Facts: Lessing, a member of the Serengeti Estates Property Owners Association (SEPOA), lodged multiple complaints with the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (IRBA) against Gormley, the auditor of SEPOA. The complaints alleged improper conduct, including failure to report non-compliance with laws, undisclosed remuneration, and the provision of secretarial services while acting as auditor. IRBA investigated and ultimately charged Gormley with only one count, charging SEPOA for responding to the complaint, and imposed a fine of R40,000, half of which was suspended. Lessing, dissatisfied with the outcome and the limited scope of the sanction, brought a review application under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), challenging the decisions of IRBA’s Investigating Committee (INVESCO) and Enforcement Committee (ENCOM).

Application: This was a PAJA review application brought by Lessing against IRBA and Gormley. Lessing sought to have the decisions of INVESCO and ENCOM set aside, and the matter remitted for reconsideration. He argued that IRBA had acted unlawfully by failing to properly investigate all complaints, by allowing INVESCO to propose a sanction directly to Gormley, and by excluding him from meaningful participation in the disciplinary process. IRBA opposed the application, arguing that Lessing lacked locus standi and that its disciplinary procedures were lawful and compliant with the Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005 (APA). The issue was whether IRBA’s conduct constituted administrative action subject to review, and whether Lessing had standing to challenge the outcome.

Discussion: A narrow interpretation of standing was rejected in favour of section 38 of the Constitution, which permits any person acting in their own or the public interest to challenge administrative action. As a whistleblower and SEPOA member, Lessing had a direct and substantial interest in the outcome. INVESCO’s conduct, proposing a sanction to Gormley before ENCOM had formally charged him, was found to be ultra vires, bypassing the prescribed disciplinary framework. This violated section 49 of APA and the IRBA Disciplinary Rules, which require ENCOM to issue charges and consider mitigating factors before imposing any sanction. Administrative action must be lawful, rational, and procedurally fair, and IRBA’s failure to follow its own empowering provisions rendered the process arbitrary and invalid.

Findings: Lessing was found to have locus standi both in his personal and public interest capacities. The decisions of INVESCO and ENCOM were declared unlawful due to procedural irregularities and breaches of APA. INVESCO’s direct engagement with Gormley regarding the proposed sanction amounted to a material error of law and a usurpation of ENCOM’s role. The disciplinary process was tainted by arbitrariness and failed to afford Lessing a fair opportunity to participate, despite APA’s emphasis on public protection and transparency. IRBA must reconsider all complaints de novo, using its full investigative powers and ensuring compliance with statutory procedures. While substitution of the decision was not appropriate, a proper investigation and disciplinary process was ordered to restore procedural fairness and accountability.

Order: The applicant has the locus standi in judico in this matter. The decision of the first respondent's 

Investigating Committee (INVESCO) is declared unlawful and set aside. The decision of the first respondent's Enforcement Committee (ENCOM), and the sanction imposed is declared unlawful and set aside. The matter is remitted to IRBA for determination of the merits, with the following instructions: IRBA is to properly investigate all complaints brought by the applicant, which it views as meritorious, and use all mechanisms available under APA to obtain evidence. IRBA is to permit the applicant an opportunity to meaningfully participate in any disciplinary hearing in accordance with APA. IRBA is liable for the costs on a party and party Scale C.

Facts: Sekelaxabiso CA Inc (SkX), a firm of chartered accountants, was awarded a tender in March 2022 to join a panel of service providers rendering verification and support services to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) for the Covid-TERS disaster benefit. The tender process was governed by a Request for Proposals (RFP) issued by the Department of Employment and Labour. SkX submitted a manual UIF compliance certificate with its bid, which the Department later claimed was invalid and possibly fraudulent, as manual certificates had been discontinued in January 2021. The Department alleged that SkX’s submission misled the Bid Evaluation Committee and induced the award of the tender. SkX denied any wrongdoing and provided evidence of compliance, including an electronic certificate issued before the award.

Application: This was a legality review brought by the Minister of Employment and Labour and the Director-General of the Department, seeking to have the tender award to SkX declared unlawful, unconstitutional, and invalid. The Department argued that SkX had failed to comply with UIF contribution and declaration requirements and had misrepresented its compliance status. It also claimed that the awarding of the tender was unfair to other bidders. SkX opposed the application, asserting full compliance and accusing the Department of procedural irregularities and factual misrepresentations. The issue was whether the tender award was vitiated by non-compliance, fraud, or misrepresentation, and whether the application was brought within a reasonable time.

Discussion: The matter turned on whether SkX was compliant with UIF obligations at the time of the award and whether the Department had been misled. SkX provided detailed evidence of payments made to settle UIF arrears and an electronic compliance certificate dated November 2021, which the Department conceded was valid. The Department failed to produce any records showing non-compliance and abandoned its claim under section 10 of the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act 4 of 2002. Allegations of fraud were unsupported, and SkX had already submitted an affidavit to the investigating officer, resulting in a nolle prosequi decision. The manual certificate, while irregular, did not preclude the award, as compliance was assessed at the award stage. The Department’s reliance on Annexure J of the RFP was misplaced, as the RFP allowed for multiple methods of obtaining certificates.

Findings: No evidence was presented that other bidders were disqualified due to certificate format. SkX was found to be compliant with UIF contributions and declarations at all relevant times. The Department failed to establish any factual basis for its allegations of fraud or misrepresentation. The manual certificate did not invalidate the award, and no unfair advantage was shown. The application was also found to be unreasonably delayed. Although the Department claimed to have acted promptly upon discovering the issue, internal records showed that concerns were raised as early as November 2021, and the application was only launched in January 2023. The Department’s conduct, including selective disclosure and failure to present key documents, undermined its case. The application was dismissed on both procedural and substantive grounds.

Order: The application is dismissed with costs, including the costs consequent upon the employment of the advocate for the respondent on Scale C.

Facts: Kunene and McKenzie, senior political figures in the Patriotic Alliance, were the subject of a series of public statements made by Dag, the President of the Truth and Solidarity Movement. These statements, published across social media and other platforms, accused Kunene and McKenzie of orchestrating multiple murders, being mafia leaders, and corruptly controlling law enforcement. Merricks, a journalist, echoed some of these claims in a video. The statements were widely circulated and drew significant public attention. Merricks later signed a settlement agreement and ceased further involvement. Dag continued to publish similar allegations, asserting various justifications including public interest and accountability. The statements were made in the context of ongoing political tensions and were perceived by Kunene and McKenzie as defamatory and damaging to their reputations.

Application: This was an urgent application for an interim interdict brought by Kunene and McKenzie to restrain Dag from making or publishing specific defamatory statements pending the final determination of an action. The applicants sought to prevent Dag from alleging their involvement in the murders of Meyer, Forbay, and a police investigator, and from referring to them as gang leaders, organised criminals, or corrupt politicians. Dag opposed the application, arguing that the applicants had poor reputations and that his statements were justified. The issue was whether the applicants had met the requirements for an interim interdict and whether Dag’s statements were defamatory and unjustified.

Discussion: The applicants were required to show a prima facie right, a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, that the balance of convenience favoured the relief, and that no satisfactory alternative remedy existed. The statements made by Dag were not limited to political critique but included serious allegations of criminal conduct, including murder and corruption. No substantiating evidence was presented to support these claims, and the justification offered relied on vague references to public speculation and media headlines. The defence of fair comment was undermined by the absence of factual foundation, and the claim of reasonable publication failed due to a lack of verification. The applicants’ reputations, while public, did not justify the dissemination of unverified and damaging accusations.

Findings: The nature and repetition of the statements suggested an intent to injure rather than inform, and the urgency of the application was supported by the ongoing harm caused by the continued publication. A prima facie right to protection against reputational harm was established. The applicants demonstrated that the statements were defamatory, lacked factual support, and were made with disregard for the truth. The harm was ongoing and irreparable, particularly given the public nature of the allegations and the applicants’ political roles. The balance of convenience favoured the applicants, as the interdict was narrowly framed and did not prevent Dag from expressing legitimate political criticism. The absence of a viable alternative remedy, coupled with the urgency of the matter, justified the granting of interim relief. The applicants were directed to institute their action within 20 days, failing which the interdict would lapse.

Order: Dag is interdicted from making or publishing statements that allege the applicants orchestrated specific murders, refer to them as gang or mafia leaders, claim they assaulted the second respondent, or accuse them of corruptly controlling law enforcement. This interdict remains in force pending the outcome of an action to be instituted within 20 days. Costs are reserved.

Facts: Milligan received the Pfizer-BioNTech Covid-19 vaccine on in July 2021 at Van Heerden Pharmacy in Mbombela, Mpumalanga. Following the vaccination, he experienced adverse health effects which he attributed to the vaccine. Milligan later obtained a medico-legal report from Dr Edeling, which detailed the nature and extent of his injuries and symptoms. The report referenced a large volume of supporting documentation and expressed an opinion on the causal link between the vaccine and Milligan’s condition. Milligan alleged that the vaccine was administered without adequate disclosure of its side-effects and that he would not have consented to the vaccination had he been properly informed. He initiated legal proceedings against the Minister of Health and Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd, citing multiple legal bases for his claim.

Application: This was an exception application brought by Pfizer against Milligan’s particulars of claim. Pfizer argued that the claims in delict, constitutional damages, and common law development lacked sufficient factual basis and were pleaded in a manner that made it impossible to respond meaningfully. The exception focused on five grounds, failure to plead the agreement with the pharmacy with sufficient particularity, failure to establish a legal duty in delict, vague incorporation of a medico-legal report, lack of clarity on the constitutional duty owed by Pfizer, and failure to plead the basis for developing the common law. The issue was whether the particulars of claim met the requirements of Rule 18(4) and disclosed a valid cause of action.

Discussion: The matter turned on whether the pleadings were sufficiently clear and complete to allow Pfizer to respond meaningfully. The incorporation of Dr Edeling’s 62-page medico-legal report by reference, without identifying specific allegations or attaching the referenced documents, was prejudicial and unintelligible. The delictual claim failed to establish a factual basis for a legal duty owed by Pfizer. Although the pleadings asserted that Pfizer had a duty to inform the public of vaccine side-effects, they did not allege any direct relationship between Pfizer and the plaintiff, nor did they plead that Pfizer was a healthcare provider as contemplated by the National Health Act 61 of 2003. Section 6 of the Act places the duty to inform on healthcare providers, and no alternative basis for imposing such a duty on Pfizer was articulated.

Findings: The claim for constitutional damages lacked averments showing that no other adequate remedy existed, and the damages pleaded were indistinguishable from those recoverable under common law. The claim for development of the common law was similarly deficient, as it did not explain how the existing law was inadequate or how it offended the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution. The pleadings were vague, embarrassing, and lacking in material facts necessary to sustain the claims. The incorporation of extensive expert reports without proper identification or summarisation rendered the particulars unintelligible. The delictual and constitutional claims failed to establish a legal duty or distinguish the nature of the damages sought. The attempt to develop the common law was unsupported by any pleaded rationale or constitutional foundation.

Order: The exception is upheld. The Rule 30 application is postponed sine die. The plaintiff’s particulars of claim are set aside. The plaintiff is ordered to amend his particulars of claim within 10 days of the date of this order, failing which the second defendant may apply for dismissal of the claim. The plaintiff is ordered to pay the second defendant’s costs on Scale C for senior counsel and Scale B for junior counsel.

Facts: The applicant and first respondent, married in community of property, jointly owned a residential property. In early 2025, the property was sold without the applicant’s knowledge to Industrial Butcher, a company represented by Mr Mabena. The applicant alleged that the sale was fraudulent, as the first respondent had declared himself unmarried on the offer to purchase, thereby evading the requirement for spousal consent under section 15 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. Mr Mabena moved into the property in May 2025, prompting the applicant to launch an urgent ex parte application to prevent her removal and to restore her access. This resulted in the rule nisi order. When Mr Mabena failed to comply, a contempt order was granted shortly thereafter.

Application: This was a reconsideration application brought by Mr Mabena under Rule 6(12)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the rule nisi order and the contempt order. He argued that both orders were granted ex parte and based on incomplete or false information, particularly regarding his ownership of the property. The applicant opposed the application, maintaining that the orders were justified and that Mr Mabena had unlawfully occupied the property in breach of a valid court order. The issue was whether the reconsideration application should succeed and whether the rule nisi should be made final.

Discussion: The matter turned on Mr Mabena’s right to occupy the property and the procedural fairness of the orders granted against him. The Deed of Transfer confirmed that Industrial Butcher was the registered owner, and Mr Mabena was its sole director. No challenge to the sale or transfer had been instituted by the applicant, nor had she pleaded any real or personal right to occupy the property. Allegations of fraud were not formally pleaded and could not be inferred. The rule nisi order, which prohibited Mr Mabena from occupying the property, was granted without knowledge of his ownership. The contempt order was based on non-compliance with the rule nisi order, but its validity depended on whether the initial order was lawfully granted. The reconsideration application was urgent and appropriate, given the impact on both parties and their families.

Findings: The rule nisi order was set aside on the basis that it had been granted ex parte without full disclosure of Mr Mabena’s ownership of the property. No legal right to occupy the property had been established by the applicant, and her continued attempts to evict Mr Mabena were unsupported by law. The contempt order, which had been premised on non-compliance with the rule nisi order, was also set aside as its foundation no longer stood. Ownership of the property by Industrial Butcher, represented by Mr Mabena, was confirmed, and no fraud had been pleaded or proven. The rule nisi became moot following the setting aside of the underlying order. Although the applicant’s conduct was not found to be malicious, her legal position was untenable.

Order: The rule nisi order is substituted with: “The application is dismissed with no order as to costs.” The contempt order is substituted with: “The application is dismissed with no order as to costs.” The applicant is ordered to pay the second respondent’s costs in this reconsideration application and the suspension application on the attorney and own client scale, including the costs of two counsel.

Facts: The applicant and the first respondent, married in community of property, were engaged in a highly acrimonious divorce. As part of the proceedings, the applicant brought a joinder application to include the Saburco Family Trust, represented by various trustees and entities, on the basis that the trust was a sham and its assets should be considered for redistribution under section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. The first respondent filed a notice of intention to defend and launched a counter-application, citing additional parties (collectively referred to as the affected respondents), including JJ Prinsloo Boerdery and trustees of the Amarika and Oudewerf Trusts. These affected respondents were not originally part of the divorce litigation and opposed their inclusion. The joinder was ultimately granted by agreement, and the matter proceeded to a hearing on costs.

Application: This was a costs determination following the joinder and counter-application proceedings. Both the applicant and the affected respondents sought punitive costs orders against the first respondent, citing his conduct throughout the litigation. The first respondent opposed the costs claims, arguing that he had not opposed the joinder and had made a limited costs tender. The issue was whether the first respondent’s conduct justified attorney-and-client costs orders against him in both the joinder and counter-application proceedings.

Discussion: The litigation was marked by procedural confusion and unnecessary escalation. The first respondent’s notice to defend did not clearly concede the joinder, and his counter-application introduced parties without formally joining them. His supplementary affidavit and correspondence revealed conditional concessions and threats, undermining claims of non-opposition. Despite withdrawing the counter-application, the first respondent continued to serve papers and issue subpoenas, including against the affected respondents’ bank, which were not withdrawn. His failure to file heads of argument timeously and the late briefing of counsel showed disregard for procedural norms. The affected respondents invoked Rule 41(1)(c) and Rule 30 to challenge irregular steps and demanded a costs tender, which the first respondent limited to Scale A for counsel. The litigation conduct was further complicated by the fact that the first respondent’s attorney was also a trustee of the trust the applicant sought to join, raising concerns of conflict of interest.

Findings: The first respondent’s conduct throughout the litigation was found to be wasteful, obstructive, and disrespectful of court processes. His actions inflated costs unnecessarily and dragged non-parties into litigation without proper procedural steps. The conditional concessions, late filings, and continued service of documents after withdrawal of the counter-application demonstrated a lack of candour and procedural fairness. His failure to make meaningful concessions during argument and the conflict of interest involving his attorney further compounded the concerns. Given the nature of the dispute, a divorce action, the depletion of assets through unnecessary litigation was particularly troubling. Punitive costs orders were appropriate to reflect the seriousness of the misconduct and to protect the integrity of the proceedings.

Order: The first respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs on an attorney-and-client scale in both the joinder application and the counter-application. The first respondent, as the applicant in the counter-application, is ordered to pay the costs of the second to seventh respondents (the affected respondents) on an attorney-and-client scale.

Facts: Moodley, a 25-year-old South African woman, was arrested in connection with an international investigation into the online distribution of child sexual abuse material. The investigation began when a minor in the United States reported a case of sextortion to the FBI, which traced the activity to a website called “DankmegaZ,” allegedly operated from South Africa. Accused 1, Wilken, was identified as the site’s administrator. Moodley, who lived and worked with Wilken, was implicated in the daily operations of the site. Upon arrest, authorities seized digital infrastructure and devices linking both accused to the dissemination of illegal content. Moodley was found to have attempted to delete evidence following Wilken’s arrest, but forensic teams recovered the data. She was subsequently charged with offences under the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998, and additional charges including fraud, possession of stolen property, and drug-related offences.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the lower court’s refusal to grant bail to Moodley. The State opposed bail, citing the seriousness of the charges, the strength of its case, and the risk that Moodley could access cryptocurrency wallets containing proceeds of crime. Moodley argued that she was not a flight risk, had no prior convictions, and had voluntarily surrendered to police. She offered R10,000 for bail and undertook to comply with strict conditions. The issue was whether her continued detention was justified under section 60(11)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which applies to Schedule 5 offences and places the onus on the accused to show that release is in the interests of justice.

Discussion: The matter turned on whether Moodley had discharged the onus required under section 60(11)(b). Her personal circumstances were considered, including her cooperation with police, lack of prior convictions, and verified residential address. The State’s case was acknowledged as strong, with forensic evidence linking Moodley to the website’s operations. However, the strength of the case alone does not justify refusal of bail. The State failed to provide concrete evidence of cryptocurrency wallets or foreign assets. Moodley’s role, while significant, was not that of the primary offender. Her claim of being in a controlling and abusive relationship with Wilken was considered relevant to her level of culpability.

Findings: Moodley was found not to be a flight risk. Her voluntary surrender, family support, and lack of foreign ties supported her application. She had cooperated with investigators, and the risk of interference with evidence was minimal, given that devices had already been seized and mirrored. The State’s reliance on speculative access to cryptocurrency was insufficient to justify continued detention. The seriousness of the charges was acknowledged, but the absence of minimum sentencing provisions and the possibility of a non-custodial sentence weighed in her favour. The magistrate’s refusal to grant bail was a misdirection, particularly in conflating Moodley’s role with that of Wilken. The appeal was upheld, and bail was granted subject to stringent conditions, including a digital lockdown and regular reporting.

Order: The appeal is upheld. The decision of the court a quo refusing bail is set aside. Moodley is granted bail in the amount of R15,000, subject to stringent conditions.

Facts: The Manoke Traditional Authority, led by Manok, governs land in the Sekhukhuneland area, including the farm Appiesdoorndraai 298KT. This land has historical significance, with portions acquired by Jacobus Manok in the early 1900s and later transferred to his heirs. A land restitution claim was lodged under the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 and accepted for gazetting in 2008. Despite this, from March 2021, Mafane, the Kgwetes, and Mabelane, along with other unidentified individuals, began allocating and occupying stands on the farm. The respondents claimed they were on Portion 0, allegedly owned by the government, and not Portion 2, which the applicant identified as the subject of the eviction application. The applicant maintained that the entire farm was under claim and subject to statutory protections.

Application: This was an application for eviction under section 4(2) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), brought by the Manoke Traditional Authority against the respondents and unlawful occupiers. The applicant sought an order evicting the respondents from Portion 2 of Appiesdoorndraai 298KT and requested that the Sheriff enforce the order if necessary. The respondents opposed the application, raising points in limine regarding locus standi and authority, and later argued non-joinder of Sekhukhune, who held a permission to occupy (PTO) on the land. The issue was whether the respondents’ occupation was unlawful and whether eviction would be just and equitable under PIE.

Discussion: The respondents’ claim that they occupied Portion 0 was undermined by the applicant’s title deeds and the accepted land claim over the entire farm. PIE requires a humane and equitable approach to eviction, especially where vulnerable groups are involved. The respondents failed to show any legal entitlement to allocate or occupy the land. Their denial of invasion was contradicted by the applicant’s evidence and the absence of any lawful allocation. It was emphasised that traditional leaders must act within their gazetted jurisdictions and that self-help and unlawful land occupation undermine orderly development and governance. The presence of families, children, and elderly persons required a compassionate and structured relocation process.

Findings: The respondents’ opposition was without merit. The points in limine were abandoned or dismissed, and the claim of non-joinder was rejected as Sekhukhune had filed a confirmatory affidavit supporting the application. The applicant had established ownership and a valid land claim over the entire farm, including Portion 2. The respondents’ conduct amounted to unlawful occupation and allocation of land outside their jurisdiction. Eviction was justified but must be carried out in a manner that respects the dignity and rights of affected persons. A phased relocation plan was ordered, prioritising vulnerable households and requiring the respondents to compile detailed lists of occupants.

Order: The first to fourth respondents must, within 7 days, compile a list of all occupants they have issued or sold sites to on Appiesdoorndraai 298KT. Within 30 days, they must audit and list child-headed households, elderly occupants, women-headed households, households with young children or persons with disabilities, and submit this to the Sheriff. The third respondent must, within 60 days, allocate alternative sites within his jurisdiction, prioritising vulnerable groups. All respondents and those occupying through them must vacate Portion 2 by 31 December 2025. Failing vacation, eviction will be enforced by the Sheriff from 15 January 2026, with assistance from SAPS or private security. The first to fourth Respondents must pay the costs of the application, including counsel fees on Scale B.

Facts: Paramount Property Fund, represented by Growthpoint Management Services, leased commercial premises to New Africa Capital Group for use as a restaurant and music lounge. The lease commenced in 2022 and was set to run until 2024. In November 2023, the lease was cancelled by the applicants due to alleged non-payment of rental and ancillary charges. The respondent remained in occupation and disputed the cancellation, claiming that performance under the lease had become impossible due to delays in obtaining a liquor licence and other operational challenges. The respondent also alleged that it had paid more than was due and that the cancellation was unlawful.

Application: This was an eviction application brought by Paramount Property Fund and Growthpoint Management Services against New Africa Capital Group. The applicants sought an order directing the respondent and all persons occupying through it to vacate the premises. The respondent opposed the application and filed its answering affidavit two months late, seeking condonation. It also challenged the applicants’ locus standi and argued that the lease obligations had been suspended due to impossibility of performance. The applicants opposed the condonation application and maintained that the lease had been lawfully cancelled in terms of clause 26.1, which permitted cancellation upon breach and failure to remedy within seven days. The issue was whether the respondent’s opposition and condonation application had merit, and whether the eviction should be granted.

Discussion: The respondent’s explanation for the delay was inadequate and factually inconsistent. The answering affidavit was filed nearly three months late, not 22 days as claimed. Settlement negotiations had collapsed before the deadline, and no agreement to suspend time periods was shown. The respondent’s reliance on impossibility of performance was undermined by its own conduct and failure to provide supporting documentation. The explanation for the delay was vague and contradicted by correspondence between the parties. The deponent to the answering affidavit, Mr Besong, was also the respondent’s attorney of record and failed to provide a resolution authorising his representation. The version advanced by the applicants was supported by documentary evidence, including the lease agreement, arrears statements, and correspondence demanding payment and cancellation.

Findings: The respondent’s continued occupation of the premises was unlawful. The lease agreement had been validly cancelled in terms of clause 26.1 after the respondent failed to remedy its breach within the stipulated seven-day period. Despite the cancellation, the respondent remained in possession and failed to provide any legal basis for its occupation. Arguments regarding impossibility of performance were unsupported and contradicted by the respondent’s own conduct. The applicants had established their entitlement to vacant possession, and the relief sought was justified. While the respondent had also filed a condonation application for late filing of its answering affidavit, the explanation offered was inadequate and riddled with inconsistencies, further weakening its position. The eviction was granted.

Order: The respondent’s application for condonation for the late filing of the answering affidavit is dismissed. The respondent and all persons occupying the premises through or under the respondent are directed to vacate the premises within seven days of this order and allow the applicant vacant possession of the premises. Should the respondent and all persons occupying the premises through or under the respondent fail to vacate the premises within the time stipulated above, or enter the premises after the expiry of seven days, the Sheriff of this court or his duly authorised deputy, duly assisted by members of the South African Police Service (SAPS), if necessary, is authorised and directed to eject the respondent and all persons occupying through or under the respondent. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application on an attorney-and-client scale.

Facts: Radebe, employed as a Partner: Learning and Development at Standard Insurance Brokers, was responsible for coordinating training initiatives and securing discretionary grant funding from the Insurance Sector Education and Training Authority (INSETA). In late 2024, Radebe failed to submit expressions of interest by the internal deadline, resulting in his managers preparing the funding application using outdated data. This led to internal tensions and a written warning in April 2025 for misconduct and insubordination. Radebe appealed the warning, alleging that the instruction to use outdated data was unethical and amounted to misrepresentation. Separately, he had sent confidential internal communications to a legal advisor at First National Bank, seeking advice on the disciplinary process. The company viewed this as a breach of confidentiality and suspended him in July 2025, later issuing formal charges. Radebe claimed the disciplinary action and suspension were occupational detriments arising from a protected disclosure under the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000.

Application: This was an urgent application brought by Radebe to halt the disciplinary inquiry and uplift his suspension, pending the outcome of an unfair labour practice dispute referred to the CCMA. He argued that the disciplinary process constituted an occupational detriment in retaliation for a protected disclosure made to his legal advisor. The employer opposed the application, asserting that the disclosure was not protected, that Radebe had breached confidentiality policies, and that the urgency was self-created. The issue was whether the disciplinary inquiry should be suspended pending the resolution of the unfair labour practice claim, and whether the suspension itself warranted interim relief.

Discussion: The matter turned on whether Radebe had made a protected disclosure and whether the disciplinary action was causally linked to that disclosure. The disclosure in question involved internal communications about the INSETA funding process and alleged impropriety, which Radebe shared with a legal advisor. Under section 5 of the Protected Disclosures Act, such disclosures are protected if made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, regardless of intent to expose wrongdoing. The disciplinary charge directly referenced the emails sent to the advisor, suggesting a causal link. While the employer argued that the disclosure was self-serving and not made in good faith, the statutory definition did not require good faith for disclosures to legal advisors. Radebe’s claim that he was being punished for whistleblowing was therefore not implausible. However, the relief sought required a balance of convenience assessment, considering the potential prejudice to both parties.

Findings: A prima facie case was established that Radebe had made a protected disclosure and that the disciplinary action was at least partly a response to it. The disclosure fell within the scope of section 5 of the Protected Disclosures Act, and the disciplinary charge was directly linked to the communication. Nonetheless, the balance of convenience did not favour granting interim relief. The employer faced greater prejudice if the inquiry was suspended indefinitely, especially if Radebe chose to refer the dispute to the Labour Court, which could delay resolution for months. By contrast, Radebe had access to remedies through the CCMA, including reversal of any adverse disciplinary outcomes. His claim to uplift the suspension was struck off for lack of urgency, as no explanation was provided for the delay in challenging it.

Order: The application to set aside the applicant’s suspension is struck off the roll for lack of urgency. The application to halt the disciplinary enquiry is heard as a matter of urgency. The application to halt the disciplinary enquiry is dismissed. No order is made as to costs.

Facts: Manganyi and over 300 other applicants, all employed as Metro Police Constables by the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, were appointed in December 2015 and confirmed in their positions a year later. They contended that the municipality had failed to apply its own approved grading scheme which provided for progression from Constable to Lance Sergeant under grades B1, C1, and C2. Despite meeting the requirements outlined in the scheme and submitting a grievance in 2019, the applicants were not placed on the appropriate grades. The grievance outcome issued in November 2020 confirmed that the 2006 grading scheme was valid and should be applied, but the municipality failed to implement it. The applicants sought declaratory relief and retrospective monetary compensation based on the grading scheme.

Application: This was an opposed application brought by Manganyi and others against the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. The applicants sought an order declaring the municipality’s failure to apply the 2006 grading scheme unlawful, and requested retrospective implementation of the scheme, recalculation of their monetary entitlements, and payment of the amounts due. The municipality opposed the application, raising two points in limine including the defence of lis pendens and the existence of material disputes of fact. It argued that the same dispute was pending before the Labour Court, following arbitration proceedings initiated by IMATU on behalf of over 900 employees, including some of the applicants. The issue was whether the application should be dismissed due to pending litigation on the same subject matter.

Discussion: The matter turned on the defence of lis alibi pendens, which requires pending litigation between the same parties, based on the same cause of action and subject matter. The municipality demonstrated that IMATU had referred a dispute to the South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC), which was dismissed in arbitration and subsequently taken on review to the Labour Court. The applicants in this case were among those represented by IMATU in the earlier proceedings. The relief sought in both forums centred on the application of the 2004/2006 grading scheme and progression to Sergeant with backpay. The applicants denied the applicability of lis pendens but failed to respond substantively to the allegations or distinguish their case from the pending review. Their reliance on the grievance outcome was acknowledged, but the municipality had withdrawn implementation of the scheme in 2017 pending a decision by the Basic Conditions Committee. The risk of conflicting judgments and duplication of proceedings was substantial.

Findings: The requirements for lis alibi pendens were satisfied. The applicants were found to be pursuing the same dispute already pending before the Labour Court, involving the same grading scheme, cause of action, and overlapping parties. Their denial of the pending litigation was unsupported, and their failure to respond to key allegations was treated as an admission. The application was inappropriate for parallel adjudication, as it posed a risk of inconsistent outcomes and undermined the principle of finality in litigation. The discretion to stay or dismiss proceedings was exercised in favour of dismissal, given the advanced stage of the Labour Court review and the applicants’ representation through IMATU.

Order: Lis pendens is upheld. The application is dismissed with costs.

Facts: Hintsa and other former employees of the King Sabata Dalindyebo Local Municipality were employed between 2003 and 2017. During their tenure, the municipality participated in the Task Job Evaluation Collective Agreement (TASK), aimed at standardising salary grades across municipalities. In 2018, the Executive Mayor submitted a memorandum proposing the normalisation of salary grades and back-pay for “all affected employees.” The council adopted this resolution in May 2018. The respondents, who had left municipal service by then, were classified in the memorandum as a separate group of affected employees. Despite initial assurances that they would be paid by September 2018, no payments were made, prompting the respondents to seek declaratory relief in the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court.

Appeal: This was an appeal by the King Sabata Dalindyebo Local Municipality, its Municipal Manager, and Chief Financial Officer against a High Court order declaring the municipality’s failure to implement its 2018 resolution unlawful. The respondents had sought recognition as “affected employees” entitled to back-pay under the resolution. The appellants argued that the resolution applied only to current employees and that the respondents lacked legal standing to compel implementation. The issue was whether the resolution included former employees and whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion to grant declaratory relief.

Discussion: The matter turned on the interpretation of the 2018 resolution and the legal standing of the respondents. The resolution approved full payment of back-pay to “all affected employees,” a phrase not explicitly defined in the resolution itself. However, the mayor’s memorandum, which formed the basis of the resolution, categorised the respondents as part of the second group of affected employees, those who were in service in July 2012 and included in the TASK schedules but had since left. The municipality’s conduct following the resolution, including meetings and correspondence acknowledging the respondents’ inclusion and promising payment, reinforced this interpretation. The principles of document interpretation were applied, favouring a sensible reading aligned with the resolution’s purpose and context. The respondents were found to have a direct and substantial interest in the matter, satisfying the requirements of section 21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013.

Findings: The resolution did apply to the respondents. The council had adopted the mayor’s memorandum, which explicitly included the respondents in the implementation process. The municipality’s subsequent communications confirmed their inclusion and promised payment. The respondents were therefore “affected employees” with an existing right to back-pay. Their legal standing was affirmed, and the High Court’s discretion to grant declaratory relief was properly exercised. The municipality’s failure to implement the resolution was unlawful. A declaratory order was appropriate even in the absence of a monetary claim, as it served to resolve a legal uncertainty affecting the respondents’ rights. The municipality’s attempt to narrow the scope of the resolution post hoc was rejected as inconsistent with both the wording and the conduct of its own officials.

Order: The appeal is dismissed with costs, including costs of two counsel where so employed.

Facts: Monyemoratho, Selepe, and Chokwe are long-standing informal traders in the Polokwane CBD, each relying on street trading as their primary source of income. In October 2020, their trading stalls were demolished without prior notice during a municipal enforcement operation described as a “cleaning campaign.” The operation was carried out by officials acting under the direction of the Polokwane Municipal Manager. The applicants’ structures were dismantled, and their trading activities abruptly halted. Although the respondents claimed the traders lacked valid permits, the applicants maintained that no effective notice was given and that the municipality had stopped processing permit applications months prior. Attempts to resolve the matter with municipal authorities failed, prompting the applicants to seek urgent judicial relief.

Application: This was a review application brought by the three informal traders against the Polokwane Municipal Manager and the Polokwane Municipality. The applicants sought to have the respondents’ actions reviewed and set aside, arguing that the demolition of their stalls and prohibition from trading were unlawful, procedurally unfair, and unconstitutional. They requested the establishment of a dispute resolution committee for informal traders and a costs order. The respondents opposed the application, asserting that the operation was lawful, that reasonable notice had been given, and that the applicants were trading without permits. The issue was whether the respondents’ conduct complied with the requirements of legality, procedural fairness, and proportionality under the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.

Discussion: The matter turned on whether the respondents had legal authority to demolish the applicants’ stalls and whether they exercised that authority in a procedurally fair and reasonable manner. The relevant municipal by-laws and the Businesses Act 71 of 1991 permit enforcement against unlawful trading, including removal of goods and structures. However, such enforcement must follow due process. The respondents failed to produce evidence of any individual notice served on the applicants prior to the operation. Their claim of “reasonable notice” remained vague and unsupported. The applicants’ version, that they were caught by surprise, was found to be more credible, especially given their immediate resort to court. Compounding the issue was the municipality’s own moratorium on processing trading permits, which rendered compliance impossible. The respondents’ conduct was thus not only procedurally unfair but also irrational, as it punished traders for non-compliance that the municipality itself had made unavoidable.

Findings: The respondents’ actions were unlawful and unconstitutional. The demolition of the applicants’ stalls without notice or opportunity to respond violated the principles of procedural fairness under section 3(2) of PAJA. The respondents failed to consider less invasive alternatives, such as issuing compliance notices or engaging with traders. Their conduct was disproportionate to the stated objective of enforcing by-laws and maintaining urban order. The applicants’ constitutional rights were unjustifiably infringed, including the right to just administrative action (section 33), dignity (section 10), freedom of trade (section 22), property (section 25), and access to courts (section 34). The respondents acted without proper legal authority and denied the applicants a fair hearing. No internal remedy was available or shown to exist, and the applicants’ urgent approach to court was appropriate. Municipal officials must act within the bounds of the law and respect the rights of all persons, including informal traders.

Order: The decision taken by the respondents to prohibit the applicants from trading by demolishing their structures or stalls without notice or opportunity to redress the alleged non-compliance is declared unlawful and is reviewed and set aside. The respondents are directed to forthwith establish a dispute resolution committee to deal specifically and adequately with matters pertaining to informal traders within their jurisdiction. The respondents are ordered, jointly and severally, one paying to absolve the other, to pay the costs of the review application (Parts A and B) on party and party Scale B.

Facts: Maseti, an attorney admitted in 2012, practised under the name Maseti Attorneys in Johannesburg. Between 2016 and 2022, multiple complaints were lodged against him, ranging from failure to execute mandates and account to clients, to misappropriation of funds and impersonation. Several complainants paid substantial amounts to individuals allegedly acting on Maseti’s behalf, including secretaries Modise and Motoeneng, who were later found to be running a fraudulent scheme through a company called Arnishs and Associates. Funds were paid into private accounts, mandates were not executed, and clients were left without recourse. Maseti denied authorising these transactions and claimed ignorance of the misconduct. Additional complaints involved delayed payments, failure to report progress, and improper handling of trust funds. An audit by Swart, a chartered accountant, revealed trust shortages and incomplete accounting records, with discrepancies linked to client funds that should have been available.

Application: The South African Legal Practice Council (LPC) seeks the removal of Maseti’s name from the roll of legal practitioners, alternatively his suspension. The LPC alleged unprofessional conduct, failure to supervise staff, breach of trust obligations, and dishonesty. Maseti opposed the application, arguing that he had not been subjected to a disciplinary hearing and that many complaints stemmed from unauthorised actions by former employees. The issue was whether Maseti’s conduct rendered him unfit to continue practising and whether removal or suspension was the appropriate sanction.

Discussion: The matter turned on a three-stage inquiry which included whether the offending conduct was established on a balance of probabilities; whether Maseti was a fit and proper person to practise; and whether removal or suspension was warranted. Each complaint was examined in detail. Maseti failed to supervise staff, respond to correspondence, and maintain proper accounting records. His denials were often unsupported by evidence, and his responses to the LPC were evasive or absent. The audit revealed trust shortages, including funds from Rodel Financial Property Services that were misused and not available when required. Maseti’s explanations were inconsistent, and in some cases, he misrepresented facts under oath. Attorneys are held to the highest standards of integrity, and failure to account for trust money, even if not personally received, constitutes a breach of duty.

Findings: Maseti was found to have engaged in multiple acts of unprofessional and dishonourable conduct. He failed to supervise employees, respond to complaints, and maintain accurate trust records. His conduct in the Rodel matter, where trust funds were misused and later repaid only after litigation, demonstrated a lack of integrity. His claim that he merely acted as surety was rejected, as he had signed undertakings and received funds directly. His failure to cooperate with the LPC and provide requested documentation further undermined his credibility. The cumulative effect of the complaints, audit findings, and evasive responses led to the conclusion that Maseti was no longer fit to practise. No exceptional circumstances justified a lesser sanction, and removal from the roll was necessary to protect the public and uphold the profession’s integrity.

Order: The name of Maseti is removed from the roll of legal practitioners of this court. Maseti must surrender his certificate of enrolment within two weeks, failing which the Sheriff is authorised to retrieve it. Maseti is prohibited from operating any trust accounts. A curator bonis is appointed to administer and control Maseti’s trust accounts and related matters. Maseti is removed from office in all fiduciary roles, including executor, trustee, curator, and liquidator. Maseti must pay the costs of the inspection, auditor’s fees, curator’s fees, and costs of this application on an attorney-and-client Scale C. The curator is authorised to recover and distribute trust funds, report to the LPC, and wind up Maseti’s practice.