Facts: Jaijai, a former employee of Investec Bank, resigned in 2014 citing discriminatory treatment, financial prejudice, and unfair labour practices. Several years later, he submitted complaints to Investec’s Remuneration and Social Ethics Committees, which were dismissed. In 2019, Jaijai referred the matter to the Prudential Authority (PA) as a protected disclosure under the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000, alleging contraventions of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 and the Companies Act. The PA declined to act, stating that the referral did not engage its jurisdiction under financial sector law. Jaijai then approached the Financial Services Tribunal (FST), which confirmed the PA’s position and dismissed the reconsideration application. The court of first instance later reviewed the FST’s decision and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal.

Appeal: The Prudential Authority appealed the remittal order, arguing that the FST lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the matter as no “decision” had been taken under a financial sector law. The issue was whether the FST had authority to entertain Jaijai’s reconsideration application in the absence of a qualifying decision under section 218 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (FSRA).

Discussion: The appeal turned on the interpretation of “decision” within the meaning of section 218 of the FSRA. The PA maintained that Jaijai’s referral was rooted in an employment dispute and did not trigger any obligations under financial sector law. The disclosure, while extensive, focused on alleged unfair treatment, bonus disputes, and dignity-related grievances, none of which fell within the PA’s statutory mandate. The PA’s response to Jaijai clarified that no contraventions of the Banks Act or its regulations had been identified, and therefore no regulatory action was warranted. The FST had dismissed the reconsideration application on the basis that no decision had been taken. Jaijai’s review application targeted the FST’s dismissal, alleging procedural unfairness and jurisdictional error.

Findings: However, even if procedural flaws existed, they could not cure a lack of jurisdiction. The FSRA confines the FST’s powers to decisions taken under financial sector law, and Jaijai’s complaints did not meet that threshold. The FST lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the matter, as the PA had not taken a decision within the meaning of section 218 of the FSRA. The referral concerned employment-related grievances, not regulatory breaches. The remittal order was ultra vires, as it directed a statutory body to act beyond its lawful powers. The appeal succeeded on the basis that the FST could not adjudicate a matter falling outside its statutory remit, and any procedural concerns raised by Jaijai were rendered moot by this jurisdictional limitation.

Order: The appeal is upheld, with costs, including the costs of two counsel, where employed. The order of the court a quo is replaced with the following: “The application is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel, where employed.”

Facts: Waterberg Boulevard leased commercial premises to Smulhoekie Tuisnywerheid under a written agreement signed in March 2016. Boshoff, representing Smulhoekie, also bound himself as surety for the company’s obligations. The lease was for three years, with escalating monthly rental and additional charges for utilities. Smulhoekie took occupation and began trading but ceased operations in October 2016 due to poor performance. Boshoff informed Waterberg and attempted to find a replacement tenant. Hassim was introduced as a prospective tenant and allegedly undertook to settle the arrears. Waterberg later instituted two separate actions in the Bela-Bela Magistrates’ Court to recover unpaid rental. The first action was successful and upheld on appeal. The second action, for R442,493.33, was dismissed by the High Court on jurisdictional grounds and for failure to mitigate damages.

Appeal: Waterberg appealed the High Court’s decision, arguing that its claim was monetary in nature and fell within the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court. The issue was whether a claim for arrear rental constitutes a claim for specific performance under section 46 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, and whether the magistrates’ court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim without an alternative prayer for damages.

Discussion: The appeal examined the distinction between claims for specific performance and claims sounding in money. Waterberg contended that its claim was not for specific performance but for payment of a debt and therefore did not require an alternative claim for damages. The statutory framework under section 46(2)(c) was analysed, alongside historical interpretations and case law, which supports the view that monetary claims are not specific performance claims. The lease agreement included a clause consenting to the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court, and the parties’ residence and business location fell within the Bela-Bela district, satisfying section 28. The claim was also broken down into separate annual rental periods, each below the R200,000 jurisdictional threshold. The High Court’s finding that Waterberg had a duty to mitigate damages by accepting Hassim as a substitute tenant was challenged, with reference to clause 9.2.3 of the lease, which imposed no such duty unless the lease was cancelled.

Findings: The claim for arrear rental was found to be a monetary claim, not one for specific performance. The magistrates’ court had jurisdiction to hear the matter, both by statutory provision and by written consent. The High Court’s interpretation of section 46 was incorrect, and its finding on mitigation was inconsistent with the lease terms. Waterberg was not obliged to accept a substitute tenant, and the lease had not been cancelled. The breakdown of the claim into separate periods further supported jurisdiction. The structure and wording of the lease agreement reflected a clear intention to recover unpaid rental as a debt, not to compel performance. The absence of any alternative prayer for damages did not prejudice the claim, as the relief sought was purely financial and within the court’s competence.

Order: Special leave to appeal is granted. The appeal is upheld with costs. The respondents are to pay the costs of the appeal jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved. The High Court order is set aside and replaced with the following: The appeal is upheld with costs on Scale B. The magistrates’ court is set aside and replaced with: The defendants are ordered to pay R442,493 jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved. Interest a tempora morae from 25 April 2023 to date of payment. Costs of suit on attorney and client scale.

Facts: Brookway Properties launched an eviction application in 2010 against unlawful occupiers on its land, seeking both their removal and compensation from the City of Tshwane for the duration of the occupation. An eviction order was granted and the City was directed to provide alternative accommodation by January 2011. The compensation claim was postponed sine die and referred to oral evidence. In 2020, Brookway filed a declaration alleging constitutional damages due to the City’s failure to comply with the 2010 order. The City raised a special plea, arguing that Brookway had failed to deliver a notice in terms of section 3 of the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002 (the Act), and that the claim had prescribed.

Application: Brookway applied for condonation under section 3(4)(a) of the Act for the late delivery of its notice of intended legal proceedings. The issue was whether the claim for constitutional damages constituted a “debt” under the Act and the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, and whether the proceedings were new or merely a continuation of the original eviction application.

Discussion: Brookway argued that its claim was not a new cause of action but a continuation of the original proceedings, as the compensation claim had been postponed for oral evidence. It was submitted that constitutional damages were introduced by amendment during the original hearing and accepted without objection. The claim was framed as a consequence of the City’s failure to comply with the 2010 order, and not as a delictual or contractual debt. Reference was made to previous cases which support the principle that constitutional damages may be awarded as appropriate relief for breaches of constitutional rights. The City contended that the claim was new, had prescribed, and required compliance with the Act. It also argued that constitutional damages constituted a “debt” and that condonation could not be granted for a prescribed claim.

Findings: The claim for constitutional damages was found to be a continuation of the original proceedings, not de novo litigation. The referral to oral evidence was interpreted as an augmentation of the existing claim, and not a fresh cause of action. The constitutional damages were introduced during the original hearing and accepted by the court a quo, which postponed the matter for oral evidence. The claim was not considered a “debt” under the Act or the Prescription Act and had not prescribed. Even if the Act were applicable, good cause for condonation was established, including the impact of Covid-19 lockdowns and the City’s longstanding awareness of the claim. No unreasonable prejudice to the City was shown, and the litigation history supported the applicant’s position. The City’s failure to comply with the 2010 order was central to the dispute, and its delayed reliance on procedural objections was found to be opportunistic.

Order: The applicant’s claim is not subject to the provisions of section 3 of the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act, Act 40 of 2002. Insofar as the claim might be subject to the Act, condonation is granted in terms of section 3(4). Costs awarded, including costs of counsel on Scale C.

Facts: Elekwa Mining was appointed as a mining contractor for the Eleazer Farm site in Klerksdorp, North West Province, following the failure of Zambezi Gold to meet its contractual obligations under a prior agreement. The site, owned by J. B. Marks Municipality, contains approximately 1,5 million tonnes of gold-bearing material. The Programme for Community Development, placed under business rescue in 2017, held the mining licence granted by the Minister of Minerals and Energy. Nell was appointed as the business rescue practitioner (BRP) and developed a revised business rescue plan, which was adopted by 99,02% of creditors and affected persons at a section 151 meeting. This plan included Elekwa’s appointment and a post-commencement finance facility of R4 million. Despite being instructed to vacate the site, Zambezi Gold continued operating machinery and processing material, claiming a retention right over its R20 million processing plant.

Application: This was an urgent application brought by Elekwa Mining to interdict Zambezi Gold from conducting any mining or related activities at Eleazer Farm, pending finalisation of a separate application in the Pretoria High Court challenging Elekwa’s appointment. The issue was whether Elekwa Mining, as the lawfully appointed contractor under a valid business rescue plan, was entitled to exclusive operational control of the site, and whether Zambezi Gold’s continued presence and activities were unlawful.

Discussion: Elekwa argued that its appointment followed proper procedure under the Companies Act 71 of 2008, and that the conditions precedent in Zambezi Gold’s agreement were never fulfilled, rendering that agreement void. Zambezi Gold contended that the matter lacked urgency and that its activities were limited to processing material from other sites, not mining. It also claimed that the alleged operations occurred on adjacent land owned by Rhythm of the Nation, not Eleazer Farm. Elekwa responded that the site remained under the control of the BRP, and that Zambezi Gold’s presence and operations were unauthorised. The requirements for an interim interdict were assessed with reference to National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [2012] ZACC 18, which outlines the need for a prima facie right, irreparable harm, balance of convenience, and absence of alternative remedy.

Findings: It was accepted that Elekwa Mining had established a clear right through its appointment under the revised business rescue plan, which remained valid and unchallenged. The delay in launching the application was not unreasonable, given the timeline of events and Zambezi Gold’s intermittent presence on the site. The argument that the matter lacked urgency was rejected, as Elekwa had no substantial redress in due course. Zambezi Gold’s own version, that it was not conducting mining operations, supported the granting of relief, as it would suffer no prejudice from being interdicted. The broad wording of Elekwa’s notice of motion was interpreted to include both mining and processing activities. No counter-application was brought by Zambezi Gold to assert its retention rights or seek permission to continue processing. The matter was confined to the site under the BRP’s control, and no findings were made regarding adjacent properties or retention claims.

Order: Non-compliance with the rules pertaining to time periods and service is condoned, and the application is heard as urgent in terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court. Pending finalisation of the application under case number 106799/2025, Zambezi Gold is interdicted and restrained from undertaking any mining operations or activities, including exploration, drilling, processing, and use of associated infrastructure, at Eleazer Farm. Zambezi Gold is directed to pay the costs of the application on a scale as between attorney and client, inclusive of the costs of two counsel, one of whom is senior counsel.

Facts: Mahlopi Metals Group (MMG), a mining company specialising in chrome extraction, was placed under provisional liquidation in June 2025 following a claim by Gradco South Africa for an unpaid debt exceeding R12 million. The Makatoane Family Trust, MMG’s sole shareholder, did not oppose the liquidation due to legal advice received at the time. MMG’s operations ceased in September 2025, and its mining rights were suspended. The Trust launched an urgent application to place MMG under business rescue, citing threats from mining rights holders to cancel agreements and the inability to remedy breaches while under liquidation. Over 400 employees were affected by the shutdown.

Application: The trustees of the Makatoane Family Trust applied for an urgent order placing MMG under supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings in terms of section 131(1), read with section 131(4)(a), of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The issue was whether MMG was financially distressed and whether there was a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company, despite its provisional liquidation status and opposition from major creditors.

Discussion: The urgency of the application was challenged by Standard Bank and Gradco, who argued that the timing was self-created and the application aimed to frustrate liquidation. The applicants contended that the threat to MMG’s business, particularly the suspension of mining rights and potential cancellation of agreements, justified urgent intervention. Urgency must be assessed based on whether substantial redress is attainable through ordinary proceedings. The applicants acknowledged prior procedural missteps but attributed them to legal advice and later shifted focus to business rescue. The financial distress of MMG was not disputed, and the applicants presented a detailed business rescue plan, including post-commencement funding of R18,5 million, support from mining rights holders, and restructuring proposals. Standard Bank opposed the application, citing lack of disclosure and trust breakdown, while Gradco questioned MMG’s solvency and the feasibility of acquiring mining rights. The applicants responded with evidence of undertakings, payments made, and ongoing engagements with stakeholders.

Findings: It was accepted that MMG was financially distressed and that the urgency was not self-created. The application was found to be a legitimate attempt to salvage the business rather than obstruct liquidation. The business rescue plan provided a factual foundation for a reasonable prospect of success, supported by commitments from mining rights holders, funding arrangements, and operational restructuring. The conduct of MMG’s directors prior to the application was criticised but not deemed sufficient to bar relief. The nomination of Buba and Mitchell-Marais as interim business rescue practitioners was unopposed and accepted. The role of business rescue practitioners was distinguished from that of liquidators, with emphasis on rehabilitation and maximising returns for stakeholders.

Order: Non-compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court is condoned in terms of Rule 6(12); the application is heard as urgent. MMG is placed under supervision and business rescue proceedings may commence in terms of section 131(1), read with section 131(4)(a), of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Buba and Mitchell-Marais are appointed as interim business rescue practitioners, subject to ratification by the majority of independent creditors at the first meeting. Costs of the application are costs in the business rescue proceedings, except for the costs of opposition, which are to be paid jointly and severally by Standard Bank and Gradco, including costs of two counsel on Scale C.

Facts: Matlala, a businessman and director of multiple companies, was arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, and money laundering. The charges stemmed from three separate shooting incidents involving high-profile individuals. Matlala applied for bail in the Regional Court, where the matter was incorrectly heard under Schedule 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, despite agreement between the parties that Schedule 5 was applicable. The Regional Magistrate refused bail, citing failure to establish exceptional circumstances. Matlala appealed the decision, arguing that the incorrect schedule had imposed a higher burden than required by law.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the refusal of bail, with the central issue being whether the misapplication of Schedule 6 constituted a legal misdirection, and whether, under the correct Schedule 5 standard, Matlala had shown that his release would be in the interests of justice.

Discussion: The appeal examined the procedural and substantive aspects of the bail hearing. It was accepted that the Regional Magistrate had applied the wrong legal standard, which constituted a misdirection. The correct test under Schedule 5 requires the applicant to show that release is in the interests of justice. Matlala’s personal circumstances were extensively canvassed, including his family ties, business interests, substantial assets, and chronic medical conditions. He denied involvement in the shootings and challenged the admissibility and reliability of the State’s evidence, which was largely circumstantial. The State conceded that certain financial transactions previously linked to the alleged crimes were misinterpreted, weakening its case in one of the incidents. However, concerns remained about flight risk, potential interference with witnesses, and unauthorised communications while in custody.

Findings: The misapplication of Schedule 6 was confirmed as a legal error. However, when reassessed under the correct Schedule 5 standard, the evidence presented still supported the refusal of bail. Matlala’s explanations did not sufficiently dispel concerns about flight risk, interference with witnesses, and danger to the community. The circumstantial nature of the State’s case was acknowledged, but it was found to have substance and required testing at trial. The interests of justice did not permit release, even under the lower threshold. The procedural misdirection did not alter the outcome, as the substantive findings remained valid.

Order: The appeal against the denial of bail is dismissed.

Facts: Tubatse African Agriculture Merging Farmers Communal Property Association (TAAMF), the registered owner of a portion of the Farm Grootboom 336 in Limpopo, entered into a lease agreement with Southern Sphere Platinum for mining operations. Upon surveying the land, Southern Sphere discovered multiple businesses trading on the property without apparent authorisation. These included Tau Global Construction, Mmilong Transport, Kgomo Resort, and others. Several respondents claimed longstanding occupation based on lease agreements with TAAMF, some dating back over a decade. The trustees of the Motlokwa Family Trust intervened in the proceedings, citing a 2012 lease agreement with TAAMF. The applicants sought eviction of all respondents, alleging unlawful occupation and invalid lease agreements.

Application: TAAMF and Southern Sphere Platinum applied for the eviction of the respondents from the farm, asserting that the lease agreements relied upon were void due to non-compliance with section 3(d) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. The issue was whether the respondents’ occupation was lawful, and whether the lease agreements were enforceable in the absence of ministerial consent for leases exceeding ten years.

Discussion: The matter centred on the validity of long-term lease agreements entered into without the required ministerial consent under section 3(d) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act. The applicants argued that the contracts were void and unenforceable. The respondents contended that they were beneficiaries of TAAMF and had entered into lease or sale agreements in good faith, often facilitated by attorneys. Some respondents had occupied the land for over a decade and made substantial investments. The principle of in pari delicto was examined, which allows for relaxation of the rule to achieve fairness. The contracts were acknowledged as void due to statutory non-compliance, but the respondents’ lack of awareness and reliance on legal assistance were considered relevant. The communal nature of the property and the role of TAAMF as both lessor and applicant were highlighted, raising concerns about procedural fairness and internal governance.

Findings: It was accepted that the lease agreements were invalid due to non-compliance with statutory requirements. However, the respondents were not found to be unlawful occupiers in the conventional sense, given their status as beneficiaries and the involvement of TAAMF in the original agreements. The approach taken by TAAMF, seeking eviction without first cancelling or declaring the contracts void, was criticised. The principle of fairness between parties was emphasised, and it was noted that the respondents had not been given a proper hearing regarding the revocation of their agreements. The matter was not suitable for eviction proceedings without first addressing the contractual entanglements and the respondents’ rights as community members.

Order: The application is dismissed. Each party is ordered to pay its own costs.

Facts: The applicant and respondent were married by Islamic rites in 2019 and have two minor children together. The respondent issued a third Talaaq in May 2024, formally ending the marriage under Sharia law. Despite this, the applicant initiated divorce proceedings under the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, seeking a redistribution of assets, rehabilitative maintenance, and orders regulating care and contact of the children. Pending finalisation of the divorce action, the applicant brought a Rule 43 application for interim relief, including maintenance, medical aid reinstatement, housing-related expenses, and a contribution to legal costs.

Application: The applicant sought interim maintenance of R38,100 (later adjusted to R40,534), reinstatement on the respondent’s medical aid, payment of housing expenses, and a contribution of R100,000 towards legal costs. The issue was whether the applicant, divorced under Islamic law, was entitled to interim relief under Rule 43, and whether the respondent had a duty of support pending finalisation of the divorce action.

Discussion: The applicant argued that the respondent had withdrawn financial support since their separation, removed her from his medical aid, disconnected utilities, and threatened the domestic worker. She contended that she was financially dependent on the respondent, having relocated to Knysna at his request and abandoned her business. The respondent disputed the extent of his obligations, asserting that he had continued to pay for household expenses and had reinstated the applicant on his medical aid. He maintained that, under Sharia law, he had no duty to support the applicant post-divorce. However, the Divorce Amendment Act 1 of 2024 now recognises Muslim marriages under the Divorce Act, including claims for maintenance and asset redistribution. Rule 43 applies even where the validity or subsistence of a marriage is disputed. The respondent’s financial disclosures were scrutinised, revealing significant income and expenditure inconsistent with his claimed earnings.

Findings: It was accepted that the applicant was unemployed, caring for the children, and dependent on the respondent. The respondent’s financial position enabled him to provide adequate support, yet his contributions were found to be insufficient and controlling. The practice of requiring grocery lists and selectively purchasing items was described as patronising and oppressive. The respondent’s prioritisation of charitable donations and support for others over his own children was criticised. The applicant’s dignity and autonomy were emphasised, and her right to manage household expenses was affirmed. The Rule 43 application was necessary and justified, and the applicant’s entitlement to interim relief was upheld.

Order: The minor children shall reside with the applicant, subject to the respondent’s contact rights. The respondent must reinstate the applicant and children on his medical aid and cover any uncovered medical expenses. The respondent must pay the mortgage bond and all related housing expenses, including rates, levies, Wi-Fi, insurance, wages for domestic worker and gardener, and maintenance. Interim maintenance of R4,000 per child and R10,000 for the applicant is payable monthly. A contribution of R60,000 towards legal costs is payable in monthly instalments of R10,000. The family advocate is directed to investigate care and contact arrangements. The respondent must pay the costs of the application on Scale A.

Facts: The applicants, including Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia, brought a joint application against Operation Dudula, a registered non-profit association known for its anti-immigrant campaigns. The applicants alleged that Operation Dudula and its members had engaged in widespread unlawful conduct targeting foreign nationals, including intimidation, harassment, evictions, and interference with access to healthcare, education, and employment. The application also implicated various government departments and officials, alleging failure to prevent or respond to xenophobic violence and to implement the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.

Application: The applicants sought interdictory and declaratory relief to prohibit Operation Dudula from engaging in vigilante actions and hate speech, and to compel the government to fulfil its constitutional and international obligations. The issue was whether private individuals or organisations could lawfully demand identity documents from others, and whether the State had failed to take reasonable steps to prevent xenophobic violence and uphold constitutional rights.

Discussion: The matter was heard as a Special Motion, with Operation Dudula not opposing the application despite being served. The applicants relied on extensive evidence, including affidavits from victims and witnesses, documenting incidents of violence, forced evictions, threats at schools and clinics, and public incitement. The legal arguments focused on section 41 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, which permits immigration and police officers to request identification. It was argued that this power does not extend to private individuals and must be exercised with reasonable suspicion and only in public spaces. The applicants also challenged the constitutionality of section 41, particularly its application to children and its use in warrantless raids. The government's failure to implement the National Action Plan was highlighted, along with the lack of disaggregated data and early warning systems. The South African Human Rights Commission and several amici curiae supported the applicants’ case.

Findings: It was confirmed that only immigration and police officers may demand identity documents under section 41, and that this power is confined to public spaces and must be exercised with reasonable suspicion. The provision was interpreted to exclude warrantless searches of private homes, workplaces, and schools. The arrest and detention of children under section 41 was found to be unconstitutional unless used as a last resort. Operation Dudula’s conduct was found to violate multiple constitutional rights, including dignity, equality, freedom and security of the person, and access to healthcare, education, and housing. The applicants demonstrated a clear right to protection, ongoing harm, and lack of alternative remedies. The government’s failure to implement the National Action Plan was a breach of its constitutional obligations under section 7(2), and a mandamus was issued to compel reasonable steps toward implementation.

Order: Only immigration or police officers may demand identity documents under section 41 of the Immigration Act. Operation Dudula and its office-bearers are interdicted from demanding identity documents, engaging in intimidation, hate speech, unlawful evictions, and interference with access to services. Operation Dudula must communicate this order to all members. The government is directed to implement the National Action Plan, including early warning systems and data collection. Section 41 is interpreted to exclude warrantless searches in private spaces, require reasonable suspicion, and prohibit detention of children except as a last resort. Costs awarded against Operation Dudula and opposing government respondents, including costs of three counsel on Scale C.

Facts: Free Agape Enterprises operated an unlawful investment scheme under various trading names, taking deposits from clients and using those funds to pay out other clients, styled as dividends. The scheme was declared illegal and void in 2019. Free Agape was placed under final liquidation in 2018, with the effective date of liquidation in March 2018. Strydom, Moosa, and Botha were appointed as joint liquidators. During the period between April and November 2017, Free Agape made payments totalling R1,044,500 to Le Roux, who had made no payments to Free Agape in return. The liquidators instituted action to recover these funds under section 26 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, alternatively under section 29.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the judgment of the court of first instance, which had granted relief only under section 29 of the Insolvency Act and dismissed the main claim under section 26. The issue was whether the payments made to Le Roux constituted dispositions not made for value within two years of liquidation, and whether the liquidators were entitled to recover the full amount under section 26(1)(b).

Discussion: The appellants argued that the payments were made within two years of liquidation and that no value was received in return, satisfying the requirements of section 26(1)(b). The respondent had not filed a plea or raised any defence, despite being personally served and given opportunities to do so. She failed to provide bank statements or any explanation for the funds received. The statutory requirements for impeachable dispositions were analysed, noting that the onus under section 26(1)(b) shifts to the recipient to prove that the insolvent’s assets exceeded its liabilities immediately after the disposition. The respondent did not discharge this burden. The business model of Free Agape was described as a pyramid scheme, with no genuine profit-generating activity. The payments to Le Roux were made without any investment or consideration, and the scheme’s illegality rendered all related agreements null and void.

Findings: It was accepted that the payments to Le Roux were dispositions not made for value, made within two years of liquidation, and that no defence had been pleaded. The statutory requirements under section 26(1)(b) were satisfied, and the liquidators were entitled to recover the full amount. The earlier judgment had erred by granting relief only under section 29, despite clear allegations and evidence supporting the section 26 claim. The absence of any substantive response from the respondent meant that the allegations stood uncontested. The discretion afforded under the Insolvency Act does not permit refusal of relief where statutory requirements are met and no lawful defence is raised.

Order: The order of the court of first instance is set aside and substituted with the following: The dispositions made by Free Agape Enterprises (Pty) Ltd to the defendant in the amount of R1,044,500 are set aside in terms of section 26(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. The defendant is ordered to pay the sum of R1,044,500 to the plaintiffs in their capacity as duly appointed liquidators of Free Agape. Interest on the amount at 11,25% per annum from 15 June 2023 to date of payment. The defendant is to pay the costs. The defendant is also to pay the costs of appeal, including the costs of two counsel on Scale C and B respectively.

Facts: The appellants, a married couple, applied for voluntary surrender of their joint estate, citing overwhelming debt and financial hardship. Both were permanently employed and earned a combined monthly income of just over R53,000, but their expenses exceeded R54,000, excluding payments to creditors. Their financial difficulties stemmed from study loans, medical bills, and legal fees. They had previously entered into a debt review process, which they claimed had failed, and sought sequestration as a last resort. To fund the costs of the application, they sold assets and converted paid leave into cash. The application was dismissed by the court a quo.

Appeal: The appellants challenged the dismissal of their application for voluntary surrender, arguing that the requirements under section 6 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 had been met. The issue was whether the appellants had provided sufficient disclosure and evidence to justify the sequestration of their estate, and whether the remedy of voluntary surrender was appropriate given their financial circumstances and the availability of alternatives under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005.

Discussion: The appeal raised multiple grounds, including the assertion that the original judgment relied too heavily on the presiding officer’s own prior decisions and failed to consider successful sequestrations in similar cases. The appellants argued that the format of their application followed standard practice and that some degree of repetition was inevitable due to statutory requirements. They contended that their expenses clearly exceeded their income and that the debt review process had failed. The requirements under section 6 of the Insolvency Act were examined, emphasising the need for full and frank disclosure, the advantage to creditors, and the presence of realisable assets. The remedies available under the National Credit Act were also considered, including debt counselling, debt rearrangement, and the investigation of reckless credit. The appellants had not provided sufficient evidence of their debt review process or the nature of their credit agreements, nor had they disclosed key financial details such as bank statements, asset values, or the surrender value of insurance policies.

Findings: The appellants had failed to meet the disclosure standard required in ex parte applications for voluntary surrender. The financial information provided was vague, incomplete, and largely reliant on the statement of affairs, which is intended for inspection by creditors but does not constitute substantive evidence. The absence of bank statements, proof of indebtedness, and detailed explanations of expenses undermined the credibility of the application. Although the appellants had disclosed the source of funds for the sequestration costs, the lack of clarity around the value and use of those funds weakened their case. The application did not provide a sufficient basis for exercising that discretion in favour of sequestration. The appeal did not demonstrate that the original decision was based on incorrect legal principles or irrelevant considerations.

Order: The appeal is dismissed.

Facts: Scheun served in the South African Police Services (SAPS) from 1994 until his retirement in 2017 due to chronic ill-health, including osteoporosis, epilepsy, spinal fractures, and depression. His medical condition deteriorated from 2015, leading to extended sick leave and multiple applications for temporary incapacity leave (TIL) under clause 7.5 of PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2000. Although some TIL was granted, Scheun’s condition worsened, and he applied for ill-health retirement in June 2016. His last working day was in June 2016, and he was formally retired in September 2017. During this interim period, Scheun was booked off sick and applied for TIL, but SAPS failed to process these applications. Only after retirement did SAPS inform him that the leave had been recorded as unpaid, resulting in over 14 months of salary loss. Scheun referred a dispute to the Public Sector Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC), alleging breach of the collective agreement.

Application: SAPS applied to review and set aside the arbitration award issued by the PSCBC commissioner, who had found in favour of Scheun. The issue was whether the commissioner had jurisdiction to hear the dispute, whether the claim had prescribed, and whether the remedy ordered, requiring SAPS to investigate the TIL applications post-retirement, was rational and enforceable.

Discussion: SAPS raised four grounds of review which included prescription, jurisdiction, procedural irregularities, and irrationality of the remedy. On prescription, it was argued that the claim had lapsed by October 2020. However, the breach only crystallised when SAPS formally rejected the TIL applications in October 2017, making the referral timely. On jurisdiction, SAPS contended that the dispute fell under section 186(2)(b) of the Labour Relations Act (unfair labour practice) rather than section 24 (interpretation and application of a collective agreement). This was rejected, as the dispute concerned SAPS’s failure to investigate TIL applications as required by clause 7.5.1 of the Resolution. Procedural objections to the virtual hearing format and lack of SAPS evidence were dismissed, as no prejudice was shown and SAPS had chosen not to lead evidence. The remedy was challenged as irrational and unenforceable, but it was found to be a proportionate response to the breach, requiring SAPS to perform its original obligation to investigate the applications.

Findings: The review application failed on all grounds. The claim had not prescribed, as the debt arose only upon SAPS’s formal rejection of the TIL applications. The commissioner had jurisdiction under section 24, as the dispute involved the interpretation and application of a collective agreement. The arbitration proceedings were fair, and SAPS’s failure to present evidence was a tactical choice. The remedy was rational, enforceable, and within the commissioner’s powers. SAPS retained the authority to investigate historical TIL applications, even post-retirement, and the materials required for investigation remained available. The costs order against SAPS was upheld, as its defence was found to be vexatious and without reasonable cause.

Order: The application to review and set aside the arbitration award is denied. SAPS is ordered to comply with the arbitration award within 30 days of this judgment. SAPS is ordered to pay Scheun’s costs, including the costs of counsel.

Facts: Arcelormittal South Africa (AMSA), the country’s primary steel producer, issued a section 189(3) notice in January 2025 signalling its intention to wind down its Longs business at Newcastle and Vereeniging. Formal retrenchment consultations were facilitated by the CCMA and concluded in March 2025. Shortly thereafter, AMSA deferred the wind-down for six months, citing funding from the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and support from the Temporary Employee Relief Scheme (TERS). During this deferral period, AMSA implemented operational improvements and explored structural interventions. In September 2025, AMSA resumed the retrenchment process without renewed consultation, issuing termination notices to NUMSA members. NUMSA launched an urgent application under section 189A(13) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, seeking reinstatement and resumption of consultations.

Application: NUMSA applied urgently to compel AMSA to comply with a fair procedure before proceeding with dismissals. The issue was whether the developments during the six-month deferral period gave rise to a duty of renewed consultation under section 189A, and whether AMSA’s reliance on the original January notice was procedurally unfair.

Discussion: NUMSA argued that material changes had occurred since the original consultation process, including the IDC’s due diligence, a proposed R8,5 billion acquisition bid, NERSA’s approval of a reduced electricity tariff, and AMSA’s own efficiency initiatives. These developments, it was submitted, affected the rationale for retrenchment and required renewed engagement. AMSA maintained that the consultation process had been properly concluded and that the deferral period was a temporary holding operation. It contended that the dismissals now contemplated were the same as those originally proposed, and that no new consultation was required. The statutory framework under section 189A was examined, with emphasis on the purpose of meaningful joint consensus-seeking and the role of urgent judicial intervention to restore procedural integrity.

Findings: It was accepted that the developments following the March 2025 suspension were material and had a direct bearing on the timing, scope, and necessity of retrenchments. The most significant change was the potential acquisition of the Longs business, which could affect employees’ rights under section 197 of the Labour Relations Act. By failing to resume consultations in light of these changes, AMSA implemented dismissals on an outdated procedural foundation. The statutory obligation to consult was not fulfilled in substance, and the opportunity for meaningful engagement was lost. The procedural defect triggered the need for restorative relief under section 189A(13), aimed at preserving the employment relationship and enabling renewed consultation.

Order: The application is heard as one of urgency. The preliminary point of non-joinder is dismissed. AMSA is directed to comply with a fair procedure by resuming consultations pursuant to the section 189(3) notice issued on 8 January 2025. AMSA is interdicted and restrained from dismissing any employee at its operations in Newcastle and Vereeniging pursuant to the notice, and is directed to reinstate all employees whose employment was terminated under that notice, pending compliance with a fair procedure. The parties are directed to resume consultations within ten calendar days of the date of this order. There is no order as to costs.

Facts: The appellant, Mr Ntekwana, resided at a property in Tswelopele Extension 6, Tembisa, for over two decades. The property was originally allocated to his uncle, Paxton, under the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which aimed to provide housing to low-income families. Paxton received two adjacent stands and gave one to Mr Ntekwana, who erected a shack and later improved the property with a retaining wall and paving. Although the Title Deed was registered in the name of Ms Ntekwana, Paxton’s sister, she never lived on the property. Mr Ntekwana paid R10,000 to Paxton for the stand and Ms Ntekwana did not pay any sum of money towards the property. A family meeting was held where Ms Ntekwana was asked to transfer ownership, and a confirmatory affidavit was signed by a cousin. Ms Ntekwana later signed an affidavit stating she gave Mr Ntekwana permission to own the shelter on the property.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the eviction order granted by the court a quo, which had dismissed the appellant’s counterclaim for a declaratory order of ownership. The issue was whether the eviction was justified despite a long-standing occupation and familial transfer of the property, and whether the Title Deed alone was sufficient to determine ownership in the context of RDP housing.

Discussion: The appellant argued that the court a quo erred by applying the abstract system of ownership, which validates transfer based solely on formalities, rather than the causal system, which considers the underlying transaction. He submitted that his occupation and improvements constituted delivery and that Ms Ntekwana’s affidavit supported a transfer of ownership. The respondent maintained that she allowed the appellant to stay due to safety concerns and never intended to relinquish ownership. Section 26(3) of the Constitution prohibits arbitrary evictions and requires courts to consider all relevant circumstances. There must be a balancing of property rights with occupiers’ dignity.

Findings: The court a quo had misdirected itself by failing to consider the factual dispute over ownership and the surrounding circumstances of the occupation. The long-term residence, improvements, and familial agreement warranted further scrutiny. The affidavit signed by the respondent, although referring to a “shelter,” supported the appellant’s claim to the property. Oral evidence was necessary to resolve the ownership dispute, and the matter could not be properly decided on affidavit alone. Rule 6(5)(g) of the Uniform Rules was cited to support the referral to oral evidence. The discretion exercised by the court a quo was found to be flawed. Justice required a full hearing of the evidence.

Order: The appeal is upheld. The order of the court a quo is set aside and substituted with the following: The matter is referred to oral evidence on the issue of true ownership of the property before a different judge. Both parties shall testify and may call or subpoena witnesses. Costs of the appeal will be costs in the referral to oral evidence.