Facts: Goldfields Logistics undertook repairs to a provincial road in the Free State Province, alleging that the Department of Police, Roads and Transport had failed to maintain the road for several years. The company claimed to have incurred expenses amounting to R234,594.65 and instituted legal proceedings against the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for reimbursement. The MEC raised a special plea, arguing that Goldfields had failed to comply with section 3(1)(a) of the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002, which requires prior written notice before suing an organ of State for recovery of a debt.

Appeal: This was an appeal by the MEC against the decision of the Full Court of the Free State Division, which had overturned the High Court’s dismissal of Goldfields’ claim. The MEC contended that the claim constituted a “debt” under the Act and therefore required prior notice. Goldfields argued that its claim was based on negotiorum gestio, a quasi-contractual remedy, and did not amount to a claim for damages. The question was whether a claim based on negotiorum gestio constitutes a “debt” as defined in section 1 of the Act, thereby requiring notice under section 3(1)(a) before legal proceedings may be instituted against an organ of State.

Discussion: The appeal turned on the interpretation of the term “debt” in the Act. Section 1 defines “debt” as arising from delictual, contractual, or other liability, but qualifies it as one for which an organ of State is liable for the payment of damages. Goldfields argued that its claim was not for damages but for reimbursement of expenses incurred in managing the affairs of the State without its knowledge or consent, the essence of negotiorum gestio. The judgment explored the nature of this remedy, noting that it does not require consensus and arises from voluntary and beneficial management of another’s affairs. The reimbursement sought is based on enrichment, not compensation for harm. Prior case law was considered, and it was emphasised that the definition of “debt” must be read conjunctively, with the damages requirement acting as a limiting qualifier.

Findings: A claim under negotiorum gestio does not constitute a claim for damages in the legal sense contemplated by the Act. The reimbursement sought by Goldfields was not for harm suffered but for expenses incurred in the voluntary management of State affairs. The definition of “debt” in section 1 was interpreted narrowly, requiring that the liability be for damages, which negotiorum gestio does not entail. The structure and language of the Act supported this interpretation, and the broader reading proposed by the MEC was rejected as inconsistent with legislative intent. Although the purpose of section 3 is to allow the State time to investigate claims, this purpose cannot override the clear wording of the statute. Goldfields was not required to give notice under section 3(1)(a) before instituting proceedings.

Order: The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Facts: Richard Meaden & Associates Incorporated, a firm of attorneys, rendered professional legal services to Global Merchant Supply Services and the respondents, including a shareholder and the sole director. The services were provided under a general mandate and billed monthly. The parties signed a payment plan in February 2022, acknowledging indebtedness of R1,324,358.43 as of January 2022. Partial payments were made thereafter. In January 2023, the shareholder signed a separate accommodation of payment agreement, undertaking to pay R1,138,195.42 in eight instalments. Only R70,000 was paid, leaving R1,068,195.42 outstanding.

Application: This was an application for provisional sentence brought by the applicant against the respondents, based on the signed payment plan and accommodation of payment. The applicant sought judgment for the unpaid amounts, arguing that both documents constituted liquid documents. The respondents opposed the application, raising defences that the documents were not liquid and that they amounted to credit agreements under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, which would require the applicant to be a registered credit provider. The question was whether the payment plan and accommodation of payment constituted liquid documents capable of supporting a provisional sentence application, and whether they amounted to credit agreements requiring registration under the National Credit Act.

Discussion: The applicant argued that the documents met the requirements of liquid documents as they contained unequivocal acknowledgments of indebtedness, specified fixed sums, and were signed by the debtors. The respondents raised several objections, including the absence of a certificate of balance, discrepancies in figures, and lack of authority for certain payments. They also claimed the agreements were credit arrangements under the Act. The applicant responded that the documents were self-contained and did not require extrinsic evidence, and that the interest charged was incidental, arising only upon default. The accommodation of payment explicitly stated that the original payment plan remained in force. The applicant also opposed the filing of further affidavits, but both parties ultimately sought leave to file supplementary papers.

Findings: The payment plan was found to meet all the requirements of a liquid document. It contained a clear acknowledgment of debt, a fixed amount, and a phased repayment structure. The objections raised by the respondents, including the absence of a certificate of balance and discrepancies in figures, were immaterial to the document’s liquidity. The accommodation of payment was similarly found to be a liquid document, with the shareholder’s unconditional acceptance of liability. The argument that the agreements amounted to credit agreements was rejected. The purpose of the agreements was the provision of legal services, not the extension of credit. Interest was only charged upon default, making it an incidental credit agreement, which does not require registration under the Act. The respondents’ defence based on misrepresentation and lack of authority was undermined by the original mandate, which authorised the applicant to act in all related matters. On balance, the applicant’s claim was supported by the probabilities, and the respondents failed to establish a valid defence.

Order: Provisional sentence was granted against the first and third respondent in the amount of R614,358.43; and against the second respondent in the amount of R1,068,195.42. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the application on Scale C.

Facts: The applicant and respondent are married out of community of property with accrual. They have no children together, but each brought major children into the marriage. During their relationship, they jointly operated guesthouses in Mpumalanga and Cape Town, with the respondent managing the finances. The applicant registered a company, MFP Properties, which acquired two properties with bank loans for which both parties stood as sureties. The respondent allegedly diverted income into third-party accounts, including those of his children, and failed to settle debts incurred by the applicant. Following their separation in 2023, the respondent continued paying the applicant a monthly allowance from third-party accounts, which ceased after she rejected a revised settlement proposal. The applicant claimed financial hardship, including repossession of assets and reliance on loans from family and friends.

Application: This was an application under Uniform Rule 43 for interim spousal maintenance and a contribution to legal costs, pending finalisation of divorce proceedings. The applicant sought R15,000 per month and R200,000 towards legal costs. The respondent opposed the application, denying financial capacity and alleging that the applicant exaggerated her needs and failed to disclose her financial position. The question was whether the applicant had demonstrated a reasonable need for interim maintenance and legal cost contribution, and whether the respondent had the financial means to meet those obligations.

Discussion: The applicant supported her claim with detailed financial disclosures, including bank statements and a Rule 43 financial disclosure form, which reflected a sharp decline in income and mounting liabilities. She argued that the respondent continued to enjoy a comfortable lifestyle, transacting through third-party accounts to obscure his financial position. The respondent denied earning any income and claimed to be financially dependent on family support, while also alleging that the applicant was being supported by her new partner. He criticised the applicant’s supplementary affidavit as unnecessarily lengthy and accused her of exaggerating her financial needs. The purpose of Rule 43 was considered, which is to provide interim relief in matrimonial disputes without requiring exhaustive evidence. Both parties are expected to make full and frank disclosure of their financial circumstances. The respondent’s failure to provide complete bank records and his use of third-party accounts raised serious doubts about the credibility of his claims.

Findings: The applicant was found to have made a genuine and transparent disclosure of her financial position. Her bank statements reflected consistent payments from the respondent, averaging over R21,000 per month, which ceased after she rejected his revised settlement offer. The respondent’s failure to provide full bank statements and his use of third-party accounts supported the inference that he was concealing income. His claims of insolvency were undermined by his continued access to luxury goods, travel, and credit facilities. The applicant’s financial distress, including repossession of assets and reliance on loans, was corroborated. The respondent had the means to contribute to both maintenance and legal costs, and his conduct reflected a deliberate attempt to frustrate the applicant’s claims. The criticism of prolixity was dismissed, as it was affirmed that relevance, not length, should guide Rule 43 proceedings.

Order: The respondent was ordered to pay R15,000 per month in interim spousal maintenance, starting 15 October 2025. The respondent was ordered to contribute R200,000 towards the applicant’s legal costs, payable in 20 monthly instalments of R10,000. Costs of the application were reserved for determination in the divorce proceedings.

Facts: Oostendorp, a long-serving employee in the labour relations department of the City of Cape Town, held a dual-graded position at salary scales T14/T15. He had performed the duties of a Senior Professional Officer (SPO) for over 15 years and was regarded as one of the most capable employees in his unit. Despite having only a matric qualification, he shared the same job description and responsibilities as colleagues who held national diplomas. In 2019, the City updated its job descriptions and introduced an Advancement Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), which required a minimum of a degree for advancement. Several colleagues were included in a deviation report recommending advancement to T15, but Oostendorp was excluded.

Application: This was a review application brought by the City of Cape Town to set aside an arbitration award issued by the commissioner under section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The commissioner had found that the City committed an unfair labour practice by excluding Oostendorp from the deviation report. The City challenged the award on multiple grounds, including jurisdiction, procedural irregularities, and the commissioner’s authority to grant advancement. The question was whether the exclusion of Oostendorp from the deviation report constituted an unfair labour practice relating to the provision of benefits under section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act, and whether the commissioner had the authority to order his advancement.

Discussion: The commissioner found that the advancement opportunity constituted a benefit under section 186(2)(a), even though it was subject to managerial discretion. The exclusion of Oostendorp, who had performed the same duties as his colleagues and had previously been included in the draft deviation report, was deemed unfair. The commissioner noted that there was no absolute bar to advancement for employees with only matric, and that other legacy employees had been advanced under similar circumstances. The City argued that the commissioner had exceeded his powers by ordering advancement, which fell within the statutory discretion of the City Manager under section 66 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. While the commissioner was correct in identifying the unfairness, he had overstepped by granting substantive relief that bypassed the City Manager’s role.

Findings: The exclusion of Oostendorp from the deviation report was found to be irrational, arbitrary, and procedurally unfair. His long service, exemplary performance, and parity with colleagues who were recommended for advancement made the decision to exclude him unjustifiable. The commissioner’s finding that this constituted an unfair labour practice was upheld. However, the relief granted, ordering direct advancement to T15, was beyond the commissioner’s powers. The authority to approve deviations rests with the City Manager, and the commissioner’s order effectively usurped that statutory function. The appropriate remedy was to direct the City to prepare and submit a deviation report for Oostendorp, allowing the City Manager to exercise discretion. The commissioner’s role was limited to addressing the procedural unfairness, not to substitute his judgment for that of the designated authority.

Order: The arbitration award was reviewed and set aside. It was declared that the exclusion of Oostendorp from the deviation report constituted an unfair labour practice. The City was ordered to prepare and submit a deviation report for Oostendorp within 30 days. The City Manager was directed to consider the report and communicate a decision with reasons within 30 days of receipt. Oostendorp retained the right to challenge the City Manager’s decision as an unfair labour practice. No order is made as to costs.

Facts: The Rand Water Board, a statutory organ established under the Water Services Act 108 of 1997, holds a registered servitude over a 16-metre-wide strip of land running through Woodhill Golf Estate in Pretoria. This servitude, created in 1997, allows Rand Water to convey water and maintain infrastructure for residents in Pretoria East. The servitude includes a 2-metre buffer zone on either side, within which no structures may be erected without written consent. The late Rautenbach owned a property within the estate, which included a home and swimming pool that encroached into the buffer zone, by 0.34 metres and 1.65 metres respectively, but not into the servitude itself. Rand Water alleged that these encroachments prevented the installation of a second pipeline and compromised its access and maintenance rights. The matter was initially heard in motion proceedings, then referred to trial, where the claim was dismissed and a partial counterclaim upheld.

Appeal: This was an appeal by Rand Water against the dismissal of its claim and the partial granting of the counterclaim. Rand Water sought demolition of the encroaching structures or, alternatively, a declarator that it had been spoliated of its possession of the servitude and buffer zone. The respondent sought a declaration that Rand Water had consented to the development, or alternatively, that consent be granted under the notarial deed of servitude. The question was whether Rand Water had granted written consent for the encroachments into the buffer zone, as required by clause 2 of the Deed of Servitude, and whether the respondent was entitled to rely on estoppel or enforce Rand Water’s statutory duties regarding pipeline safety.

Discussion: Rand Water’s case relied on clause 2 of the Deed of Servitude, which prohibits structures within the servitude and buffer zone without written consent. The respondent pointed to correspondence from Rand Water in 2005 and 2008, which responded to site plans showing the proposed development, including the encroachments. These letters expressed no objection in principle and attached the site plans, which were interpreted as implicit consent. Rand Water argued that clause 1.3 of its annexure prohibited any structures within two metres of the pipeline, but this clause was found to refer to proximity to the pipeline itself, not the buffer zone. The respondent also relied on estoppel, arguing that Rand Water’s conduct created a reasonable impression of consent, which was acted upon to her detriment. The counterclaim was based on Rand Water’s own affidavit, which acknowledged risks to the pipeline and a lack of maintenance.

Findings: Rand Water had, through its correspondence and attached site plans, granted consent to the encroachments. The interpretation of clause 2 was guided by principles of text, context, and purpose, and the letters were found to constitute written consent when read as a whole. Even if consent had not been granted, the respondent was entitled to rely on estoppel, having constructed the encroachments in reliance on Rand Water’s representations. The requirements for estoppel, including a negligent misrepresentation capable of misleading a reasonable person, were satisfied. On the counterclaim, Rand Water’s own admissions regarding the risks posed by the pipeline and its failure to maintain it justified the order compelling inspection and compliance with statutory duties. The trial court’s reliance on admitted affidavit content was procedurally sound, and the award of costs for two counsel was justified by the complexity and broader community impact of the dispute.

Order: The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel, on Scale C.