Facts: R[…] H[…] K[…] (the applicant) and her estranged husband, Mr F[…], were engaged in long-running matrimonial litigation. Danielle Lawrence (Lawrence), Mr F[…]’s current partner, was not a party to the divorce proceedings. In earlier Rule 43(6) proceedings, Gamble J authorised the applicant, at her own expense, to appoint a forensic expert to investigate the value of Mr F[…]’s estate. The order empowered that expert to subpoena persons believed to possess information concerning the existence, identity or value of assets or liabilities forming part of Mr F[…]’s estate. On 27 March 2026, however, the applicant herself caused a subpoena duces tecum to be issued against Lawrence, seeking 58 broad categories of financial and personal documents covering 2021 to 2024.

Application: The applicant sought an order compelling Lawrence to comply with the subpoena. Lawrence opposed, contending that it had been issued contrary to the Gamble J order and that its scope was vague, oppressive and irrelevant to the forensic mandate. The subpoena demanded banking records, employment agreements, earnings, bonuses, tax returns, vehicle and immovable-property documentation, and extensive financial correspondence. The applicant maintained that Lawrence’s financial dealings with Mr F[…] justified investigation and that further disclosure was necessary because she considered Mr F[…]’s own disclosure inadequate.

Discussion: A subpoena duces tecum remains subject to judicial control and may be set aside where it constitutes an abuse of process. The court-ordered forensic process was directed specifically at identifying, composing and valuing Mr F[…]’s estate. It did not authorise the applicant herself to conduct an independent forensic investigation into third parties. Relevance and specificity remained necessary. A subpoena may be abusive where framed so widely that it becomes oppressive, vexatious or a fishing expedition. A non-party subject to coercive court process is entitled to know why particular documents are relevant and necessary. The applicant therefore had to establish a proper evidential basis for each category demanded.

Findings: The subpoena was an abuse of process. No affidavit, interim report or status update from the court-appointed forensic expert identified any deficiencies in Mr F[…]’s disclosure, any unresolved forensic issue, or any need for Lawrence’s records. Mr F[…] had already disclosed more than 1,500 pages of material, much of which overlapped with the categories sought from Lawrence. The applicant’s suspicions that Lawrence might be holding or concealing assets, acting as a nominee or participating in undisclosed arrangements rested on conjecture rather than facts or expert assessment. Financial interaction arising from a romantic relationship did not, without more, justify a sweeping investigation into Lawrence’s private affairs. The subpoena reversed the process contemplated by the Gamble J order by assuming hidden dealings first and then demanding broad disclosure in the hope that something useful might emerge. Its breadth, duplication and lack of identified forensic purpose rendered it oppressive and intrusive. Although formally issued and binding until set aside, its effect and purpose justified judicial intervention. Disclosure would also irreversibly compromise Lawrence’s confidentiality. The applicant had effectively usurped the expert’s court-appointed role and used the process in a manner inconsistent with the earlier order.

Order: The application to compel compliance with the subpoena duces tecum was dismissed. The subpoena issued on 27 March 2026 was set aside. No order was made as to costs.

Facts: Mirror Trading International (Pty) Ltd (MTI) was provisionally liquidated in December 2020 on the application of Anton Lee (Lee), a creditor, and finally liquidated in June 2021. MTI had operated an unlawful bitcoin-based Ponzi scheme involving hundreds of thousands of investors. Its joint liquidators undertook extensive investigations, reconstructed its records and instituted thousands of domestic and foreign recovery proceedings aimed at setting aside impeachable dispositions and recovering assets for creditors. Forty-four proceedings in the United Kingdom concerned claims aggregating 493 bitcoin. Lee became concerned about litigation expenditure, adverse costs, an asserted prescription risk and a decline in estate assets from approximately R1,1 billion to R550 million.

Application: Lee sought removal of the liquidators under section 379 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, together with orders compelling detailed accounting concerning the estate and the UK proceedings. Alternatively, he sought supervisory controls over the UK litigation, including prior creditor approval, monthly reports to the Master of the High Court (the Master), a court-imposed expenditure cap and appointment of an independent insolvency practitioner. The liquidators opposed, contending that no proper case for removal, interdictory or supervisory relief had been made out and that the application constituted an abuse of process.

Discussion: Removal of a liquidator is an extreme remedy requiring assessment of the conduct complained of in its full context and consideration whether removal would benefit all interested parties. “Good cause” may extend beyond misconduct, but mere complaints, questionable decisions or errors of judgment do not suffice. Liquidators must remain independent and act in the interests of creditors, but their statutory duties include recovering assets and impeaching transactions where appropriate. Lee’s principal criticism concerned prescription defences raised in some recovery proceedings. Those defences were fact-specific, remained for determination by the courts seized with the claims and could not properly be predetermined in these proceedings. Final interdictory relief additionally required a clear right, injury or reasonable apprehension thereof and absence of an adequate alternative remedy.

Findings: Lee failed to establish any statutory failure, unsuitability or other good cause for removal. The liquidators’ explanations concerning acquisition and analysis of the MTI database, the complexity of identifying investor accounts and the institution of recovery proceedings were cogent and largely unanswered by proper factual evidence. The UK proceedings sought recoveries far exceeding the expenditure incurred, had creditor support and were already substantially advanced. Removal would delay the winding-up, duplicate extensive work and increase costs, contrary to creditors’ interests. The interdictory relief was also incompetent: Lee established no clear right to prescribe how the liquidators should perform their statutory duties, and the relief would interfere with foreign proceedings and seek to compel performance according to his directions rather than the statutory scheme. The proposed oversight relief likewise failed. Lee had already invoked section 381 by complaining to the Master, whose statutory supervisory jurisdiction had thereby been engaged. No policy consideration justified bypassing that process or usurping the Master’s functions. The application further sought, in substance, to impede the liquidators’ statutory recovery efforts and served an ulterior purpose. Lee’s disregard of Rule 6 requirements and serious but unfounded allegations impugning the liquidators’ integrity justified punitive costs.

Order: The application was dismissed with costs, to be taxed on the attorney-and-client scale.

Facts: C[...] G[...] S[...] (the applicant) and J[...] H[...] S[...] (the respondent) married on 22 March 2013 out of community of property with application of the accrual system. They have two minor children. The applicant instituted divorce proceedings on 9 June 2026 and claimed, among other relief, permanent spousal maintenance and implementation of the antenuptial contract. The principal issues remaining in the divorce were the quantum of her accrual claim and whether she was entitled to maintenance until death or remarriage. She had depended on her elderly parents to fund the litigation. The respondent was the sole shareholder and director of A[...] (Pty) Ltd (A[...]), from which he drew a salary and which funded a monthly shortfall in his personal expenses.

Application: In proceedings under Rule 43, the parties resolved all interim maintenance, residence and contact issues, leaving only the respondent’s contribution towards the applicant’s legal costs and the costs of the application for determination. The applicant initially claimed R915,400 for future attorney and counsel fees, R230,000 for a forensic accountant and R35,190 for an industrial psychologist. Her counsel later accepted that approximately R300,000 could be deducted from the legal estimate and submitted that an irreducible contribution of R524,400, inclusive of expert fees and discovery and pre-trial costs, was required. The respondent ultimately tendered R150,000 towards legal costs, opposed the expert expenses and contended that senior counsel and the projected costs were unnecessary.

Discussion: A contribution towards costs under Rule 43 derives from the reciprocal duty of support between spouses and must be determined with regard to the circumstances of the case, the parties’ financial positions, the nature and complexity of the issues and the scale on which they are litigating. The discretion must be exercised consistently with equality and equal protection of the law, so that a spouse without sufficient means is enabled adequately to present the case and achieve “equality of arms”. The contribution is not necessarily confined to part of the costs or to the first day of trial, but it does not entitle a litigant to conduct litigation at any chosen scale. The applicant contended that a forensic accountant was required to investigate and value the respondent’s interests, including A[...] and his loan account, while an industrial psychologist was required to assess her earning capacity for purposes of maintenance.

Findings: The respondent’s disclosure did not permit a proper assessment of his true financial obligations and means, and an adverse inference could be drawn from the incompleteness of that disclosure. Although he alleged a salary of only R15,832.97 per month, he was able to fund substantial maintenance obligations, had a R4,200,000 loan claim against A[...] and disclosed movable assets worth approximately R2,000,000. A[...] had also incurred substantial expenditure during the relevant period. There was accordingly no basis to conclude that he could not afford a meaningful contribution. Given the acrimony, the accrual dispute and the respondent’s control over A[...], a forensic investigation was justified. The industrial psychologist’s involvement was also reasonable because the applicant’s employability and earning capacity were contested. Briefing senior counsel was not unreasonable. The applicant adequately substantiated the estimated legal and expert costs required to place her in a position to litigate fairly and effectively on a footing as near to equal as possible. Her right to seek a further contribution under Rule 43(6) remained preserved.

Order: The respondent was ordered to pay a first contribution of R259,210 towards the applicant’s legal costs, in eight monthly instalments of R32,401.25 commencing on 30 November 2026; the forensic accountant’s fees up to R230,000, inclusive of VAT, on presentation of the relevant invoice; and the industrial psychologist’s fees up to R34,590, inclusive of VAT, on presentation of the relevant invoice. The costs of the Rule 43 application were reserved for determination in the divorce action.

Facts: The Democratic Alliance (DA) challenged proportional representation (PR) candidate lists submitted for the 4 November 2026 municipal elections by ActionSA, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), GOOD and uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK Party). Each had deliberately submitted a single candidate in virtually every municipality it contested, notwithstanding past electoral performance suggesting that some would obtain more than one PR seat. The parties intended to supplement their lists after the election under item 17 of Schedule 1 to the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (Structures Act). ActionSA’s published selection policy contemplated ranking ward candidates after the election according to electoral support. GOOD had sought guidance from the Electoral Commission of South Africa (Commission) regarding supplementation. The Commission certified the lists on 16 September 2026.

Application: The DA sought declarations that the single-candidate lists were submitted in bad faith and in fraudem legis, violated sections 157(2)(a), 19(2) and 19(3)(b) of the Constitution, sections 1, 13 and 14 of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000 and the Structures Act. It also sought review of the Commission’s certification decision and consequential relief preventing supplementation under item 17 before the first council meeting. Its case was that item 17 was merely a narrow safety valve for a party which genuinely and unexpectedly won more seats than anticipated. The conditional constitutional challenge to the legislation was ultimately postponed for later determination.

Discussion: Section 157(2) requires a proportional-representation system based on party lists but leaves the detailed electoral system to national legislation. In that system voters vote for parties, which nominate their representatives; individual candidate approval by voters is not determinative. Item 11 of Schedule 1 prescribes a maximum number of candidates but no minimum. Item 17 applies where, after votes are counted and seats allocated, a list contains fewer candidates than the party is entitled to seats. Its operation depends on an objective comparison between the seats won and names available, not upon whether the party genuinely underestimated its support. Item 20 generally prohibits supplementation between nomination closure and the day after the first council meeting, but item 17 necessarily operates during that period because insufficiency becomes known only after voting and seat allocation.

Findings: Reading item 20 as preventing supplementation under item 17 would render item 17 largely nugatory and undermine proportional representation. Item 20 was therefore read subject to item 17. Nothing in the statutory scheme required a political party to predict its likely electoral support, submit a minimum number of candidates, or prove a genuine expectation that it would win only the number of seats corresponding to its original list. Introducing such subjective requirements would amount to impermissible judicial legislation. The single-name lists accordingly complied with the existing statutory scheme. ActionSA’s public policy and GOOD’s prior communications with the Commission contradicted any suggestion of concealment, while no factual basis established bad faith against any of the parties. The constitutional claims also failed on the statutory interpretation advanced, and direct reliance on the Constitution offended subsidiarity. The review of the Commission’s certification likewise failed because no material error of law or fact or proper review ground was established. The broader constitutional challenge was inappropriate for urgent determination shortly before polling day and required participation by additional interested constitutional actors.

Order: The declaratory applications, review of the Commission’s decision and consequential relief were dismissed. The application to declare the Commission’s decision unconstitutional, unlawful and invalid, together with the conditional constitutional challenge to the electoral legislation, was postponed sine die. No order was made as to costs.

Facts: Inga Samantha Dyantyi (Dyantyi), an attorney formerly employed by Norton Rose Fulbright South Africa Inc (the firm), alleged that from June 2023 she was subjected to victimisation, bullying and racial harassment by a director and that the firm failed to protect her. She resigned with effect from 31 July 2024, contending that continued employment had become intolerable. On 13 August 2024 she referred a dispute to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). In Form LRA 7.11 she selected dismissal and identified the dispute as constructive dismissal under section 191 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). She did not select unfair discrimination under section 10 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA). Her annexure was headed “Constructive dismissal - facts of the dispute”. The certificate of outcome likewise described the unresolved dispute as constructive dismissal.

Claim: Dyantyi later instituted proceedings in the Labour Court claiming compensation and damages under section 50(2) of the EEA for alleged racial harassment under section 6(3), read with section 10. The firm raised two special pleas. Primarily, it contended that the discrimination dispute had never been referred to or conciliated by the CCMA, depriving the Labour Court of jurisdiction. Alternatively, it contended that the court referral was outside the 90-day period prescribed by section 10(7) of the EEA, read with section 136(1)(b) of the LRA, without condonation. The parties agreed that the special pleas would be determined separately and solely on the pleadings and annexed documents, without oral evidence.

Discussion: Prior conciliation is an indispensable statutory jurisdictional fact under section 10 of the EEA. The burden of establishing jurisdiction rested on Dyantyi as dominus litis. Although the true nature of a dispute is not determined formalistically by labels on referral forms or certificates, the available evidence still had to establish that the discrimination dispute was in fact referred and conciliated. Dyantyi argued that her affirmative response under the form’s discrimination section, together with allegations of bullying, victimisation and racist mistreatment in the annexure, showed that unfair discrimination had formed part of the dispute before the CCMA. The firm contended that those allegations merely formed the factual foundation of her constructive dismissal case.

Findings: The dispute referred to conciliation was constructive dismissal, not a distinct unfair discrimination dispute under the EEA. Dyantyi had expressly selected constructive dismissal, recorded her resignation date as the date the dispute arose, requested arbitration of that dismissal dispute after conciliation, and attached a narrative directed to showing intolerability of continued employment. The certificate of outcome confirmed only constructive dismissal. Allegations of racial abuse and bullying did not transform that referral into a separate section 10 dispute, particularly because section 10(1) expressly excludes unfair dismissal disputes and the two causes of action arise under distinct statutory schemes. Unlike cases where evidence showed that a differently labelled dispute had actually been canvassed at conciliation, no evidence established that a standalone racial-discrimination dispute was raised, discussed or conciliated. The parties’ pre-trial agreement precluded resort to oral evidence to establish otherwise. Dyantyi’s own amended statement of claim, which recorded that she approached the Labour Court because of delay in the CCMA arbitration of her constructive dismissal dispute, reinforced the inference that the discrimination claim was a later and distinct course of litigation. Because the actual EEA claim had not passed through conciliation, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction. The alternative special plea concerning lateness therefore fell away.

Order: The firm’s first special plea in limine was upheld. Dyantyi’s referral was struck off the roll for lack of jurisdiction. No order was made as to costs.

Facts: Sabelo Mkhize (Mkhize), Lindokuhle Mchunu (Mchunu) and Sboniso Khubisa (Khubisa) were charged with offences arising from an ambush of police officers on 22 September 2015. Mkhize lured Sergeant Jojisa and Sergeant Moyana to his house at Namibia, Inanda under the pretence of serving a letter of demand. Mchunu and Khubisa were waiting there armed, Mchunu with a pistol and Khubisa with an AK47 rifle. The officers were disarmed, stripped of their uniforms and belongings, kidnapped and driven away. Moyana was later shot dead and Jojisa seriously injured. The AK47 was recovered shortly afterwards from Mkhize’s locked house together with the stolen police uniforms and other items.

Appeal: All three appellants appealed against their convictions and sentences on counts 1 to 6, contending principally that the identification evidence was unreliable and that the sentences were shockingly inappropriate. The State cross-appealed against their acquittals on firearm-related counts 7 to 10. It abandoned the cross-appeal on counts 9 and 10 because the recovery evidence was materially contradictory, but persisted with counts 7 and 8 concerning the fully automatic AK47 rifle. The State contended that the trial court had misapplied the principles of joint possession.

Discussion: The identification evidence of Jojisa and Ms Dlamini was assessed against the established caution applicable to identification. Both had ample opportunity to observe the perpetrators in broad daylight, and their identifications were confirmed at a properly conducted identification parade. Their evidence was further supported by circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of stolen police items from Mkhize’s house and admissions made to relatives. On joint possession, the Court emphasised that common purpose to commit an offence does not, without more, establish joint possession of a firearm physically held by one participant. It must be shown that the holder intended to possess the firearm on behalf of the others and that they intended him to exercise physical control on their behalf.

Findings: The identification evidence was reliable and the appellants’ alibis were materially contradictory and correctly rejected. The appeal against counts 1 to 6 accordingly failed. The trial court, however, misdirected itself on counts 7 and 8. The evidence established that the robbery had been carefully planned, that Khubisa possessed the AK47 as part of that plan, and that he used it to prevent Jojisa from resisting while the group executed the robbery. Mkhize and Mchunu knew of the rifle and intended it to be used as an instrument of their common enterprise. The subsequent recovery of the same AK47 from Mkhize’s locked house, together with the stolen police uniforms, shortly after the robbery reinforced the inference that the group retained control over it. The facts therefore established both the physical detention exercised through Khubisa and the shared intention required for joint possession. The appeal against sentence also failed because no substantial and compelling circumstances justified departure from the prescribed sentences.

Order: The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed. The State’s cross-appeal succeeded in respect of counts 7 and 8. All three appellants were convicted of possession of a prohibited fully automatic firearm under section 4(1)(a) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000. Counts 7 and 8 were taken together for sentence, and each appellant was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, antedated to 6 July 2018 and ordered to run concurrently with the life sentence imposed on count 1.

Facts: Sibonginhlanhla Kiza Radebe (Radebe) was charged with two counts of rape involving the same complainant, who was 13 at the time of the first alleged rape in October 2014 and 14 at the time of the second in June 2015. The complainant testified that Radebe, a neighbour, raped her on both occasions and threatened to kill her if she disclosed what had happened. She eventually told a friend, who informed her mother. Her mother took her to the police and she was examined by Dr Bana on 5 November 2015. He recorded fresh hymenal tears at three positions and no other significant findings. Radebe denied both incidents. The Regional Court convicted him on both counts and imposed 20 years’ imprisonment on the first and life imprisonment on the second, to run concurrently.

Appeal: Radebe had an automatic right of appeal on count two but not on count one. His earlier petition concerning count one had been received by the High Court registrar in July 2018 but apparently never placed before judges for determination. The High Court accordingly granted the petition and entertained appeals against both convictions and sentences. The State ultimately conceded that the convictions could not stand.

Discussion: The complainant was a single witness. Although section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 permits conviction on the evidence of a single competent witness, such evidence must be approached with caution and must be substantially satisfactory in material respects or otherwise sufficiently reliable when assessed with the evidence as a whole. Cross-examination revealed that the complainant had omitted from her evidence in chief significant details recorded in her police statement, including that her mouth had been sealed with Sellotape and that she had been threatened with both a knife and a firearm. She attributed these omissions to forgetfulness. Her mother was not the first recipient of the complaint and her repetition of the complainant’s version amounted merely to an inadmissible previous consistent statement.

Findings: The complainant’s evidence was not substantially satisfactory in material respects. The Regional Court wrongly attributed the contradictions to deficiencies in the recording of the police statement when the complainant herself accepted the statement as correct and acknowledged that she had forgotten those details. More importantly, Dr Bana’s evidence created a serious difficulty for the State. The fresh hymenal tears observed on 5 November 2015 were inconsistent with the charged incidents in October 2014 and June 2015. His agreement that the findings were consistent with penetration in October 2015 arose from an incorrect proposition put by the prosecutor, because no rape was alleged in that month. The medical evidence therefore pointed to penetration much closer to the date of examination, but no evidence linked that act to Radebe. His explanation concerning a possible motive for false accusation may have been improbable, but weakness in that explanation did not establish the State’s case. Penetration was proved, but not beyond reasonable doubt that Radebe was the perpetrator of the two charged offences. The convictions were unsafe.

Order: The petition to appeal the conviction and sentence on count one was granted. The appeals on both counts of rape were upheld. The convictions and sentences were set aside and replaced with verdicts of “Not Guilty” on both counts. A copy of the judgment was directed to the registrar for consideration of the handling of Radebe’s 2018 petition.

Facts: Enoch Mgijima Local Municipality (the Municipality) resulted from the merger of three municipalities. Following industrial action, employees who had previously been remunerated at lower municipal categories ultimately received remuneration associated with Category 6. The Municipality contended that this grading was incorrect and contributed materially to its financial distress. By 2023 it described itself as “technically bankrupt”: creditor liabilities had increased substantially, revenue was below expenditure, debt collection was poor and approximately R1,1 billion was owed to Eskom. National government intervened under section 139 of the Constitution and a financial recovery plan was adopted. The Municipality had complied for two years with a three-year Wage and Salary Collective Agreement concluded on 15 September 2021, but sought exemption from the third-year across-the-board increase of 5.4%.

Application: The Municipality applied under clause 15.1.15 of the Collective Agreement for a partial exemption from clauses 6.6 and 6.7. A panellist appointed under the South African Local Government Bargaining Council refused the exemption, directed the Municipality to review and adjust its budget to prioritise employee increases, and ordered payment of the increases. The Municipality sought review and substitution granting an exemption until its pay levels were “regularised”, alternatively remittal to a different panellist. The Independent Municipal and Allied Workers Trade Union and South African Municipal Workers Union opposed the application.

Discussion: The Collective Agreement required consideration of fairness, affordability, cash flow, unexpected economic hardship, budgetary provision, the effect on collective bargaining and other relevant factors. Exemptions are exceptional and intended to accommodate special or unforeseen circumstances; a reviewing court is not free merely to substitute its preferred assessment. The Municipality relied heavily on the alleged incorrect categorisation, historical maladministration, its new administration, potential job losses and financial distress. It argued that the panellist gave excessive weight to collective bargaining and insufficient weight to affordability. The panellist had nevertheless considered each criterion, accepted that the Municipality’s financial position was precarious, and weighed that circumstance against fairness to employees, public interest and the integrity of collective bargaining.

Findings: The refusal of exemption was not reviewable. A change in municipal administration did not create a new juristic entity or permit the Municipality to escape accountability for earlier governance failures. It would generally offend fairness to shift the consequences of historical maladministration onto employees by withholding negotiated remuneration, particularly where councillors received increases. The alleged incorrect categorisation could not justify exemption. Its lawfulness fell outside the panellist’s powers and, until reviewed and set aside, the existing administrative position continued to produce legal consequences. The Municipality had also allowed years to pass without obtaining judicial relief concerning the grading. Collective bargaining was not treated as an absolute consideration; the panellist balanced it against affordability, fairness and public interest. Potential retrenchments were properly dealt with through the processes prescribed by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 rather than used as a substitute route to obtain cost savings through exemption. No institutional bias was established. The panellist did, however, exceed her powers by directing the Municipality to revise its budget. The Collective Agreement authorised her only to grant or refuse an exemption, and municipal budget approval is a non-delegable function of the Municipal Council under section 160(2)(b) of the Constitution. The budget relief had neither been sought nor canvassed and could not lawfully be imposed.

Order: The application was dismissed save that paragraph 78 of the exemption ruling, directing the Municipality to review and adjust its budget and prioritise salary, wage and benefit increases, was deleted. No order was made as to costs.

Facts: Randall Gallant (Gallant), known as “Robot”, was convicted in the Wynberg Regional Court of murder and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The State relied solely on Eileen Jacobs (Jacobs), the deceased’s mother, regarding the killing. She testified that on 6 August 2023 she saw Gallant about 30 metres away with his arms stretched forward holding a black object resembling a firearm, after which three or four shots were heard. When she emerged from her house, she found her son lying in the street with a gunshot wound to his head. Gallant admitted being present nearby but denied possessing or firing a firearm. He testified that two men approached, one armed, and that a gunfire exchange occurred between that man and another person across the road.

Appeal: Gallant appealed against both conviction and sentence. He contended that Jacobs’s evidence, as a single witness, was materially contradictory and insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he was the shooter. The Regional Magistrate had acknowledged that Jacobs was a single witness but regarded the contradictions between her oral evidence and sworn statement as immaterial and accepted her as credible. The Magistrate further reasoned that because Gallant was admittedly present and Jacobs had seen him holding what appeared to be a firearm, the only inference was that he fired the shots that killed the deceased.

Discussion: Section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 permits conviction on the evidence of a single competent witness, but such evidence must be approached with caution. The proper enquiry is whether, after considering the merits, shortcomings and contradictions, the evidence is sufficiently trustworthy. Jacobs’s sworn statement said Gallant was with one person immediately before the shooting, whereas her oral evidence initially referred to several men. Her statement said she heard shots, looked and saw Gallant shooting; in court she said she saw him before the shots and could not say he was the shooter. She alternated between describing the black object as a firearm and saying she did not see a firearm. She also gave contradictory versions on whether other persons were shooting.

Findings: The contradictions were material because they concerned the very circumstances of the shooting and Gallant’s alleged role in it. Jacobs never disavowed her sworn statement and offered no credible explanation for the inconsistencies. The Regional Magistrate invoked S v Mafaladiso without explaining how its principles resolved these contradictions and failed to consider the evidence holistically. He also failed to account for Jacobs’s own evidence that she was hurriedly crossing the road and that events unfolded rapidly. Gallant’s version was not merely a bare denial: he described an exchange of gunfire by others and denied possessing a firearm. On all the evidence, it was reasonably possible that Jacobs saw Gallant standing on the corner, associated him with gang involvement and, amid gunfire and confusion, wrongly inferred that he was the shooter. The State’s single-witness evidence was therefore not sufficiently reliable to sustain the conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Order: The appeal was upheld. Gallant’s conviction and sentence were set aside. Provided that he was not in custody in respect of any other criminal charge, conviction or sentence, he was ordered to be released immediately.

Facts: On 25 September 2020 the Minister of Electricity and Energy (the Minister), acting under section 34(1) of the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006 (ERA) and with the concurrence of the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA), determined that additional generation capacity was required, including 1,500 MW from coal. The determination was linked to the Integrated Resource Plan 2019 (IRP 2019). African Climate Alliance, Vukani Environmental Justice Movement in Action and the trustees of groundWork Trust challenged the coal component. The High Court declared the Minister’s determination, NERSA’s concurrence and IRP 2019 unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that they provided for 1,500 MW of new coal-fired generation, holding that they negatively affected rights under sections 24 and 28 of the Constitution.

Appeal: The Minister appealed with leave of the High Court. NERSA did not participate in the appeal. Before the appeal was determined, the Minister published the Integrated Resource Plan 2025 (IRP 2025) on 28 October 2025. IRP 2025 made no provision for additional coal-fired power and was being implemented. The central question therefore became whether the appeal retained any practical effect or result under section 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. The Minister contended that the appeal remained live because the 2020 coal determination had not been withdrawn and because future deviation from an integrated resource plan might be permissible in an emergency or national interest.

Discussion: The 2020 determination expressly tied the 1,500 MW coal allocation to IRP 2019 and its implementation timetable. The amended ERA, effective from 1 January 2025, requires the Minister, when making a determination, to have regard to the operative integrated resource plan. Deviation is permitted only in an emergency or where necessary in the national interest, and is subject to prescribed procedural requirements, including public participation. IRP 2025 superseded IRP 2019 and contained no allocation for 1,500 MW of new coal-fired capacity. No procurement process under the 2020 determination had commenced, no contracts had been concluded and Eskom had acquired no rights under it. The original implementation timetable had also become incapable of fulfilment.

Findings: The appeal no longer had a practical effect or result. The issue was not merely whether the 2020 determination continued to exist formally, but whether it could lawfully be implemented under the current statutory and planning framework. It could not. There was no savings provision preserving implementation of the coal allocation under IRP 2025, and any future attempt to procure the same 1,500 MW would require a fresh determination complying with the amended section 34 of the ERA. Setting aside the High Court’s order would therefore not restore a presently exercisable power or remove any legal impediment to coal procurement. The interests of justice also did not justify deciding the otherwise moot constitutional issues. The High Court had not determined several substantial defences raised by the Minister and NERSA, and deciding them on appeal would effectively require first-instance adjudication. Although electricity planning, environmental protection and children’s rights are matters of considerable public importance, future challenges could be decided in the context of concrete decisions taken under the operative statutory framework. The Supreme Court of Appeal expressly stated that its decision should not be understood as endorsing the High Court’s conclusions on the merits.

Order: The appeal was dismissed under section 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act. The Minister was ordered to pay the costs of appeal of African Climate Alliance, Vukani Environmental Justice Movement in Action and the trustees of groundWork Trust, including the costs of two counsel.

Facts: O[…] M[…] (the minor child) was seven years old when, on 9 December 2016, he was struck by a motor vehicle while a pedestrian on the N2 near Grabouw. The collision was caused solely by the negligence of the insured driver. He sustained fractured ribs with a pneumothorax, a traumatic head injury and an open fracture of the right tibia and fibula. His orthopaedic injuries largely resolved, but the traumatic brain injury left significant and enduring neurocognitive consequences. The family relocated to Zimbabwe in 2021. Lee Gabriel NO, acting as curator ad litem, pursued the claim against the Road Accident Fund (the Fund).

Claim: Liability had been settled at 100% in the minor child’s favour and the Fund furnished an undertaking under section 17(4)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. The remaining issues were future loss of earning capacity and general damages. The plaintiff claimed R3,219,510 for future loss of earning capacity and R1,800,000 general damages. The Fund contended that the minor child had largely recovered, that his uninjured trajectory should be confined to Grade 12 followed by unskilled work, and that R800,000 would adequately compensate general damages.

Discussion: The expert evidence established persistent impairments in memory, attention, executive functioning, literacy and problem-solving. The neuropsychologists agreed that the minor child suffered a major neurocognitive disorder with enduring personality, behavioural and cognitive changes, substantial educational difficulty and probable inability to compete in the open labour market. The industrial psychologists had initially agreed that, but for the collision, he would probably complete Grade 12 and enter employment at an unskilled level, but the plaintiff’s industrial psychologist later revised her view after receiving additional educational and speech-language evidence. The educational evidence supported Grade 12 followed by a Higher Certificate or equivalent vocational training. The family’s relocation to Zimbabwe created uncertainty as to future earnings, but no reliable Zimbabwean earnings evidence was presented.

Findings: The traumatic brain injury profoundly diminished the minor child’s educational and vocational potential. The moderate initial classification of the injury was not inconsistent with severe long-term functional consequences. The additional expert material justified the revised vocational opinion and did not impermissibly contradict the joint minute. On the probabilities, but for the collision the minor child would have completed Grade 12, obtained a Higher Certificate and entered the open labour market. South African earnings data provided the most reliable basis for assessment, with uncertainty arising from age, socio-economic circumstances and cross-border relocation accommodated through contingencies. A 30% contingency on uninjured earnings was appropriate, producing future loss of earning capacity of R3,219,510. Any residual earning capacity through sheltered or supported employment was too speculative to quantify. The serious and permanent cognitive consequences, reduced independence and loss of amenities justified general damages of R1,300,000. Punitive costs were not warranted, but Scale C counsel fees were justified by the complexity and value of the matter.

Order: The Fund was ordered to pay R4,519,510, comprising R3,219,510 for future loss of earning capacity and R1,300,000 for general damages, within 30 days, with prescribed interest thereafter. It was further ordered to provide the section 17(4)(a) undertaking and to pay the plaintiff’s party-and-party costs on the High Court scale, including counsel’s fees on Scale C, specified expert costs and Rule 37A conference costs.

Facts: Jordan Mikael Herzenberg (Herzenberg) began residing at the GM Loubser Family Trust’s property in Yzerfontein in March 2025. His occupation arose from his romantic relationship with Katherine Loubser and the goodwill of her mother, Elizabeth Loubser. The property was the respondents’ family home and Herzenberg’s residence formed part of that domestic arrangement. The romantic relationship ended in November 2025. The respondents thereafter removed the keys kept on a hook behind the kitchen door, preventing Herzenberg from entering or remaining at the property. He nevertheless continued accessing the property for a period. A rule nisi directing restoration was initially granted and, after resistance to execution, the sheriff was authorised to change the locks. The Magistrate ultimately dismissed Herzenberg’s spoliation application.

Appeal: Herzenberg appealed against the dismissal of his application for the mandament van spolie and final interdictory relief. He contended that his residence at the property constituted peaceful and undisturbed possession and that the respondents unlawfully deprived him of that possession by removing the keys. The respondents cross-appealed against aspects of the Magistrate’s reasoning despite having obtained dismissal of the application. The appeal required separate determination of whether Herzenberg had proved factual possession for spoliation purposes and whether he had established a clear right supporting the final interdict.

Discussion: The mandament protects factual possession, not the underlying right to possess. Herzenberg therefore had to plead and prove peaceful and undisturbed possession immediately before dispossession, comprising effective physical control and the intention to possess for his own benefit. His founding affidavit merely asserted that he enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession without identifying primary facts showing independent control, such as regulating access, excluding others, occupying a defined area or possessing independent means of entry. Residence arising from a romantic relationship or permission does not, without more, negate possession, but neither does the fact of occupation itself establish it. Possession had to be assessed practically from the entire factual matrix.

Findings: Herzenberg failed both at pleading and evidential level to establish possession of the requisite quality. His occupation remained embedded in the respondents’ domestic arrangements. He did not show autonomous control over the premises, any demarcated area under his control, independent access or conduct demonstrating that he held the property for his own benefit. The absence of his own keys was not decisive by itself, but was relevant when considered with the absence of other incidents of control. His occupation was accordingly relational and tolerated rather than possessory. The final interdict failed independently. By seeking that relief Herzenberg placed the asserted legal basis for continued occupation in issue, yet established no contractual, proprietary or personal right to remain at the property or regulate access. Withdrawal of tolerated access therefore did not infringe a legally protected right. The respondents’ cross-appeal was incompetent because an appeal lies against an order, not merely against reasons where the operative order is not challenged.

Order: The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed. Condonation was granted for the late filing of the respondents’ heads of argument. Herzenberg was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal on Scale B, including counsel’s costs. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs occasioned by the cross-appeal on Scale B, including counsel’s costs.

Facts: Gerald Ndlovu (Ndlovu), a property manager, attended premises occupied by the deceased and others on 11 November 2017 to serve eviction notices. Five men accompanied him because occupants had previously reacted aggressively. A fracas developed inside the premises and the men fled. Two eyewitnesses testified that Ndlovu struck the deceased on the head with a brick. The deceased later died. Dr Luyolo Leonardo Mantanga, who conducted the post-mortem examination, identified cranial-cerebral blunt-force trauma and blunt-force abdominal trauma. He testified that the head injury, which caused a subdural haemorrhage and brain bruising, was fatal and non-survivable. The liver laceration was potentially fatal but potentially survivable. Ndlovu was convicted of murder in the regional court and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The full bench dismissed his appeal.

Application: After two judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal refused special leave to appeal, Ndlovu applied under section 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 for reconsideration of that refusal. He contended principally that the State had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the brick blow caused the deceased’s death, because the deceased also sustained an unexplained ruptured liver. He argued that the abdominal injury raised uncertainty as to causation and suggested that a subsequent assault could have constituted a novus actus interveniens. He also challenged the full bench’s reference to common purpose and sought interference with the prescribed sentence.

Discussion: The reconsideration procedure did not afford a disappointed litigant another appeal. Ndlovu had to establish exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify reconsideration of the refusal of special leave. The regional court had speculated, without evidential foundation, that the liver injury was probably inflicted while the deceased lay in the street. The full bench correctly rejected that conclusion but regarded it as immaterial because the medical evidence established that the head injury caused death. Dr Mantanga explained the substantial force required to cause the cranial injuries but did not exclude the possibility that a single forceful strike with a brick could produce them. The post-mortem report had been admitted by consent and his oral evidence clarified the distinction between the fatal head injury and the potentially survivable abdominal injury.

Findings: The State was not required to close every conceivable avenue of escape, but to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence as a whole. The medical evidence, read with the eyewitness testimony, established that Ndlovu delivered the blow to the deceased’s head and that this was the fatal injury. The unexplained liver injury did not create reasonable doubt about the cause of death. The suggested subsequent assault constituting a novus actus interveniens was far-fetched and highly improbable. The applicant’s argument depended on viewing portions of the evidence in isolation rather than weighing all evidence together. Common purpose was irrelevant because the State did not rely upon it and the conviction did not depend upon that doctrine. No misdirection was established in relation to causation, much less one satisfying the high threshold for reconsideration. The sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment also disclosed no basis for appellate interference: the personal and mitigating circumstances did not constitute substantial and compelling circumstances warranting departure from the prescribed sentence.

Order: The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissing Ndlovu’s application for special leave to appeal was confirmed.

Facts: Traderoot Africa (Pty) Ltd (Traderoot), a supplier of payment acquiring software, furnished Efficacy Payment (Pty) Ltd (Efficacy) with a revised “Solution Proposal” dated 13 July 2021. Efficacy required software to operate as a payment acquirer following its designation by the South African Reserve Bank. The proposal was signed by Efficacy’s managing director on 13 August 2021. It recorded that it was “subject to” a Master Licence Agreement, Support and Maintenance Agreement and Transaction Agreement, that final pricing remained subject to a scoping workshop and functional requirements, and that its contents were for proposal purposes only and not to be construed as a commitment by Traderoot. The proposal provided for staged licence and commissioning fees. None of the contemplated agreements was ultimately concluded.

Appeal: Traderoot applied for payment of R3,169,170, relying on the signed proposal and emails exchanged in February 2022 in which Efficacy confirmed that Traderoot could invoice the initial milestone and that payment would be made by the end of March 2022. The High Court dismissed the application, finding that the proposal was not binding and that Efficacy’s later undertaking was conditional. Traderoot appealed, contending that signature constituted acceptance of a binding agreement, alternatively that the February correspondence created an unconditional payment obligation. It also relied on quasi-mutual assent, waiver and fictional fulfilment.

Discussion: Whether the proposal created contractual obligations depended objectively on its text, context, purpose and the parties’ conduct. Although the proposal contained prices, payment stages and a signature block, much of it resembled a marketing document and it expressly stated that it was subject to three further agreements. The “Next Steps” contemplated that those agreements would be presented after signature and before project implementation. Correspondence accompanying the proposal showed that signature was intended to trigger the business and functional requirements phase, for which Efficacy separately paid R98,000, while the licence fees would be “triggered” later. Subsequent emails likewise reflected that contracts still had to be “signed and sealed” before payment according to contracted milestones.

Findings: The proposal did not, upon signature, bind Efficacy to pay the initial milestone amounts irrespective of whether the contemplated agreements were concluded. Its express terms, the sequencing in the “Next Steps”, and the parties’ subsequent conduct outweighed the fact that it had been signed. The February 2022 emails, read in isolation, supported Traderoot’s case, but on motion proceedings Efficacy’s version that the undertaking was conditional on conclusion of the contracts, approval of the functional requirements document and the project proceeding could not be rejected as far-fetched or untenable. That version was consistent with the surrounding correspondence and specifically addressed the disputed meeting and emails. Traderoot had elected motion proceedings despite the evident factual dispute and did not seek referral to oral evidence. Quasi-mutual assent was not established because Traderoot could not reasonably have understood Efficacy to have undertaken payment regardless of whether the contracts were concluded or the project proceeded. Waiver had not been pleaded and was inconsistent with Efficacy’s insistence on contracts being in place. Fictional fulfilment likewise failed because Efficacy was under no duty to accept Traderoot’s proposed contractual terms and there was no evidence that it intentionally frustrated fulfilment of a condition.

Order: The appeal was dismissed. Traderoot was ordered to pay Efficacy’s costs of appeal, including the costs of the applications for leave to appeal in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal, on the party-and-party scale, with the costs of one counsel on Scale B.