Facts: Tlou, sister to the late Thomas, challenged the possession of tavern furniture and equipment removed from the deceased’s premises. Shortly after Thomas’s passing, Mtsweni presented a handwritten note, commissioned by the local SAPS station commander, purporting to be the deceased’s last will. The note named Mtsweni as heir to the tavern and its contents. The family disputed the will’s validity. Despite this, the Master of the High Court issued a letter of executorship to Mtsweni. Acting on this authority, Mtsweni, accompanied by SAPS officers, removed tavern assets from the deceased’s home without a court order. Tlou claimed this amounted to unlawful dispossession and sought urgent relief to restore possession and prevent further interference.

Application: This was an urgent application for a mandament van spolie, seeking restoration of possession of the tavern furniture and equipment and interdictory relief against further interference. The issue was whether Tlou had been unlawfully dispossessed of the items and whether she had the requisite possession to invoke the spoliation remedy.

Discussion: The matter turned on the principles of spoliation, particularly whether Tlou had both detentio and animus, physical control and intent to benefit from the items. It was accepted that the items had been moved to the family home for safekeeping, but Tlou did not claim personal use or benefit. Her testimony indicated that the items were held for the estate’s benefit, not her own. This undermined the requirement of animus possidendi. The legal framework under the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 was examined, especially section 26(1), which mandates that an executor must take control of estate assets immediately upon appointment. Mtsweni’s authority to collect assets was confirmed, provided the items belonged to the estate. However, he failed to issue a written demand as required under section 11 for items previously under the deceased’s control. The refrigerators in question were shown to belong to SAB and not the estate, which further complicated the claim.

Findings: The absence of a written demand and the lack of clarity on ownership weakened both parties’ positions. Tlou did not meet the requirements for possession under the spoliation remedy. Her role was that of a custodian, not a possessor with intent to benefit. The removal of the items by Mtsweni, although procedurally flawed, did not amount to unlawful dispossession under the circumstances. The application failed on both factual and legal grounds. The urgency of the matter was accepted, but the relief sought was not justified. The authority of an executor to collect estate assets was reaffirmed, but the importance of following proper procedures, including written demands, was emphasised.

Order: The application is dismissed. The applicant is ordered to pay the costs, including counsel’s fees on Scale B.

Facts: Ntombela was arrested in September 2016 on charges of murder and assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. He was detained for 14 months before being released on bail in November 2017. The charges were later withdrawn. In May 2018, Ntombela consulted attorneys and was advised that he had a claim for wrongful arrest and detention. A notice in terms of section 3(1) of the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002 was sent to the Minister of Police shortly thereafter. The Minister conceded the merits of the claim but raised a special plea that the notice had been served outside the six-month period required by the Act. Ntombela initially applied for condonation but withdrew the application at trial, believing the notice had been timeously served.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the High Court’s dismissal of Ntombela’s claim on the basis that the section 3(1) notice had been served late, and no condonation was granted. The issue was whether the delay in serving the notice should have been condoned and whether the High Court had erred in accepting the withdrawal of the condonation application.

Discussion: The matter turned on whether the High Court had properly exercised its discretion when the condonation application was withdrawn. It was accepted that the application had been validly filed and was still before the court, despite the applicant’s belief that it was no longer necessary. The reasoning emphasised that a court is not bound to accept a withdrawal where it would result in injustice or procedural unfairness. The delay in serving the notice was adequately explained, and the applicant had acted promptly upon becoming aware of his rights. The respondent had conceded the merits of the claim, and the procedural defect should not have barred relief. It was clarified that technical non-compliance must be weighed against the interests of justice, particularly where the delay is short and the prejudice minimal.

Findings: The High Court had failed to appreciate its discretion under Rule 41 to refuse the withdrawal of the condonation application. That discretion, properly exercised, would have allowed the matter to proceed on the merits, especially given that the respondent had conceded liability and the High Court had indicated it would have granted condonation. The failure to exercise that discretion was a material misdirection. The explanation for the delay, being incarcerated and only becoming aware of his rights upon consulting an attorney, constituted good cause, particularly as the respondent had not demonstrated any prejudice. The High Court erred in allowing the withdrawal of the condonation application without exercising its discretion. The condonation application ought to have been considered and granted. The respondent’s concession on the merits further supported the granting of condonation.

Order: The appeal is upheld with costs, including counsel’s fees on Scale B. The High Court’s order is set aside and replaced with: Leave to withdraw the condonation application is refused. Condonation for late delivery of the section 3(1) notice is granted. The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant R1,500,000 plus interest from 27 June 2018 until payment. The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of suit.

Note: The minority (Wentzel AJ) provides a detailed analysis of the case law on when a debt for wrongful arrest and detention falls due. The minority concludes that, as a matter of law, the debt the appellant claims fell due on his arrest, and that notice of the claim ought to have been given within six months of that date.

The majority (Wilson J with Mfenyana J concurring) assumes without deciding that the debt the appellant claims fell due on his arrest, but nevertheless finds that the High Court failed to appreciate that it had a discretion to refuse to accept the withdrawal of the condonation application, and that the appeal should be upheld on that basis.

Facts: Spar Group entered into two written credit agreements with Volemo Trading Enterprise, which operated under the names Njhaka Njhaka Build It and Elim Build It. As security for the credit facilities, four General Notarial Covering Bonds were registered in Spar’s favour. Volemo Trading breached the agreements and failed to rectify the breach despite multiple indulgences and demands. The business had ceased receiving stock from Spar, suggesting either closure or reliance on other creditors. The respondents admitted the debt and acknowledged financial difficulties, attributing them to seasonal rainfall. They also attempted to distinguish the indebtedness between the two trading entities and proposed using a Development Fund to settle the debt, despite not having access to those funds.

Application: This was an application by Spar Group to perfect its security under the General Notarial Covering Bonds. The relief sought included authorisation to take possession of movable assets, control business operations, and recover debts owed. The respondents opposed the application, arguing that the Development Fund should be used to settle the debt and that only one of the trading entities was indebted. The issue was whether Spar was entitled to perfect its security and take control of the assets and operations of the indebted business.

Discussion: The matter turned on the legal principles governing the perfection of notarial bonds. A perfection clause allows the bondholder to take possession of the bonded movables, thereby creating a real right enforceable against third parties. The principle prior tempore potior iure was emphasised, establishing that possession confers priority among competing real rights. The respondents’ arguments regarding the Development Fund were rejected, as the fund was intended for business development and not debt repayment. It was also noted that Volemo had previously applied for access to the fund and been denied. Even if the fund were applied to the debt, a significant shortfall would remain.

Findings: The respondents’ attempt to separate the liabilities of the two trading entities was dismissed, as both operated under the same legal entity. Spar had met the requirements for perfecting its security. The breach of the credit agreements was undisputed, and the respondents had failed to demonstrate any valid defence. The risk of other creditors taking legal action further justified Spar’s application. A court may grant a perfection order where the agreement permits it. The respondents’ financial difficulties and admissions of debt confirmed Spar’s entitlement to the relief sought. The application was necessary to protect Spar’s interests and secure its claim against third parties.

Order: Judgment is granted against the respondents, jointly and severally, the one paying, the others to be absolved, for: Payment of R3,007,730.95 and interest at 5% above the prime overdraft rate from December 2024 to final payment. Spar is authorised to perfect its security under the General Notarial Covering Bonds, including: Taking possession and control of movables at the business premises; operating the first respondent’s banking accounts and collecting debts; selling or disposing of movables and retaining proceeds; carrying on the business in the name of the first respondent; taking legal action in the name of the first respondent; managing licences, permits, and registrations related to the movable property. Spar is not obliged to use its own capital to run the business. The respondents are to pay costs on the attorney-and-client scale, jointly and severally.

Facts: Niemand and JN Waterworks obtained an urgent ex parte Anton Piller order against Arestech, authorising the Sheriff to search the respondent’s premises in Benoni and secure specified documents and digital materials. The order permitted access to technical drawings, tender documents, contracts, and digital storage devices related to water and sewerage treatment products. Specific individuals were authorised to accompany the Sheriff, including the applicants’ attorney and nominated experts. The order also required the respondent to disclose passwords and allow access to electronic systems. Execution took place on 8 and 9 October 2025. The respondent later invoked Rule 6(12)(c) to seek reconsideration of the order, alleging procedural irregularities and abuse of process.

Application: This was a Rule 6(12)(c) reconsideration application brought by the respondent to set aside the Anton Piller order. The respondent argued that the order had been improperly executed, that the applicants lacked locus standi, and that the application amounted to a fishing expedition. The issue was whether the order had been obtained and executed in accordance with the safeguards required for Anton Piller relief, and whether reconsideration was justified.

Discussion: The reconsideration focused on multiple grounds. The respondent alleged that unauthorised individuals, including Niemand and Mr Gerber, accessed the premises and computer systems, contrary to the order’s terms. It was also shown that Niemand had misrepresented his directorship status in the founding affidavit, and that JN Waterworks lacked proper authorisation to institute proceedings. The procedural safeguards required for Anton Piller relief were examined, including strict compliance with the order and preservation of evidence by the Sheriff. The applicants’ admission that they had retrieved and accessed the documents themselves was found to be a serious deviation from the order’s terms. The failure to join Shosalowe Investments and Wamechsi CC, entities with a direct interest in the drawings, further undermined the application. The urgency was contrived, and the relief sought was overly broad and speculative.

Findings: The Anton Piller order had been obtained and executed in a manner that violated its safeguards and purpose. The presence of unauthorised individuals during execution, the applicants’ direct access to the documents, and the failure to preserve evidence through the Sheriff constituted grave irregularities. The misrepresentation of directorship and lack of a resolution authorising JN Waterworks to act rendered the application procedurally defective. The failure to join interested entities and the sweeping nature of the relief confirmed that the application was a fishing expedition. The applicants’ own statements revealed an intent to use the retrieved information freely, contrary to the preservation purpose of Anton Piller relief. These factors, taken together, justified the setting aside of the order.

Order: The Anton Piller order is set aside. Within 48 hours, the Sheriff must return all documents taken during execution to the respondent. Within 24 hours, the applicants must deliver to the respondent’s attorney: All documents relating to the respondent obtained during execution, in hard copy or electronic format and a sworn statement confirming destruction of all electronic records of the respondent’s documents. The applicants, jointly and severally, are ordered to pay the costs on the attorney-and-client scale.

Facts: Hamman, a practising attorney, was appointed as receiver and divider in terms of a divorce order between the respondent and his ex-wife. His mandate was to divide the net proceeds from the sale of their jointly owned immovable property, taking into account each party’s contributions exceeding their respective liabilities. After interviewing both parties, Hamman compiled a report detailing the proposed division. The respondent objected to the report, alleging that Hamman had failed to properly assess the contributions and had incorrectly applied the relevant legal principles. The report was later set aside and replaced with a revised division of proceeds, following a successful review application. No costs order was made in that review. Subsequently, the respondent instituted a damages claim in the Magistrate’s Court, alleging breach of duty and negligence by Hamman in his role as receiver and divider. Hamman raised a special plea of res judicata and issue estoppel, which the Magistrate dismissed.

Appeal: This was an appeal by Hamman against the Magistrate’s dismissal of his special plea of res judicata and issue estoppel. The issue was whether the respondent’s damages claim in the Magistrate’s Court, based on Hamman’s alleged breach of duty, was precluded by the earlier High Court review judgment which had already addressed the same underlying conduct and made a final order on costs.

Discussion: The appeal turned on whether the requirements for res judicata were met, which included a final judgment, between the same parties, based on the same cause of action, and concerning the same subject matter. It was accepted that the first two requirements were satisfied. The respondent argued that the causes of action differed, the review concerned the incorrect application of actio communi dividundo, while the Magistrate’s Court claim was for damages arising from breach of duty. The Magistrate accepted this distinction. However, the appeal court found this reasoning artificial. The respondent’s damages claim effectively sought to recover the costs incurred in the review, which had already been addressed by the final judgment, which ordered each party to bear their own costs. The proper course would have been to seek clarification or appeal the cost order, rather than initiating fresh proceedings. Individuals acting in quasi-judicial capacities, such as receivers and dividers, are generally not mulcted in costs unless they act in bad faith, a principle not challenged in the review proceedings.

Findings: The respondent’s damages claim was a disguised attempt to overturn the cost order made in the review. The same underlying conduct, Hamman’s handling of the division, formed the basis of both proceedings. The subject matter and cause of action were sufficiently identical to meet the requirements of res judicata. The Magistrate’s reasoning was held to be contradictory, particularly in acknowledging that the relief sought in both matters related to costs, while simultaneously treating them as distinct. The respondent should have pursued an appeal or clarification of the review judgment rather than instituting new proceedings. As the requirements for res judicata were met, it was unnecessary to consider issue estoppel.

Order: The appeal is upheld with costs, on a party and party scale. The Magistrate’s order dismissing the special plea of res judicata and issue estoppel is replaced with the following: “The special plea of res judicata and issue estoppel is upheld with costs.”

Facts: Hazendal Wine Estate contracted Pure Electrical Solutions to relocate high-voltage Eskom pylons from its property, which interfered with the estate’s tranquillity. The respondent, represented by its sole director Theart and shareholder Pretorius, claimed to have connections with Eskom and promised project completion by year-end. A service level agreement was signed in July 2024, with Hazendal paying a R32 million deposit and an additional R7,95 million for EMF reactors. Despite these payments, no work was performed, and Eskom had not entered into any agreement with the respondent. Hazendal’s investigation revealed forged invoices, diversion of funds to Pretorius’ personal accounts, and no procurement of the reactors. The respondent later tendered repayment of R39,75 million, which was not honoured.

Application: Hazendal Wine Estate brought an urgent application for the provisional winding-up of Pure Electrical Solutions in the hands of the Master of the High Court, Cape Town. The issue was whether the respondent was commercially insolvent and whether urgency was justified given the admitted debt, lack of service delivery, and diversion of funds.

Discussion: The matter turned on urgency, insolvency, and the respondent’s reliance on the constitutional right to silence. The urgency was accepted due to the undisputed debt and risk of further dissipation of funds. The respondent argued that the applicant failed to justify urgency and invoked the right to remain silent, citing potential criminal implications. It was clarified that the right to silence applies to accused persons in criminal proceedings, not civil matters. In civil litigation, adverse inferences may be drawn from silence. The respondent’s failure to explain the transfer of funds to Pretorius’ personal accounts, coupled with the unfulfilled tender, was viewed as evasive. Pretorius’ silence, in the face of detailed allegations, strengthens the inference that the funds were wilfully misappropriated. The statutory requirements for winding-up were examined under sections 344(f) and 345(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, confirming that the debt exceeded R100, was admitted, and remained unpaid.

Findings: The respondent had accepted substantial funds without rendering any services and failed to account for their use. The tender to repay R39,75 million was a binding admission of indebtedness, and its non-payment demonstrated commercial insolvency. The respondent’s silence in the face of detailed allegations strengthened the inference of misappropriation. The right to silence was misapplied, as Pretorius was not an accused person and faced no imminent prosecution. Limited liability cannot shield a company from accountability when it accepts funds and fails to deliver. The requirements for a provisional winding-up were satisfied as the debt was admitted, unpaid, and not subject to a bona fide dispute. The urgency was justified, and the application succeeded.

Order: The applicant’s non-compliance with Rule 6 is condoned and the matter is heard as one of urgency. The respondent is placed under provisional winding-up in the hands of the Master of the High Court, Cape Town. A rule nisi is issued, returnable on 5 December 2025, calling upon the respondent and any interested party to show cause why: The respondent should not be placed under final liquidation; and the costs of the application should not be costs in the liquidation. Service of this order is to be effected by the Sheriff and by publication in newspapers, and on employees, trade unions, and SARS as prescribed.

Facts: Galito’s Mobile operated a national chicken fast-food franchise and had entered into a franchise agreement with Tetz Investment, formerly known as Khom Trading. The relationship deteriorated over time, culminating in a termination letter issued in February 2025. Tetz Investment was deregistered for failing to lodge annual returns. Despite this, Choeu, a director of Lehumo Rise, continued operating a Barcelos franchise from the same premises previously used by the Galito’s outlet. Galito’s alleged that this conduct breached the restraint of trade clause in the original franchise agreement and sought to interdict Choeu and Lehumo Rise from continuing operations within a 10 km radius of the original outlet.

Application: Galito’s Mobile applied for declaratory and interdictory relief, including an order declaring the deregistration of Tetz Investment void under section 83(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, and restraining the respondents from engaging in competing business activities. The issue was whether Choeu and Lehumo Rise, as related parties, were bound by the restraint of trade provisions in the franchise agreement, and whether the deregistered company could be reinstated to enable enforcement of contractual claims.

Discussion: The matter turned on contractual interpretation and the scope of restraint clauses. Clause 15.5 of the franchise agreement extended the restraint to related persons and entities, including those associated by blood, marriage, or common ownership. Galito’s argued that this clause bound Choeu and Lehumo Rise, even though they were not signatories to the agreement. It was examined whether a person not party to a contract could be deemed bound by its terms through implied or silent consent. No such consent or conduct had been demonstrated. The respondents had not signed as sureties, nor had they acted in a manner suggesting acceptance of the agreement’s terms. The attempt to enforce the restraint through contractual means was flawed, as the respondents were not parties to the agreement. It was also considered whether the conduct amounted to unlawful competition under Aquilian liability. South African law protects free competition and does not generally recognise exclusive trading rights unless the conduct is intentionally unlawful or unfair. The evidence presented did not support a delictual claim, and the contractual route chosen by Galito’s was insufficient.

Findings: Galito’s had failed to establish a legal basis for enforcing the restraint of trade against Choeu and Lehumo Rise. The franchise agreement did not bind third parties who were neither signatories nor shown to have tacitly accepted its terms. The attempt to rely on clause 15.5 was found to be overly broad and unenforceable without clear evidence of association or consent. The operation of a competing franchise from the same premises, while commercially inconvenient to Galito’s, did not amount to unlawful competition under South African law. The absence of any misleading conduct, misappropriation of confidential information, or breach of fiduciary duty further weakened the claim. The application for reinstatement of the deregistered company was noted but not granted, as no substantive relief could be issued against a non-existent entity. The overall approach taken by Galito’s was legally unsustainable and factually insufficient to justify the relief sought.

Order: The application is dismissed. Galito’s Mobile is ordered to pay the costs of the second and third respondents, including counsel’s fees on Scale C.

Facts: Sithole was convicted in the Ngwelezana Regional Court of murder and rape. The complainant was both the victim and the primary witness in both counts. She had previously been in a relationship with Sithole, which ended before she moved in with the deceased. On the night of the murder, she identified Sithole as the assailant who entered the shack, shot the deceased multiple times, and later raped her at knife-point in front of her child. Her testimony was supported by cellphone tower evidence placing Sithole near the scene. Sithole pleaded not guilty and was legally represented throughout the trial. Leave to appeal was granted on the rape conviction and sentence.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the convictions and sentences for murder and rape. Sithole argued that the trial was a nullity due to the absence of assessors, and that the complainant’s evidence was unreliable. The issue was whether the trial was procedurally defective and whether the convictions were supported by credible evidence.

Discussion: The appeal raised an in limine point regarding the constitution of the lower court. Sithole contended that section 93ter of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 required assessors unless expressly waived. The record showed that Sithole initially requested assessors but later, through his attorney, confirmed he did not require them. The trial proceeded without assessors, and no further objections were raised. The magistrate had fulfilled the duty to inform the accused of his rights, and the waiver was valid. On the merits, the evidence of the complainant was scrutinised under the cautionary rule applicable to single witnesses. Her testimony was found to be coherent, consistent, and credible. She identified Sithole by voice and physical features, and her conduct after the incidents was rational and not indicative of dishonesty. Cellphone tower data corroborated her account, placing Sithole near the scene during relevant times. The investigating officer confirmed her disclosures and the forensic process followed.

Findings: The trial was procedurally sound and Sithole’s waiver of assessors was validly made with legal representation. The complainant’s evidence was accepted as reliable and materially satisfactory, supported by corroborating cellphone data and consistent post-incident behaviour. Her identification of Sithole was based on familiarity and direct observation, and her initial reluctance to name him to the deceased’s family was reasonably explained by fear of retaliation. The forensic and investigative evidence aligned with her account, and no material contradictions were found. Minor inconsistencies do not undermine credibility, especially where the witness testifies with restraint and clarity. The appeal failed to demonstrate any misdirection or irregularity that would justify interference with the convictions or sentences. The overall evidentiary picture was coherent and persuasive, and the findings were upheld.

Order: The appeal is dismissed.

Facts: The accused, a 17-year-old teenager, was convicted in the Middelburg Magistrate’s Court for contravening section 36 of the General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1955. The charge related to the possession of a blue Raleigh bicycle, valued at R500, which was found at his residence. The police suspected it was stolen, and the accused was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation. He pleaded guilty and submitted a written statement in terms of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The magistrate accepted the plea and convicted him. A pre-sentence report compiled by a probation officer recommended compulsory residence in a Child and Youth Care centre. The accused was sentenced to 30 months in such a facility.

Review: This matter came before the High Court for automatic review in terms of section 85 of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, read with section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The issue was whether the conviction and sentence were in accordance with justice, particularly in light of the written plea statement and the accuracy of the pre-sentence report.

Discussion: The review focused on whether the accused had admitted all elements of the offence. Section 36 requires that the accused be found in possession of suspected stolen goods and unable to account for such possession. The written statement merely stated that the bicycle was found at the accused’s residence, without clarifying whether he had personal and direct control over it. No details were provided about proximity, presence, or exclusive possession. The magistrate failed to question the accused further or invoke section 113, which would have been appropriate given the lack of factual admissions. The pre-sentence report contained multiple inaccuracies, including references to convictions for theft and possession of stolen property, despite the accused being convicted of only one offence. The probation officer claimed the accused admitted to committing two offences and described how they were committed, which was factually incorrect. Both the prosecutor and defence counsel endorsed the report without addressing its errors or presenting mitigating circumstances. The sentencing judgment repeated the same inaccuracies, resulting in a material misdirection.

Findings: It was found that the conviction was not supported by sufficient factual admissions and should not have been entered on the basis of the written statement. The sentence was based on incorrect information and a flawed report. The legal representatives and magistrate failed to exercise their duties to ensure accurate and fair proceedings. The sentence imposed was disproportionate to the offence and failed to consider the Zinn-triad which includes the nature of the crime, the offender’s personal circumstances, and societal interests. A non-custodial sentence would have been more appropriate. Given that the accused had already served two months of the sentence, remittal was deemed unjust and futile.

Order: The conviction and sentence of the accused are reviewed and set aside. If the prosecuting authority decides to prosecute the accused de novo, the proceedings must be heard by a different magistrate. The Registrar must submit a copy of this judgment to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Legal Aid Board, Department of Social Development, and the accused’s guardian.

Facts: Phaahla was convicted in 2004 for his role in a violent armed robbery involving 18 individuals, which resulted in the deaths of six security guards. He was sentenced to six life terms and has been incarcerated since. Over the years, Phaahla consistently applied for parole, supported by favourable recommendations from the Case Management Committee (CMC) and the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board (CSPB). Despite this, the National Council for Correctional Services (NCCS) repeatedly declined to recommend parole, and the Minister of Correctional Services endorsed these decisions. Phaahla had completed multiple rehabilitation programmes, maintained a clean disciplinary record, and received positive assessments from psychologists and social workers. Nevertheless, his parole applications were denied, prompting him to bring several legal challenges, including review and urgent applications.

Application: This was a review application brought by Phaahla to set aside the decisions of the NCCS and the Minister, taken in December 2024 and January 2025 respectively, declining to place him on parole. He sought an order for his release on parole within 15 days, subject to continued participation in rehabilitation programmes, and a costs order on an attorney-and-client scale. The issue was whether the Minister’s decision to deny parole was irrational, unlawful, and arbitrary under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) and the Constitution.

Discussion: The matter centred on whether the Minister’s decision was rationally connected to the evidence and statutory purpose. The Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 and relevant Constitutional Court decisions were examined, which clarified that parole eligibility should be based on the date of commission of the offence, not sentencing. The Minister cited superficial remorse, poor insight, and moderate risk of reoffending as reasons for denial, relying heavily on a single psychological report. However, multiple expert reports contradicted this view, showing remorse, rehabilitation, and low risk. The NCCS’s recommendations were inconsistent and lacking substantive justification, especially as they acknowledged that compliance with further programmes would not guarantee parole. The Minister’s failure to consider all available evidence and his reliance on subjective impressions rather than objective assessments were highlighted.

Findings: The Minister’s decision lacked rationality and fairness. Parole is not a right but must be considered justly and expeditiously. The Minister’s reasoning was contradicted by expert reports, and his reliance on isolated statements was nitpicking. The NCCS’s repeated deferrals and vague recommendations were viewed as evidence of a predetermined outcome. Phaahla had completed all required programmes, maintained exemplary conduct, and received strong support from correctional staff. The Minister’s decision was found to be arbitrary, prejudicial, and constitutionally invalid. Exceptional circumstances justified not remitting the matter to the Minister, as further delays would perpetuate injustice.

Order: The order made on 5 September 2025 was confirmed.

Facts: Alp Africa faced a potential strike by members of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), who were employed at its plant. The dispute arose from allegations against the company’s Commercial Financial Controller, Maheshi, who was accused of using vulgar and derogatory language towards employees. A grievance was lodged by Monageng, followed by a collective grievance from other employees. Although Maheshi apologised and the facilitator recorded a resolution in Monageng’s case, NUMSA maintained that the broader collective grievance remained unresolved. The union issued a strike notice demanding disciplinary action or transfer of Maheshi, citing workplace hostility and emotional distress.

Application: Alp Africa brought an urgent application under section 68(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, seeking an interdict against the strike. It argued that the demand was unlawful and not a matter of mutual interest, and that the grievance had already been resolved. The issue was whether the demand for disciplinary action or transfer of Maheshi constituted a lawful basis for protected strike action.

Discussion: The matter turned on whether the demand fell within the scope of mutual interest and whether it infringed Maheshi’s rights. The applicant argued that the demand was unlawful and that strike action in support of it should be prohibited. While employees may strike over demands for disciplinary action, the employer must show that such action would infringe the rights of the affected employee. The applicant failed to provide evidence that disciplinary proceedings or a transfer would violate Maheshi’s rights. Monageng’s individual grievance was distinguished from the collective complaint, which involved broader allegations of repeated vulgar language. The facilitator’s minutes confirmed that the collective grievance was not resolved by the earlier apology. The demand was therefore not based on a previously settled issue.

Findings: The demand underpinning the proposed strike action was not unlawful. The grievance raised by Mr Monageng had been resolved individually, but the collective complaint involved broader allegations of repeated vulgar language directed at multiple employees, which had not been addressed or resolved. The demand for disciplinary action or transfer of Maheshi was therefore based on a distinct and ongoing issue. The reasoning clarified that a demand for disciplinary action is not inherently unlawful, and that the applicant bore the burden of proving that such action would infringe the employee’s rights. No evidence was presented to show that disciplinary proceedings or a transfer would violate any contractual or statutory rights. The assertion that the demand was not a matter of mutual interest was abandoned during argument, and the remaining objections were unsupported. Employees are entitled to demand a respectful working environment and such demands, if made in good faith and without infringing others’ rights, fall within the scope of protected industrial action. The application failed to establish a clear right to an interdict, and the strike was not shown to be unprotected.

Order: The application is declared to be urgent in terms of Rule 38 of the Labour Court Rules and the forms and service provided for in the Rules read with section 68(2) of the Labour Relations Act are dispensed with. The application is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

Facts: Mokgwankgwa referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA after his termination by Ubuntu Services Worker Co-operative Ltd. At the arbitration hearing, Thompson Security Group and Ubuntu Co-operative raised a jurisdictional objection, relying on a document signed by Mokgwankgwa stating he was a member of the co-operative, not an employee. The arbitrator upheld the objection, finding that the CCMA lacked jurisdiction under section 6(1) of the Co-operative Act 14 of 2005. Mokgwankgwa launched a review application in the Labour Court, challenging the jurisdictional ruling and arguing that the arbitrator had committed a material error of law.

Application: This was a review application brought in terms of sections 145 and 158(1)(g) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. Mokgwankgwa sought to set aside the jurisdictional ruling issued by the arbitrator, contending that the CCMA did have jurisdiction to hear his unfair dismissal dispute. The issue was whether the arbitrator had correctly interpreted and applied the relevant statutory provisions in determining that Mokgwankgwa was not an employee as defined in section 213 of the Labour Relations Act.

Discussion: The matter turned on whether the arbitrator’s reliance on section 6(1) of the Co-operative Act 2005 was legally sound. It was shown that the Co-operative Act had been amended by the Co-operatives Amendment Act 6 of 2013, which came into effect in April 2019. The amended section 6 expressly provides that a member or non-member of a worker co-operative may qualify as an employee under the Labour Relations Act. The arbitrator had relied on repealed legislation and failed to consider the amended statutory framework. The bifurcated review standard was analysed, confirming that jurisdictional rulings must be assessed on the basis of correctness, not reasonableness. The arbitrator’s conclusion was a material error of law, as it excluded Mokgwankgwa from the definition of employee without applying the correct legal test. The review also addressed procedural fairness, noting that the arbitrator had not received Mokgwankgwa’s written submissions opposing the jurisdictional point, despite them having been filed timeously.

Findings: The arbitrator’s jurisdictional ruling was based on repealed legislation and failed to apply the correct legal framework. The Co-operatives Amendment Act 2013 clearly states that members of worker co-operatives may be employees for purposes of labour legislation. No exemption had been sought by Ubuntu Co-operative from the Minister of Labour or a bargaining council, which would have been the only basis for excluding Mokgwankgwa from the protections of the Labour Relations Act. The arbitrator’s legal conclusion was incorrect and constituted a material error of law. The review succeeded on this ground alone, and it was unnecessary to consider the remaining grounds. The matter was remitted to the CCMA for arbitration de novo before a different arbitrator.

Order: The jurisdictional ruling is reviewed and set aside. The unfair dismissal dispute is remitted to the CCMA for arbitration de novo before a different arbitrator. The CCMA is directed to enrol the arbitration as soon as possible. There is no order as to costs.

Facts: Dr N, a paediatric registrar employed at Pelonomi Hospital, was on overnight duty when she was raped by an intruder while moving between wards. The assailant, a 16/17-year-old male with no connection to the hospital, gained access to the premises during ongoing construction. At the time, the hospital’s perimeter fencing was under temporary repair, the elevator was not functioning, and the lights on the first floor, where the attack occurred, were out. The attacker was later convicted and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Dr N instituted a damages claim against the MEC for Health in the Free State, alleging a failure to provide a safe working environment. The MEC raised a special plea that the claim was barred by section 35(1) of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA), arguing that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment and was thus compensable only under the Act.

Appeal: This appeal concerned whether Dr N’s common law damages claim was precluded by section 35(1) of COIDA. The issue was whether the rape constituted an “accident” arising out of and in the course of her employment, thereby triggering the exclusivity of the statutory compensation scheme.

Discussion: The appeal required a close reading of section 35(1) of COIDA and the definitions of “accident” and “occupational injury” within the Act. South African and international jurisprudence on the scope of employment-related injuries were reviewed, including cases involving criminal assaults. COIDA is remedial legislation intended to be interpreted generously in favour of employees, but it was also recognised that not all injuries sustained at the workplace necessarily arise out of employment. The policy rationale behind workers’ compensation schemes and the historical development of the exclusivity doctrine were examined. Comparative approaches in jurisdictions such as Germany, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom were considered, noting that intentional acts like rape are often excluded from compensation schemes or treated as distinct from workplace risks.

Findings: The rape did not arise out of Dr N’s employment and was not incidental to her duties as a paediatric registrar. The notion that rape could be considered a risk inherent in such employment was rejected, with emphasis on the egregious nature of the act and its lack of connection to her professional responsibilities. The argument that the injury occurred “in the course of employment” was insufficient without a causal link to the employment itself. Accepting the MEC’s position would send an unacceptable message that rape is a foreseeable occupational hazard for women in the workplace, which would be contrary to constitutional values. The exclusivity provision in section 35(1) did not apply, and Dr N was entitled to pursue her common law claim for damages.

Order: The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Key dictum:

[31] Counsel on behalf of the MEC did not go so far as to suggest that the dictum in Khoza referred to in the preceding paragraph was clearly wrong and that we should depart from it, but pointed out that relating the causal connection, as Rumpff JA did, to the motive of the perpetrator of the wrong that caused the injury was problematic and would lead to uncertainty. I agree. However, it appears to me that the problem can be resolved by a slight adjustment, namely to ask the question whether the wrong causing the injury bears a connection to the employee’s employment. Put differently, the question that might rightly be asked is whether the act causing the injury was a risk incidental to the employment. There is of course, as pointed out in numerous authorities, no bright-line test. Each case must be dealt with on its own facts.

[33] I can understand that courts have strained to come to the rescue of particularly impecunious individuals and have held them entitled to claim compensation from a fund established for that purpose. I also understand that courts have done this by adopting a position in line with the policy behind the Workers’ Compensation Legislation, namely, that workers should as far as possible be assisted to claim compensation that is their due under the Act and which flow from incidents connected to their employment and which can rightly be said to be a risk attendant upon or inherent to the employment. Dealing with a vulnerable class within our society and contemplating that rape is a scourge of South African society, I have difficulty contemplating that employees would be assisted if their common law rights were to be restricted as proposed on behalf of the MEC. If anything, it might rightly be said to be adverse to the interest of employees injured by rape to restrict them to COIDA. It would be sending an unacceptable message to employees, especially women, namely, that you are precluded from suing your employer for what you assert is a failure to provide reasonable protective measures against rape because rape directed against women is a risk inherent in employment in South Africa. This cannot be what our Constitution will countenance.

Facts: Els entered into a residential lease agreement with the Venters, who had relocated to Australia but retained ownership of their family home in Stellenbosch. Initially, the property was let to Els for three years, ending in December 2023. When Els requested an extension, the Venters agreed on condition that the new lease would include a three-month termination clause to facilitate the sale of the property. A second lease was signed in August 2023, commencing in January 2024 and ending in December 2026. The property was sold in December 2023, and the Venters issued a termination notice requiring Els to vacate by March 2024. Els acknowledged the notice but later disputed its validity, arguing that the lease fell under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and could only be terminated for material breach.

Appeal: Els appealed against the Western Cape High Court’s decision that upheld the termination notice and ordered him to vacate the property. He argued that the lease was a fixed-term consumer agreement under the Act and that the termination was unlawful. The issue was whether the lease constituted a rental agreement concluded in the ordinary course of business, thereby falling within the scope of the Act.

Discussion: The appeal focused on statutory interpretation of the terms “transaction,” “service,” and “rental” under the Act. It was explained that for a lease to qualify as a rental agreement under the Act, it must be concluded by a supplier in the ordinary course of business and marketed to a consumer. The Venters, a software engineer and a civil engineer respectively, had rented out their home as a temporary measure while settling abroad. They were not engaged in the business of letting property, nor did they continually market rental services. The lease was a private arrangement to preserve an asset pending its sale. Els, a senior economist, was not a vulnerable consumer and had freely agreed to the lease terms, including the termination clause. The interpretation of “ordinary course of business” was examined using dictionary definitions and legal precedent, confirming that the lease did not meet the statutory threshold.

Findings: The lease agreement did not fall within the scope of the Consumer Protection Act. The Venters were not suppliers, and the lease was not part of any ongoing business activity. The appellant’s reliance on section 14(2)(b)(ii) of the Act was misplaced, as the lease exceeded the maximum duration prescribed for fixed-term consumer agreements and lacked demonstrable financial benefit to the consumer. The appeal was dismissed on these grounds. However, the High Court’s order requiring Els to vacate the property by March 2024 was problematic. Although the lease had been validly terminated, the order resembled an eviction and conflicted with the procedural safeguards under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. That portion of the order was set aside.

Order: The appeal succeeds in part. Paragraph 49(iv) of the High Court’s order is set aside. Save as aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed with costs on the scale as between attorney and own client.