Facts: Flentov joined the “Atlantic Seaboard Community Forum” Facebook group in June 2020, which was administered by Koelma. After warning Koelma about a potentially harassing post, Flentov was blocked from the group. In February 2022, Koelma posted defamatory statements about Flentov’s mother on Facebook and sent WhatsApp messages alleging her involvement in wartime activities. The posts resumed in January 2024, when Flentov published an article titled A Cautionary Tale on the group’s page, referencing events involving Nestel and Koelma. Nestel and Koelma had previously been friends, but their relationship deteriorated, leading to Koelma posting degrading content about Nestel, including accusations of drug use and mental instability. In January 2024, Nestel was arrested under an interim protection order obtained by Koelma, who filmed and later posted the arrest on YouTube. The order was set aside in February 2024, and the criminal case was withdrawn in September.

Application: This was an application for final interdictory relief, contempt of court, dismissal of a stay application, and rejection of a joinder request. The applicants sought to prohibit Koelma from publishing defamatory content and to compel the removal of existing material. The issue was whether Koelma’s conduct amounted to unlawful defamation and contempt of an interim order, and whether the applicants were entitled to final relief and punitive costs.

Discussion: From June to August 2025, Koelma escalated her campaign across Facebook, Instagram, X, YouTube, and a website hosted by Xneelo, accusing both applicants of dishonesty, bullying, and unethical conduct. These allegations were repeated and expanded in a book titled Bullied in South Africa. Despite an interim interdict, Koelma continued posting defamatory content, including the court order itself, photographs of Nestel, and promotional material for her book. Koelma’s posts and book were defamatory, lacking justification or public interest. Her affidavits and oral submissions revealed a vindictive motive, with no credible defence. The applicants demonstrated a clear right to protection of their reputations, and the harm was ongoing despite an interim order issued in August 2025. Koelma’s conduct after the order included reposting the judgment, sharing photographs of Nestel, and advertising her book on Amazon.

Findings: The applicants established all three requirements for a final interdict including a clear right to dignity and reputation, ongoing injury, and no alternative remedy. Koelma’s continued publication of defamatory content, even after the interim order, demonstrated wilful and mala fide non-compliance. Her justification, that she was telling her lived experience, was rejected as insufficient. The defamatory statements were not protected by privilege, fair comment, or reasonableness. The contempt application succeeded, with Koelma’s conduct found to be deliberate and persistent. Her attempt to stay the interim order was overtaken by its confirmation and lacked merit. The joinder application was dismissed as vexatious, with no legal basis for adding parties who had no direct interest in the proceedings. The applicants’ reputations were severely harmed, and the relief sought was necessary to prevent further damage.

Order: The rule nisi is made final. Koelma must pay the costs of the main application on the attorney-and-client scale. Koelma is declared to be in contempt of court and must pay a fine of R5,000. Koelma must pay the costs of the contempt application on the attorney-and-client scale. Koelma’s application to stay execution of the interim order is dismissed with costs. Koelma’s application for joinder is dismissed with costs on the attorney-and-client scale.

Facts: Redheads TMS Turbomachinen Service SA, an engineering firm contracted to maintain turbines at Eskom power stations, became embroiled in a dispute with its non-executive director, Ms Mooketse. She had previously rendered consulting services to Redheads through PNDEE Brand Management Powerhouse, a company she solely directed. After Redheads declined to support a separate project requiring R5 million in capital, tensions escalated. Ms Mooketse issued invoices totalling over R9 million, including charges for a “consulting retainer” and use of her image on the company website. She refused to resign when requested and instead threatened reputational harm via a 25-page dossier allegedly detailing misconduct. Mr Zwane, acting on her behalf, sent messages implying potential criminal exposure and reputational damage unless payment was made. Despite requests, the dossier was not initially disclosed. Ms Mooketse later claimed whistleblower status and alleged institutional racism within Redheads.

Application: This was an urgent application brought by Redheads for interim interdictory relief pending Part B of a broader application. Redheads sought to restrain Ms Mooketse, Mr Zwane, and PNDEE Brand Management Powerhouse from disclosing the contents of the dossier, disseminating falsehoods, contacting clients to suspend engagements, and engaging in extortionate conduct to secure payment of disputed invoices. The issue was whether the respondents’ conduct amounted to unlawful threats and reputational harm, and whether interim relief was justified to protect Redheads’s commercial interests.

Discussion: The matter turned on the nature of the communications and whether they constituted extortion or whistleblowing. The WhatsApp messages from Mr Zwane were found to be coercive, aimed at securing payment through reputational threats. Ms Mooketse’s attempt to frame the dispute as a whistleblower matter under the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 was rejected, as no genuine effort to report wrongdoing to authorities had been made. Her affidavit failed to substantiate claims of corporate malfeasance, and the dossier was eventually annexed without any clear incriminating content. Redheads clarified that it did not seek to prevent disclosure to authorities, only public dissemination of unverified allegations. The respondents’ argument that the relief infringed freedom of speech was dismissed, as no right permits reputational harm through unsubstantiated claims. The urgency of the matter was accepted, and the evolution of the relief sought was deemed procedurally sound.

Findings: The communications from Mr Zwane, acting on Ms Mooketse’s behalf, were calculated threats intended to pressure Redheads into making payments. Ms Mooketse did not distance herself from these threats and instead sought to legitimise them through vague references to whistleblower protections. The dossier, once disclosed, did not contain substantiated evidence of criminal conduct. While allegations of institutional racism were noted, they remained unproven and could not justify the respondents’ conduct. Redheads was found to have a protectable interest in its reputation and business relationships, and the harm posed by the respondents’ actions was not remediable through damages or criminal complaints. The relief sought was narrowly tailored to prevent reputational harm while preserving the right to report to authorities. The respondents failed to show any prejudice from the interdict, and their opposition lacked merit.

Order: Part A of the application is enrolled as urgent. Pending Part B, the respondents are interdicted from: Disclosing the contents of annexure PM7 to anyone other than relevant authorities. Disseminating injurious falsehoods about Redheads regarding the contents of PM7. Making unsubstantiated statements about institutional racism within Redheads. Contacting Redheads’s clients to suspend engagements. Engaging in extortion to obtain payment of any amount. Parties may supplement papers within specified timeframes. The first and third respondents are to pay Redheads’s costs of Part A, including costs of two counsel, on Scale C.

Facts: Omnigo, a manufacturer of electronic devices, entered into a Manufacturing Service Agreement with Sefeko in July 2020. Under the agreement, Omnigo was to procure components and manufacture handsets and Combo Chargers based on Sefeko’s specifications. The relationship was governed by purchase orders and quotations. In November 2022, Sefeko terminated one of the purchase orders with immediate effect, allegedly without offering cancellation charges as required by clause 10.6 of the agreement. Omnigo responded by cancelling the entire agreement in February 2023 and demanded payment for cancellation charges and damages related to materials procured and partial manufacturing. The total claim exceeded R10 million. A second claim related to completed manufacturing under additional purchase orders for Combo Chargers and Power Harness Assemblies.

Application: This was an opposed interlocutory application brought by Omnigo for leave to amend its particulars of claim under Rule 28(4). Sefeko objected to the proposed amendment, arguing that it was vague, embarrassing, and legally incompatible with Omnigo’s earlier election to cancel the agreement. The issue was whether Omnigo’s proposed amendment constituted a bona fide attempt to clarify its claims or an impermissible shift in legal strategy that prejudiced the respondent.

Discussion: The proposed amendment sought to clarify the contractual basis for damages claimed under clause 13.4 of the Manufacturing Service Agreement, which permits termination for material breach and allows for claims of specific performance or damages. Sefeko objected, arguing that Omnigo had already elected to cancel the agreement and could not now rely on its terms to claim specific performance. The objection was framed as a contradiction or vacillation in legal strategy. However, Omnigo’s amended pleading did not amount to a claim for specific performance, but rather a refined articulation of its damages claim post-cancellation. Clause 13.4 expressly preserves the right to claim damages even after termination. Sefeko’s reliance on clause 16.2, which limits liability for indirect or consequential damages, was premature and better suited for trial. Amendments should be allowed unless mala fide or prejudicial in a way that cannot be cured by costs or further pleadings. The objections raised were procedural and did not bar the amendment.

Findings: The proposed changes were found to be bona fide and aimed at achieving proper ventilation of the dispute. Omnigo had consistently pleaded cancellation and damages, and the amendment did not introduce a new or incompatible cause of action. Sefeko’s argument that the amendment constituted an impermissible shift from cancellation to specific performance was rejected, as the relief sought remained within the bounds of clause 13.4. There was no evidence of prejudice or procedural unfairness. Sefeko retained the right to respond through plea or exception. Assertions of mala fides were dismissed as unfounded. Regarding Sefeko’s claim that the amendment failed to cure earlier defects, such objections did not constitute valid grounds to refuse the amendment. The discretion to allow amendments was exercised in favour of ensuring that the real issues between the parties could be adjudicated.

Order: The applicant’s application for amendment of its particulars of claim is granted in the terms set out in prayer 1 of the applicant’s Notice for Leave to Amend in terms of Rule 28(4). The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs in respect of the opposed application for amendment. The scale of fees shall be Scale C, as contemplated in Uniform Rule 69(7).

Facts: Avura Motors, trading as Avura Executive Auto, sold a pre-owned 2014 Mazda BT-50 to Muthaki for R288,577.50. Within 28 days, the vehicle developed severe radiator and engine problems, rendering it inoperable. Muthaki contacted the dealership, which refused assistance, citing expiry of a 30-day or 1,000 km warranty. He then approached the Motor Industry Ombudsman, who declined jurisdiction, and subsequently had the vehicle repaired at a cost of R106,088.28, R75,000 paid by his insurer and R31,088.28 paid personally. The National Consumer Commission investigated and found evidence of latent defects, including corrosion and rust in the cooling system. The matter was referred to the National Consumer Tribunal.

Appeal: This was an appeal brought by Avura Motors under section 148(2)(b) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, challenging the Tribunal’s finding that the dealership had contravened sections 55(2)(a) and 56(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. The issue was whether the Tribunal had correctly found that the vehicle was sold with a latent defect and whether the dealership’s refusal to assist constituted prohibited conduct under the Act.

Discussion: The Tribunal had relied on an assessor’s report submitted by the consumer’s insurer, which detailed extensive corrosion in the cooling system and concluded that the damage was likely due to prolonged operation with insufficient coolant. Avura Motors argued on appeal that the report was inadmissible hearsay, as the assessor had not testified. However, this objection was raised for the first time on appeal, despite the dealership having relied on the same report during the Tribunal proceedings. This was criticised this as “sharp practice” and there was no procedural unfairness in the Tribunal’s reliance on the report. The dealership’s claim that the damage was due to the consumer’s negligence was unsupported by evidence. No warning lights or servicing obligations had been triggered during the short period of ownership.

Findings: The vehicle was found to have been sold with a latent defect, specifically, a severely corroded cooling system that could not have deteriorated within 28 days. The Tribunal’s conclusion that the defect pre-existed the sale was upheld. The dealership’s refusal to repair or assist constituted a breach of sections 55(2) and 56(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act. The argument that the fine imposed was disproportionate was rejected, as the Tribunal had considered all relevant factors under section 112(3) of the Act. Previous fines of R500,000 and R1 million had been imposed in similar cases, and the R100,000 fine in this matter was appropriate. The dealership’s conduct was found to have caused significant financial harm to the consumer, and its attempt to discredit the Tribunal’s findings was unsuccessful.

Order: The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

Facts: Kobe, a serving police officer, was charged in the Regional Court, Strand, with attempted murder for allegedly shooting Mr Foto in the back while on duty. The incident occurred late at night in Greenfields, Strand, after Foto refused a police search and attempted to walk away. Witnesses, including Foto’s sisters and friend Tshongweni, testified that the police van accelerated toward Foto, prompting him to flee. As he ran, a shot was fired, striking him below the shoulder blade. The appellant was identified as the shooter. Foto was treated at Helderberg Hospital, and the bullet remained lodged in his body. Kobe did not testify during trial and closed his case without calling witnesses.

Appeal: This was an appeal against conviction brought by Kobe, who had been acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. He challenged the conviction on grounds of procedural unfairness, evidentiary insufficiency, and lack of forewarning regarding the competent verdict. The issue was whether the conviction for assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm was legally sustainable in light of the evidence, Kobe’s silence, and the absence of prior notice of the competent verdict.

Discussion: The appeal focused on whether Kobe’s fair trial rights were infringed and whether the magistrate erred in convicting him on a competent verdict. The trial court had acquitted Kobe of attempted murder due to the absence of medical expert testimony but found sufficient evidence for the lesser offence. The complainant and Tshongweni gave direct, corroborated evidence that Kobe shot Foto while he was running away. Kobe’s failure to testify left the prima facie case unchallenged. Section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was considered, which permits force during arrest, but there was no evidence that Kobe had a reasonable suspicion or that Foto was aware of any arrest attempt. The appellant’s version, including claims of a shiny object resembling a firearm, was never substantiated. The magistrate’s reasoning was consistent with section 258(b) of the Act, which allows conviction on a competent verdict even if not stated in the charge sheet, provided there is no prejudice.

Findings: Kobe’s silence in the face of direct evidence weighed against him, especially given his legal representation and the opportunity to respond. The trial court’s reliance on section 258(b) was appropriate, and no prejudice was shown. The magistrate correctly found that the shooting constituted more than ordinary assault and reflected intent to cause serious harm. The absence of ballistic or medical expert evidence did not undermine the direct testimony of witnesses. The appellant’s reliance on section 49(2) failed due to lack of evidence regarding his state of mind and the absence of reasonable grounds for suspicion. There was no merit in arguments about the J88 or ballistic report, as the complainant’s injury and the circumstances of the shooting were undisputed.

Order: The appeal is dismissed, and the conviction for assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm is confirmed.

Facts: Cambrig Holdings CC, the registered owner of commercial premises in Bellville, leased the property to SA Mr Smart Fashion Wholesalers and Retailers CC in 2011 for a five-year term. The lease included an option to renew for a further five years, subject to written notice six months before expiry. No such notice was given, and the lease expired in 2016. The tenant, represented by Mr Yusuf, continued to occupy the premises under an oral month-to-month arrangement. In 2024, Cambrig issued notice to vacate, citing planned renovations. The tenant refused to vacate, prompting Cambrig to offer financial assistance and later initiate legal proceedings. The tenant claimed that oral agreements with both the late Mr Shevel senior and his son, Mr Shevel junior, extended the lease to 2026.

Application: This was an application for ejectment brought by Cambrig Holdings CC against SA Mr Smart Fashion Wholesalers and Retailers CC and all those occupying under it. Cambrig sought cancellation of the lease and removal of the respondents from the premises. The issue was whether the lease had been validly extended beyond its original term and whether the respondents were unlawfully occupying the premises.

Discussion: The written lease expired in 2016, and no written renewal was exercised as required. The tenant alleged oral extensions with both Shevel senior and junior, claiming continued occupation on the same terms. However, no corroborating evidence was provided, and the alleged conversations lacked detail. The tenant did not assert a tacit or express renewal and relied instead on what was “effectively” agreed. The written lease did not provide for a second five-year renewal. Even if the first oral extension were accepted, no steps were taken to renew the lease for a further term. The applicant’s notice to vacate was found to be properly delivered, and the tenant’s objections to its form were dismissed. The tenant’s claim that 53 days’ notice was unreasonable was unsupported by evidence of market conditions or relocation challenges.

Findings: The lease agreement terminated by effluxion of time in 2016, and no valid renewal was exercised. The continued occupation was governed by a month-to-month lease, which Cambrig was entitled to terminate on reasonable notice. The tenant’s reliance on oral agreements was unsubstantiated and implausible, particularly regarding a second extension to 2026. The claim of unreasonable notice was overtaken by the passage of time, as the tenant remained in occupation for over a year after receiving notice. No evidence was presented to support the assertion that relocation within the notice period was commercially unfeasible. The tenant’s opposition was a deliberate attempt to delay ejectment and benefit from extended occupation. Cambrig’s conduct, including rental reductions and offers of financial assistance, was noted as reasonable. The applicant was entitled to cancellation of the lease and ejectment of the respondents.

Order: The lease agreement is cancelled. The first and second respondents must vacate the premises by 1 December 2025, failing which the Sheriff is authorised to eject them. The first respondent must pay the costs of the application on the attorney-and-client scale.

Facts: The applicant and respondent were previously married out of community of property, excluding accrual. Two children were born of the marriage. Divorce proceedings were instituted in 2018, and a Rule 43 application was launched simultaneously. In March 2019, an order was granted requiring the respondent to pay monthly maintenance for the children and the applicant, retain them on his medical aid, cover educational and medical expenses, and contribute to the applicant’s legal costs. The respondent failed to comply with the order, prompting the applicant to bring a contempt application. In response, the respondent launched multiple interlocutory applications, including a variation application and a Rule 6(11) application, both of which were procedurally defective and served late.

Application: This was a contempt of court application brought by the applicant, seeking enforcement of the Rule 43 order and committal of the respondent to prison for non-compliance. The issue was whether the respondent had wilfully and mala fide failed to comply with the Rule 43 order, and whether the contempt application was justified in light of his conduct and procedural delays.

Discussion: The respondent claimed financial constraints as justification for non-compliance. He launched a variation application and a Rule 6(11) application, both of which were found to be attempts to delay proceedings. The Rule 6(11) application was voluminous, served three court days before the contempt hearing, and lacked substantive defence. The respondent failed to disclose updated financial information and did not pursue the variation application to finality. His conduct was described as opportunistic and obstructive, with repeated attempts to derail the contempt proceedings. The procedural abuse and the respondent’s failure to provide credible evidence of inability to comply were considered. The applicant’s legal representatives responded promptly despite limited time, and the respondent failed to engage meaningfully with the process.

Findings: The respondent was found to be in contempt of the Rule 43 order. The three elements of contempt, existence of a valid order, knowledge thereof, and non-compliance, were established beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent’s defence of financial hardship was unsupported by evidence and failed to rebut the inference of wilfulness and mala fides. His conduct, including late filings and procedural abuse, compromised the integrity of the court and the best interests of the children. The importance of maintenance orders and the judiciary’s role in protecting vulnerable parties was emphasised. The respondent’s failure to comply, despite being legally represented and aware of the order, warranted punitive measures. The contempt was aggravated by his failure to disclose income and his attempts to shift blame to the applicant.

Order: The respondent is declared to be in contempt of the court order dated 25 March 2019. The respondent is committed to imprisonment for 90 days, suspended for two years on condition of full compliance within seven days. If the respondent fails to comply, the writ of committal is authorised, and he must submit himself to SAPS Brooklyn or be delivered to Correctional Services in Pretoria. The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs on an attorney-and-client scale, including costs of counsel, applicable to both the Rule 6(11) and contempt applications.

Facts: Investec Bank sought the provisional sequestration of Mnqandi, relying on her alleged factual insolvency and, alternatively, an act of insolvency. The claim arose from a home loan agreement secured by a first covering mortgage bond over Mnqandi’s immovable property, valued at R4,4 million in May 2021. Mnqandi defaulted on the loan in June 2022, prompting termination of the agreement. At the time of the application, the bank alleged an outstanding debt of over R4,4 million, supported by a certificate of indebtedness. Mnqandi admitted her indebtedness but disputed the extent and provided proof of subsequent payments. Additional liabilities were alleged, including amounts owed to the City of Johannesburg and ABSA Bank, though Mnqandi contested these and provided documentation of payment arrangements and book debts from her practice as an advocate.

Application: This was an opposed application for provisional sequestration brought by Investec Bank against Mnqandi. The bank sought relief on the basis of factual insolvency or, alternatively, an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. Mnqandi opposed the application, raising procedural objections under Uniform Rule 30A and disputing the allegations of insolvency. The issue was whether Mnqandi was factually insolvent or had committed an act of insolvency, and whether the sequestration would be to the advantage of creditors.

Discussion: Mnqandi’s Rule 30A objection, based on alleged defective service, was dismissed as insubstantial, given her active participation in the proceedings. The bank’s reliance on an act of insolvency was introduced only in its heads of argument and not pleaded in the founding affidavit. It was based on a payment arrangement Mnqandi had entered into with the City of Johannesburg, which the bank argued constituted written notice of inability to pay debts. However, the arrangement was shown to be a standard instalment agreement, with no admission of inability to pay. Mnqandi explained that the City was investigating possible overcharging and had agreed to adjust the account if necessary. The bank also relied on liabilities to other creditors, including ABSA and the City, but Mnqandi provided evidence of payments and disputed the ABSA debt. Her book debts, totalling over R238,000, were dismissed by the bank as unlikely to be recovered, though they were only slightly overdue and not proven to be irrecoverable.

Findings: The alternative ground of an act of insolvency was rejected. The payment arrangement with the City of Johannesburg did not meet the statutory threshold under section 8(g) of the Act, as it lacked any written admission of inability to pay. The factual insolvency claim was undermined by the bank’s reliance on a four-year-old property valuation from May 2021, which was outdated and insufficient. The bank bore the onus of proving insolvency at the date of hearing but failed to obtain or present a current valuation. Mnqandi’s book debts, which exceeded the alleged shortfall in her estate, were not convincingly excluded as assets. The bank’s failure to discharge the onus of proof on both grounds led to the dismissal of the application. The argument on advantage to creditors was rendered moot.

Order: The application for provisional sequestration is dismissed. The applicant is ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, including the costs of counsel, on Scale C.

Facts: Pillay, a qualified accountant and former Finance and Administration Superintendent at Samancor Chrome, was dismissed following internal disciplinary proceedings. Her dismissal followed a series of emails she sent to her supervisor, Msani, raising concerns about irregular payments and stock discrepancies. One email questioned payments to Phabema Enterprise for services rendered by another company, and another highlighted a mismatch between stock records and physical surveys. Shortly after these disclosures, Pillay was charged with breaching confidentiality by allegedly sharing sensitive information with junior staff. She denied any misconduct and maintained that her disclosures were made in good faith. Following her dismissal, Pillay experienced psychological distress and financial hardship, including the loss of professional accreditation and reliance on rental income. Expert assessments were conducted to evaluate her mental health and earning capacity.

Claim: Pillay sought damages under actio injuriarum for harm to her dignity and reputation, special damages for occupational detriment under the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000, and, in the alternative, damages for breach of contract. The issue was whether Pillay’s disclosures constituted protected disclosures under the Act, and whether her dismissal and subsequent harm amounted to occupational detriment warranting compensation.

Discussion: The nature of Pillay’s disclosures and the conduct of Samancor and its employees were examined. The Protected Disclosures Act was interpreted to include disclosures made in good faith to an employer, even if not strictly following internal whistleblowing procedures. Evidence showed that Msani had acknowledged the irregularities raised by Pillay and had instructed others to cease the questionable payments. Despite this, he later charged Pillay with misconduct. The disciplinary action was retaliatory and not based on genuine breaches of policy. Expert testimony from a clinical psychologist suggested severe psychological harm, but this was contradicted by Pillay’s courtroom demeanour and her ability to manage rental properties. It was accepted that she suffered mild depression but claims of severe psychological disorders were rejected. An industrial psychologist assessed her future earning potential and supported her claim for loss of income, though the exact quantum remained unproven.

Findings: Pillay’s disclosures fell squarely within the scope of section 6 of the Protected Disclosures Act, having been made in good faith and concerning serious financial irregularities. The disciplinary charges brought against her were not based on genuine misconduct but were instead a retaliatory response to her whistleblowing. Her dismissal was therefore an occupational detriment. The harm to her dignity and reputation was substantiated by the nature of the charges and the manner in which she was dismissed. Although the psychological evidence was mixed, it was accepted that she suffered emotional and reputational harm, albeit not to the extent claimed. Her ability to continue managing rental properties and her presentation in court undermined the claim of severe psychological impairment. The claim against Brits was dismissed due to insufficient evidence linking him to the alleged harm. The special plea on jurisdiction was also dismissed, confirming that the matter was properly before the court. Overall, the evidence supported a finding of unlawful retaliation and partial damages.

Order: The special plea is dismissed. Samancor Chrome Ltd must pay Pillay’s costs on Scale B, including costs of two counsel. Samancor Chrome Ltd must pay Pillay proven Aquilian damages with interest at 7% per annum from summons to payment, and costs on Scale C, including Senior Counsel. Samancor Chrome Ltd and Msani are jointly and severally liable for proven damages for impairment of dignity and reputation, with interest at 7% per annum from summons to payment, and costs on Scale C, including Senior Counsel. Pillay must pay Brits’ costs on Scale C, including costs of two counsel.

Facts: Vezi, a Shift Manager at Grootvlei Power Station, transferred to Kusile Power Station in 2016 after successfully applying for a similar position. Following the transfer, Vezi entered into a deed of sale with Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd for the purchase of his residential property. Eskom later declined to proceed with the transaction, citing policy limitations and audit findings. Vezi’s colleague, Haasbroek, who transferred under similar circumstances, had his property purchased by Eskom. Vezi alleged that the differential treatment amounted to unfair discrimination based on race. He lodged internal grievances and referred the matter to the CCMA before approaching the Labour Court.

Claim: This was a claim for unfair discrimination brought by Vezi against Eskom under section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. He sought declaratory relief, enforcement of the deed of sale, and costs. The issue was whether Eskom’s refusal to purchase Vezi’s property, while purchasing that of a white colleague in similar circumstances, constituted unfair discrimination based on race.

Discussion: Vezi argued that Eskom’s refusal to purchase his property was racially motivated, relying on the fact that Haasbroek’s property was purchased while his was not. Eskom raised a jurisdictional objection, contending that the claim was contractual in nature and fell outside the scope of the Employment Equity Act. Eskom maintained that Vezi did not qualify for the property purchase benefit under its Conditions of Service, as his transfer was voluntary and not a forced transfer, which is a prerequisite for the benefit. Haasbroek’s property was purchased in error at local level and not escalated for compliance checks. Vezi conceded under cross-examination that he had no evidence of racial bias beyond assumptions. Eskom’s witness, Ms Funston, explained that the Conditions of Service only permitted property purchases for compulsory transfers. She confirmed that other employees of colour had their properties purchased when they met the criteria, and that Vezi’s application was correctly declined.

Findings: The evidence did not support a finding of discrimination based on race. Vezi’s assumptions about racial bias were not substantiated by any factual or documentary evidence. The differentiation in treatment was attributed to timing and procedural oversight, not racial preference. Haasbroek’s application had been processed before audit queries were raised, and Vezi’s was flagged during compliance checks. Eskom’s Conditions of Service were applied consistently, and the benefit was only available for compulsory transfers. Vezi’s transfer was voluntary, and his entitlement was limited to relocation allowances, which were granted. The respondent’s explanation was accepted, and Vezi conceded that he could not dispute it. The policy had been applied to employees of various races, and no pattern of racial discrimination was established. The claim failed to meet the threshold for unfair discrimination under section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act.

Order: The applicant’s claim is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

Facts: Pule was employed by the Healthcare Professionals Council of South Africa (the Council) on a five-year fixed-term contract starting in June 2017. His role as Senior Manager: Human Resources and Labour Relations followed prior acting appointments in the same position. The contract included a probationary period, which was extended twice, and required the development of a performance agreement. Disputes arose over whether probation reviews were properly conducted and whether a valid performance agreement had been concluded. Pule submitted grievances regarding his assessments and was ultimately dismissed in June 2018, following a letter of intention to terminate his employment. He alleged that the dismissal was unlawful and in breach of his contract.

Claim: This was a contractual damages claim brought by Pule against the Council for breach of his fixed-term employment contract. He sought compensation for the unexpired portion of the contract (47 months) and for the 60-day notice period stipulated in the contract. The issue was whether the Council had lawfully terminated Pule’s contract without notice, and whether he was entitled to damages for breach of the notice provision and/or the full unexpired term.

Discussion: The trial focused on whether the Council was entitled to summarily terminate the contract due to serious breach. The Council argued that Pule’s performance was deficient and that he failed to meet SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Reasonable and Time-bound) criteria in his draft performance agreement. Pule maintained that the draft he submitted was adequate and that the Council failed to finalise the agreement or provide guidance. The Council’s witness, Dr Kwinda, testified about performance concerns but acknowledged that no signed performance agreement existed. The Council also failed to conduct quarterly probation reviews as required by its own policy. The absence of a formal performance agreement and incomplete assessments undermined the claim of serious breach.

Findings: The termination of Pule’s contract without notice was found to be unlawful. The Council did not establish a serious breach that would justify summary dismissal. The failure to conclude a performance agreement and to conduct proper probation reviews meant that performance concerns could not be objectively assessed. The limited damages rule applied, restricting Pule’s claim to the value of the contractual notice period. Although he had initially claimed for the full unexpired term, the law only permits damages equivalent to the notice period unless the contract provides otherwise. Pule was therefore entitled to compensation for the 60-day notice period, amounting to R216,139.30. No damages were awarded for the remaining 47 months of the contract. Both parties were partially successful, and no costs order was made.

Order: The defendant is ordered, within 14 days of delivery of this judgment, to pay the plaintiff an amount of R216,139.30 as damages in respect of the breach of the 60-day notice requirement in the employment contract. There is no order as to costs.

Facts: Mbulaleni, employed as a Process Controller Grade 01 at Sasol Synfuels Operations since 2013, applied for a promotional post of Process Artisan Grade 02 at Sasol Chemical Operations (SCO) in 2019. He was shortlisted, interviewed, and informed telephonically that he was the preferred candidate. Salary discussions followed, and he submitted his qualifications. Shortly thereafter, he was informed that the offer had been withdrawn due to procedural irregularities and lack of plant-specific experience. Mbulaleni lodged a dispute with the National Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry (NBCCI), alleging unfair labour practice relating to promotion. The arbitrator dismissed his claim, prompting a review application to the Labour Court.

Application: This was a review application brought by Mbulaleni under section 158(1)(g) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, seeking to set aside the arbitration award issued by the NBCCI and to substitute it with a finding of unfair labour practice. The issue was whether the withdrawal of the job offer constituted an unfair labour practice relating to promotion, and whether the arbitrator’s decision was reviewable on grounds of unreasonableness or failure to consider material evidence.

Discussion: The review focused on whether the arbitrator had properly considered the evidence and applied the correct legal standard. Mbulaleni argued that a reasonable expectation of promotion had been created through the interview process, salary discussions, and submission of qualifications. He relied on internal policies and recruitment procedures, asserting that the withdrawal was arbitrary and procedurally unfair. Sasol contended that the appointment was never finalised, as vetting had revealed that Mbulaleni lacked plant-specific experience required for the role. Witnesses testified that promotion required competency assessments and training specific to the plant, which Mbulaleni had not undergone. The employer’s policies prohibited diagonal promotions across plants. The arbitrator had found that no appointment had occurred and that the employer acted within its discretion.

Findings: The evidence supported the conclusion that no final appointment had been made, and that the employer’s decision to withdraw the offer was based on legitimate operational and safety concerns. Mbulaleni’s responses during cross-examination confirmed that he lacked the required plant-specific experience and had not completed the necessary training. The employer’s policies were consistently applied, and the recruitment process had not reached the stage of formal appointment. The arbitrator’s decision was reasonable and supported by the record. The argument that the interview panel’s recommendation created a binding obligation was rejected, as final approval and vetting were still pending. No unfair labour practice was established.

Order: The review application is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

Facts: Smith, a senior attorney and director of Raphael & David Smith Inc, faced disciplinary proceedings initiated by the South African Legal Practice Council (LPC). The firm, which specialised in Road Accident Fund (RAF) litigation, handled thousands of claims annually. The LPC relied on a 2017 investigation report by chartered accountant Faris, which raised concerns about accounting practices, client complaints, and internal controls. More than sixty complaints were attached to the application, though none implicated Smith personally. The firm’s accounting system had transitioned from Lexpro to AJS, and the investigation revealed issues such as trust account debit balances, unallocated payments, and questionable journal entries. Smith had not been issued with a Fidelity Fund Certificate (FFC) since 2018 and could not lawfully practise as an attorney.

Application: This was an application brought by the LPC seeking to strike Smith off the roll of attorneys. The issue was whether Smith was a fit and proper person to continue practising as an attorney, based on his failure to supervise employees and maintain adequate internal controls.

Discussion: The matter was procedurally complex, spanning over seven years and involving voluminous affidavits and supplementary filings. The LPC’s case was built on thematic allegations, including touting, misappropriation, overreaching, and failure to account. However, many complaints were outdated, closed, or not previously shared with the firm. The LPC did not conduct an internal disciplinary enquiry before approaching the court, and its reliance on the Faris Report was complicated by Faris’s death in 2021. Attempts to substitute his findings with those of Reddy were criticised as ex post facto expert evidence. Smith responded comprehensively, supported by reports from auditors Russon and Selbst, which addressed and partially confirmed Faris’s concerns. The firm’s business model, involving deductions from RAF payouts based on signed mandates and powers of attorney, was found not to contravene the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997. Allegations of touting and dishonesty were dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

Findings: Smith was not personally implicated in any of the complaints, but his role as managing director from 2013 to 2018 placed him in a position of responsibility. His “light-touch” supervision of professional staff was inadequate, particularly given the firm’s fiduciary role in handling RAF claims for vulnerable clients. The Faris Report revealed poor internal controls, including fictitious journal entries and unreconciled trust positions, which posed risks to client funds. Although no misappropriation for personal gain was proven, the failure to maintain proper oversight contravened the Rules for the Attorneys’ Profession. The LPC’s case was weakened by procedural missteps and lack of direct evidence, but Smith’s failure to ensure robust internal governance warranted sanction. Given that he had not held an FFC since 2018 and had only practised unlawfully on a few brief occasions, a striking-off was disproportionate. A one-year suspension with mandatory legal practice management training was considered a more appropriate remedy to address the regulatory breaches and safeguard future compliance.

Order: Smith is suspended from practice for one year from the date of the order. Should he wish to resume practice thereafter, he must complete the legal practice management training course contemplated in Rule 27(1) of the LPC Rules. Proof of completion must be submitted to the LPC by affidavit. Smith may not resume practice unless he complies with paragraph. Each party is to bear its own costs.

Facts: Semi Conductor Services Export Division and Van Zyl applied for the cancellation of a mortgage bond over a property in Beaufort West, registered in terms of a Settlement Agreement concluded in July 2021 and made an order of court shortly thereafter. The dispute stemmed from a series of financial arrangements involving Moto Trust, which had obtained a loan from ABSA Bank in 2007 to develop a Spar complex. The loan was secured by multiple mortgage bonds and suretyships, including those provided by Semi Conductor and Van Zyl’s late husband. Moto Trust was liquidated in 2014, and most of its properties were sold by 2016, except the Beaufort property, which was sold only in 2022, resulting in a shortfall due to accumulated interest. ABSA sued Semi Conductor and Mr Van Zyl in 2019 for the outstanding debt, and the matter was settled in 2021 with Mrs Van Zyl paying R7 million on behalf of all parties involved.

Application: This was an application for a mandatory interdict brought by Semi Conductor and Van Zyl to compel ABSA Bank to cancel the mortgage bond over the Beaufort West property and deliver the original title deed, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. ABSA opposed the application, arguing that the bond in question was not contemplated by the Settlement Agreement. The issue was whether the mortgage bond over the Beaufort property was included in the scope of the Settlement Agreement and whether the applicants were entitled to a mandatory interdict compelling its cancellation.

Discussion: The matter turned on the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and the intention of the parties at the time of contracting. Several authorities were canvassed on contractual interpretation, affirming that context, background, and surrounding circumstances are admissible to determine meaning. The language of the Settlement Agreement was examined, which referenced multiple case numbers and entities but did not explicitly mention the Beaufort property or its account number. However, the absence of specific account numbers in clause 9.2, contrasted with their inclusion in clauses 9.1 and 9.3, was interpreted as deliberate, suggesting that all claims against Semi Conductor and Mr Van Zyl were intended to be settled. This interpretation was supported by pre-contractual correspondence, in which the applicants’ attorneys expressed a clear intention to settle all claims and suretyships.

Findings: ABSA’s own correspondence did not explicitly exclude the Beaufort property, and its argument that the property was not contemplated was unconvincing. The parties intended the Beaufort property to be included in the Settlement Agreement. Clause 23 of the agreement required ABSA to cancel all bonds and deliver title deeds upon receipt of the settlement amount. The applicants had established a clear right under the agreement, a reasonable apprehension of harm if the bond remained uncancelled, and the absence of any other satisfactory remedy. The requirements for a mandatory interdict were therefore met. ABSA’s failure to cancel the bond and deliver the title deed constituted an ongoing interference with the applicants’ rights under the agreement.

Order: A rule nisi was issued: Compelling ABSA Bank Ltd to cancel the mortgage bond registered over Erf 3[…] Beaufort West. Compelling ABSA Bank Ltd to hand over the original title deed to the First Applicant upon cancellation of the bond. Return date: 31 January 2026, on which ABSA must show cause why the order should not be made final. ABSA to pay the costs of the application on attorney-client Scale B.