Facts: Swartland Kelder owns the registered trademark SWARTLAND for wine products. The dispute arose when the Wine and Spirit Board approved wine labels that used the term “Swartland” without the accompanying wine of origin expression (“WO”, “WINE OF ORIGIN”, or “WYN VAN OORSPRONG”), as required under the Wine of Origin Scheme. The labels in question belonged to Trizanne Signature Wines and Marelise Niemann Wines. Swartland Kelder challenged these approvals, arguing that they infringed its trademark and contravened the Scheme’s labelling requirements. The Board had delegated its operational duties to SAWIS, and its decisions were later upheld by the Appeal Board. The Wine Certification Authority, which replaced the Board, opposed the application.

Application: Swartland Kelder brought a review application to set aside the decisions approving the wine labels and the Appeal Board’s dismissal of its internal appeal. It also sought declaratory relief confirming that, under the Scheme prior to its amendment, wine labels could only be approved if the wine of origin expression appeared next to every instance of the production area name. The issue was whether the Board had the authority to approve labels that omitted the wine of origin expression next to repeated mentions of the production area.

Discussion: The Authority opposed the application on four grounds including mootness, lack of legal standing, undue delay, and incorrect interpretation of the Scheme. It argued that the matter was moot due to a recent amendment allowing the wine of origin expression to appear only once, and that the applicant lacked standing as it suffered no prejudice. The Authority also claimed the review was filed outside the 180-day limit under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. On interpretation, it contended that the Scheme permitted approval of labels with the wine of origin expression appearing only once. Swartland Kelder countered that the decisions were made before the amendment and that its trademark rights were affected. It argued that the 180-day period began when the decision was communicated, not made. The applicant also maintained that the Scheme’s requirements were distinct and had to be met independently.

Findings: The matter was not moot, as the decisions remained valid and had legal consequences. Swartland Kelder had sufficient interest to challenge the approvals, given its trademark ownership and the potential dilution of its rights. The review application was found to be timeous, as the relevant decision was communicated on 12 October 2023 and the application was served on 8 April 2024. The Authority’s argument regarding the late joinder was rejected, as its executive manager had received the papers from the outset. On interpretation, it was held that the Scheme, prior to amendment, required the wine of origin expression to accompany each mention of the production area. The Board’s reliance on other provisions to justify its approvals was incorrect. The approvals were therefore unlawful, and the decisions could not stand. The declaratory relief was granted to clarify the Board’s authority under the unamended Scheme.

Order: The first and fifth respondents were only empowered under the Wine of Origin Scheme (prior to its amendment in R.6003 in GG 52342 of 20 March 2025) to approve a wine label if the wine of origin expression appeared next to each instance of the production area name, subject to section 11(6) of the Liquor Products Act 60 of 1989. The first respondent’s decisions to approve the following labels are reviewed and set aside: “CAPE GARDEN 2020 SWARTLAND CHENIN BLANC” (third respondent). “DAWN PATROL CINSAULT ROSÉ | 2021 SWARTLAND” (fourth respondent). “DAWN PATROL CHENIN BLANC | 2021 SWARTLAND” (fourth respondent). The second respondent’s decision to dismiss the applicant’s appeal under section 22 of the Act is reviewed and set aside. The fifth respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs, including the costs of two counsel on Scale C.

Facts: The Jacky Parker Trust was established in 1992 by Mr Parker, a farmer from Lichtenburg, for the benefit of himself, his wife, and their descendants. Initially, the trustees were Mr and Mrs Parker, along with their family attorney, Senekal. When Senekal resigned in 1996, the Parkers failed to appoint a third trustee for nearly two years, despite the trust deed requiring a minimum of three trustees. During this period, the Parkers, acting alone, entered into several loan agreements with the Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa, purporting to bind the trust as co-principal debtor and surety. In June 1998, prompted by the Master of the High Court, they appointed their son, DG Parker, as the third trustee. However, he was not consulted about the final R30 million loan agreement. The Bank later sought to sequestrate the Parkers and the trust, alleging unpaid debts exceeding R16 million.

Appeal: The Bank appealed against the full court’s decision to set aside the trust’s sequestration order. The issue was whether the Parkers, acting alone or as a majority, had authority to bind the trust in the absence of the minimum number of trustees, and whether the trust was validly represented in the appeal proceedings.

Discussion: The Bank argued that trustees in office could bind the trust, and that after the son’s appointment, the Parkers, as a majority, could act without consulting him. It also relied on the Turquand rule, claiming it was entitled to assume internal formalities had been complied with. These arguments were rejected. The trust deed required a minimum of three trustees, and this was a capacity-defining condition. When fewer than three trustees were in office, the trust lacked the capacity to act. Even after the son’s appointment, the Parkers could not act without his participation, as the trust deed required joint decision-making or majority decisions exercised through proper meetings. No such meeting or consultation occurred. The Bank’s reliance on the Turquand rule was misplaced, as it had not pleaded or proven that it believed the Parkers were authorised by the son.

Findings: The Parkers could not bind the trust while only two trustees were in office, and their conduct amounted to a breach of trust. After the son’s appointment, the Parkers again acted without authority by excluding him from decision-making. The trust’s appeal to the full court was also invalid, as it was instituted when only two trustees were in office following Mr Parker’s sequestration. The trust was not properly represented and lacked standing in the appeal. The judgment of the full court was therefore set aside, and the original sequestration order reinstated. The case highlighted the abuse of the trust form in family trusts where trustees and beneficiaries overlap, and the need for independent trustees to ensure accountability.

Order: The appeal succeeds with costs, including the costs of two counsel. The order of the full court is set aside and replaced with: The appeal is struck from the roll with costs. The trustees Jacqueline Lesley Parker and Dakin Greig Parker who brought the appeal proceedings without authority are to pay the costs from their own pockets, jointly and severally.

Key dictum:

A sub-minimum of trustees cannot bind the trust

[10] The first principle accounts for the fact that the trust could not be bound while there were fewer than three trustees. Except where statute provides otherwise, a trust is not a legal person. It is an accumulation of assets and liabilities. These constitute the trust estate, which is a separate entity. But though separate, the accumulation of rights and obligations comprising the trust estate does not have legal personality. It vests in the trustees and must be administered by them, and it is only through the trustees, specified as in the trust instrument, that the trust can act. Who the trustees are, their number, how they are appointed, and under what circumstances they have power to bind the trust estate are matters defined in the trust deed, which is the trust’s constitutive charter. Outside its provisions the trust estate cannot be bound.

[11] It follows that a provision requiring that a specified minimum number of trustees must hold office is a capacity-defining condition. It lays down a prerequisite that must be fulfilled before the trust estate can be bound. When fewer trustees than the number specified are in office, the trust suffers from an incapacity that precludes action on its behalf.

Facts: Maharaj was admitted to Netcare St. Augustine’s Hospital in Durban in December 2014 for spinal surgery to correct a C4/C5 cervical spine prolapse. The procedure was performed by Dr Nadvi, a practising neurosurgeon. During the operation, Maharaj sustained burns to her upper back, allegedly caused by the negligent use of diathermy equipment or improperly heated surgical sandbags. She initially instituted proceedings in the magistrate’s court and later transferred the matter to the High Court, claiming approximately R1,6 million in damages from both the hospital and the surgeon. The defendants denied liability and resisted the action.

Application: This was an opposed application brought by Netcare to postpone the civil trial, which was scheduled to commence on 27 October 2025 and run for four days. The issue was whether the matter was genuinely trial ready, and whether the postponement was justified in light of outstanding expert reports and unresolved procedural steps.

Discussion: Netcare argued that the matter was not trial ready, citing the plaintiff’s failure to provide further particulars and the need to instruct its own experts based on newly amended reports. The plaintiff’s attorney, Mr Pieterse, had previously assured the acting judge during judicial case management that the matter was ready for trial, despite knowing that the plaintiff’s expert summaries were outdated and required revision. This omission was later revealed in correspondence, where Pieterse acknowledged that the expert reports had become “stale” and would be replaced. Netcare had relied on the original reports to prepare its defence and now required additional time to conduct further investigations and obtain updated expert opinions. The plaintiff opposed the postponement, arguing that the matter had already been delayed for years and that she was being denied her day in court.

Findings: The matter was not trial ready, either at the time of judicial case management or at the date of hearing. The plaintiff’s attorney had failed to disclose material facts about the status of expert reports, which misled the acting judge into certifying the matter as trial ready. The delivery of amended expert summaries introduced new issues that required investigation, and Netcare had acted promptly in seeking a postponement. The explanation provided was detailed and bona fide. The plaintiff’s opposition was not supported by credible grounds, and her attorney’s conduct was criticised for being misleading and unnecessarily adversarial. The prejudice to Netcare in proceeding without proper preparation outweighed any inconvenience to the plaintiff.

Order: The trial scheduled to commence on 27 October 2025 is postponed sine die. The first defendant is granted leave to withdraw its application dated 19 March 2025 to compel the plaintiff to deliver further particulars, and the plaintiff shall pay the costs of that application, taxed on Scale A. The plaintiff is directed to pay the costs of the application for the postponement of the trial, taxed on Scale C.

Facts: Premier FMCG, a major fast-moving consumer goods company, entered into a supplier agreement with Zitixo Trading in 2019. The agreement was part of Premier’s enterprise development programme, aimed at supporting small businesses and pre-schools through painting and signage services. Zitixo, represented by its sole director Keys, was registered as a supplier and received payments totalling over R12,9 million between 2019 and 2024. Two Premier employees, De Lange and Windwaai, were implicated in a fraudulent scheme involving inflated invoices and kickbacks from Zitixo. Both resigned after admitting their involvement, and their estates were provisionally sequestrated. Premier launched an investigation, supported by forensic auditors, which revealed that large sums were paid for services not rendered and that the respondent had facilitated corrupt payments to its employees.

Application: Premier FMCG applied for the final liquidation of Zitixo Trading under section 344(f) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and section 81(1)(c)(ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The application was based on two grounds, that Zitixo was unable to pay its debts and that it was just and equitable to wind it up due to its role in a fraudulent scheme. The issue was whether the evidence of fraud and financial misconduct justified liquidation under either statutory ground.

Discussion: Zitixo opposed the application, arguing that no formal demand for payment had been made and that the fraud allegations were speculative and based on incomplete investigations. It challenged the authority of Premier’s deponent and claimed that the affidavits lacked confirmatory evidence. Zitixo also disputed the authenticity of letters linking it to De Lange and Windwaai and denied knowledge of any criminal proceedings. Premier responded that the fraud had been substantiated through internal and forensic investigations, and that the respondent’s failure to engage with the allegations amounted to tacit admission. The matter turned on whether the respondent’s denials were bona fide and whether the applicant had established a prima facie case for liquidation.

Findings: Premier had established a clear and uncontested factual basis for the relief sought. The respondent’s version was evasive and lacked credibility, offering no substantive rebuttal to the forensic findings. The payments made to De Lange and Windwaai were traced directly to Zitixo, and the audit confirmed that the company had been used as a conduit for fraudulent transactions. The respondent failed to disclose its financial position, did not provide evidence of solvency, and had no immovable assets. Its conduct undermined the integrity of the supplier programme and justified a finding that it was commercially insolvent. The relationship between the parties was voidable due to bribery, and restitution was appropriate. The just and equitable ground for liquidation was satisfied, not only due to insolvency but also because the company had been used as a vehicle for fraud, with no prospect of rehabilitation or meaningful engagement.

Order: Zitixo Trading is placed in final liquidation. The costs occasioned by this application are costs in the liquidation, to be paid on a scale as between attorney and client, including the costs occasioned by the employment of two counsel.

Facts: Lomajasa Beleggings is the majority shareholder of Nastoworx. Wilken is a director of both companies. Nastoworx’s primary asset is Fairview Farm, purchased in 2020 for R76 million, initially accounted for under Lomajasa and later transferred to Nastoworx. Lomajasa funded R56 million of the purchase, while the Doornberg Trust, a shareholder in Nastoworx, secured a R20 million loan from Standard Bank. Nastoworx’s liabilities exceed R162 million, with R46 million owed to Standard Bank. Wilgrow, a related company, was finally liquidated in May 2025. Nastoworx had provided guarantees for debts owed by Lomajasa and Wilgrow, contributing to its financial distress.

Application: This was an application brought by Lomajasa and Wilken to place Nastoworx under supervision and commence business rescue proceedings in terms of section 131(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. They sought to stay the winding-up proceedings initiated by Standard Bank, appoint Mr Rautenbach as interim business rescue practitioner, and have the costs of the application included in the business rescue or paid by any opposing party. The issue was whether Nastoworx should be placed under business rescue or finally wound up, given its financial position and the proposed rescue plan.

Discussion: The applicants argued that business rescue would yield a better return for creditors than liquidation. A conditional sale agreement for Nastoworx’s business and assets, including the farm, was signed for R66 million, later revised to R70 million for the farm alone. The farm’s market value was appraised at R114,5 million, with a forced sale value of R73,4 million. The applicants proposed that the shortfall be covered by Lomajasa’s sale of Teebus Flats and water rights, and Wilgrow’s movable assets. However, Lomajasa itself faced winding-up proceedings, and Wilgrow had already been liquidated. The proposed plan relied heavily on assets not under Nastoworx’s control and lacked clarity on how other creditors would be paid. Standard Bank, Nastoworx’s major creditor, opposed the application, arguing the plan was speculative, potentially mala fide, and aimed at avoiding liquidation oversight. The bank also contended that the sale agreement was void, having been signed after the provisional liquidation order.

Findings: Nastoworx was commercially insolvent and unable to pay its debts. The proposed business rescue plan did not establish a reasonable prospect of achieving the goals of business rescue as defined in section 128(b)(iii) of the Companies Act. The applicants failed to lay a sufficient factual foundation to support their claims, particularly regarding the feasibility of the proposed asset sales and the role of Lomajasa, which was itself financially distressed. The plan appeared to be an attempt to retain control of the farm through a new entity involving the Wilken family, rather than a genuine effort to rescue Nastoworx. The risks associated with the business rescue were not materially different from those of liquidation, and the liquidators had already taken steps to preserve the value of Nastoworx’s assets. Standard Bank’s opposition was reasonable, and its concerns about the timing and structure of the rescue plan were justified.

Order: The application for business rescue is dismissed, with the applicants, jointly and severally, to pay the costs of the application. The provisional order of winding-up is made final.

Facts: Kotze executed a suretyship in favour of OK Kloof Plase CC (in liquidation) in December 2014. Following partial payment by the liquidator, Afgri Veevoere, a division of Afgri, issued summons against Kotze in January 2019 for the outstanding balance. Kotze initially raised a special plea of prescription and denied understanding the nature of the suretyship. She claimed that the agreement had not been explained to her and that she would not have signed it had she known its implications. The matter was delayed repeatedly due to procedural non-compliance and changes in legal representation.

Claim: Afgri Veevoere sought payment of R5,515,796.43 from Kotze, together with interest and costs, based on the suretyship agreement. The issue was whether Kotze was liable under the suretyship and whether her special plea of prescription and defence of lack of consent could succeed.

Discussion: Kotze’s defence included a special plea of prescription and a denial of informed consent to the suretyship. She alleged that the document was not explained and that she did not intend to bind herself as surety. The matter was set down for trial, but Kotze and her legal representative failed to appear. Her attorney had previously withdrawn, and the new representative failed to respond to communications from the registrar. The attorney later claimed to be hospitalised and offered no formal application for postponement. The absence of representation and failure to brief counsel were viewed as deliberate and obstructive. The matter had been pending for six years, with delays largely attributable to Kotze and her attorneys.

Findings: Kotze’s conduct and that of her legal representatives demonstrated a pattern of delay and disregard for the litigation process. The special plea of prescription had not been pursued meaningfully, and no effort was made to set it down for determination. The explanation for non-appearance was vague and unsupported by formal documentation, and the failure to brief counsel was unjustifiable. The plaintiff’s claim was substantiated by the pleadings and supporting documents, including the signed suretyship agreement. Kotze’s defence, that she did not understand the document, was not supported by any evidence, and her failure to attend trial meant that no version was placed before the court. The cumulative effect of the delays, evasions, and procedural failures justified the granting of default judgment.

Order: The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of R5,515,796.43. The defendant shall pay interest a tempore mora on the aforesaid amount at the prevailing rate of interest, as determined from time to time, in terms of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975, as amended. The defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party and party costs on the High Court scale, in accordance with Rule 70 of the High Court Rules, subject to the discretion of the taxing master, with costs of counsel to be taxed on Scale B.

Facts: Gujraat Trading is a registered company whose director is Panchbhya. In August 2025, an employee, Mkhatswa, was transporting cigarettes and cash in an Isuzu bakkie when he was stopped by Traffic Officer Motlhatlhedi near Ventersdorp. The vehicle was directed to a weighbridge due to overloading. While waiting, Mkhatswa observed police officers attempting to open the vehicle. Despite protesting that he lacked authority to consent to a search, he was instructed to unlock the bakkie and remove the cargo. The officers seized the cigarettes and cash, and Mkhatswa was arrested. No SAP 13 documentation was provided, and the items were taken to the Ventersdorp Police Station. Gujraat claimed peaceful possession of the goods and challenged the legality of the search and seizure.

Application: Gujraat Trading brought an urgent application seeking spoliatory relief and a declaration that the search and seizure conducted by SAPS members was unlawful under section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The issue was whether the respondents had lawfully conducted a warrantless search and seizure, and whether Gujraat was entitled to restoration of possession under the mandament van spolie.

Discussion: The respondents argued that the search was lawful under section 22 of the Act, and that Mkhatswa had voluntarily consented. They also raised points in limine regarding urgency, defective affidavits, and non-joinder of SARS. Urgency was established and the defective affidavit point was abandoned. On non-joinder, it was held that SARS had no direct and substantial interest, as its involvement occurred after the search and seizure. The respondents’ version was riddled with contradictions, including discrepancies about when and where the arrest occurred, whether consent was given, and the role of SARS. The affidavits lacked corroboration from key witnesses and failed to establish a lawful basis for the search. Motion proceedings must resolve legal issues based on common cause facts, and the respondents’ contradictory evidence undermined their case.

Findings: The respondents failed to establish any lawful basis for the warrantless search and seizure. The version presented was internally inconsistent and unsupported by credible evidence. The claim that Mkhatswa consented was undermined by his protestations and the absence of any written or informed consent. The jurisdictional requirements of section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act were not met, as there was no indication that the officers reasonably believed an offence had been committed or that delay would defeat the object of the search. The principle of legality, rooted in the Constitution, was violated. Gujraat had been in peaceful possession of the goods and was wrongfully deprived thereof. The requirements for a mandament van spolie were satisfied including possession and unlawful dispossession without consent. The respondents’ failure to provide SAP 13 documentation and their refusal to return the goods further confirmed the unlawful nature of the seizure. The court declined to rule on the legality of the cigarettes or accompanying documents, as the spoliation remedy is concerned only with possession, not ownership or lawfulness.

Order: The usual forms, time limits and requirements relating to service as provided for in the Uniform Rules of Court are dispensed with and this matter is heard as one of urgency. The search and seizure conducted by the respondents in terms of section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is declared unlawful. The respondents are ordered to immediately restore possession of the items seized during the said search and seizure to the applicant. Should the items have been handed over by the respondents to any other person or entity, such other person or entity shall immediately restore possession of the items to the applicant. In the event of the respondents refusing to comply with the above, the sheriff of this court is authorised to take the necessary steps and give effect thereto. The first and second respondents shall pay the costs of the application on a party and party scale on Scale B.

Facts: The City of Cape Town sought to evict individuals unlawfully occupying Tuin Plein Park and surrounding streets in the central-city precinct. The case raises the delicate balance which courts must strike between compassion for the plight of persons living without shelter and the obligations of municipalities to manage and safeguard public spaces. The occupiers included seventy-two named individuals and several unidentified persons living in makeshift shelters. The area, adjacent to schools, a crèche, an old-age home, and a place of worship, had become hazardous due to open fires, refuse, and human waste. The City had previously engaged in mediation with some occupiers, resulting in a settlement agreement that provided alternative accommodation at Safe Space shelters. However, many occupiers remained unrepresented and continued to reside in the area.

Application: The City applied for an eviction order under section 4(6) and (7) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), along with interdictory relief to prevent re-occupation. The issue was whether eviction was just and equitable, considering the availability of alternative accommodation and the rights of both the occupiers and the broader community.

Discussion: The City argued that the occupation was unlawful and that it had fulfilled its constitutional and statutory obligations by offering dignified alternative accommodation through its Safe Spaces programme. This programme included shelter, meals, ablution facilities, social support, and pathways to employment. The City emphasised that no person would be rendered homeless and that the interdict was necessary to prevent re-occupation. The remaining occupiers, unrepresented at the hearing, raised concerns about curfews, lack of privacy, inadequate meals, and limited access to medical care at the shelters. These concerns were addressed during an inspection in loco, which revealed that the shelters were clean, structured, and equipped with support services. The inspection confirmed that the current living conditions in Tuin Plein Park posed serious health and safety risks.

Findings: The occupation of Tuin Plein Park and surrounding streets was unlawful and posed significant risks to public health, safety, and dignity. The City had taken reasonable steps to engage with the occupiers and had provided meaningful alternatives through its Safe Spaces programme. The inspection in loco confirmed that the shelters were clean, secure, and offered comprehensive support services, including access to social workers, healthcare, and employment pathways. The concerns raised by the occupiers were acknowledged but did not outweigh the broader public interest in restoring the area. The relief sought was proportionate, and the thirty-day relocation period was considered sufficient to allow for a dignified transition. The mechanism for indicating acceptance of alternative accommodation was accessible and fair. The interdict was necessary to prevent re-occupation and ensure the sustainability of the intervention.

Order: The respondents are evicted from Tuin Plein Park and adjoining streets.

Facts: Momsen is the registered owner of a sectional title unit in a residential complex in Ekurhuleni. Davies occupied the unit under a lease agreement concluded with Russell, Momsen’s representative. The lease commenced in September 2016 and converted into a monthly tenancy after its initial term expired. In October 2022, Momsen issued written notice terminating the tenancy and requiring Davies to vacate by the end of November 2022. Davies refused to leave, claiming rights of occupation based on two purported court orders and other defences, including a lien over the property and a ruling by the community services ombud.

Application: Momsen applied for the eviction of Davies and all persons occupying through her under section 4 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. The issue was whether the respondents had any lawful basis to remain on the property and whether eviction would be just and equitable under the circumstances.

Discussion: Davies raised several defences. She alleged that a new lease agreement had been made an order of court in February 2018, and that she held a lien over the property based on a monetary judgment obtained against Momsen. Both purported court orders were found to be forgeries. The Chief Registrar of the Johannesburg High Court confirmed that the documents bore no authentic signatures or stamps and were not issued by any sitting judge. It was claimed that the documents were received from a person believed to be an attorney, but the identity of this individual remained unclear. Other defences, including payment of rental arrears and reliance on a community ombud ruling, were found to be irrelevant to the question of lawful occupation. The matter turned on whether the tenancy had been lawfully terminated and whether any of the respondent’s claims could justify continued occupation.

Findings: The monthly tenancy had been lawfully terminated by written notice in October 2022. The respondent’s reliance on forged court orders and unrelated rulings did not establish any right to remain on the property. The applicant had made repeated efforts over three years to regain possession and was entitled to the protection of her property rights. The respondent’s occupation was unlawful, and eviction was deemed just and equitable, considering the applicant’s age and health, and the respondent’s ability to secure alternative accommodation. The respondent’s conduct and use of forged documents warranted referral to the Legal Practice Council and the National Prosecuting Authority for investigation.

Order: The respondents, and any person claiming occupation through or under them, are evicted from the property. They must vacate the property by 30 November 2025. If they fail to vacate, the Sheriff is authorised to evict them. They are interdicted from re-entering the property after eviction. If they reoccupy, the Sheriff is authorised to remove them again. The Sheriff may request assistance from SAPS. The Registrar is requested to forward the judgment and application to the Legal Practice Council and the National Prosecuting Authority. The respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the application, including costs on the attorney-and-client scale.

Facts: The applicant and the respondent were previously married in community of property. Their marriage was dissolved by order of the High Court in 2006. Although the divorce order included a provision for the division of the joint estate, the process remained unresolved for nearly two decades. In 2020, the parties signed a settlement agreement intended to resolve the outstanding division, which was made an order of court in October 2023. The agreement provided that the respondent, a member of the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), would pay R360,000 to the applicant from his pension interest. It also included a clause stating that the agreement constituted a full and final settlement of all claims between the parties. Despite signing the agreement, the applicant later challenged its validity, alleging that the respondent had been represented during negotiations by Mr Khoza, who falsely claimed to be an attorney. She further argued that the agreement failed to address the division of immovable property in Mamelodi, which she claimed formed part of the joint estate and remained in the respondent’s possession.

Application: The applicant sought an order declaring the 2023 settlement agreement null and void, or alternatively varying it to include a clause directing the GEPF to pay her R360,000 and to provide for the valuation and sale of the immovable property. She also requested a declaration that the property be sold, and the proceeds divided, or that first respondent be given first preference to purchase her half share. The issue was whether the settlement agreement constituted a full and final division of the joint estate, and whether it could be rescinded or varied under rule 42 of the Uniform Rules of Court or common law principles.

Discussion: The applicant argued that the agreement was void due to fraud, as Mr Khoza misrepresented himself as an attorney during negotiations. However, she failed to allege that this misrepresentation induced her to sign the agreement or that she suffered prejudice as a result. She was legally represented at the time and did not dispute the agreement when it was made an order of court. Her alternative argument was that the agreement only settled her claim to the respondent’s pension interest and not the division of the immovable property. The respondent contended that the agreement was a full and final settlement of all claims, including the property division, and that the applicant’s application was an attempt to reopen settled matters. He also sought to have her declared a vexatious litigant. The matter turned on the interpretation of the settlement agreement and whether the court had jurisdiction to vary or rescind the order under rule 42.

Findings: The settlement agreement, read in context and in light of the parties’ conduct, constituted a full and final settlement of all claims arising from the joint estate. The wording of the agreement was clear and unambiguous, and included a non-variation clause. The misrepresentation by Mr Khoza was not shown to have materially affected the applicant’s decision to sign the agreement. Her application did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of rule 42, nor did it establish grounds under common law for rescission. However, paragraph 7.4 of the agreement contained a patent error and ambiguity regarding the payment of the pension interest, which was corrected to reflect that R360,000 was payable to the applicant from the respondent’s pension interest. The request to declare the applicant a vexatious litigant was refused, as her litigation was not shown to be frivolous or abusive.

Order: The application to declare the applicant a vexatious litigant is dismissed. Paragraph 7.4 of the settlement agreement is varied to clarify that R360,000 of the first respondent’s pension interest in the GEPF is assigned to the applicant and payable within 60 days of her election. In the event that the GEPF fails to comply, either party may set the matter down for further relief. Each party is to pay their own costs.

Facts: Van der Linde was employed by Lekwa Consulting Engineers as a design engineer, earning R71,000 per month. She had worked for the company for 18 years, progressing from junior designer to manager design engineer. In mid-2020, the company faced financial strain due to the Covid-19 pandemic and issued a notice indicating its intention to embark on a retrenchment process. A follow-up consultation notice was sent, and a single consultation meeting was held telephonically. Van der Linde was later served with a termination agreement via email, which she did not sign due to concerns about the restraint of trade clause and the severance calculation. She was under the impression that her position was not at risk and claimed she was never informed that it had become redundant. The company made a partial severance payment of R222,000 but acknowledged owing her R504,701.11 in outstanding severance pay.

Claim: Van der Linde brought a claim for compensation based on procedural unfairness in terms of section 189 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, and for interest on the unpaid severance pay under sections 41 and 75 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. The issue was whether the retrenchment process complied with statutory requirements and whether the respondent was liable for interest on the outstanding severance amount.

Discussion: The applicant argued that the consultation process was inadequate and failed to meet the requirements of section 189(2) and (3) of the LRA. She contended that the notices did not specify which positions were being considered for redundancy and that the consultation meeting did not address the selection criteria or alternatives to retrenchment in any meaningful way. The respondent maintained that it had followed the correct procedure, citing financial difficulties and asserting that the applicant had been consulted and informed of the process. The respondent also acknowledged the outstanding severance amount but disputed liability for interest. The respondent did not disclose relevant information in writing, including the rationale for selecting the applicant’s position, thereby breaching section 189(3).

Findings: The retrenchment was procedurally unfair. The notices issued by the respondent were vague and failed to identify specific positions affected by redundancy. The consultation process was superficial, consisting of a single telephonic meeting that did not allow for meaningful engagement or consensus-seeking as required by section 189(2). The applicant was not given a fair opportunity to propose alternatives or understand the basis for her dismissal. The respondent’s failure to comply with statutory obligations justified compensation. Additionally, the severance pay became due in August 2020 and remained unpaid until the eve of litigation, placing the respondent in mora and triggering liability for interest under section 75 of the BCEA. The respondent’s conduct in forcing the applicant to litigate to recover what was undisputed further justified a costs order.

Order: The applicant’s retrenchment was procedurally unfair. The respondent is ordered to pay four months' remuneration as compensation to the applicant, calculated at her rate of pay at the time of retrenchment. The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant her outstanding severance and notice pay in the amount of R504,701.11, plus interest from 31 August 2020. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of suit.

Facts: Booysen, a former municipal manager with extensive experience in local government, applied for the position of Director of Community Services at Beaufort West Municipality. He was shortlisted and scored highest in the selection process conducted by external consultants and the Council’s selection panel. Despite this, the Council resolved to re-advertise the position, influenced by political figures including Prince, who was part of the selection panel and later became a candidate. In a second recruitment round, Booysen again ranked highly but was bypassed in favour of Prince, who had resigned as a councillor and was controversially appointed to the position. The Minister of Local Government intervened, challenging the legality of the appointment, prompting the municipality to reverse its decision and re-advertise the post.

Appeal: Booysen appealed against the Labour Court’s dismissal of his review application, seeking to have both recruitment decisions set aside and to be instated as Director of Community Services with effect from 1 July 2019. The issue was whether the municipality’s decisions were irrational, arbitrary, and unlawful under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 and the constitutional principle of legality, and whether Booysen was entitled to instatement.

Discussion: The municipality argued that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction under section 158(1)(h) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, as Booysen was not an employee. It also contended that the decisions did not constitute administrative action and that Booysen had waived his rights by participating in the second recruitment process. These arguments were rejected. Section 158(1)(h) conferred jurisdiction to review decisions made by the State in its capacity as employer, even in respect of job applicants. The decisions were found to be administrative actions under PAJA, as they involved public power and had broader implications beyond Booysen. The Council’s conduct was scrutinised, particularly its failure to deliberate on the selection report and its politically motivated appointment of Prince. The second recruitment process was similarly tainted, with the Council ignoring recommendations and manipulating the organogram to retain Prince.

Findings: Both recruitment decisions were unlawful and irrational. The first decision to re-advertise the post lacked any factual or procedural justification, especially given Booysen’s top ranking and the absence of concerns about his suitability. The Council’s failure to engage with the selection panel’s report and its disregard for the structured process indicated arbitrariness. The second decision to appoint Prince was equally flawed, as it was driven by political motives and executed through procedural manipulation, including altering the organogram to accommodate him. Although this appointment was later reversed, the damage to the integrity of the process had already occurred. Booysen’s rights under section 23 of the Constitution were infringed, and the delay in bringing the review was found to be reasonable. The argument that Booysen had waived his rights by participating in the second process was rejected, as unlawful exercises of public power cannot be legitimised by estoppel. Given the strength of Booysen’s candidacy and the procedural irregularities, substitution was appropriate.

Order: The appeal is upheld with costs. The cross-appeal is dismissed with costs. The Labour Court’s order is set aside and substituted with the following: The municipality’s decision not to appoint Booysen as Director of Community Services is reviewed and set aside. Booysen is instated to the position of Director of Community Services with effect from 1 July 2019, with full salary and benefits. The municipality shall pay Booysen’s costs.

Facts: Trendigraph CC operates a butchery on in Qumrha (Komga). In February 2025, the Great Kei Local Municipality disconnected its electricity supply without prior notice. The stated reason was the absence of electricity purchases during December 2024 and January 2025, despite a payment of R3,843 on 7 February 2025 and bulk purchases of R10,000 each in September and October 2024. The applicant had installed solar panels, significantly reducing its reliance on municipal electricity. At the time of disconnection, pre-paid units were still available. The applicant denied any tampering with the meter and challenged the legality of the disconnection.

Application: Trendigraph CC sought confirmation of a rule nisi declaring the disconnection unlawful and challenging the constitutionality of the respondent’s Credit Control and Debt Collection Policy and corresponding By-law, which permitted disconnection without notice. The issue was whether the disconnection was procedurally and substantively lawful, and whether the relevant policy provisions were constitutionally valid.

Discussion: The municipality relied on monitoring data from Ontec Systems, which flagged low consumption as indicative of tampering. It cited a council resolution to combat meter tampering and claimed that the applicant had previously made an illegal connection, resulting in a fine. The applicant responded that its solar energy system accounted for the reduced consumption and denied any tampering. It also disputed the claim of a prior illegal connection, attributing it to a former lessee. The matter turned on whether there was a factual basis for the disconnection and whether the policy provisions permitting disconnection without notice were constitutionally compliant. The principles of just administrative action under section 33(1) of the Constitution and section 3(2)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 were central to the analysis.

Findings: The municipality had no factual basis to disconnect the supply. The absence of electricity purchases did not constitute evidence of tampering, especially given the applicant’s reliance on solar energy. No supporting affidavit from Ontec Systems was provided, and the respondent’s version was deemed implausible and untenable. The applicant’s reconnection after obtaining interim relief was not considered evidence of tampering. Regarding the constitutional challenge, paragraphs 7.5, 7.7, and 20 of the Credit Control and Debt Collection Policy were found to permit disconnection without notice in cases of non-payment, contrary to the requirements of procedural fairness under PAJA and the Constitution. These provisions were declared unconstitutional. However, the broader relief sought in relation to all clauses was not pursued in argument due to lack of specificity.

Order: The respondent’s disconnection of the applicant’s electricity supply on or about 20 February 2025, without prior notice, is declared unlawful. The respondent’s implementation of paragraphs 7.5, 7.7, and 20 of its Credit Control and Debt Collection Policy (2023/2024) is declared inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that it fails to provide adequate prior notice before disconnection for non-payment. The respondent is interdicted from charging a reconnection fee to the applicant due to the unlawful disconnection. The respondent is interdicted from unlawfully disconnecting the electricity supply to the applicant’s premises. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the application on a party-and-party basis (Scale C).

Facts: The applicant, Sigcawu, claimed to be the life partner of Bambeni, who passed away in 2022. She sought recognition as a beneficiary of his estate based on a copy of a Will allegedly signed by the deceased at his workplace, the South African Defence Force base in Mthatha. The Will named Sigcawu and the deceased’s children as beneficiaries, and appointed his siblings, Mphuthumi and Mpendulo, as executors. The original Will was said to be held by the deceased’s employer, but only a copy was submitted to the Master of the High Court. The Master rejected the copy and indicated that the estate would be administered as intestate unless a court ordered otherwise.

Application: Sigcawu applied for an order under section 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953, seeking to have the copy of the Will accepted as the deceased’s Last Will and Testament. She also requested that the Master be authorised to accept the copy, that any delay in launching the application be condoned, and that the administration of the estate be interdicted pending finalisation. The issue was whether the copy of the Will, which lacked the deceased’s signature on the first page, could be accepted as valid under section 2(3) of the Wills Act, despite non-compliance with formalities.

Discussion: The children and siblings of the deceased opposed the application, disputing Sigcawu’s status as life partner and denying knowledge of the Will. They argued that the original Will was available and that Sigcawu should have compelled its production rather than seeking recognition of a copy. The applicant claimed to have seen the original with her attorney and suggested the missing signature on the copy’s first page was due to a photocopying error. However, she did not confirm whether the original complied with section 2(1) of the Wills Act, nor did she approach the witnesses who signed the Will. The Master did not file a report, and the notice of set down was not served on the Master’s office. The matter turned on whether the copy was a true representation of the original and whether the jurisdictional requirements of section 2(3) were met.

Findings: The applicant failed to establish that the copy was a true copy of the original Will. Her uncertainty regarding the signature and lack of corroboration from witnesses undermined the reliability of the copy. The absence of a report from the Master and the failure to serve the notice of set down further weakened the application. It was noted that section 2(3) of the Wills Act requires strict compliance, and the relief sought could not be granted without clear evidence that the copy reflected the deceased’s true intentions. The suggestion that the applicant should have compelled the production of the original was considered reasonable, and her failure to do so rendered the application premature.

Order: The application is dismissed with costs.