Facts: The Libuyile Community Trust was established in 2006 following a successful land restitution claim, and registered by the Master of the High Court, Pretoria, under section 6(1) of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1998. In 2019, the applicants and the second to fourteenth respondents were elected as Trustees, and a letter of authority was issued. Disputes later arose between the two groups, culminating in the applicants seeking the removal of the elected Trustees. Central to the conflict was an annual general meeting held in July 2022, where the respondents were re-elected as Trustees. The applicants alleged that the respondents were no longer permanently resident on the trust property, as required by clause 15.4 of the Trust Deed, and had only returned shortly before the hearing to renovate homes in an attempt to meet the residency requirement.

Application: This was an application for declaratory relief. The applicants sought an order declaring that the respondents were not duly elected as Trustees at a properly constituted annual general meeting, and that they were ineligible for appointment due to non-residency on the trust property. They also requested the cancellation of the letter of authority issued by the Master and the appointment of the applicants as Trustees, along with an independent Trustee pending a new election. The issue was whether the meeting held in July 2022 complied with the Trust Deed and whether the respondents met the eligibility criteria for appointment as Trustees.

Discussion: The annual general meeting was facilitated by the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development, and the Master subsequently issued the letter of authority. The applicants did not challenge the procedural validity of the meeting through a review application, nor did they seek to set aside the Master’s decision. Instead, they pursued a declarator. Clause 15.4 of the Trust Deed stipulates that a Trustee’s office is vacated if they are no longer permanently resident on the property. The respondents argued that physical residency was not required, only entitlement to permanent residence. They also claimed to have returned to the property prior to the hearing. The matter turned on whether the applicants had provided sufficient factual evidence to support their claims. In motion proceedings, the founding affidavit must contain all necessary facts.

Findings: The applicants were required to establish that the meeting was improperly constituted and that the respondents were ineligible. The applicants failed to demonstrate that the meeting was irregular or that the respondents were not eligible to be elected. No evidence was presented to show that the meeting did not comply with the Trust Deed, and the respondents’ return to the property undermined the claim of non-residency. The application was not framed as a review, and without such relief, the Master’s letter of authority remained valid. The facts did not support the declaratory relief sought, and the application was dismissed. The rivalry between the parties was acknowledged, but it did not justify the relief requested.

Order: The application is dismissed with costs, including costs of Counsel to be taxed on Scale B.

Facts: Merchant Commercial Finance had advanced credit to Radsmec Enterprise under a factoring agreement and two loan agreements. Valecic, the first respondent, signed a deed of cross-suretyship binding himself as co-principal debtor for Radsmec’s obligations. Radsmec defaulted, and Merchant obtained default judgment against Valecic for over R43 million. Efforts to recover the debt were unsuccessful, prompting an application to declare Valecic’s Sea Point property specially executable. Separately, the second respondent, J Valecic, signed a Guarantee and Indemnity agreement in favour of Investec Bank in May 2019, securing a loan granted to the first respondent with a mortgage bond registered over her Noordhoek property. Merchant later acquired Investec’s rights under a sale and cession agreement and sought to enforce the guarantee and bond against her.

Application: Merchant applied under Uniform Rule 46A to declare both respondents’ properties specially executable. Against the second respondent, it also sought a money judgment for R4,550,000 and R910,000 under the Guarantee agreement. The issues included whether Merchant had complied with section 129(1) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA), whether it was lawfully entitled to enforce the credit agreement and security, and whether it was required to be registered as a credit provider under section 40(1) of the NCA.

Discussion: The first respondent opposed the application on grounds of defective service and fraud, but his rescission application was belated and not properly before the court. The second respondent raised three defences including that she was not a judgment debtor, that Merchant had failed to serve a valid section 129(1) notice, and that the Guarantee agreement should be rectified to reflect a narrower scope. Merchant conceded it had not complied with section 129(1) before launching proceedings and attempted to cure this by serving notice during litigation. However, it did not seek judicial oversight under section 130(4)(b), which is required to regularise non-compliance. The notice itself was defective, as it referenced unrelated judgment debts and failed to properly identify the credit agreement and default. Merchant also failed to establish that it was registered as a credit provider when it extended credit to the first respondent.

Findings: Merchant was found to have extended credit to the first respondent in a manner that constituted a credit agreement under section 8 of the NCA, thereby requiring registration as a credit provider. Its failure to do so rendered the agreement unlawful under section 40(4), and the security provided by the second respondent was similarly void. The application against the first respondent succeeded. The property was not his primary residence, and its sale would not render him homeless. The judgment debt remained unpaid, and the property was declared specially executable. The application against the second respondent failed. Merchant had not complied with the procedural requirements of the NCA, and its credit agreement was declared unlawful. The Guarantee and mortgage bond were void from inception, and Merchant had no enforceable claim against her. The steps taken to amend the application and serve notice were improper, and the litigation continued in breach of the statutory moratorium. The second respondent was entitled to cancellation of the mortgage bond and restoration of her title deed.

Order: The application against the first respondent succeeds; his Sea Point property is declared specially executable. The Registrar is authorised to issue a writ for attachment and sale of the property. The Sheriff is directed to execute the writ and pay proceeds into the applicant’s attorneys’ trust account. The application against the second respondent is dismissed. The applicant must pay the second respondent’s costs on an attorney-client scale for the main application and on a party-party scale for the amendment application. The credit agreement between the applicant and the first respondent is declared unlawful from inception. The applicant has no enforceable claim against the second respondent under the Guarantee or mortgage bond. The applicant must cancel the mortgage bond over the Noordhoek property and restore the title deed to the second respondent within 30 days.

Facts: Akinwale, a social media influencer, had previously worked for Native Child Africa. Following her departure, she posted derogatory content about the company on her platforms. These posts included allegations that were damaging to the applicant’s reputation and brand image. The posts gained traction online, prompting concern from the applicant about reputational harm and commercial impact. In response to the escalating situation, the applicant obtained an urgent court order in December 2023, directing Akinwale to remove the offending posts and refrain from publishing further commentary about the company. Despite service of the order, Akinwale failed to comply, and the posts remained online, prompting the company to return to court seeking a declaration that she was guilty of contempt of court.

Application: This was a civil contempt application arising from non-compliance with a prior court order. Native Child sought a declaration that Akinwale was guilty of the crime of contempt of court and requested that the finding be recorded on her criminal record. The issue was whether a civil court’s finding of contempt, accompanied by punishment, constituted a criminal conviction for purposes of section 271 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which governs the recording of previous convictions.

Discussion: The matter raised complex questions about the nature of civil contempt and its consequences. The judgment explored South African common law and compared it with the legal positions in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. In South Africa, contempt of court is recognised as a criminal offence, but the proceedings for civil contempt are initiated through motion procedure and do not follow the criminal trial format. It was examined whether a finding of contempt in civil proceedings, even when proven beyond a reasonable doubt and accompanied by punitive committal, amounted to a criminal conviction. The submissions from the amicus curiae, Deborah’s 972, and the respondent, highlighted the procedural and conceptual differences between civil and criminal contempt, and the potential constitutional implications of treating civil contempt findings as criminal convictions.

Findings: A civil court’s finding of contempt, even when accompanied by punishment, does not constitute a criminal conviction for purposes of section 271 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Civil contempt proceedings remain within the civil jurisdiction, and the use of criminal terminology such as “conviction” or “sentence” does not transform the nature of the proceedings. The respondent’s conduct was found to be in contempt of the prior order, but as she had complied with the order following the first judgment, committal was deemed unnecessary. The judgment emphasised the need for precision in legal language and confirmed that civil contempt findings do not result in a criminal record. The broader implications for constitutional rights and the rule of law were acknowledged, and the common law position was confirmed through declaratory relief.

Order: It is declared that a civil court’s finding of contempt of court, with concomitant imposition of punishment, does not count as a ‘previous conviction’ for purposes of section 271 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The first respondent is declared to be in contempt of the court order made in December 2023. The first respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs up to 10 January 2024 on a High Court party and party scale, with counsel’s fees determined at Scale B.

Facts: Mabaso had previously been in a relationship with Gumede, who was married to the deceased. Their relationship continued during Gumede’s estranged marriage. Shortly before the murder, Gumede informed Mabaso she intended to end their relationship, prompting threats from him that he would shoot both her and her husband. On the morning of the incident, Gumede heard a gunshot after her husband stepped outside to leave for work. A neighbour, Mthembu, who had arrived to travel with the deceased, witnessed the shooting but could not identify the shooter. The post-mortem confirmed the deceased died from a gunshot wound to the head, with an additional wound to the hand. Gumede was discharged from prosecution under section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Mabaso later confessed to the killing, stating he had acted in self-defence and had planned the shooting.

Appeal: This was an appeal against convictions and sentences imposed by the Regional Court, Ingwavuma. Mabaso challenged his conviction for murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. He argued that the trial court erred in accepting the confession, misinterpreted forensic evidence, and failed to properly assess the credibility of witnesses. The issue was whether the convictions and sentences, particularly on counts 3 and 4, were supported by sufficient evidence and correctly formulated in law.

Discussion: The appeal focused on the admissibility and reliability of Mabaso’s confession, the forensic analysis of signatures, and the circumstantial evidence linking him to the firearm and ammunition. Mr Clayton, a forensic document examiner, concluded that Mabaso’s specimen signatures were likely deliberately disguised, supporting the authenticity of the confession. Cellphone records and tower data placed Mabaso near the crime scene. The confession aligned with Gumede’s testimony and the post-mortem findings. Although no firearm was recovered, the ballistic report confirmed the bullet was a 9mm calibre. The trial court had convicted Mabaso of possessing a semi-automatic firearm, but this was not supported by evidence. The respondent failed to prove the firearm’s make or type, and the conviction was reformulated accordingly.

Findings: The conviction and sentence for murder were upheld. The confession was voluntary and corroborated by other evidence. The trial court’s reliance on circumstantial evidence was found to be sound, particularly in light of Mabaso’s admission and the forensic findings. However, the convictions on counts 3 and 4 were reformulated to reflect the proven facts which were possession of a firearm of an unknown make and two rounds of ammunition. The original wording of the convictions did not align with the evidence and were substituted accordingly. The sentences on counts 3 and 4 were also reconsidered, as the trial court had failed to provide adequate reasoning for the length of imprisonment imposed.

Order: The appeal against the conviction and sentence on count 1 is dismissed. The conviction and sentence on count 1 are confirmed. The appeal against the conviction and sentence on count 3 is upheld. The conviction is substituted with: “The accused is found guilty of contravening section 3(1) read with section 120(1)(a) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, being the unlawful possession of a firearm, a 9mm calibre, the exact make unknown, on 11 February 2013.” The appeal against the conviction and sentence on count 4 is upheld. The conviction is substituted with: “The accused is found guilty of contravening section 90 read with section 120(1)(a) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, being the unlawful possession of two rounds of ammunition, being one 9x19mm and one unidentified calibre.” The sentences on counts 3 and 4 are taken as one for the purpose of sentencing, and the accused is sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.

Facts: The applicant and the respondent met in 2010 and began a romantic relationship that led to cohabitation, shared finances, and the birth of two children. In May 2011, the families of both parties participated in traditional Zulu marriage rites, including lobolo negotiations, umembeso, and umbondo ceremonies. The applicant claimed these events constituted a valid customary marriage. In January 2017, the parties entered into a civil marriage preceded by an Antenuptial Contract that excluded community of property and the accrual system. The applicant later challenged the validity of the Antenuptial Contract, alleging it was signed without full understanding and under pressure. The respondent denied the existence of a customary marriage and maintained that the civil marriage governed their matrimonial regime.

Application: The applicant sought a declaration that a valid customary marriage existed between the parties, rendering the Antenuptial Contract invalid. She also requested a decree of divorce, division of the joint estate, appointment of a Receiver and Liquidator, joint parental rights, maintenance for the minor children, and spousal maintenance of R80,000 per month. The respondent opposed the application, asserting that the parties were married only in terms of civil law and that the Antenuptial Contract was valid and enforceable. The issues were whether a valid customary marriage had been concluded, whether the Antenuptial Contract was legally binding, and whether the applicant was entitled to maintenance.

Discussion: The matter turned on whether the traditional rites performed in 2011 constituted a valid customary marriage under section 3 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. The applicant testified extensively about the ceremonies, the involvement of both families, and the cultural significance of the events. She presented documentary evidence, including a signed confirmation of lobolo payment and a wedding invitation referring to the events as a “traditional wedding.” The respondent acknowledged the ceremonies but claimed they were performed to appease the families and did not reflect an intention to marry under customary law. He denied key elements of the ceremonies, including the use of bile and traditional attire, and maintained that the civil marriage was the only valid union. Both parties testified as single witnesses, and no experts or family members were called to corroborate their accounts. The applicant’s testimony was found to be credible, consistent, and supported by documentary evidence. The respondent’s version was considered improbable and inconsistent with his own prior statements and conduct.

Findings: The applicant proved on a balance of probabilities that a valid customary marriage was concluded in May 2011. The statutory requirements and traditional customs were observed, and both parties consented to be married under customary law. The Antenuptial Contract signed in 2016 was invalid, as it attempted to alter the matrimonial regime postnuptially without judicial oversight, contrary to section 21 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1988 and section 88 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. The civil marriage was invalid, as the parties were already married under customary law. The applicant was entitled to division of the joint estate and spousal maintenance. Her claim for R500,000 per month was not supported by sufficient evidence, but she demonstrated a need for support and limited earning capacity due to her role in the household and the respondent’s restrictions on her career.

Order: It is declared that the parties entered into a valid customary marriage. The marriage is in community of property and profit and loss. The Antenuptial Contract is declared invalid. The civil marriage is declared invalid. A decree of divorce is granted. The joint estate is to be divided, and a Receiver and Liquidator is appointed. Joint parental rights are awarded, with primary residence to the applicant and detailed contact rights to the respondent. The respondent shall pay maintenance of R25,000 per month per child, escalating annually. The respondent shall pay spousal maintenance of R67,167 per month to the applicant, escalating annually. The respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs, including costs of two counsel and half the costs of preparing heads of argument.

Facts: The applicant and her former spouse were previously married in community of property. Their marriage was dissolved by default in 2009, and eight years later, the former spouse applied for the appointment of a liquidator to divide the joint estate. The first respondent, Jordaan, was appointed to oversee the process. The estate included a property in Willowbrooke, Roodepoort, purchased during the marriage and registered in the applicant’s name. Disputes arose regarding the property's value at the date of divorce, with the applicant claiming it was still a vacant stand, while the former spouse asserted the house was complete. Jordaan relied on a 2018 valuation of R2,200,000 and submitted a final report in 2022. The applicant challenged the report, alleging bias, procedural irregularities, and inflated costs, and sought Jordaan’s removal and substitution with another liquidator.

Application: The applicant applied for the removal of Jordaan as liquidator, the setting aside of his final report, forfeiture of his fees, and the appointment of a new liquidator. She alleged bias, failure to consider relevant evidence, and undue delay. The second respondent opposed the application and filed a counterapplication seeking confirmation of the final report and payment of R986,639.65 as her share of the joint estate. The issue was whether Jordaan’s conduct justified removal and whether the report could be confirmed in light of unresolved disputes.

Discussion: The matter turned on whether Jordaan had acted impartially and fulfilled his mandate effectively. The applicant accused him of favouring the second respondent, ignoring evidence, and inflating the property value to increase fees. Jordaan denied the allegations, citing the applicant’s refusal to cooperate and failure to provide documentation proving the property’s state at the date of divorce. He had conducted extensive investigations, including obtaining valuations, consulting municipal records, and requesting affidavits from estate managers and engineers. The procedural history, the nature of the disputes, and the applicable legal standards for removing a liquidator were examined. Delays were largely attributed to the applicant’s non-cooperation. The valuation of R2,200,000 was based on available evidence, and repeated requests for further documentation had gone unanswered.

Findings: The liquidator’s role was to act on behalf of the court, not either party, and mere dissatisfaction with the outcome did not constitute grounds for removal. No evidence supported a reasonable apprehension of bias or misconduct. The valuation relied upon was justified in the absence of alternative evidence, and the investigative efforts were found to be thorough and necessary. The applicant’s refusal to provide documentation hindered the process and contributed to delays and costs. Jordaan had not disregarded relevant facts and acted reasonably under the circumstances. The counterapplication for confirmation of the report was postponed, as further information was still required to finalise the valuation of the property at the date of divorce. The applicant’s conduct had frustrated the process, and costs incurred were to be borne by her share of the joint estate.

Order: The application for removal of the liquidator is dismissed. The counterapplication for confirmation of the final report is postponed sine die. The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of both respondents, which shall form part of the joint estate and be charged to her 50% share by way of adjustment.

Facts: The applicant and the first respondent were previously married and have two children. Their son is the subject of this matter. In December 2022, the family relocated permanently to Turino, Italy, retaining their home and movable property in Pretoria. The respondent has a large extended family in South Africa and, together with the child, visited South Africa on at least three occasions after the relocation. In April 2025, during one such visit, the respondent retained the child in South Africa. At the time, the parties were undergoing divorce proceedings in Italy and had each appointed legal representatives.

Application: The applicant sought the return of the child to Italy under the Hague Convention, arguing that the child had been unlawfully retained and that the Convention mandated his return. The respondent opposed the application, raising defences under Article 13(b) of the Convention, including allegations of grave risk of psychological harm, objections by the child to his return, and broader concerns about racism, patriarchy, and emotional abuse. The issue was whether the retention was unlawful and whether any of the Convention’s exceptions applied to justify refusal of return.

Discussion: The matter involved extensive factual disputes, including allegations of alcohol abuse, emotional and economic abuse, and racism. The respondent submitted a lengthy affidavit detailing her concerns, but many allegations were found to be unsubstantiated or contradicted by objective evidence. The legal representative’s report and the psychologist’s findings indicated that the child had not experienced abuse or racism in Italy and maintained a strong bond with his sister and grandparents. The child’s objection to returning was considered but found to be influenced by the respondent and lacking independent rationale. The Hague Convention does not determine custody but seeks to restore the status quo for proper adjudication in the country of habitual residence. The applicant held rights of custody in Italy, and the child’s habitual residence had not changed.

Findings: The retention of the child in South Africa was unlawful under the Hague Convention. The respondent failed to establish any of the exceptions under Article 13(b). Allegations of grave risk, emotional abuse, racism, and fractured family relationships were not supported by credible or independent evidence. The psychologist’s report and the legal representative’s findings confirmed that the child had not experienced harm in Italy and maintained strong familial bonds. While the child expressed a preference to remain in South Africa, this was influenced and lacked the maturity and independence required to override the Convention’s presumption of return. The objections raised were not rooted in fear or trauma but appeared to reflect temporary emotional alignment with the respondent. The applicant’s conduct was consistent and child-focused, and the proposed return plan included therapeutic support and safeguards.

Order: The first respondent is ordered to return the child to Italy within one month. The applicant is authorised to make all travel arrangements and must personally accompany the child. The first respondent must cooperate with all administrative processes and hand over travel documents. Daily contact between the child and the first respondent is to be facilitated until departure. Upon return, the applicant must report to the Italian Central Authority and continue therapy for the child. If the first respondent elects to return to Italy, the applicant must provide financial support and accommodation. Either party may seek a mirror order in Italy. The first respondent is ordered to pay costs on Scale C, including the legal representative’s costs.

Facts: Investec Bank advanced approximately R182 million to Viturwell under a written loan agreement. As security, Maree signed a “Guarantee and Indemnity” undertaking to satisfy Viturwell’s obligations to Investec upon demand. Viturwell failed to repay the loan and was liquidated in December 2024. Investec demanded payment from Maree under the guarantee. In response, Maree issued summons seeking to have the guarantee declared reckless credit under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 or alternatively suspended for two years. He claimed to be over-indebted and unable to meet the obligations under the guarantee. Investec then applied for Maree’s provisional sequestration, alleging factual insolvency and acts of insolvency.

Application: This was an application for Maree’s provisional sequestration. Investec claimed a liquidated debt exceeding R180 million and alleged that Maree was factually insolvent and had committed acts of insolvency. Maree opposed the application, arguing that the guarantee constituted reckless credit, that Investec had instituted proceedings against Santam for the same debt, and that there would be no benefit to creditors. The issue was whether the guarantee fell within the scope of the National Credit Act and whether Maree’s estate met the requirements for provisional sequestration.

Discussion: Maree’s defence relied on the argument that the guarantee was a credit agreement under the National Credit Act and therefore constituted reckless credit. However, the guarantee was found to secure a large agreement, a loan exceeding R250,000, which excluded it from the Act’s application. Maree had not received credit himself, and no consumer-credit provider relationship existed between him and Investec. The guarantee was a co-principal obligation, not a standalone credit facility. Maree’s reliance on the Badenhorst rule was rejected, as the dispute was legal rather than factual. His summons, which stated he could not satisfy the debt, was interpreted as an act of insolvency under section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. The argument that Investec’s proceedings against Santam precluded sequestration was dismissed, as Maree had simultaneously sought to invalidate the Santam guarantee. The estate’s asset value was disputed, but the papers revealed possible misappropriation and concealed assets, suggesting that a trustee’s investigation could uncover value for creditors.

Findings: The application met all statutory requirements for provisional sequestration. The papers established a liquidated claim, factual insolvency, and an act of insolvency. The debt was liquidated and undisputed, and Maree’s own summons, in which he claimed to be over-indebted and unable to satisfy the guarantee, constituted an act of insolvency under section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. Maree’s assertions regarding the value of his estate were contradicted by evidence showing potential misrepresentation of share ownership and financial dealings. His argument that the guarantee amounted to reckless credit was dismissed, as the agreement fell outside the scope of the National Credit Act due to its size and nature. The guarantee was not a credit facility but a co-principal obligation securing a large commercial loan. The possibility of uncovering assets through an enquiry under section 65 of the Insolvency Act was sufficient to meet the requirement of advantage to creditors.

Order: The estate of the respondent is placed under provisional sequestration. The respondent and any other interested party are called upon to show cause why a final sequestration order should not be granted on 9 March 2026 at 10:00. A copy of the order must be served on the respondent, his employees (if any), relevant trade unions, the Master, and the South African Revenue Service. The costs of the application are costs in the sequestration of the respondent’s estate.

Facts: Chrystal Spring Consumer Division, a UK-based company, manufactures and distributes natural deodorants under the trademark “SALT OF THE EARTH.” In 2021, it entered into an exclusive distribution agreement with Good Health Products, granting the latter rights to import and sell these products in South Africa. Salt of the Earth Products, directed by Lowe, also sells deodorants under the same name, using a logo featuring concentric dotted circles above the words “Salt of the Earth.” Lowe claims to have used the name since 2008, initially as a sole proprietor, and later through the respondent company registered in 2018. The applicants sought to interdict the respondent from using the trademark and requested removal of the branding from all deodorants.

Application: This was an application for interdictory relief under section 34(1)(a) and (b) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993. The applicants sought to prohibit the respondent from using the SALT OF THE EARTH trademark on deodorants and to compel removal of the branding from all related materials. The respondent opposed the application, arguing that the applicants had not shown a likelihood of deception or confusion, and claimed prior use under section 36 of the Act. A counterapplication was also filed, seeking partial expungement of the trademark registration under section 27(1)(a), limiting its scope to deodorants only. The dispute centred on whether the applicants needed to prove a likelihood of deception or confusion when the marks were identical.

Discussion: The applicants argued that section 34(1)(a) distinguishes between identical marks and similar marks, with the latter requiring proof of confusion. The respondent conceded that it used the identical trademark but argued that the applicants had not met the statutory threshold. The applicants’ interpretation was accepted, supported by Century City Apartments Property Services CC and Another v Century City Property Owners Association [2009] ZASCA 157, that no such proof is required for identical marks. On the claim of prior use, the respondent relied on invoices from 2015 and affidavits from associates, but the evidence was sparse, inconsistent, and failed to establish continuous and bona fide use of the trademark before its registration. The counterapplication for partial expungement was opportunistic, lacking genuine dispute over the broader product range, and unsupported by evidence of use beyond deodorants.

Findings: The applicants successfully established that the respondent’s use of the SALT OF THE EARTH trademark amounted to infringement. Because the marks were identical, there was no need to prove deception or confusion. The statutory protection under section 34(1)(a) applied directly, and the interpretation advanced by the applicants was accepted as correct. The respondent’s claim of prior use was unsupported by consistent or credible evidence. The invoices and affidavits submitted failed to demonstrate continuous, bona fide use of the mark before the applicants’ registration. The respondent’s counterapplication to limit the trademark’s scope to deodorants was found to be opportunistic and lacking in substance, as no evidence was presented to show use of the mark in relation to other goods. The request for a separate cost order for confirmatory affidavits was also dismissed, as it lacked justification and did not align with established practice.

Order: The respondent is interdicted and restrained from infringing the first applicant’s rights acquired by the registration of the trademark numbered 2019/35883 by using it in trade in relation to goods for which the trademark is registered, or any mark so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion. The respondent is ordered to remove the trademark SALT OF THE EARTH from all deodorants in its possession or control, including its graphic representation in websites, social media pages, packaging, or electronic materials. If removal is not possible, the items must be delivered to the applicants for destruction. The counterapplication is dismissed. The respondent shall pay the costs of both the application and the counterapplication on a party and party scale, including costs of counsel on Scale B.

Facts: De Jongh was employed as an Advanced Mining Operator in the Cut and Fill Production Department at Black Mountain Mining (BMM). His duties included operating a Sandvik Boltec DS311 machine, used for rock reinforcement in underground mines. On a night shift in January 2020, De Jongh asked his colleague, Plagg, a Mining Operator and Working Place Safety Representative, to untie a resin hose from the boom of the Boltec machine while its power pack was running. Plagg sustained fatal injuries from blunt-force trauma during the process. An internal investigation was conducted under section 11(5) of the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996, followed by disciplinary proceedings. De Jongh was found guilty of dishonesty and gross negligence and dismissed. His internal appeal was unsuccessful.

Application: This was an application brought by the National Union of Mineworkers on behalf of De Jongh to review and set aside the arbitration award issued by the commissioner under section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The issue was whether the commissioner’s findings and the sanction of dismissal were decisions that a reasonable decision-maker could not have reached, due to alleged irregularities, misdirection, and failure to properly assess the evidence.

Discussion: The commissioner had found De Jongh not guilty of dishonesty, noting his voluntary correction of a police statement. However, on the charge of gross negligence, the commissioner accepted uncontested evidence that De Jongh instructed Plagg to work in front of the Boltec while its power pack was running, a serious safety breach. Verified DCU data showed the machine was operational at the time of the incident. The commissioner found De Jongh’s testimony contradictory and unreliable, and preferred BMM’s version. Expert medical evidence indicated that Plagg’s injuries were consistent with being struck by machinery, not falling rocks. The commissioner concluded that De Jongh’s conduct demonstrated a complete failure to take care, and that he remained defiant and unremorseful. The applicant challenged the award on multiple grounds, including alleged reliance on hearsay, failure to consider personal circumstances, and the severity of the sanction.

Findings: The commissioner had properly considered all material evidence, including documentary records, expert testimony, and De Jongh’s own admissions. The inference that De Jongh instructed Plagg to untie the hose while the machine was running was supported by his statement and cross-examination. The DCU data confirmed the machine’s operational status, and the autopsy evidence reasonably supported the conclusion that the machine caused Plagg’s death. The commissioner’s findings on credibility were implicit in his preference for BMM’s version. The argument that the employment relationship had not broken down was rejected, as the commissioner had clearly explained why trust had been irreparably damaged. The absence of dishonesty did not preclude dismissal, given the gravity of the misconduct. The commissioner’s failure to explicitly mention De Jongh’s personal circumstances did not render the outcome unreasonable. Each ground of review was assessed and found to lack merit. The commissioner’s decision was reasonable and defensible.

Order: The application for the arbitration award to be reviewed and set aside is refused. There is no order as to costs.

Facts: Chwaro was appointed as Chief of Staff in the office of the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans. Her appointment was made on a probationary basis and linked to the Minister’s term of office. The Department later terminated her contract, citing her failure to possess an NQF level 7 qualification, which was required for the salary level of her post. Chwaro held an NQF level 6 qualification. The Department had previously sought approval to deviate from the statutory requirements to regularise her appointment, but this request was not granted. Chwaro refused to sign the probation extension letter and did not comply with its terms. Her contract was ultimately terminated via a letter.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the dismissal of Chwaro’s judicial review application. She sought to challenge the Minister’s decision to terminate her contract, arguing that the termination was unlawful and that her appointment should have remained valid for the duration of the Minister’s term. The issue was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter and whether the termination of her contract was procedurally and substantively fair under administrative law principles.

Discussion: Chwaro’s review application was based on section 6(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. She argued that the probation imposed was arbitrary and not rationally connected to her failure to meet the qualification requirement. The respondents contended that the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court, as it concerned unfair dismissal. The initial judgment had conflated jurisdiction with prospects of success, dismissing the review on the basis that no fundamental rights were implicated. However, the reasoning in Baloyi v Public Protector and Others [2020] ZACC 27 clarified that a litigant may choose a cause of action and forum, even where multiple options exist. The High Court’s jurisdiction was therefore engaged, and the review should have been considered on its merits.

Findings: The review relief lacked merit. Chwaro’s appointment was irregular due to her failure to meet the qualification criteria, and the probation imposed was lawful under regulation 68(1) of the Public Service Regulations. Her argument that probation did not apply because her appointment was linked to the Minister’s term was unsupported by the regulations. The Minister had discretion to exempt her from probation but chose not to do so. The termination letter was a rational response to the irregularity in her appointment, and the procedural steps taken were consistent with the applicable legal framework. The appeal was dismissed, and the remedial relief sought was not granted.

Order: The appeal is dismissed with costs, including Counsel’s fees to be taxed on Scale B.

Facts: The applicant, a non-profit organisation representing market agents, brought proceedings against the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Joburg Market (SOC) Ltd, seeking urgent intervention in the deteriorating conditions at the Johannesburg Market Precinct. The market, which handles over R500 billion in annual turnover, had become unsafe, unsanitary, and dysfunctional. Complaints included flooding, broken equipment, power outages, inadequate cold storage, and health risks. Despite years of correspondence and meetings, no meaningful improvements had been made. The applicant sought a court order compelling the respondents to submit and implement a comprehensive precinct plan addressing infrastructure, safety, and operational failures.

Application: The applicant sought a mandatory interdict directing the respondents to submit a precinct plan within 60 days, followed by a final plan within 120 days. The plan was to include a risk assessment, recovery strategy, and detailed implementation timelines. Relief also included a R20 million budget allocation, repairs to critical infrastructure, and adoption of a Code of Conduct. The issue was whether the respondents had failed to fulfil their constitutional and statutory obligations to maintain and operate the market, and whether just and equitable relief was warranted under section 172 of the Constitution.

Discussion: The respondents raised multiple preliminary objections, including lack of locus standi, non-joinder of service providers, mootness, and jurisdiction. These were dismissed. The applicant was found to have standing as a representative body of market agents and a community stakeholder. The respondents’ reliance on existing plans and reports was rejected, as no implementation had occurred since 2017. The argument that the matter was moot because plans existed was illogical, plans without execution do not satisfy constitutional obligations. The respondents’ failure to file answering affidavits or provide timelines for implementation further undermined their position. The applicant’s complaints were supported by photographs, correspondence, and media reports, all demonstrating systemic neglect. The respondents’ suggestion that the applicant should have approached the Consumer Ombudsman was inappropriate, given the nature of the relief sought.

Findings: The respondents had failed to fulfil their constitutional duties to provide safe, hygienic, and functional municipal services through the market. The Johannesburg Market was found to be in a state of disrepair, posing risks to traders, consumers, and the public. The applicant’s request for a precinct plan was reasonable and necessary to compel compliance. The relief sought was not an overreach but a constitutionally mandated remedy. The respondents’ failure to act over an extended period justified judicial intervention. A tailored remedy was fashioned to ensure accountability and immediate action, including budget allocation, infrastructure repairs, and adoption of governance standards.

Order: The first and second respondents must submit a draft precinct plan within 60 days and a final plan within 120 days, including risk assessment, health and safety, financial and quality management, and implementation details. Repairs to cold storage, fire safety, electrical systems, security, lifts, and sanitation must be completed within 90 days of the final plan. An additional R20 million must be allocated to the annual budget for capital and operational expenditure. Annual budget assessments must be conducted as part of the Integrated Development Process. The Code of Conduct prepared by the applicant must be adopted and implemented. The first and second respondents must pay the applicant’s costs, including costs of two counsel on Scale C.

Facts: Engelbrecht was admitted as an advocate in October 2017 and practised independently in the Western Cape without maintaining a trust account. In 2018, she received R223,739.25 from Gewalt to assist with a property transaction. The funds were misappropriated, and Engelbrecht later admitted to using the money for personal purposes. She provided fraudulent proof of repayment and attempted to persuade Gewalt to withdraw his complaint. A disciplinary hearing was delayed due to medical reasons but eventually proceeded in December 2022, where Engelbrecht pleaded guilty to two charges and was found guilty on three additional counts, including accepting funds without a brief and misrepresenting repayment.

Application: The applicant sought an order under section 44 of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 to strike Engelbrecht’s name from the roll of legal practitioners. Engelbrecht opposed the application and filed a counterapplication to review the decision to initiate the striking-off process, arguing that she had not been afforded the opportunity to appeal the disciplinary findings. She later abandoned the counterapplication and requested that the disciplinary committee’s recommended sanction, a suspended suspension and fine, be implemented instead. The issue was whether Engelbrecht remained fit and proper to practise and whether a suspension or removal was appropriate.

Discussion: Engelbrecht’s conduct was examined through the three-stage inquiry which included whether the misconduct was proven, whether she remained fit and proper, and what sanction was appropriate. The disciplinary committee had found her guilty of misappropriation, misleading the investigating committee, and accepting funds directly from the public. Her explanations were inconsistent and evasive, including claims that her guilty plea was coerced due to depression and lack of legal representation. She continued to deny wrongdoing despite the findings and attempted to shift blame to the applicant. Her conduct during the investigation and litigation was described as obstructive and dishonest. Comparisons to other disciplinary cases revealed that her actions were more serious and aggravated by her attempts to avoid accountability.

Findings: The misconduct was serious and sustained, involving misappropriation of client funds, deception, and a breach of professional ethics. Engelbrecht’s explanations were inconsistent and lacked credibility. She admitted to using the funds for personal purposes and provided fraudulent proof of repayment yet continued to deny wrongdoing during the disciplinary and court proceedings. Her conduct during the investigation was obstructive, including attempts to persuade the complainant to withdraw the complaint and efforts to deflect responsibility onto the applicant. The disciplinary committee’s findings were clear and supported by documentary evidence, yet Engelbrecht failed to acknowledge the gravity of her actions or demonstrate remorse. The pattern of dishonesty and evasion, coupled with her unwillingness to accept accountability, rendered her unfit to continue practising. A suspension was inadequate, and removal from the roll was necessary to protect the integrity of the profession and the public.

Order: The respondent’s name is struck off the roll of legal practitioners. The respondent must surrender her certificate of enrolment to the Director of the Western Cape office of the South African Legal Practice Council within one week. If she fails to do so, the Sheriff is authorised to retrieve and deliver the certificate. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the application and the counterapplication on an attorney-and-client scale.

Facts: Visser (Senior) had sold his farming business to the DC Visser Familie Trust in 2008, with amendments in 2009. The purchase price was over R8 million, partially paid through bond transfers, with the balance secured by a bond in favour of the deceased. After his death in 2019, his son, Burgert Visser, acting as executor, demanded payment of the outstanding balance. When the trust failed to pay, he sought to cancel the sale agreement and recover the property. In parallel, members of the trust challenged the validity of a 2017 Will submitted to the Master, claiming it lacked the testator’s signature and should be declared null. They argued that the 2011 Will, executed in Worcester, was the valid testament for estate distribution.

Claim: The first action was brought by Burgert Visser in his capacity as executor, seeking cancellation of the sale agreement and restitution of the farm to the estate. The second action was brought by trustees of the DC Visser Familie Trust, seeking a declarator that the 2017 Will was invalid due to the absence of the testator’s signature, and that the 2011 Will should govern the estate. The issue was whether the 2017 Will was valid and whether the executor was entitled to cancel the sale agreement and claim restitution.

Discussion: The matter turned on the authenticity of the signature on the 2017 Will. The trust led expert evidence from Ms Palm, a forensic document examiner, who identified six fundamental differences between the questioned signature and known specimens of the testator’s signature. These included the direction of the initial stroke, the shape and orientation of letters, and the placement of flourishes. Her conclusion was that the signature on the 2017 Will was not authentic. The trust also led evidence from DC Visser, who described the estate planning arrangements made by the testator and the rationale behind the sale to the trust. In contrast, the executor relied on the testimony of Mr Mostert, an accountant who claimed to have witnessed the signing of the 2017 Will. His evidence was challenged for inconsistencies, evasiveness under cross-examination, and lack of corroboration. The witnesses who signed the will were not called, and the executor himself did not testify. The expert evidence remained unchallenged, as the executor’s own expert did not appear despite multiple delays.

Findings: The evidence supported the conclusion that the 2017 Will was not signed by the deceased. Ms Palm identified multiple structural and stylistic inconsistencies between the signature on the disputed will and known specimens, including differences in stroke direction, letter formation, and spacing. Her findings were detailed, methodical, and remained unchallenged. The executor’s reliance on the 2017 Will was undermined by the absence of testimony from the attesting witnesses and his own decision not to testify. The explanation offered by Mr Mostert, the accountant who claimed to have witnessed the signing, was riddled with contradictions and evasive responses, particularly regarding the origin and printing of the document. His version was implausible and inconsistent with the surrounding facts. In contrast, the 2011 Will was properly executed and aligned with the deceased’s estate planning intentions. The claim for cancellation of the sale agreement and restitution of the farm was dismissed, as the relief sought was no longer practically feasible.

Order: The Will and testament purportedly executed in December 2017 is declared null and void. The Will and testament executed in September 2011 is declared valid for purposes of liquidating and distributing the estate. The plaintiff’s action under case number 11450/2020 is dismissed. The plaintiff in case 11450/2020 is ordered to pay costs on Scale A. The first defendant in case 13401/2020 is ordered to pay costs on Scale A.