Facts: Strumpfer Investments (Pty) Ltd, trading as Kays Caravan Park, owns plots at Kays Caravan Park in Strand and brought eviction proceedings under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 against the Van Vuuren family, who had occupied a three-bedroom structure on the property since September 2023. The respondents had lived at the caravan park for several years and moved into the structure after being offered more permanent accommodation by the park’s then manager. Rental was initially R6,300 per month. A dispute arose regarding rental arrears, the nature and duration of the lease agreement, and the lawfulness of the applicant’s purported termination of the lease. The respondents were unrepresented throughout and also instituted a counter-application seeking declaratory and monetary relief relating to the alleged unlawfulness of the structure and remission of rental.

Application: Strumpfer sought eviction on the basis that the respondents’ lease had been validly cancelled for non-payment of rental, rendering their occupation unlawful. The applicant contended that the lease was a month-to-month agreement concluded in writing, now lost, and that it had been lawfully terminated by a letter delivered in March 2025. The respondents opposed the eviction, denying that any written lease existed and alleging instead that a verbal fixed-term lease of two years had been concluded with the applicant’s manager. They further argued that the termination letter was invalid, particularly for failing to comply with section 14(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. In their counter-application, the respondents sought declarations regarding zoning and safety non-compliance and repayment or remission of rental.

Discussion: The matter fell to be determined on motion and thus on the respondents’ version unless it was so far-fetched or untenable as to be rejected. Although the respondents only belatedly set out a detailed factual version of a fixed two-year verbal lease, their account was the only direct evidence on oath of the negotiations, was given by persons present at the conclusion of the agreement, and was not directly contradicted by the applicant, whose version rested largely on hearsay and speculation. Given that the respondents were laypersons, their failure to plead these facts earlier was excusable. The court therefore accepted that a fixed-term lease had been concluded, triggering the application of section 14 of the Consumer Protection Act. Independently of that finding, the court analysed the termination letter and held that a notice of termination must be clear, unconditional and unequivocal. The letter in question purported to cancel the lease immediately while simultaneously affording time to vacate and demanding payment of arrears, rendering it unacceptably equivocal. Such equivocality precluded it from constituting either a valid cancellation for breach or a valid notice terminating a month-to-month lease. Even if the fixed term had expired by effluxion of time, section 14(2)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act would have resulted in the lease continuing on a month-to-month basis.

Findings: The applicant failed to establish that the respondents’ right of occupation had lawfully terminated and thus failed to show unlawful occupation, a prerequisite for eviction under the PIE Act. The purported termination was invalid due to its equivocal nature and non-compliance with statutory and common-law requirements. The counter-application was largely incompetent: alleged zoning or safety irregularities did not render the lease unlawful, and claims for repayment of all rental were unsustainable. The claim for remission of rental was insufficiently pleaded and not conveniently determined in eviction proceedings, though it could be pursued in an appropriate forum.

Order: The eviction application is dismissed; the counterclaim or counter-application is dismissed; there is no order as to costs save that the first to fourth respondents are ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of the counter-application on the Magistrates’ Court scale.

Facts: Lightmap (Pty) Ltd, a minority shareholder holding 33.511% of the issued ordinary shares in Cybersmart (Pty) Ltd, approached the High Court on an urgent basis concerning two proposed corporate transactions. Cybersmart, an internet service provider, proposed to dispose of its Hosting Division to Host Africa (Pty) Ltd pursuant to a letter of intent dated February 2026, and to unwind an incorporated joint venture with Hexion Data Storage (Pty) Ltd in which Cybersmart held a 50% equity interest. The Hosting Division was Cybersmart’s founding business, its most profitable division, and a major contributor to net profits. Lightmap objected to both transactions on the basis that they were being pursued without the prior approval of shareholders by special resolution as required under Cybersmart’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) and Shareholders’ Agreement (SHA), and that the transactions would fundamentally alter the company’s business and diminish Lightmap’s minority protections.

Application: The matter came before the court as Part A of a two-part application, in which Lightmap sought urgent interim interdictory relief pending the determination of Part B. The relief sought was to interdict and restrain Cybersmart and its chief executive officer, Andrew Forssman, from implementing or taking further steps to give effect to the Hosting Disposal and the Hexion joint venture unwinding. Lightmap relied on section 163(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, alternatively the common law requirements for an interim interdict, contending that the conduct complained of was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to it as a minority shareholder. Cybersmart and Forssman opposed the application, disputing that the transactions were reserved matters and contending that they fell within the ordinary course of business or below the monetary thresholds requiring special resolution approval.

Discussion: The court addressed urgency and was satisfied that the matter was inherently urgent, noting that Lightmap had acted with due haste and that the respondents had refused repeated requests to preserve the status quo pending judicial determination. The court considered whether Lightmap had established a prima facie right, albeit open to some doubt, to the relief sought. Central to the dispute was whether the proposed transactions constituted “reserved matters” under the MOI and SHA, and whether they fell outside the normal and ordinary course of Cybersmart’s business. Competing interpretations of clauses dealing with the “sale of the Company’s business” were advanced. Lightmap argued that the unqualified wording and protective purpose of the clauses extended to the disposal of a major division, while the respondents contended that the clauses applied only to the sale of the business as a whole. The court also considered the operational and financial consequences of the transactions, including the loss of Cybersmart’s most profitable division, the dismantling of the Hexion venture without compensation, and the creation of irreversible third-party rights.

Findings: The court held that it was not required at the interim stage to make definitive findings on the interpretation of the MOI and SHA, those issues being more appropriately determined in Part B. However, on the evidence, Lightmap had established a bona fide and prima facie enforceable right not to have potentially reserved matters implemented without the requisite special resolution. The Hosting Disposal and the Hexion joint venture unwinding appeared, prima facie, to fall outside the normal and ordinary course of business and to require shareholder oversight. The court found that Lightmap had demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm, as the implementation of the transactions would render its minority veto rights nugatory and could not adequately be remedied by damages. The balance of convenience favoured the granting of interim relief, as the respondents had not demonstrated any cogent prejudice that would result from preserving the status quo pending Part B, while refusal of relief would permit potentially unlawful and irreversible conduct.

Order: Pending the hearing of Part B of the application, the first and second respondents were interdicted and restrained from implementing or taking any further steps in relation to the proposed disposal of Cybersmart’s Hosting Division to Host Africa (Pty) Ltd and the unwinding or termination of the joint venture with Hexion Data Storage (Pty) Ltd. All issues of costs, including costs related to the abandoned rule 30 application, were ordered to stand over for determination by the court hearing Part B.

Facts: This is an action for damages instituted by K.E.M., in her representative capacity as mother and natural guardian of her minor daughter, O.M., against the Member of the Executive Council for Health, North West Provincial Government. O.M. was born in 2006 at Schweizer-Reneke Hospital following a labour complicated by prolonged rupture of membranes of approximately 48 hours. It is alleged that during the intrapartum period O.M. sustained a severe hypoxic‑ischaemic brain injury, later manifesting as cerebral palsy and associated neurological sequelae. By agreement between the parties, the issue of liability was separated from quantum in terms of Rule 33(4), and the Court was required to determine only whether the defendant was liable for the harm alleged.

Claim: The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s medical and nursing staff were negligent in the obstetric and neonatal management of labour and delivery, in particular by failing adequately to monitor foetal wellbeing during active labour, administering labour augmentation in circumstances of inadequate surveillance, and failing to detect and respond to evolving foetal compromise. It was contended that these failures probably caused the hypoxic‑ischaemic brain injury sustained by the minor child. The defendant denied negligence and causation, relying on intermittently recorded reassuring foetal observations and advancing alternative explanations for the child’s condition, including meconium aspiration and non‑intrapartum developmental causes.

Discussion: Extensive expert evidence was led by both parties, including obstetric, paediatric, paediatric neurology and radiological experts. It was common cause that the plaintiff presented with prolonged rupture of membranes, elevating obstetric risk, and that no continuous cardiotocographic monitoring was performed during labour. The MRI findings were agreed to demonstrate a watershed hypoxic‑ischaemic injury pattern, consistent with a prolonged evolving hypoxic process rather than an acute catastrophic event. The plaintiff’s experts testified that materially inadequate foetal surveillance during active labour fell below accepted standards of care and that such inadequate monitoring would likely have failed to detect progressive foetal compromise. The defendant’s experts accepted that monitoring was materially less frequent than ideal but relied on isolated reassuring observations and explored alternative causative theories. The Court evaluated the expert evidence in accordance with established principles, emphasising that expert opinion must be logically grounded in proven facts and withstand analytical scrutiny.

Findings: The Court found that the defendant’s employees were negligent in failing to provide adequate foetal monitoring during a high‑risk labour, creating a foreseeable risk that evolving foetal compromise would go undetected. The administration of oxytocin in circumstances of inadequate surveillance formed part of the broader pattern of substandard intrapartum management. On causation, the Court accepted that the agreed MRI findings demonstrated a prolonged evolving hypoxic insult and that, on a balance of probabilities, reasonable foetal surveillance would probably have detected deterioration in time for appropriate clinical intervention, thereby preventing the injury. The alternative explanations advanced by the defendant were not established as more probable and did not displace the objective radiological and clinical evidence. Both factual and legal causation were accordingly established.

Order: The defendant was declared liable for payment of 100% of the plaintiff’s proven or agreed damages arising from the negligent management of labour and delivery at Schweizer‑Reneke Hospital on 27 and 28 December 2006, resulting in hypoxic‑ischaemic brain injury to O.M. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs relating to the separated issue of liability, including the reasonable costs of counsel, expert witnesses, medico‑legal reports, radiological investigations, and associated expenses, subject to taxation where not agreed.

Facts: The parties were formerly married and were divorced by a decree granted in 2019, which incorporated a written Settlement Agreement concluded earlier that year. In terms of the Settlement Agreement, the applicant retained a motor vehicle financed under an instalment sale agreement concluded in 2018, while the respondent undertook to pay 50% of the monthly instalments of R2,657 “until the expiry of the finance agreement”. The finance agreement ran for seventy‑two months and comprised seventy‑one monthly instalments and a final substantially larger instalment, commonly referred to as a balloon payment. The respondent paid his share of the monthly instalments but refused to contribute 50% of the final balloon payment when it became due in December 2024. The applicant paid the full amount and sought to recover the respondent’s share.

Application: The applicant approached the High Court seeking enforcement of the Settlement Agreement by way of a writ of execution for R55,786.65, being 50% of the balloon payment, together with interest and costs. The Registrar declined to issue the writ on the basis that the Settlement Agreement did not clearly provide for the amount claimed. The applicant therefore sought an order directing the Registrar to issue the writ and authorising execution. The respondent opposed the application, contending that his liability under the Settlement Agreement was limited strictly to 50% of the monthly instalments and did not extend to the final balloon payment.

Discussion: The main issue was the proper interpretation of the phrase “until the expiry of the finance agreement” in the Settlement Agreement. The applicant argued that the finance agreement only expired once all obligations under it, including the final balloon payment, had been discharged, and that excluding the balloon payment would render the phrase meaningless. The respondent argued that the clause referred only to the duration over which the monthly instalments of R2,657 were payable and that there was no express reference to any liability for a residual or balloon amount. The court applied the modern, unitary approach to interpretation articulated in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality and confirmed in University of Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological Seminary, requiring consideration of text, context and purpose together. An alleged admission by the respondent in a later email was disregarded after the applicant elected not to rely on it.

Findings: The court found that the finance agreement, which predated the Settlement Agreement, formed the factual matrix within which the parties contracted and that both parties must have been aware that the agreement included a final balloon instalment. The repeated use of the words “until the expiry of the finance agreement” emphasised duration rather than the quantum of individual instalments. Had the parties intended to exclude the final instalment, this would have been expressly stated. Interpreting the clause as excluding the balloon payment would undermine its purpose and lead to an insensible result. The balloon payment formed part of the finance agreement and was not an additional or separate obligation. Accordingly, the respondent was liable for 50% of that final instalment.

Order: The Registrar was directed to issue a writ of execution in favour of the applicant for R55,786.65 plus interest from 28 December 2024 to date of final payment; the Sheriff was authorised to attach and sell the respondent’s movable property to satisfy the debt; the Sheriff was directed to pay the proceeds to the applicant; and the respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application, including the costs of counsel on Scale B.

Facts: JB was arraigned in the regional court sitting at Krugersdorp on two counts of rape committed while he and the complainants were detained in the juvenile section of the Bosasa Youth Centre. Count one related to the rape of a 17‑year‑old male on 5 April 2019, when JB was 18 years old, and count two to the rape of a 15‑year‑old male on 27 June 2018. JB pleaded guilty to both charges and was convicted on his plea. Prior to sentence, a pre‑sentence report compiled by a probation officer alleged that JB was HIV‑positive, that he knew of his HIV‑positive status, and that one of the complainants had contracted HIV as a result of the rape. Relying on this report, the regional court treated JB’s alleged HIV‑positive status as a significant aggravating factor and sentenced him to life imprisonment on count one and ten years’ imprisonment on count two, to run concurrently.

Appeal: JB exercised his automatic right of appeal against sentence only. The full bench of the Gauteng Division of the High Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the regional court’s reliance on JB’s alleged knowledge of his HIV‑positive status as justifying the imposition of life imprisonment. With special leave, JB appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal and simultaneously applied, in terms of section 19(b) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, to adduce further evidence on appeal establishing that he was in fact HIV‑negative. The State did not oppose the application to lead further evidence and accepted that JB’s HIV‑negative status was not disputed.

Discussion: The appeal raised two intertwined issues: whether the requirements for admitting further evidence on appeal were met, and whether the sentence of life imprisonment was vitiated by a material misdirection. The Court considered the principles governing the admission of further evidence on appeal, including that such evidence must be prima facie true, materially relevant, and accompanied by a reasonable explanation for its absence at trial. The new evidence consisted of affidavits from Lancet Laboratories employees and an expert clinical virologist, together with an authenticated medical report, establishing a clear chain of custody and confirming that JB tested HIV‑negative, with an explanation that a true HIV‑positive status cannot later revert to negative absent a stem cell transplant. The Court examined the statutory framework governing sentencing for rape under section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, emphasising that reliance on HIV‑status as an aggravating factor requires proper medical proof both of the accused’s status and of knowledge thereof. It was noted that the probation officer’s report constituted hearsay and that the State had led no medical evidence to establish either JB’s HIV‑status or transmission to the complainants, despite the potentially decisive sentencing consequences.

Findings: The Court found that the further evidence was credible, scientific, objective and directly material to sentence, and that its exclusion would result in a miscarriage of justice. The evidence conclusively negated the aggravating factor relied upon by both the regional court and the full bench, namely that JB was HIV‑positive and knowingly exposed the complainants to the virus. The Court held that it was impermissible to impose life imprisonment on the basis of unverified hearsay concerning HIV‑status, and that the failure to obtain medical evidence constituted a serious misdirection. Once the erroneous aggravating factor was removed, the Court found that substantial and compelling circumstances were present, including JB’s youth, emotional immaturity, traumatic upbringing, absence of prior convictions, and guilty plea. The sentence of life imprisonment was therefore excessive and disproportionate, and the full bench erred in confirming it.

Order: The application to adduce further evidence on appeal was granted, the appeal was upheld, the decision of the full bench was set aside, and the sentence of life imprisonment on count one was substituted with a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment, ten years of which were ordered to run concurrently with the sentence of ten years on count two, effectively resulting in a term of 15 years’ imprisonment, antedated to 9 November 2021.

Facts: The appellant, Jason De Bruyn, was convicted in the Somerset West Regional Court of the murder of Mr Edmere Chinzete and of defeating the ends of justice. The murder occurred in 2014 when Mr Chinzete was struck with a hammer, stabbed repeatedly, and his body discarded on the R44 near Gordon’s Bay, where it was discovered two weeks later. The appellant, who was 20 years old at the time, acted together with co-accused in the execution of a common purpose and thereafter assisted in concealing the crime by cleaning the vehicle used. He was arrested in 2022 and pleaded guilty in terms of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. On conviction, he was sentenced to 25 years’ direct imprisonment for murder, being a deviation from the prescribed sentence of life imprisonment under section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, and to two years’ imprisonment for defeating the ends of justice, wholly suspended.

Appeal: The appeal was directed solely against the sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment imposed for murder. The appellant contended that the Regional Court committed multiple misdirections resulting in a sentence that was disproportionate and unjust. It was argued that insufficient weight was afforded to the probation officer’s report detailing the appellant’s traumatic upbringing, including prolonged childhood sexual abuse and psychological domination within a dysfunctional family environment, as well as his youth, first-offender status, remorse, plea of guilty, and willingness to testify against his co-accused as a section 204 witness. The appellant further submitted that the Regional Court overemphasised the seriousness of the offence and the interests of the community, relied on unsubstantiated prosecutorial assertions, and made erroneous factual findings regarding paternal influence. A substantially reduced sentence, potentially incorporating correctional supervision under section 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act, was sought.

Discussion: The Court approached the appeal mindful of the limited basis upon which a sentencing discretion may be interfered with, namely where there has been a material misdirection or where the sentence induces a sense of shock. The principles governing sentencing under the minimum sentence regime, as articulated in S v Malgas, were reiterated, emphasising proportionality and the need for truly convincing reasons to depart from the legislatively ordained sentence. The brutality of the murder, the concealment of the body, the prolonged anguish suffered by the deceased’s family, and the absence of any prior voluntary disclosure by the appellant were considered significant aggravating features. The mitigating factors advanced, including the appellant’s youth, personal history, guilty plea, and co-operation with the State, were evaluated in context. The Court examined whether the Regional Court had meaningfully engaged with these factors and whether their cumulative weight justified any further deviation beyond that already afforded.

Findings: It was found that the Regional Court properly considered all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors, including the probation officer’s report, and exercised its discretion judicially. The appellant’s tragic personal history, while acknowledged, did not establish diminished criminal capacity or coercion sufficient to justify a lesser sentence. Youth and first-offender status were correctly treated as relevant but not decisive factors within the framework of section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. The willingness to testify against co-accused and the plea of guilty were expressly recognised and formed part of the basis for deviating from life imprisonment. No material misdirection was established, and the sentence imposed was neither disproportionate nor shockingly inappropriate. The sentence was, if anything, lenient in light of the gravity of the offence.

Order: The appeal against sentence was dismissed.

Facts: This matter concerns a dispute arising from the administration of the deceased estate of Filida Delport. The applicant, Marianne Bryant N.O., acts as executrix of the estate, of which the sole beneficiary is Filida’s granddaughter, Lynn Delport. The first and second respondents are Filida’s son, Winston Delport, and his wife, Liesell Delport. Prior to her death in 2023, Filida sold her immovable property in Somerset West to Winston and Liesell for R350,000. After transfer, the net proceeds of R322,690.10 were paid into Filida’s bank account, but on the same day R322,600 was transferred from that account into Winston’s personal cheque account. The funds were thereafter dissipated by Winston through transfers and substantial cash withdrawals. Filida passed away shortly thereafter. The executrix contended that the transfer of the sale proceeds to Winston was without lawful cause and that a further amount of R25,090.90 paid by Filida for transfer and bond costs constituted an unrepaid loan.

Application: The executrix approached the High Court seeking repayment of R350,000 from Winston and Liesell, alternatively relying on enrichment and loan claims. By the time the matter was heard, relief against the Registrar of Deeds, the bank, and the conveyancing attorneys had been withdrawn, leaving only the monetary claim against Winston and Liesell. The primary relief pursued was repayment of the sale proceeds on the basis that Winston had been unjustly enriched by transferring the funds to his own account without justifiable cause. In addition, the executrix sought repayment of the transfer and bond costs advanced by Filida as a loan. Winston and Liesell opposed the application, disputing wrongdoing and asserting that the funds were transferred pursuant to an agreement with Filida to use the money to build a flatlet on the property.

Discussion: The Court first addressed standing and held that the executrix was duly authorised, as the 2022 will had been accepted by the Master and had not been set aside. The enrichment claim based on alleged fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence in the sale of the property raised material disputes of fact which could not be resolved on the papers, particularly in light of the evidence of the conveyancing attorney who confirmed Filida’s understanding of the sale. However, the Court separately considered the alternative enrichment ground relating to the transfer of funds from Filida’s account to Winston’s account. Applying the principles of condictio sine causa, the Court examined whether there was a lawful cause for that transfer. Winston’s explanation, raised only in a further affidavit at the hearing, that the funds were to be used for construction, was tested against the objective evidence, his prior conduct, and the bank records. The Court also considered whether the executrix was entitled to rely on this ground despite it being fully articulated only in supplementary affidavits, concluding that this was an exceptional case where the facts were not initially within her knowledge and no prejudice was caused.

Findings: The Court found Winston’s version regarding an agreement to use the funds for construction to be far-fetched, untenable, and inconsistent with his conduct, including the eviction proceedings against Lynn and the systematic dissipation of the funds in cash. There was no credible evidence of any lawful agreement authorising the transfer of the sale proceeds to Winston’s personal account. Accordingly, the requirements for an enrichment claim were satisfied: Winston received money belonging to Filida, he was enriched, and the estate was correspondingly impoverished. The Court further found that the amount of R25,090.90 paid by Filida for transfer and bond costs was a loan to Winston and Liesell, which they admitted had not been repaid, entitling the estate to recovery of that sum. Interest was allowed at the prescribed rate from the date of the order.

Order: The first respondent was ordered to pay R322,600 to the applicant, the first and second respondents jointly were ordered to pay R25,090.90, interest was awarded on both amounts at the prescribed rate from the date of the order, and the first and second respondents were ordered to pay the applicant’s costs, including counsel’s fees on scale B.

Facts: Mary Fisher and Puso Fisher, who are co-owners of a residential unit in the Silverbirch Estate, became embroiled in a protracted dispute with The Silverbirch Estate Homeowners’ Association (NPC) and Johannes Jochimus Heyneke concerning control of the association and the correctness of director information recorded by the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission. The dispute arose after steps were taken in 2020 to amend the CIPC records to reflect Mary Fisher, together with Avril Counter and Kelebogile Ntsane, as directors of the association, which steps were alleged by the respondents to have been unauthorised. Ancillary disputes included unpaid levies, the lawfulness of Heyneke’s appointment as chairperson, and alleged prejudice to members. In 2021, an application was brought in the Gauteng Division of the High Court to remove Fisher, Counter and Ntsane from the CIPC records and to reflect Heyneke as a director. That application succeeded, adverse credibility findings were made against Mary Fisher, and she was ordered to pay costs. Leave to appeal was refused by the High Court and a subsequent petition for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal was dismissed.

Application: Mary Fisher applied for reconsideration of the refusal of her petition for special leave to appeal under section 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, contending that a grave failure of justice would result if the refusal stood. She relied on alleged procedural unfairness, misapplication of company law principles, misinterpretation of the association’s governing documents, failure to refer disputes to oral evidence, incorrect rejection of technical defences, and improper credibility findings. The reconsideration application was referred to a five-member bench of the Supreme Court of Appeal. During the process it emerged, belatedly, that Fisher had resigned as a director of the association prior to the petition refusal.

Discussion: Three judgments were delivered. Cloete AJA held that the amended section 17(2)(f) requires a two-stage enquiry: first, whether refusal of reconsideration would result in a grave failure of justice or bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and second, only if that threshold is met, whether the petition refusal should be reconsidered. Applying this framework, Cloete AJA held that even assuming the threshold were met, the reconsideration application was rendered moot by Fisher’s prior resignation. Any appeal against the High Court order directing amendment of the CIPC records would have no practical legal effect, engaging section 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act. Mocumie JA agreed that the reconsideration application must fail but disagreed with the legal approach and the form of the order. She held that once the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal refers a matter for reconsideration, the Court’s task is to step directly into the shoes of the judges who refused leave to appeal and to decide whether leave ought to have been granted, without re-examining the jurisdictional threshold. On this approach, the application should be dismissed, not struck from the roll. Goosen JA agreed with Cloete AJA and expressly rejected Mocumie JA’s reliance on 4 Seasons Logistics CC v Kgotse. Goosen JA held that the jurisdictional threshold under section 17(2)(f) remains for determination by the Court hearing reconsideration and that where the threshold is not met, the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the reconsideration on the merits. In such circumstances, the proper order is to strike the application from the roll.

Findings: The majority of the Court was reflected in the judgments of Cloete AJA and Goosen JA. They held that the reconsideration application could not succeed because the appeal Mary Fisher sought to pursue would have no practical effect, given her resignation as a director prior to the petition refusal. This meant that the jurisdictional threshold in section 17(2)(f) was not met and that the Court lacked competence to reconsider the refusal of leave to appeal. The minority judgment of Mocumie JA agreed in outcome but not in reasoning, holding that dismissal rather than striking from the roll was the correct order and that the Court should not revisit the jurisdictional threshold once referral had occurred. The majority view prevailed and informed the final order.

Order: The first and second respondents were ordered to pay the first applicant’s costs occasioned by their late filing of heads of argument, and save as aforesaid, the application for reconsideration was struck from the roll with costs, such costs to be paid by the first applicant.

Facts: This application arose from a tragic event at Parliament in 2018, when Mr Lennox Garane, a senior parliamentary official, committed suicide in his office, describing his death as a “protest suicide”. Following the incident, the Presiding Officers of Parliament requested the Public Service Commission (PSC), established under section 196 of the Constitution, to investigate the personnel practices relating to Mr Garane’s transfer, grievances and the non-renewal of his fixed-term contract. The PSC conducted an extensive investigation, interviewed staff, considered documents and produced a provisional report, followed by a final report in April 2019. The report made findings of procedural unfairness and maladministration and issued non-binding recommendations directed at Parliament. Mr Dumisani Job Sithole, a senior parliamentary employee implicated in the report, later faced internal disciplinary proceedings by Parliament, was found guilty of misconduct and issued with a final written warning which expired in 2021.

Application: Mr Sithole instituted a Uniform Rule 53 review application seeking to have the PSC report and findings declared unlawful, unconstitutional and invalid, alternatively reviewed and set aside, together with costs. In further and alternative relief, he sought to review and set aside the decisions of the Presiding Officers to refer the matter to the PSC and the PSC’s decision to accept and conduct the investigation. He contended that the PSC lacked jurisdiction to investigate parliamentary employees, that the referral and investigation were ultra vires and irrational, and that the report prejudicially affected his reputation. The respondents opposed the application, contending that the matter was moot, unreasonably delayed, that the report was not reviewable as it was non-binding, and that the PSC acted within its constitutional mandate.

Discussion: The court considered condonation for late filings and granted it in the interests of justice. On the merits, the applicant advanced his case under the principle of legality rather than the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, arguing that all exercises of public power, including investigative and recommendatory conduct, must be lawful and rational. He relied on constitutional demarcation between the public service and the legislature, contending that Parliament and its staff fall outside the PSC’s jurisdiction. The respondents countered that section 196(4)(f) of the Constitution empowers the PSC to investigate personnel and public administration practices and report to the legislature, and that the report had no direct legal effect. They further argued that the applicant’s true grievance lay in the disciplinary sanction, which existed independently of the PSC report.

Findings: The court held that the application was moot, as the PSC’s recommendations had already been acted upon by Parliament, the disciplinary sanction had been imposed and had lapsed, and setting aside the report would have no practical legal effect for the applicant. As a court of first instance, the High Court could not determine an extinguished cause of action merely because it raised constitutional questions. The delay in bringing the review was found to be unreasonable and inadequately explained, amounting to an impermissible attempt to circumvent statutory time limits. In any event, the PSC report was not reviewable, as it was non-binding, recommendatory in nature and had no direct, external legal effect on the applicant’s rights. The court further found that the PSC acted within its constitutional powers under section 196(4)(f) to investigate and report on personnel and public administration practices relating to Parliament. No irrationality, procedural unfairness or bias in the investigation was established, and no case was made for declaratory relief.

Order: The application was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel where employed, such costs to be taxed on Scale C.

Facts: Aggrippa Mudavanhu Nhunge was injured as a pedestrian in a motor vehicle collision in 2022 and lodged a claim with the Road Accident Fund in 2022. After the lodgement, the Fund acknowledged receipt and called for further information but did not reject the claim. In January 2024 the applicant submitted a RAF 4 serious injury assessment report supported by medico-legal evidence. In terms of regulation 3(3)(dA) of the Road Accident Fund Regulations, the Fund was obliged within 90 days to accept the assessment, reject it with reasons, or direct the applicant to undergo a further assessment. That period expired without any decision being taken. Despite a further written demand, the Fund remained inactive for more than a year, prompting the applicant to approach the High Court to compel compliance with the statutory duty.

Application: The applicant brought an application to compel the Road Accident Fund to take the decision required by regulation 3(3)(dA) in relation to the serious injury assessment report. The Fund opposed the application on several grounds, contending that the applicant’s claim had earlier been rejected for non-compliance with section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, that the lodgement was defective under new regulatory requirements, and that the applicant’s remedy lay in review proceedings under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 rather than in compulsion proceedings. On the day of the hearing, the Fund conceded the substantive relief and agreed to a consent order directing it to make the required decision, leaving only the question of costs for determination.

Discussion: The court applied the settled approach to costs after settlement, requiring an assessment of where the merits and the conduct of the litigation lay. The Fund’s reliance on an earlier letter requesting further information was rejected, as that letter did not constitute a rejection of the claim and could not pre-empt a later duty arising from the submission of a serious injury assessment report. The court considered the principles of substantial compliance with section 24 of the Act, as established in Pithey v Road Accident Fund and reaffirmed in Road Accident Fund v Busuku, and found that the applicant’s lodgement contained sufficient information to enable investigation. The Fund’s reliance on Board Notice 271 of 2022 and the new RAF 1 form was untenable, as that instrument had been declared invalid and set aside. The procedural objection that the applicant ought to have proceeded only under PAJA misconceived the nature of the relief, since a peremptory statutory duty may be enforced by an application to compel performance. The Fund’s prolonged failure to act, coupled with opposition based on grounds foreclosed by binding authority, was scrutinised in assessing costs.

Findings: Had the matter proceeded to judgment, the applicant would probably have been substantially successful. Regulation 3(3)(dA) imposes a clear and peremptory duty on the Fund to take a decision within the prescribed period, and none of the Fund’s defences justified its inaction. The applicant was therefore the successful party for purposes of costs. The court further found that the Fund’s conduct warranted a punitive costs order: the prolonged failure to perform a statutory duty, the persistence in advancing defences contrary to settled law, and the lack of engagement with the specific facts of the applicant’s claim crossed the threshold for attorney-and-client costs. The late concession on the day of the hearing did not erase the costs incurred by the applicant in prosecuting the application.

Order: The Road Accident Fund is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of the application on the scale as between attorney and client, such costs to include counsel’s costs on Scale A in terms of rule 67A of the Uniform Rules of Court.

Facts: The applicant, the mother of four children born of a subsisting marriage to the respondent, approached the High Court for declaratory relief concerning the interpretation of a maintenance order granted pendente lite by the Strand Regional Court on 15 August 2025. One of the children, S[…], was at the time already enrolled in her second year of an LLB degree at the University of Cape Town. The respondent had historically paid her university fees. Paragraph 2.4 of the maintenance order obliged the respondent to pay “all the children’s educational costs”, followed by a non-exhaustive list of items. After the order was granted, the respondent adopted the position that his obligation was limited to school-level education and excluded tertiary education. He accordingly refused to pay S[…]’s outstanding 2025 university fees and her 2026 registration fees, placing her academic progression at risk. Urgent proceedings before both the Regional Court and this Court culminated in the present application after the Regional Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief.

Application: The applicant sought a declaratory order that the respondent’s obligation under paragraph 2.4 of the Strand Regional Court order includes payment of the tertiary education costs of the parties’ children. The relief was pursued on an urgent basis given the imminent deadline for payment of university fees. The respondent opposed the application, contending that paragraph 2.4, properly interpreted, was confined to school-related expenses and did not extend to tertiary education. He relied principally on the ejusdem generis principle and argued further that tertiary education costs had not been pleaded, quantified or adjudicated upon in the Rule 58 proceedings before the Regional Court.

Discussion: The matter turned on the proper interpretation of paragraph 2.4 of the maintenance order in accordance with the modern principles of interpretation articulated in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality. The respondent’s reliance on the ejusdem generis principle was examined and rejected, both on the wording and structure of paragraph 2.4 and in light of the interpretive approach endorsed in Endumeni. The phrase “all the children’s educational costs” was framed in broad and unqualified terms and expressly followed by the words “include but is not limited to”, signalling a non-exhaustive list of examples. The contextual matrix included the fact that S[…] was already pursuing tertiary studies when the order was made and that educational costs were deliberately excluded from the applicant’s cash maintenance budget, being treated as a separate category of direct expenditure payable by the respondent. The purpose of the order was to ensure continuity of education for all the children pendente lite, and a construction excluding tertiary education would produce an insensible and prejudicial outcome.

Findings: On a proper textual, contextual and purposive reading of paragraph 2.4, the respondent’s obligation was found to encompass the educational costs of all four children, including tertiary education. The use of the word “all” could not be reconciled with an interpretation that excluded one child entirely. The distinction advanced by the respondent between school and tertiary education found no support in the language of the order and undermined its structure and purpose. The absence of quantification of tertiary fees was not determinative, as none of the listed educational expenses were quantified. Applying the Endumeni approach, the applicant’s interpretation was the only construction that gave sensible and coherent effect to the order as a whole.

Order: The late filing of heads of argument was condoned. It was declared that the respondent’s obligation under paragraph 2.4 of the Strand Regional Court order of 15 August 2025 includes payment of the tertiary education costs of the parties’ children. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application, including the costs of counsel, on scale B.

Facts: Dr Darren Levin is a medical practitioner who had practised from premises in the Promenade Centre in Camps Bay under a lease initially concluded in his personal capacity. After the termination of that lease due to renovations, Promenade Centre (Pty) Ltd offered alternative premises. During negotiations for the new premises, Promenade indicated that it would no longer conclude leases with individuals and required Dr Levin to contract through a juristic person in order to avoid the application of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. Dr Darren Levin Incorporated was duly formed and concluded a ten‑year commercial lease with Promenade for new premises. Dr Levin stood surety for the obligations of the company. Shortly before the commencement of the lease, Dr Levin concluded a separate lease in his personal capacity elsewhere, DDL failed to pay rental under the Promenade lease, and Promenade cancelled the lease and sued for damages. DDL and Dr Levin raised a counterclaim seeking to have the lease declared void and unenforceable.

Appeal: The matter came before the Supreme Court of Appeal on appeal against the dismissal of the counterclaim by the Western Cape Division of the High Court. Dr Darren Levin Inc. and Dr Levin contended that the lease was invalid because Promenade required the contract to be concluded with a juristic person to avoid the CPA, which they argued amounted to prohibited conduct or an unlawful condition under sections 51(1)(a)(i), 51(1)(b)(ii), 51(3) or 4(5) of the Consumer Protection Act, alternatively that the lease was contrary to public policy and therefore void at common law. Promenade opposed the appeal and maintained that the lease was a valid commercial agreement concluded with a large juristic person to which the CPA did not apply.

Discussion: The appeal required the Court to determine whether a lease of immovable property concluded with a juristic person is rendered void or unenforceable merely because the lessor declined to contract with a natural person to avoid the CPA, notwithstanding a prior supplier‑consumer relationship. The appellants relied on the purposes and anti‑circumvention provisions of the CPA, arguing that Promenade’s insistence on corporate contracting defeated the purposes of the Act and amounted to prohibited conduct or an impermissible condition. The Court analysed the structure, purpose and scope of the CPA, including sections 3, 4, 5 and 51, and the distinction between substantive consumer rights and interpretive or realisation provisions. The interpretation exercise proceeded on the basis that the CPA applies only to transactions with consumers as defined, and that large juristic persons exceeding the statutory threshold are expressly excluded from its application.

Findings: The Court found that no transaction or agreement was concluded between Promenade and Dr Levin as a natural person, and that the impugned lease was concluded solely between Promenade and Dr Darren Levin Inc., a large juristic person to which the CPA does not apply. Section 51 of the CPA prohibits certain terms or conditions of a transaction or agreement, not extra‑contractual or pre‑contractual requirements imposed before an agreement is concluded, and it does not extend to a supplier’s decision as to whom it is willing to contract with. Section 4(5) does not confer substantive rights and cannot invalidate an otherwise lawful commercial lease. The Court further held that parties are entitled to structure their commercial affairs to avoid the application of legislation, and that requiring a juristic person to contract, without more, does not constitute unfair conduct or circumvention, particularly where the consumer is not vulnerable and enjoys equal bargaining power. The public policy challenge likewise failed, as the lease reflected the true agreement between the parties and was not disguised or simulated, nor was its enforcement inimical to constitutional values.

Order: The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.

Facts: The Institute of Market Agencies of South Africa (IMASA), a voluntary association representing registered fresh produce market agents, brought proceedings against the City of Matlosana Local Municipality (the Municipality), its Executive Mayor, several national and provincial organs of state, the Agricultural Produce Agents’ Council, ABSA Bank Limited, and FreshLinq (Pty) Ltd. The dispute arises from the operation of the Matlosana Fresh Produce Market, owned and operated by the Municipality, where sale proceeds from buyers are paid into a closed trust account held at ABSA Bank. In law, these monies do not belong to the Municipality but are held in trust for market agents and, ultimately, producers, subject only to the Municipality’s entitlement to a five percent commission. A court order granted on 4 March 2021 directed the Municipality to pay ninety-five percent of proceeds to market agents within forty-eight hours and included a money judgment for arrears. Despite this, the Municipality persistently failed to comply for several years, resulting in ongoing non-payment to market agents and cascading prejudice to producers.

Application: IMASA approached the High Court for interim relief in Part A of a two-part application, pending the determination of Part B. It sought an interim interdict restraining the Municipality from continuing to control the disbursement of trust monies and sought structural relief removing municipal officials from operational control of the Freshmark payment system and the relevant bank account. The relief included authorising FreshLinq to oversee daily disbursements and appointing an IMASA representative as mandatee on the bank account to ensure compliance with the forty-eight-hour payment obligation. The Municipality and the Executive Mayor opposed the application, contending that delays were caused by banking system clearing times, that the relief impermissibly interfered with municipal financial governance under the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, and that IMASA had alternative remedies, including further monetary or contempt proceedings.

Discussion: The Court considered the requirements for an interim interdict as articulated in Setlogelo v Setlogelo, namely a prima facie right, irreparable harm, balance of convenience, and absence of an adequate alternative remedy. The statutory and contractual framework governing fresh produce markets under the Agricultural Produce Agents Act 12 of 1992 was examined, together with the legal character of the proceeds as trust monies. The Court addressed and dismissed a Rule 30 application seeking to strike out FreshLinq’s supplementary affidavit, finding no prejudice and holding that the affidavit contextualised discovered documents. The Municipality’s opposition was scrutinised and rejected, primarily because its explanation for non-payment rested on inadmissible hearsay and was contradicted by objective evidence from comparable markets using the same banking infrastructure. The Court further considered whether the relief sought unlawfully intruded into municipal governance, concluding that the Municipal Finance Management Act applies only to municipal funds, not to trust monies belonging to third parties.

Findings: The Court found that IMASA had established a clear prima facie right grounded in statute, contract, and the unchallenged 2021 court order. Irreparable harm was established, as ongoing non-payment exposed market agents to regulatory sanctions, reputational damage, and financial collapse, with cumulative effects incapable of adequate redress by damages. The balance of convenience favoured IMASA, as the relief merely restored the legal position the Municipality was always obliged to maintain and imposed minimal inconvenience on the Municipality. The absence of an adequate alternative remedy was decisive: a further money judgment or contempt order would be futile in light of four years of non-compliance. Structural interim relief was therefore competent, proportionate, interim in nature, and constitutionally grounded in sections 165 and 172 of the Constitution.

Order: The Municipality and Executive Mayor were directed to remove municipal officials from operational control of the Freshmark system and the ABSA trust account; FreshLinq was authorised to oversee daily disbursements; ABSA Bank was directed to recognise an IMASA representative as mandatee on the account, subject to the Municipality’s right to withdraw its five percent commission; payments were ordered to be made within forty-eight hours pending Part B; the relief was granted as an interim interdict; Part B was postponed sine die; and costs, including two counsel, were awarded against the Municipality and Executive Mayor on the attorney-and-client scale.

Facts: Francois Petrus Ruiters and Trudie Ingrid Ruiters purchased immovable property in Bellville in 2023 and shortly thereafter sought the eviction of Elsie Arendse and other occupiers, who are descendants of families that had lived on the property for generations. The property had been jointly owned since 1969 by members of the Arendse and Florence families, all of whom died intestate between 1980 and 1993. Elsie Arendse had lived on the property since 1975, first with her in‑laws and later with her husband, Albie Arendse, until his death in 2010, and thereafter with her children and grandchildren. In 2005 and again in 2021, Chris Florence, a relative, reported the deceased estates and was appointed by the Master as a representative under section 18(3) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965, despite the property exceeding the statutory threshold. Without the knowledge or consent of the heirs, Florence purported to administer the estates and later transferred the property to attorney Sybrand Smit pursuant to a settlement of alleged legal fees, which transfer occurred without the Master’s consent. The property was immediately on‑sold and transferred to the appellants, who then launched eviction proceedings under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE).

Application: The appellants brought an application under PIE for the eviction of the respondents on the basis that they were unlawful occupiers and that ownership had vested in the appellants by registration. The respondents opposed the application, disputing the lawfulness of the alienation of the property, asserting their status as intestate heirs, and contending that their occupation remained lawful pending proper administration of the deceased estates. The Magistrates’ Court dismissed the eviction application, finding that eviction would not be just and equitable. The appellants appealed against that decision in its entirety, contending that once ownership and unlawful occupation were established, a private owner’s right to eviction was largely decisive and that the court below had unduly constrained their property rights.

Discussion: The appeal required consideration of the correct application of PIE, the meaning of unlawful occupation, and the effect of section 18(3) administration on heirs’ rights of occupation. The appellants relied on Constitutional Court authority such as City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd to argue that private owners bear no duty to house occupiers and that eviction should ordinarily follow. The respondents relied on the constitutional purpose of PIE, their long‑standing occupation, vulnerability, and the irregular manner in which the property had been alienated. A central issue was whether the court could, of its own accord, consider the absence of the Master’s consent to the transfer and the limits of a Master’s representative’s powers under section 18(3). The court analysed the jurisprudence on mero motu questions of law and the distinction between registered ownership and the lawfulness of occupation under PIE.

Findings: It was held that a court is entitled to raise, mero motu, questions of law necessary for the decision where they arise from the record and cause no prejudice. The respondents’ occupation was not unlawful, because as intestate heirs they held vested personal rights to claim transfer of the property and, under a section 18(3) regime, were ordinarily entitled to remain in occupation pending proper winding‑up of the estates, absent contrary directions from the Master. A Master’s representative appointed under section 18(3) has no independent statutory authority to alienate immovable property without the Master’s consent, and the purported withdrawal of consent relied upon by the appellants was legally ineffective. Even if unlawful occupation had been established, eviction would in any event not have been just and equitable given the respondents’ age, disability, long residence, lack of alternative accommodation, and the suspect circumstances surrounding the transfer. The appellants’ remedy lay against those responsible for the unauthorised alienation, not against the respondents.

Order: The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal on Scale B.