failed to establish ex post facto consent or acquiescence. The father’s communications, viewed objectively, were conditional, provisional and consistently emphasised the requirement that H return to Australia. There was no clear, unequivocal agreement permitting permanent retention. The court further found that the Article 13(b) defence was not established, as the evidence did not demonstrate a grave risk of harm to H upon return. While the mother’s mental health concerns were acknowledged, they did not meet the elevated threshold required, particularly in light of the available support systems and the undertakings provided by the father. The evidence showed that the mother had previously managed to function and parent effectively in Australia, and that safeguards could sufficiently ameliorate any short-term risks.

Order: The minor child must be returned to Australia; the father is authorised to remove and accompany him; implementation is delayed until 13 July 2026; detailed conditions regulate travel, accommodation, maintenance, mental health support, and proceedings in Australia; the Central Authority must coordinate enforcement; no order as to costs.

Facts: Maganathan Padayachee and Others (the appellants) were defendants in an action brought by Sunwest International (Pty) Ltd (Sunwest). Sunwest alleged that the appellants exploited a malfunction in a slot machine at the GrandWest Casino, accumulating credits of approximately R6,2 million and withdrawing part thereof. Sunwest claimed repayment, relying on its terms and conditions of play. The appellants admitted being present at the casino and gambling, but denied the binding effect of the terms. They instituted a counterclaim based on an alleged tacit agreement with Sunwest, pleading that they were entitled to gamble using casino cards and withdraw accumulated credits on demand. Sunwest excepted to the counterclaim on two grounds: that the appellants failed to identify the person representing Sunwest and failed to plead the conduct from which the tacit agreement could be inferred.

Appeal: The appellants appealed against the High Court’s order upholding the exception to their counterclaim. They contended that the court below erred by considering matters beyond the counterclaim, including Sunwest’s particulars of claim, and by applying an incorrect test requiring proof of a tacit agreement at the pleading stage. They argued that only the counterclaim should have been scrutinised, that its allegations must be accepted as true, and that they were not required to plead evidentiary material. Sunwest maintained that the counterclaim disclosed no cause of action because it failed to allege the necessary facts establishing a tacit contract and was vague and embarrassing.

Discussion: The principles governing exceptions require the court to accept the facts pleaded as true but not conclusions of law or unsupported inferences. The excipient must show that, on every reasonable interpretation, the pleading discloses no cause of action. In relation to tacit contracts, the law requires that the agreement be inferred from the conduct of the parties, which must be pleaded in its essential form, including who acted and what was done. Reference was made to Butters v Mncora and Buffalo City v Nurcha Development Finance, which resolve the apparent tension between tests for tacit contracts by confirming that conduct must support an inference of consensus on a balance of probabilities. Rule 18(6) requires a party relying on a contract to plead when, where and by whom it was made. The distinction between facta probanda and facta probantia remains central, but the identity of the actors and the conduct relied upon form part of the former in a tacit contract. The court may read pleadings as a whole, including admissions in other pleadings, to assess consistency and clarity.

Findings: The counterclaim was deficient in two fundamental respects. First, the appellants failed to identify the natural person through whom Sunwest allegedly contracted, instead pleading that the agreement was concluded through “a duly authorised representative”, which amounted to a bare conclusion. Secondly, they failed to plead any conduct from which the tacit agreement could be inferred, proceeding directly from the assertion that a tacit agreement existed to a statement of its terms. This rendered the pleading vague and embarrassing, depriving Sunwest of a fair opportunity to respond. The appellants’ admissions regarding their membership and gambling activities further created tension with the alleged unfettered right to withdraw credits. The court below did not require proof but correctly held that the necessary allegations had not been furnished. The deficiencies went to the root of the cause of action and were properly raised by exception.

Order: The appeal is dismissed. The appellants are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on scale C, including the costs of two counsel.

Facts: Junaid Beckles (Beckles) instituted proceedings against SB Guarantee Company (RF) Pty Ltd (SB Guarantee) seeking to suspend a court order granted in May 2022 and to set aside a warrant of execution against his mortgaged property. The order arose after Beckles defaulted on two loans advanced by Standard Bank, which were secured through indemnity agreements and mortgage bonds in favour of SB Guarantee. Upon default, Standard Bank called on SB Guarantee’s guarantees, which in turn enforced its indemnities against Beckles, obtaining summary judgment and an order declaring the property specially executable. Beckles did not oppose the summary judgment proceedings and later attempted, on two separate occasions, to suspend the order. On both occasions he withdrew his applications shortly before the hearing, including the present matter, without filing necessary affidavits or heads of argument.

Application: Beckles sought suspension of the execution order and setting aside of the warrant under Rule 45A, relying on alleged frustration of settlement efforts, constitutional housing rights, and reckless lending under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA). SB Guarantee opposed the application, contending that Beckles failed to make out a case for suspension or rescission, had delayed unreasonably, and was raising defences that should have been advanced earlier. At the hearing, SB Guarantee refused to accept Beckles’ withdrawal of the application and relied on Rule 41(1)(a) to request dismissal of the application with costs, given the repeated last-minute withdrawals and resulting prejudice.

Discussion: The court considered the principles governing withdrawal under Rule 41(1)(a), emphasising that once a matter has been set down, withdrawal requires consent or the court’s leave, and the court retains a discretion to prevent injustice. The arguments advanced by Beckles were scrutinised on a prima facie basis, noting that Rule 45A permits suspension only where real and substantial injustice would otherwise result. The contentions regarding reckless lending and constitutional rights were found to be misplaced, particularly as the indemnity agreements relied upon by SB Guarantee do not fall within the ambit of the NCA, unlike the underlying credit agreements with Standard Bank. The court further considered the broader structure of the financial arrangement, distinguishing between accessory suretyships and independent guarantees, and raised concerns regarding the potential circumvention of NCA protections through indemnity structures, although no determination was made on that issue.

Findings: The court was not persuaded that Beckles had established any basis for the relief sought. His repeated conduct in withdrawing applications at the eleventh hour, failing to prosecute his case, and not giving effect to cost tenders demonstrated a pattern of delay and abuse of process. The grounds relied upon were either irrelevant or should have been raised in earlier proceedings. Allowing withdrawal in these circumstances would cause prejudice to SB Guarantee, which had incurred unnecessary costs in preparing for hearings that did not proceed. The court exercised its discretion against permitting withdrawal, concluding that dismissal was warranted. The requirements for suspension under Rule 45A were not satisfied, and no basis existed to revisit the execution order or warrant.

Order: The applicant’s application is dismissed with costs awarded to SB Guarantee Company on an attorney and client scale, to be taxed on Scale B.

Facts: The applicant, Susanna Maria Jansen, approached the High Court on an urgent basis following the issue of a subpoena duces tecum by Garth John Greeff, directed at ABSA Bank Ltd, requiring disclosure of extensive banking records of Susanna Maria Stationers CC over a 15-year period. The parties had previously been engaged in a protracted membership dispute concerning the close corporation, which had culminated in a court order by agreement in 2025 regulating, inter alia, access to financial information and the valuation process of members’ interests. The subpoena was issued in April 2026 and served on the bank in May 2026, prompting the applicant to launch urgent proceedings to prevent disclosure of confidential financial information pending a substantive application (Part B) to set aside the subpoena.

Application: The applicant sought interim relief in the form of an interdict restraining the bank from complying with the subpoena pending the determination of Part B, where the applicant sought to have the subpoena set aside. The first respondent opposed the application solely on a point of law, contending that the relief sought was incompetent as one cannot interdict compliance with lawful court process, and that the correct procedure was to seek a stay or to set aside the subpoena. Reliance was placed on Greeff v Cooper and others, which was said to establish that interim interdictory relief against compliance with a subpoena is impermissible. The applicant contended that the relief sought was a permissible interim measure to preserve confidentiality pending determination of the validity of the subpoena, particularly in light of an existing court order restricting access to financial information.

Discussion: The main issue concerned whether interim interdictory relief restraining compliance with a subpoena is competent. The first respondent argued that a subpoena constitutes lawful process and must be complied with unless set aside, and that interdicting compliance circumvents proper procedure. The applicant distinguished Greeff v Cooper, emphasising that the judgment concerned the limited jurisdiction of magistrates’ courts and did not create a blanket prohibition against interim interdicts in the High Court. The present application, unlike in Greeff, was brought in a court with inherent jurisdiction to set aside the subpoena and was coupled with a pending substantive challenge. The applicant further relied on the 2025 court order, which expressly prohibited the first respondent from accessing financial information after being released from suretyship obligations, contending that the subpoena sought to circumvent this order. It was further argued that disclosure would result in irreversible loss of confidentiality and render the final relief nugatory.

Findings: The applicant established the requirements for an interim interdict. A prima facie right arose from the existing court order and the right to protection against abuse of court processes. The argument that the subpoena was lawful did not negate this right, as compliance could be excused by a court order. There was a reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm, given that disclosure of confidential financial information would be irreversible and potentially prejudicial. The balance of convenience favoured the applicant, as maintaining the status quo would not prejudice the first respondent, who failed to demonstrate any harm. No adequate alternative remedy existed, as the setting aside application would be rendered moot if disclosure occurred in the interim. The reliance on Greeff v Cooper was misplaced, as the defect in that case related to jurisdiction and the nature of the relief sought, not the availability of interim interdicts in appropriate circumstances. The subpoena appeared to undermine the existing court order and lacked a proper forensic basis.

Order: Condonation for urgency was granted. Pending Part B, ABSA Bank Ltd was interdicted from disclosing any documents pursuant to the subpoena. The interim interdict was to remain in force until the final determination of the setting aside application. Directions were issued for further affidavits, Part B was postponed to October 2026, and the first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of Part A, including counsel’s fees on Scale B.

Facts: Valiswa Gadini (Ms Gadini) and Thandikhaya Shweni (Mr Shweni) instituted separate actions against the Minister of Police arising from injuries sustained when they were shot with rubber bullets during a service delivery protest on 30 July 2012 in Sweet Home Farm, Philippi. Ms Gadini alleged that she was shot in the thigh while returning from a taxi rank, and Mr Shweni that he was shot in the eye while seated outside his home, losing his eye. The police were deployed to control a protest that became violent, with evidence showing the use of stun grenades, tear gas, and rubber bullets. The Defendant disputed liability but relied on justifications of self-defence, necessity, and voluntary assumption of risk, contending that the Plaintiffs were part of or exposed themselves to a violent protest.

Claim: The Plaintiffs sought damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by wrongful police action. The matters proceeded only on the merits. The Defendant admitted that police had fired rubber bullets to disperse a violent crowd but denied liability, asserting that the force used was justified in the circumstances. It contended that police acted lawfully in dispersing a crowd that posed a threat, and that the Plaintiffs either participated in or knowingly remained in proximity to a dangerous protest, thereby consenting to the risk of harm. The Defendant therefore bore the onus to prove that the use of force was lawful and justified.

Discussion: The Defendant relied primarily on video evidence and testimony of police officials to demonstrate that the protest was violent and required dispersal. However, the video footage was incomplete and did not capture all instances of shooting recorded in official reports. The legal enquiry turned on whether the discharge of rubber bullets was justified under recognised defences of self-defence, necessity, or voluntary assumption of risk. The Plaintiffs’ versions placed them within the residential area when shot, not as active threats. Crucially, the Defendant failed to call the specific officers who fired the shots, leaving only general evidence about police protocols. Evidence established that shots were often fired after crowds were already retreating, and that police had protective options such as remaining within armoured vehicles. The applicable principles required proof that force was necessary, proportionate, and directed at averting imminent harm, which depended on factual justification specific to each incident.

Findings: The Plaintiffs proved that they were shot by police, shifting the onus to the Defendant to justify the conduct. That onus was not discharged. The evidence, including the video, showed police entering residential areas and discharging rubber bullets even where threats had subsided or were absent. The Defendant failed to establish self-defence, as there was no evidence of imminent danger requiring shooting; necessity, as less harmful means were available and the force used was not shown to be required; or voluntary assumption of risk, particularly in respect of Mr Shweni who was at home and posed no threat. Even if Ms Gadini joined the crowd, that did not justify indiscriminate shooting. The absence of direct testimony from the officers who fired the shots was decisive. The police conduct was therefore unlawful, and the Minister was vicariously liable.

Order: The Defendant is liable for 100% of each Plaintiff’s proven or agreed damages. The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiffs’ costs, including the costs of counsel taxed on Scale C.

Facts: Cape Point Wine (Pty) Ltd (WineCo) and CPW Properties (Pty) Ltd (CPW Properties) sought urgent interim relief against Sybrand van der Spuy (van der Spuy) and Serina Investments (Pty) Ltd (Serina). The parties are engaged in a complex and acrimonious commercial relationship involving the sale of a wine business and immovable property at the Cape Point Vineyards Estate. WineCo occupies a portion of a cellar complex owned by Serina pending transfer under agreements not yet fully implemented. Numerous disputes have arisen, including arbitration and litigation. The immediate cause of the application was an incident on 8 April 2026, where van der Spuy entered WineCo’s offices and discharged a pepper spray gun after allegedly threatening employees and instructing an employee to “shoot them”. WineCo alleged repeated interference and sought to interdict van der Spuy from accessing the premises and threatening its personnel.

Application: The application was brought in terms of Uniform Rule 6(12) for urgent interim interdictory relief. The applicants sought an order restraining van der Spuy from entering specified portions of the cellar complex and from threatening employees, pending arbitration or transfer of the property. They alleged a prima facie right to undisturbed occupation and bodily integrity of employees, a well‑grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, absence of alternative remedies, and urgency arising from the April incident and prior conduct. The respondents opposed urgency, arguing that the application was delayed by approximately two weeks, that the rights claimed were disputed, that ownership remained with Serina, and that the alleged threats did not justify urgent intervention. They contended that urgency was self-created and that the relief would unjustifiably grant exclusive use of the premises.

Discussion: The matter turned on urgency under Rule 6(12), which requires explicit facts demonstrating urgency and reasons why substantial redress cannot be obtained in due course. The court examined the delay between the incident and the launching of the application (approximately twelve court days), the explanation for that delay, and whether it was cogent. It considered authority such as East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd that emphasises the central enquiry as whether substantial redress is unavailable in the ordinary course. While delay alone is not fatal, the applicant must provide a convincing explanation and demonstrate inability to obtain adequate relief later. The applicants relied on preparation of affidavits, lodging criminal complaints, and counsel availability, but the court found the explanation unpersuasive. Importantly, the founding affidavit failed to set out substantive reasons explaining why substantial redress would not be available if the matter was heard in due course, merely asserting that the matter would only be heard in 2027.

Findings: The applicants failed to meet the peremptory requirements of Rule 6(12)(b). The delay in launching the application was not satisfactorily explained, and the explanation was not cogent. Crucially, the applicants did not establish why substantial redress would not be available at a later hearing. The mere allegation that the matter would be heard in 2027 did not satisfy the requirement to provide reasons demonstrating absence of substantial redress. The court emphasised that the urgency enquiry is distinct from the merits of the interim interdict, and deficiencies in urgency cannot be cured by strong merits. The applicants’ failure to comply with Rule 6(12) meant that the matter could not be entertained as urgent. Accordingly, the court did not determine the substantive dispute between the parties.

Order: The application is struck from the roll with costs, including the costs of two counsel where so employed (Scale C).

Facts: The plaintiff, Abu Munshi, instituted an action against the trustees of the Johnson Family Trust for repayment of R3 million allegedly paid pursuant to a share sale agreement concluded in September 2009 and cancelled by November 2009. The defendants raised prescription, contending that the plaintiff’s restitution claim became due by November 2010 and had prescribed before summons was issued in December 2013. In replication, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants wilfully prevented him from becoming aware of the debt as contemplated in section 12(2) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. The pleadings contained a disputed reference to a 2008 email allegedly constituting a misrepresentation about transfer of shares. The litigation was protracted, with the plaintiff later seeking to amend the replication and the defendants opposing the amendment and applying for security for costs on grounds of vexatious litigation.

Application: The plaintiff applied for leave to amend his replication in terms of rule 28(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court, seeking to remove the incorrect reliance on the 2008 email and replace it with more general allegations that the defendants led him to believe that the shares had been or would be transferred. The defendants opposed the amendment on the grounds that it was mala fide and constituted an abuse of process, arguing that the plaintiff had changed his case and attempted to avoid a prior objection to an earlier amendment. In turn, the defendants sought an order that the plaintiff furnish security for costs, alleging that the proceedings had become vexatious due to delay, prejudice, and the manner in which the plaintiff conducted the litigation.

Discussion: The court considered the well-established principles governing amendments, noting that amendments are to be allowed unless mala fide or causing irreparable prejudice. The defendants relied on authority indicating that substantial changes to a pleaded case must be explained, and that abusive litigation practices justify refusal. The plaintiff contended that the amendment merely corrected an obvious error and did not alter the substance of the case concerning wilful prevention under section 12(2) of the Prescription Act. The court further addressed the procedural issue of whether a fresh notice of amendment may be served after an earlier one was not pursued, finding that the notices were materially different. Regarding security for costs, the court examined jurisprudence including Boost Sports Africa (Pty) Ltd v South African Breweries Ltd and Fitchet v Fitchet, and considered whether an incola plaintiff must be shown to be unable to satisfy an adverse costs order. Policy considerations concerning access to courts and balancing competing rights were also analysed.

Findings: The plaintiff’s amendment was bona fide. The reference to the 2008 email was clearly erroneous and its removal vindicated the defendants’ rejoinder rather than prejudicing them. The proposed amendment did not amount to a substantive change of case but introduced general allegations consistent with existing pleadings. The defendants’ reliance on abuse of process failed, as the second notice of amendment differed materially from the first and did not circumvent procedural requirements. No injustice to the defendants was demonstrated, and any prejudice could be cured by costs. On the issue of security for costs, the court held that evidence of an incola plaintiff’s inability to satisfy a costs order is generally required. The defendants failed to show such inability or to establish exceptional circumstances justifying security. The allegation of vexatiousness was not proven, particularly given the defendants’ own inactivity in advancing the matter to trial. The plaintiff’s delay and conduct did not meet the high threshold required to justify security.

Order: The plaintiff’s application for leave to amend dated 11 December 2025 is granted, with the plaintiff to pay the costs of that application on Scale C. The defendants’ application for security for costs is refused. The defendants are ordered to pay the costs of their application for security for costs, including counsel’s fees on Scale C.

Facts: Sonwabile Tshitshi (the appellant) was convicted in the Regional Court of rape and appeals against conviction only. The complainant, a colleague of the appellant, testified that while on night duty he forced her to drink alcohol at knifepoint, undressed her and raped her without consent. She escaped naked and immediately reported the incident. The State led her evidence as a single witness, supported by Warrant Officer Botha, Sergeant Goya and Dr Lamprecht. The medical evidence recorded minor injuries and explained that the absence of genital injuries or DNA does not exclude penetration. The appellant testified in his defence, denying the rape and claiming the complainant was intoxicated and left on her own while he passed out.

Appeal: The appellant challenges the conviction on several grounds. He contends that the trial court erred in relying on medical evidence despite the absence of DNA, in accepting the complainant’s credibility despite contradictions, and in not properly applying the cautionary rule applicable to a single witness. He further argues that discrepancies between the complainant’s testimony and her prior statements, as well as the absence of significant injuries, render her version unreliable. The State opposes the appeal, submitting that the trial court correctly evaluated the evidence holistically and that the complainant’s testimony was credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies.

Discussion: The enquiry is whether the State proved the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, considering the totality of the evidence. The correct approach requires weighing all evidence and assessing probabilities rather than focusing on isolated discrepancies. The complainant’s evidence must be assessed together with that of other witnesses and the appellant’s version. The medical expert evidence, although not demonstrating genital injury or DNA, does not exclude rape and provided a plausible explanation for the absence of such evidence. The court considered the discrepancies in the complainant’s versions, noting her intoxicated state, trauma, lapse of time, and language barriers, and found these inconsistencies not material. The legal principles applicable to single-witness testimony under section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 were applied, requiring caution but not disqualifying reliable evidence. Established authority confirms that DNA evidence is not a prerequisite for conviction and that contradictions are not fatal unless they affect the core of the case.

Findings: The trial court’s credibility findings deserve deference in the absence of material misdirection. The complainant’s evidence was found credible, logical and corroborated in material respects by surrounding evidence, including medical findings and her conduct after the incident. The discrepancies raised were minor and did not undermine the essence of her account. The appellant’s version was rejected as not reasonably possibly true, being implausible and lacking any credible explanation, particularly in light of his own concessions and the circumstances of the complainant’s escape. The absence of DNA or serious injuries does not negate rape. The complainant’s evidence satisfied the requirements of a single witness and, viewed holistically, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Order: The appeal against conviction is dismissed.

Facts: Percival Pretorius (the appellant) was employed as a long-distance truck driver and sustained three work-related back injuries in 2010, 2012 and 2014, each requiring surgical intervention. He lodged compensation claims under the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA), but received feedback only in 2025 when his permanent disablement was assessed at 21% and a lump sum awarded. The appellant objected, asserting that his injuries rendered him unable to continue his occupation and severely impaired his functioning. His uncontested evidence before the tribunal was that he suffered constant pain, numbness in his left leg, loss of balance, and could only perform limited casual work out of necessity. Medical evidence from an orthopaedic surgeon confirmed severe spinal degeneration, functional incapacity, and an inability to return to his previous employment.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the tribunal’s decision confirming the Compensation Commissioner’s assessment of 21% permanent disablement. The appellant contended that the unchallenged evidence established that he was 100% permanently disabled, at least in relation to his employment as a truck driver. He further argued that the tribunal erred in relying mechanically on the American Medical Association Guides and internal Circular Instruction 157, and that the award failed to account for his functional incapacity and the loss of sensation in his leg. The respondents maintained that the assessment was correct and that the appellant remained capable of performing other forms of work.

Discussion: The dispute centred on the proper interpretation of “permanent disablement” under COIDA and the meaning of “any work” in that definition. The appellant argued for a contextual interpretation linked to his pre-injury employment, while the respondents contended for a broader interpretation based on general employability. The court considered constitutional principles, including the right to social security under section 27 and the interpretive injunction in section 39(2) of the Constitution, together with authority emphasising that COIDA must be interpreted purposively and in favour of employees. It examined the tribunal’s approach, noting that it failed to engage with uncontested evidence and improperly relied on rigid guidelines such as the AMA Guides and Circular 157, which do not account for functional incapacity. The tribunal also failed in its inquisitorial duty to call for further evidence where it deemed the record insufficient.

Findings: The tribunal materially erred in several respects. The unchallenged factual and expert evidence established that the appellant was functionally incapable of performing his previous employment and was severely compromised in the labour market. The failure to award a disability percentage for loss of sensation, despite uncontested evidence, was irrational and contrary to principle. The court held that “any work” must be interpreted in a manner consistent with COIDA’s social purpose and the Constitution, meaning that disablement must be assessed in relation to the employee’s pre-injury occupation and earning capacity. The tribunal’s reliance on the AMA Guides and Circular 157 was impermissibly mechanical and inconsistent with the requirement to assess each case on its own medical evidence. Even on a broader interpretation, the finding that the appellant could undertake other work was unsupported by the evidence.

Order: The appeal is upheld. The tribunal’s decision is set aside, and it is declared that Percival Pretorius is 100% permanently disabled. The respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and the tribunal proceedings on an attorney-client scale, including the costs of two counsel where so employed.

Facts: The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (Tshwane) held an electricity distribution licence granted by the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Nersa), covering, inter alia, Farm Rietfontein 375‑JR, the site of the Mooikloof Mega City Development. Eskom Holdings SOC Limited (Eskom) historically supplied legacy customers on the Farm, while the undeveloped balance fell within Tshwane’s licensed area. In 2021 Eskom applied to Nersa to amend its licence to include the Mooikloof development. Tshwane only became aware of the application in 2022 but participated in the public consultation process, asserting its constitutional and statutory mandate over electricity reticulation within its jurisdiction. Despite concerns, including that the area remained part of Tshwane’s licence, Nersa approved Eskom’s licence amendment on 10 February 2023 without amending Tshwane’s licence.

Application: Tshwane brought a review application under section 10(3) of the National Energy Regulator Act 40 of 2004, read with section 31 of the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006 and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, seeking declaratory relief and the setting aside of Nersa’s decision. Tshwane contended that the Mooikloof development fell within its licensed area and that Nersa’s decision unlawfully granted Eskom overlapping rights without following the required statutory processes. Nersa and Eskom opposed the application, maintaining that the amendment was lawful, that the area could be treated as a “greenfield” development, and that electricity supply is not exclusively a municipal competence.

Discussion: The Court examined the constitutional and statutory framework governing electricity distribution, emphasising section 156(1)(a) of the Constitution, which confers executive authority over electricity reticulation on municipalities, and the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006, which regulates licensing. It analysed the distinction between licensed areas and licensable (greenfield) areas under Nersa’s rules, holding that once an area is licensed it cannot be treated as unlicensed unless amended or revoked. The Court noted that any expansion of Eskom’s licensed area required a corresponding amendment to Tshwane’s licence under section 16 or revocation under section 17 of the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006. It rejected the “greenfield” argument, as the Farm had already been included in Tshwane’s licence since 2011. Authorities such as Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal were relied upon to affirm the legality and constitutional framework for reviewing administrative action.

Findings: The Court found that Nersa acted unlawfully in approving Eskom’s licence amendment without first addressing the continued inclusion of the same area in Tshwane’s licence. This created an impermissible overlap and was not authorised by the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006. The failure to consider Tshwane’s constitutional authority and to amend or revoke its licence rendered the decision procedurally and substantively defective under section 6(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. The decision was based on an incorrect factual premise and ignored material considerations. The Court rejected other review grounds, including procedural unfairness and delay, but held that the core illegality was sufficient to invalidate the decision. It further held that municipalities retain primary authority over electricity reticulation within their jurisdiction and that Nersa failed to give effect to this constitutional position.

Order: It is declared that the Mooikloof Mega City, insofar as it is located upon Farm Rietfontein 375‑JR, forms part of Tshwane’s licensed area; Nersa’s decision of 10 February 2023 is declared unlawful, invalid, and reviewed and set aside; and Nersa and Eskom are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the costs of the application, including two counsel on Scale C.

Facts: Realkit Investments (Pty) Ltd (Realkit) purchased, in terms of a consent order granted on 23 November 2017, the fixed improvements on the Ganyesa Taxi Rank and the exclusive right of use of the premises from the Kagisano-Molopo Local Municipality (the Municipality) for R500,000. The premises are situated on communal land administered by the Barolong Boo Tlou Le Tau Traditional Council (the Traditional Council). The Taxi Association had occupied and operated the rank since 2002 under a resolution permitting such occupation. Notwithstanding payment of the purchase price and completion of a retail development by Realkit, the Municipality failed for over eight years to deliver vacant possession, allowing the Taxi Association and others to remain in occupation. In October 2022, the Municipality, under section 139 administration, agreed to pay R30,000 per month for its ongoing breach but honoured this only for three months. By July 2025, arrears of R930,000 had accrued.

Application: Realkit sought enforcement of the consent order, eviction of the Kagisano Taxi Association and other occupants, and payment of accumulated and continuing compensation. The Municipality opposed the application and brought a counter-application for rescission of the consent order on the basis of alleged absence of the Traditional Council, justus error, and illegality grounded in nemo plus iuris, accessio, and statutory non-compliance. The Taxi Association opposed eviction, relying on its longstanding occupation under the 2002 resolution, contending that it was not bound by the consent order, and invoking public interest considerations and the need for an alternative taxi rank facility. The issues concerned rescission, the scope of the consent order, the lawfulness of the Taxi Association’s occupation, and the Municipality’s liability for compensation.

Discussion: A consent order, as a compromise, may be rescinded only on limited grounds such as fraud or justus error, and Rule 42(1)(a) is confined to orders granted in the absence of a party. The evidence demonstrated that the Traditional Council was present and represented during the original proceedings and had not challenged the order. The Municipality’s alleged error was unilateral and related to the merits of the compromise, which parties assume when settling disputes. Its subsequent conduct, including partial compliance and reliance on the order, was inconsistent with a genuine belief in its invalidity. The consent order did not transfer dominium but conferred a contractual right of use and ownership of improvements, which the Municipality was competent to sell. The language of the order, properly construed, extended to the entire taxi rank premises, not merely the B1–B4 footprint. The Taxi Association’s occupation derived from a purpose-specific licence dependent on infrastructure arrangements which were fundamentally altered by the consent order, and the continued occupation, in the face of a court-sanctioned exclusive right, lacked a legally cognisable basis. Considerations under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 were inapplicable, the occupation being commercial and non-residential.

Findings: The grounds for rescission are unsustainable. The Traditional Council was neither absent nor bypassed, and the Municipality cannot invoke Rule 42(1)(a) to escape its own consent. The alleged justus error does not vitiate the consent, as it was neither induced nor fundamental to consent itself. The consent order validly conferred a contractual right of exclusive use and ownership of improvements. The Municipality is estopped from repudiating the transaction after accepting the purchase price. The obligation to deliver vacant possession is necessarily implied in the sale of an exclusive right of use. The Taxi Association’s 2002 resolution constituted a purpose-specific licence that fell away with the alteration of the underlying infrastructure arrangement, and even if construed as a PTO-type right, it was overtaken by proceedings in which the Traditional Council participated. The Municipality, through its section 139 administrator, validly agreed to compensation, and in the absence of evidence limiting that authority, remains bound by the agreement. Realkit is entitled to enforcement, eviction, and compensation.

Order: Condonation granted; Municipality’s rescission counter-application dismissed; consent order declared enforceable; Taxi Association ordered to vacate within 60 days subject to a structured eviction process and municipal reporting; compensation of R930,000 awarded with continuing monthly liability of R30,000 until vacant possession; costs awarded against the Taxi Association and Municipality on respective issues.

Facts: Newcastle Industrial Launders CC (Newcastle Industrial Launders), Faizel Cassim (Cassim), RF Screen Printers (Pty) Ltd (RF Screen Printers), and Roelien Andrie Venter (Venter) instituted action against the Newcastle Municipality (the Municipality) for damages arising from the closure of their businesses. Newcastle Industrial Launders and RF Screen Printers operated industrial laundry and screen printing businesses respectively at premises within the Municipality’s area and were reliant on municipal services, including water and sewage. Cassim held full membership of Newcastle Industrial Launders and Venter held 50% shareholding in RF Screen Printers; both were employed in those businesses and derived income therefrom. In October 2021, during the period in which Cassim was contesting local government elections, the Municipality obtained an urgent interdict terminating water supply and restraining the discharge of effluent, which effectively closed the businesses until March 2023.

Claim: The plaintiffs claimed damages of R18,6 million, alleging that the Municipality wrongfully and in breach of a legal duty caused them pure economic loss by obtaining and maintaining an interdict intended to close their businesses without evidential basis. They pleaded that the Municipality falsely alleged that their effluent contained harmful contaminants and that its conduct interfered with their business operations, income, and Cassim’s political activities. The Municipality admitted obtaining and later withdrawing the interdict but pleaded a bare denial and failed to justify its actions or provide supporting evidence. At trial, the plaintiffs relied on pleadings and agreed documentary evidence, whilst the Municipality led no evidence and its counsel recorded having no instructions to challenge liability.

Discussion: The plaintiffs’ case rested on the contention that the Municipality, as a public authority, owed a duty of care not to cause harm to ratepayers and businesses within its jurisdiction and that it breached this duty by acting without evidence. The interdict was granted on allegations that effluent contained pollutants, yet no expert or factual material supported this claim. The plaintiffs produced expert reports demonstrating the absence of harmful contaminants, which the Municipality ignored. Despite a court mechanism ordered to verify effluent safety, the Municipality failed to comply and persisted with the interdict. The principles of delictual liability, as set out in Tematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority of SA, MTO Forestry (Pty) Ltd v Swart NO, and Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security, require conduct, wrongfulness, fault, and resulting harm. The Municipality’s conduct in initiating and maintaining interdict proceedings without evidential support formed the basis of alleged wrongfulness and negligence.

Findings: The Municipality engaged in conduct by obtaining and maintaining the interdict which it expressly knew would close the plaintiffs’ businesses and cause loss. Such conduct, unsupported by evidence and pursued in disregard of contrary expert reports, constituted a breach of its legal duty and was therefore wrongful. The Municipality acted at least negligently, if not recklessly, by failing to exercise reasonable care in verifying its allegations and by ignoring available evidence. The absence of any challenge to the plaintiffs’ case and the Municipality’s failure to justify its actions reinforced the conclusion of fault. The requirements of a delict were satisfied: there was conduct, wrongfulness, fault, and resultant harm in the form of pure economic loss.

Order: The defendant is found liable to compensate the first, second, third and fourth plaintiffs for the loss/harm proved and proved to have been caused by the conduct/act of the defendant. The defendant is ordered to pay costs on Scale C including costs of senior counsel where so employed, the costs include qualifying costs and attendance in court on 11 May 2026 of the specified experts.

Wrongful interference:

[8] The defendant by virtue of being a public authority and its relationship with plaintiffs operating business within its municipal area and the first and fourth plaintiffs being its resident rate payers and registered voters owed a duty of care not to cause harm on them and or their businesses. The second plaintiff in October 2021 was contesting in local government elections was contesting a mayoral position for Newcastle under the auspices of Action SA political party and he was in some circles referred to a mayor elect. In that regard he relied on the support by co-plaintiffs. The second plaintiff in his efforts to be elected mayor was entitled not be unlawfully interfered and to be frustrated in that effort by the defendant. The second and fourth plaintiffs were entitled to earn and to continue to earn salaries from their employment without wrongful interference by the defendant.

Facts: The matter concerns a jurisdictional challenge raised by Pardon Gambakwe (Gambakwe) against the University of the Western Cape (the University). Gambakwe initially referred an unfair labour practice dispute to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) in terms of section 186(2)(d) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, alleging an occupational detriment arising from a protected disclosure under the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000. At the time of referral, he had not yet been dismissed. He was subsequently dismissed after a disciplinary process, but did not refer a fresh dispute concerning his dismissal. The CCMA conciliated the original dispute after the dismissal and issued a certificate of non-resolution describing the dispute as an automatically unfair dismissal in terms of section 187(1)(h) of the Labour Relations Act. Gambakwe then referred the matter to the Labour Court as an automatically unfair dismissal dispute.

Application: The University raised a special plea challenging the Labour Court’s jurisdiction, contending that no automatically unfair dismissal dispute had been referred to the CCMA for conciliation, which is a prerequisite for adjudication under section 191 of the Labour Relations Act. It argued that Gambakwe’s referral concerned only an unfair labour practice and that it was impossible for the CCMA to have conciliated a dismissal dispute that had not been referred. Gambakwe opposed the plea, relying on the proposition that the true nature of the dispute had been conciliated and that the CCMA commissioner was entitled to identify it as an automatically unfair dismissal based on the facts emerging during conciliation.

Discussion: The Court considered section 191 of the Labour Relations Act and the jurisprudence on the nature of disputes referred for conciliation, including NUMSA v Driveline Technologies (Pty) Ltd and the Constitutional Court judgment in September and Others v CMI Business Enterprise CC. In September, the Constitutional Court rejected a formalistic approach that limits courts to the description of the dispute in referral forms and certificates of outcome. It held that commissioners have a duty to determine the true nature of the dispute and that parties may lead evidence to establish what was actually conciliated. The referral form and certificate constitute only prima facie evidence of the dispute, and the substance must prevail over form. The purpose of conciliation is to attempt resolution of the real dispute prior to litigation, and strict adherence to labels would undermine this objective.

Findings: The Court found that the principles in Driveline had been overtaken by the Constitutional Court decision in September, which it was bound to follow. On the facts, the unfair labour practice dispute referred by Gambakwe arose from the same factual matrix that led to his dismissal. The conciliation took place after the dismissal, and the commissioner identified the dispute as an automatically unfair dismissal. It was highly probable that the real dispute, namely dismissal for making a protected disclosure, was in fact conciliated. To insist on a separate referral would amount to undue formalism and ignore the substance of the dispute. The Court therefore concluded that the requirements of section 191 had been satisfied and that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.

Order: The Defendant’s special plea is dismissed; this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s referral as an automatically unfair dismissal in terms of section 187(1)(h) of the Labour Relations Act; there is no order as to costs.