Facts: Makofane and Nozibiele had been living peacefully at a property in Midrand, which they regarded as their home. The property was registered in the names of the Marimas, who were in arrears with their mortgage obligations. In August 2025, the Marimas arrived at the property with three unidentified individuals, forced entry using power tools, and changed the locks. They informed Makofane and Nozibiele that the unknown men would move in and pay rent, even if it meant cohabiting with them. The Marimas later returned with the same men, ignited a substance that filled the house with noxious smoke, and caused Makofane and Nozibiele to flee. They spent the night in their car. The next morning, the unknown men were found sleeping inside the house. Since then, the Marimas have exercised control of the property through these individuals. Makofane and Nozibiele’s belongings remained inside, and they were forced to seek temporary accommodation elsewhere.

Appeal: This was an automatic appeal in terms of section 18(4)(a)(ii) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, following an earlier order that restored possession of the property to Makofane and Nozibiele. The issue was whether the requirements of section 18(3), exceptional circumstances and irreparable harm, had been met, and whether the appellants’ conduct justified the enforcement of the original spoliation order pending appeal.

Discussion: The appellants argued that the respondents retained access to the property, had alternative accommodation, and had consented to co-occupation with the unknown men. They also claimed that the property faced foreclosure and that rental payments from the new occupants could prevent this. These assertions were unsupported and contradicted by the events described. The respondents had been forcibly removed from their home, their possessions remained inside, and they were incurring costs for temporary shelter. The appellants’ version relied on an alleged oral agreement and the presence of tenants, but no evidence was provided to support this. The unknown men were not joined to the proceedings, and their occupation was presented as a barrier to enforcement of the spoliation order. However, their presence was a deliberate attempt to frustrate the respondents’ rights and avoid legal consequences. The respondents’ situation was dire as they faced financial strain, lacked secure accommodation, and were deprived of their home.

Findings: The appellants’ conduct was constitutionally impermissible and likely criminal. The suggestion that the unknown men were bona fide occupiers was rejected, as their possession lacked permanence and legal foundation. Their role was limited to facilitating the appellants’ unlawful control of the property. The respondents suffered irreparable harm, including loss of dignity, safety, and financial stability. Their possession of the property had been unlawfully disturbed, and the circumstances were exceptional. The appellants’ attempt to use the unknown men as a shield against enforcement was dismissed as a manufactured defence. The notion that the respondents retained access or consented to co-occupation was unsupported and contradicted by the facts. The unknown men had no independent right of occupation and were not protected under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 1998. Their presence did not render restitution impossible. The appellants’ prospects of success on appeal were weak, and their application for leave to appeal was viewed as a delay tactic. The original order was properly granted, and its enforcement pending appeal was justified.

Order: The appeal was dismissed. The appellants were directed to pay the respondents’ costs, including counsel’s fees taxed on Scale B.

Facts: Marais, acting as executor of the estate of the deceased, brought proceedings concerning a property in Krugersdorp registered in the names of Ms Stols and the deceased. The Loretos had occupied the property since 2008, initially sharing it with the deceased and Stols until 2015. The respondents had agreed to pay an amount equivalent to the bond instalment into the account of Rudi Scrap Metals CC, which was used to service the mortgage. These payments continued until December 2022, after which the respondents began paying into their attorney’s trust account instead. The applicant viewed this change as a breach of the agreement and issued notice of cancellation of the lease, requiring the respondents to vacate the property by the end of September 2024. The respondents disputed the cancellation and claimed a verbal agreement existed that would result in transfer of ownership to the first respondent upon the deceased’s death.

Application: This was an application for authorisation of a notice in terms of section 4(2) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. The issue was whether the respondents were unlawful occupiers and whether it was just and equitable to grant an eviction order.

Discussion: The respondents argued that a verbal agreement had been concluded with the deceased, entitling the first respondent to ownership of the property. This version was denied by Stols and found to be unsupported by any written deed of alienation, as required by section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. The respondents version was described as far-fetched and untenable. The respondents had known since September 2024 that they were required to vacate the property but provided no evidence of efforts to secure alternative accommodation. They lived with their adult son, who was employed in their scrap metal businesses. No elderly persons or individuals with disabilities resided at the property. The respondents were financially capable of relocating. Their heads of argument were filed late, and new points were raised during the hearing that had not been included in their papers.

Findings: The respondents were unlawful occupiers, having remained on the property without consent following the cancellation of the agreement. The alleged verbal agreement was invalid and did not comply with statutory requirements. All procedural requirements under section 4 of the PIE Act had been met, and no valid defence was raised. The respondents failed to demonstrate why eviction would not be just and equitable. Their financial position and lack of vulnerability supported the conclusion that eviction was appropriate. The joinder application was meritless and improperly pursued, having been withdrawn on the morning of the hearing despite prior insistence that it would be argued. This conduct was viewed as an abuse of process, justifying a punitive cost order on an attorney and client scale. Their attorney, Kapp, was held jointly liable for those costs due to his role in advancing the baseless application. The respondents’ heads of argument were filed late, and new points were raised during oral submissions that had not been included in their papers, further contributing to the adverse cost order in the main application.

Order: The first and second respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the joinder application on an attorney and client scale. Their attorney, Kapp, was ordered to pay those costs jointly and severally with them. The respondents and all other occupants were evicted from the property. They were required to vacate by 31 December 2025. The Sheriff was authorised to enforce the eviction if they failed to vacate by that date. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the main application on an attorney and client scale.

Facts: The appellant and respondent were married in community of property in 1997 and had one child, who had reached majority by the time of trial. The appellant was employed in the automotive industry until a motor vehicle accident in 1999 led to his resignation. He remained unemployed for five years, during which the respondent, a state-employed educator, supported the household, paid the mortgage, covered educational expenses, and serviced family debts. The respondent also purchased vehicles for the family, which the appellant sold without her consent and withheld the proceeds. From 2003, the appellant became self-employed in construction, with financial assistance from the respondent. The parties separated in 2014 and had been living apart for seven years by the time of trial. The respondent discovered, by chance, that the appellant had received a resignation benefit and a surplus apportionment payout from his provident fund, both of which he failed to disclose or account for.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the Regional Court’s order granting a decree of divorce and ordering the appellant to forfeit the patrimonial benefits of the marriage. While the decree of divorce is uncontested, the appellant challenges the forfeiture of patrimonial benefits. The issue was whether the forfeiture order was justified under section 9(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, considering the duration of the marriage, the circumstances of its breakdown, and any substantial misconduct.

Discussion: The appellant challenged the forfeiture order on several grounds, including the length of the marriage, lack of reasons for the breakdown, and absence of a finding of substantial misconduct. He claimed to have contributed to the household but offered no proof. Workers from his business often came to the marital home demanding unpaid wages, which the respondent paid. He argued that he had contributed financially and that his accident had limited his earning capacity. However, the record showed evasive and vague testimony, particularly regarding his financial contributions and the provident fund payouts. He failed to provide dates, amounts, or documentation to support his claims. The letter confirming the surplus apportionment payout was accepted into evidence, and the appellant admitted receiving it. His failure to account for both the resignation and surplus benefits was viewed as deliberate.

Findings: The appellant alienated immovable property from a previous marriage without consulting the respondent. These actions were considered in assessing whether he would be unduly benefitted if forfeiture was not ordered. The appellant’s conduct was found to constitute substantial misconduct. His failure to disclose and account for the provident fund benefits, coupled with evasive testimony and mismanagement of family resources, supported the conclusion that he would be unduly benefitted if the patrimonial benefits were not forfeited. The respondent had carried the financial burden of the household for years, while the appellant withheld assets and failed to contribute meaningfully. The Regional Court’s reasoning aligned with section 9(1) of the Divorce Act, and the credibility findings against the appellant were upheld. No misdirection was found in the exercise of discretion.

Order: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.

Facts: Dr Maureen Allem Inc, a company specialising in skin, body, and health renewal services, employed Dr Lawn as a medical practitioner from 2013. In 2017, the parties formalised their relationship through a written employment agreement that included a restraint of trade clause. Lawn acknowledged access to confidential information and undertook not to compete with the applicant during employment and for 12 months thereafter, within a 15-kilometre radius of any business location. The agreement also provided for a 24-month restraint period in the event of unlawful competition. Lawn received an additional R17,400 monthly in consideration of the restraint. His registration with the Health Professions Council lapsed in early 2025, and he resigned in March following proposed disciplinary action. A confidentiality agreement was signed shortly thereafter. In August, the applicant discovered that Lawn had received payments from former patients and was advertising aesthetic services under the name “Loving You Aesthetics Studio” through a company he had registered, Dr Lestonn Lawn Inc.

Application: This was an urgent application brought by Dr Maureen Allem Inc seeking a final interdict to restrain Lawn and his company from breaching the restraint of trade agreement and unlawfully competing with the applicant. The issue was whether the restraint clause was enforceable in light of Lawn’s conduct and constitutional rights, and whether the applicant had a protectable interest justifying the enforcement of the restraint.

Discussion: Urgency was challenged but not substantiated. The facts were largely uncontested. Lawn had registered a new company, advertised aesthetic services, and received payments from former patients. He had also engaged with suppliers previously linked to the applicant. These actions were not denied. The restraint clause had been accepted and signed, and Lawn had received monthly compensation for it. His argument that the restraint was unconstitutional and prevented him from earning a livelihood was weighed against the applicant’s interest in protecting its business model, client base, and confidential information. The restraint area was clarified as a radius, not a driving distance, and the applicant’s proposal to limit enforcement to three branches was considered reasonable.

Findings: The applicant had a legitimate interest in protecting its confidential information, client relationships, and business goodwill. Lawn’s conduct, including advertising competing services, receiving payments from former patients, and engaging with suppliers, was found to breach the restraint agreement. The argument that the restraint infringed on constitutional rights was rejected, with reference to established precedent affirming the validity of such clauses. The 24-month extension clause was punitive and unreasonable, and the restraint was limited to 12 months. The territorial scope was confined to a 15-kilometre radius around the applicant’s Nieuw Muckleneuk, Lynnwood, and Irene branches. Dr Leston Lawn Inc, Lawn’s company, was found to be a vehicle for unlawful competition and was also interdicted.

Order: A final interdict was granted. Lawn was interdicted from breaching the employment agreement and restraint of trade for 12 months from the date of judgment. He was prohibited from operating under Dr Lestonn Lawn Inc or Loving You Aesthetic Studio within the defined restraint area. He was barred from using the applicant’s confidential information, influencing its clients or employees, or engaging in competitive activity. The restraint applied within a 15-kilometre radius of the applicant’s Nieuw Muckleneuk, Lynnwood, and Irene branches. The second respondent was interdicted from aiding Lawn in breaching his obligations or competing unlawfully. Costs were awarded against the respondents jointly and severally on Scale C, including counsel’s fees.

Facts: Nonxuba was admitted as an attorney in 2018 and practised as a director of Nonxuba Incorporated Attorneys. In 2021, she began practising for her own account under N A Nonxuba Attorneys Inc. During her time at Nonxuba Inc, five medical negligence matters involving minors were settled, with court orders directing that the settlement funds be placed into trust accounts for the benefit of the children. These trust accounts were not established or funded as required. Instead, the funds, amounting to millions of rand, were paid into the firm’s trust account and not properly administered. The minors were left without access to the funds intended for their care and support. Nonxuba later resigned from the firm and continued practising independently. Her registration with the Legal Practice Council remained active, and she held Fidelity Fund Certificates during this period. The LPC alleged that the funds were misappropriated, leaving the minors in poverty and without proper care. Nonxuba was suspended from practice in 2024 pending the outcome of this application.

Application: This was an application by the LPC to strike Nonxuba’s name from the roll of legal practitioners. The issue was whether her conduct, particularly in relation to the mismanagement of trust funds and failure to comply with statutory obligations, rendered her unfit to continue practising as an attorney.

Discussion: The inquiry focused on whether the misconduct had been established, whether Nonxuba was fit to continue practising, and what sanction was appropriate. She denied responsibility for the trust account, attributing its management to her former husband and co-director. She claimed ignorance of any wrongdoing and relied on clean audits and the issuance of Fidelity Fund Certificates as reassurance. However, her version was inconsistent. She simultaneously denied knowledge of the trust account’s affairs while disputing the LPC’s findings. She failed to comply with multiple court orders, including the establishment of trusts and the delivery of financial records. Her resignation from the firm was not communicated to the LPC, and she later closed her own practice without proper notice. Despite being given opportunities to cooperate, she resisted the LPC’s efforts and pursued prolonged litigation to challenge its decisions. Her conduct showed a disregard for professional obligations and a lack of accountability.

Findings: The records that were eventually submitted were disorganised and incomplete, raising concerns about further risk to the Fidelity Fund. Throughout the proceedings, there was no indication of remorse or willingness to take responsibility. The misconduct was established on a balance of probabilities. Nonxuba’s explanations were rejected as inadequate and contradictory. Her failure to manage the trust account, comply with court orders, and uphold the standards expected of legal practitioners demonstrated that she was not fit to continue practising. Her conduct had serious consequences for vulnerable clients and undermined the integrity of the profession. The infractions were not isolated or technical but formed a pattern of neglect and evasion. Her repeated failure to notify the LPC of changes in her practice, and her inability to provide coherent financial records, reinforced the conclusion that she posed a risk to the public and the profession.

Order: Nonxuba’s name was removed from the roll of legal practitioners and conveyancers. She was ordered to surrender her certificate of enrolment within two weeks, failing which the sheriff was authorised to retrieve it. The respondents were prohibited from operating trust accounts. Briel was appointed as curator bonis to administer and control the trust accounts of the respondents. Nonxuba was removed from office in all fiduciary roles, including executor, trustee, curator, and liquidator. The respondents were directed to pay the costs of inspections, audits, curator’s fees, and publication expenses. Any claims for fees from trust funds had to be substantiated within six months.