Facts: A governance dispute arose within the Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa (AFM), Imbali Worship Centre Assembly, following the dismissal of Pastor Mkhize and the formation of a parallel leadership structure known as the “Task Team.” This group, comprising several members of the congregation, expelled the existing Governing Body and assumed control of the Assembly’s affairs and finances. The applicant, being the original Governing Body, challenged the legitimacy of the Task Team and sought to enforce internal appeal rulings that had reinstated it and declared the Task Team unlawful.

Application: This was an application for final declaratory and interdictory relief brought by the Governing Body of the AFM Imbali Worship Centre Assembly. The applicant sought confirmation of its authority to govern the Assembly and an order dissolving the Task Team, based on rulings by the Regional and National Appeals Committees of the AFM. The issue was whether the applicant remained the lawful governing body of the Assembly and whether the Task Team’s continued operation was unconstitutional and unlawful.

Discussion: The matter had initially been brought as a rule nisi for interim relief but was later argued as a final application due to the finality of the internal appeal rulings. The respondents raised several preliminary objections, including lack of standing, prematurity, and ecclesiastical non-intervention. These were rejected. The applicant’s standing was confirmed by the internal rulings, which reinstated Mr Ndlovu as Chairperson. The alleged disciplinary appeal by Pastor Mkhize was unrelated and did not suspend the reinstatement. The AFM Constitution was treated as a binding contract among members, and the internal rulings were final and enforceable. The respondents’ continued defiance of those rulings placed the matter squarely within the realm of judicial enforcement. Intervention is justified where internal remedies had been exhausted and lawful decisions disregarded.

Findings: The applicant demonstrated a clear and enforceable right to govern the Assembly, based on the AFM Constitution and the final decisions of the Regional and National Appeals Committees. The injury was ongoing, with the Task Team continuing to interfere in governance and finances. No other satisfactory remedy existed, as the internal appeal process had been completed and the respondents had refused to comply. The matter was found to be justiciable, as it concerned adherence to a constitution rather than doctrinal issues. The requirements for final relief were met, and declaratory and interdictory orders were warranted to restore lawful governance and uphold the rule of law within the voluntary association.

Order: The “Task Team” is declared unconstitutional and unlawful and is dissolved with immediate effect. The applicant is declared to be the only lawful governing body of the AFM Imbali Worship Centre Assembly, including its branches and bank account. All decisions and resolutions taken by the Task Team are declared invalid. The first to fourteenth respondents are interdicted from interfering with the governance of the Assembly, except in accordance with the AFM Constitution. First National Bank is directed to recognise the applicant’s authorised signatories and disregard any contrary authorisations. The first to fourteenth respondents are to pay the costs of the application jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved.

Facts: In March 2022, the City of Cape Town’s Anti-Land Invasion Unit (ALIU) responded to reports of unlawful occupation on four erven in Mitchell’s Plain. Upon arrival, officers found four incomplete and unoccupied structures, which were dismantled and removed. The intruders identified themselves as members of the Khoi-San community, led by Van Rooyen. Some later moved into two dilapidated buildings on the property. The City emphasised that no eviction had taken place, and that the dismantled structures were vacant. A rule nisi was granted the same day, restraining further occupation and construction. The respondents later anticipated the return date and launched a mandament van spolie application, which was dismissed.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the dismissal of the City’s application to confirm the interim interdict. The City sought confirmation of the rule nisi restraining unlawful occupation and construction on the erven. The respondents opposed the application, arguing that an eviction had occurred and that the interdict was impermissibly broad. The issue was whether the City had lawfully obtained an anti-intrusion interdict and whether the respondents had been evicted without a court order.

Discussion: The appeal turned on five issues which included whether an eviction occurred, the legality of anti-land-invasion interdicts, the citation of unnamed respondents, the requirements for a final interdict, and whether all material facts were disclosed. The respondents continued to reside in the dilapidated buildings and had not been removed from the property. The earlier mandament van spolie application had already determined that no unlawful eviction occurred, rendering the issue res judicata. The City’s ownership of the erven was undisputed, and its right to protect its property was affirmed. The interdict did not authorise eviction or demolition of occupied structures, and judicial oversight remained intact. The citation of the second respondent, persons attempting to occupy the land, was permissible, as they formed an identifiable group led by Van Rooyen. The urgency of the matter and the volatile situation justified the City’s inability to name all respondents. Comparative jurisprudence from South Africa and the UK supported the view that unnamed but identifiable groups may be interdicted.

Findings: The City met all requirements for a final interdict. It had a clear right as owner, a reasonable apprehension of injury, and no satisfactory alternative remedy. The interdict sought to prevent future unlawful occupation, not to evict current occupiers. The finding by the lower court that the City had alternative remedies such as eviction or counter-spoliation was incorrect, as those remedies apply post-occupation. The City had disclosed all material facts in its ex parte application, and its conduct did not amount to an eviction. The lower court’s dismissal of the interdict was based on flawed reasoning and was set aside. The appeal succeeded, and the interim interdict was confirmed.

Order: The appeal is upheld. The order of the lower court dismissing the interim interdict is set aside. The interim interdict is confirmed. The interdict applies to Van Rooyen and all persons led by him who attempted to occupy the erven on 5 March and 10 May 2022. The City must place copies of the order on visible noticeboards on each erf in English and Afrikaans. The City must check the noticeboards regularly to ensure the order remains displayed. This order shall not be construed as an eviction order and may not be used to demolish occupied structures or evict occupiers, except under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. No order is made as to costs.

Facts: Burger, acting as executor of the estate of the late De Beer, brought a claim against Nel concerning a right of pre-emption over Portions 6 and 11 of the farm Swarts Rust. The dispute stemmed from a prior Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) judgment which directed Burger to submit a deed of sale to Nel, and for Nel to sign it within 14 days. If Nel failed to do so, the Sheriff was authorised to sign on his behalf. Nel submitted three deeds of sale between November 2022 and February 2024, but Burger contended they did not comply with the terms of the Fanie Trust Agreement, which governed the transaction. Burger alleged that Nel had either failed to exercise his pre-emptive right or had waived it by submitting non-compliant deeds.

Claim: Burger, in his representative capacity, instituted action against Nel, alleging breach of the SCA order and seeking enforcement of the right of pre-emption. Nel raised an exception under Rule 23(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court, arguing that Burger’s particulars of claim lacked the necessary averments to sustain a cause of action. The issue was whether Burger’s particulars of claim disclosed a valid cause of action in light of the SCA order and Nel’s alleged compliance.

Discussion: Nel advanced five grounds of exception. First, he argued that the SCA order did not divest him of his pre-emptive right and did not impose an obligation to transfer similar immovable property. Second, he pointed out that Burger conceded the first deed of sale was submitted within the prescribed 14-day period, undermining the claim of non-compliance. Third, he contended that Burger failed to plead how the submitted deeds deviated from the Fanie Trust Agreement. Fourth, he challenged Burger’s assertion that Nel had waived his pre-emptive right, noting that the SCA had already found the right had been exercised. Fifth, he argued that Burger’s reliance on clause 2(e) of the Fanie Trust Agreement was misplaced, as it contained no operative terms. Burger responded by asserting that the SCA order required submission of a compliant deed of sale, and that Nel’s submissions did not meet this standard. He maintained that the particulars of claim disclosed a cause of action and that any lack of detail could be addressed through further particulars for trial.

Findings: It was found that Burger’s particulars of claim, when considered as a whole, failed to include sufficient averments to sustain a cause of action. The pleadings did not adequately explain how Nel’s deeds of sale were non-compliant with the SCA order or the Fanie Trust Agreement. The argument that Nel had waived his pre-emptive right was inconsistent with the SCA’s express finding that the right had been exercised. The reliance on clause 2(e) was legally flawed, as it did not contain enforceable terms. The objections raised were not minor or technical but went to the heart of the legal sufficiency of the claim. A globular reading of the pleadings confirmed that no possible evidence could cure the defects.

Order: The exception is upheld with costs on a party and party Scale B. Burger is ordered to deliver amended particulars of claim within 15 days of this order.

Facts: Doornhoek Plase was placed in business rescue following a dispute between its minority and majority shareholders. The Johan Snyman Trust, holding 28% of the shares, had initially sought liquidation, but the majority shareholders proposed business rescue instead, which was adopted by agreement. O2 Boerdery, a tenant on Doornhoek’s properties, and the trustees of the Johan Snyman Trust later challenged the business rescue plan, particularly the proposed sale of immovable assets to settle debts. They alleged that Land Bank, a major creditor, lacked locus standi due to an invalid cession of claims from Griekwaland Wes Korporatief (GWK), and that without Land Bank’s claim, Doornhoek was no longer in financial distress.

Application: This was a semi-urgent application seeking to stay the business rescue proceedings and interdict the sale of Doornhoek’s immovable properties, pending finalisation of an action challenging Land Bank’s status as a creditor. The applicants argued that the cession from GWK to Land Bank was invalid and that the sale of assets would cause irreparable harm. The issue was whether the applicants had standing to bring the application and whether the business rescue process should be suspended pending resolution of the underlying debt dispute.

Discussion: The application was opposed by Land Bank, Nedbank, GWK, and other interested parties. GWK successfully intervened, having a direct interest in the outcome due to its prior creditor status. The applicants’ standing was scrutinised. O2 Boerdery’s claim, based on tenancy and alleged improvements, was raised only in reply and found to be inadequately substantiated. The trustees’ standing as minority shareholders was also questioned, as they had not followed the statutory derivative action process under section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The application was found to fall within the moratorium created by section 133 of the Act, requiring leave of the court, which had not been sought. Even if standing were accepted, the applicants failed to show that expunging Land Bank’s claim would resolve Doornhoek’s financial distress, given outstanding debts to Nedbank and others. The business rescue plan had been lawfully adopted by the majority of creditors, and the sale of assets was approved. The proposal to hold Land Bank’s portion of the proceeds in trust pending litigation was found to adequately protect the applicants’ interests.

Findings: The applicants failed to establish locus standi and did not follow the correct statutory procedures to litigate on behalf of Doornhoek. The relief sought would interfere with the implementation of a lawfully adopted business rescue plan and potentially expose Doornhoek to liquidation. There was no prima facie case for the suspension of the business rescue proceedings. The balance of convenience favoured the majority creditors and shareholders, who supported the sale. The applicants’ concerns were addressed by the trust arrangement for disputed proceeds. The urgency of the application was not of their own making, but the timing and procedural shortcomings undermined their case. The matter was complex and required careful consideration, warranting costs on Scale C.

Order: The application is dismissed with costs on Scale C. The wasted costs occasioned by the postponement on 31 January 2025 are to be borne by the applicants on the party and party scale.

Facts: October was charged with sexual assault under section 5(1) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, arising from an incident involving a 12-year-old girl. He pleaded not guilty and was legally represented throughout the trial. The complainant, her aunt, and her father testified for the State. October’s wife testified for the defence, and October initially declined to testify but later changed his mind. The trial court postponed the matter to allow him to testify but ordered his detention overnight and transfer to Calvinia for medical examination, despite his compliance with bail conditions. October later applied for the magistrate’s recusal, citing bias and procedural irregularities.

Appeal: This was an appeal against both conviction and sentence. October argued that the trial was unfair due to the premature invocation of section 299A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the unilateral cancellation of bail, and the refusal to recuse the magistrate. He also challenged the sentence, seeking correctional supervision under section 276(1)(h) of the Act. The issue was whether the trial was conducted fairly and whether the conviction and sentence should be set aside due to procedural irregularities and a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Discussion: The appeal focused on three main irregularities. First, the trial court invoked section 299A before conviction, informing the complainant’s father of his right to participate in parole proceedings. Although the magistrate emphasised the conditional nature of this right, section 299A should only be invoked post-conviction and sentencing. Second, the trial court cancelled October’s bail without an application from the prosecution or evidence under oath, contrary to section 68 of the Act. October had complied with all bail conditions and was detained without justification. Third, the recusal application was dismissed despite October’s affidavit detailing humiliating treatment, lack of food, and derogatory conduct by the magistrate. The record showed that the magistrate laughed during submissions and dismissed concerns without proper engagement. These actions created a perception of bias and undermined the fairness of the proceedings.

Findings: The trial was found to be procedurally flawed. The premature invocation of section 299A, while not fatal on its own, contributed to a perception of prejudgment. The cancellation of bail was a serious irregularity, violating October’s constitutional right to personal freedom. The failure to apply the audi alteram partem rule and the magistrate’s conduct during the recusal application further supported a reasonable apprehension of bias. These cumulative irregularities rendered the trial unfair. The conviction and sentence were set aside, not on the merits, but due to the failure of justice. The matter was referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions to decide on re-arraignment before a different magistrate.

Order: The appeal is upheld. The conviction and sentence are set aside. The matter is referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Northern Cape, to decide whether October should be re-arraigned. If re-arraigned, the trial must be before a different Regional Magistrate.

Facts: Diedericks operates a private rhino conservancy registered for non-commercial breeding purposes. The conservancy spans over 33,000 acres and houses a population of white rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum simum), bred in captivity to aid species survival. Diedericks lawfully harvested rhino horn from living animals and sought to export it to fund ongoing conservation efforts, which cost him approximately R20 million annually. He applied for ten export permits, which were refused by the MEC for Agriculture, Environmental Affairs, Rural Development and Land Reform. The refusal was based on the interpretation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), specifically the exclusion of Article VII(5) from South African domestic law.

Application: Diedericks brought a hybrid application under Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court, seeking judicial review of the MEC’s refusal to grant export permits. He argued that Article VII(5) of CITES, which exempts captive-bred specimens from certain permit requirements, had been incorporated into South African law via the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 (NEMBA). The issue was whether Article VII(5) of CITES forms part of South African domestic law and whether the MEC’s refusal to issue export permits was lawful under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).

Discussion: The matter turned on the incorporation of international treaties into domestic law. Diedericks argued that South Africa, having ratified CITES without reservation, was bound by all its provisions, including Article VII(5), which allows export of captive-bred specimens with a certificate in lieu of permits. The respondents contended that CITES was incorporated only through the 2010 regulations under NEMBA, which omitted Article VII(5) as part of stricter domestic measures. This interpretation was rejected. NEMBA itself incorporated CITES, and the use of source code “C” (indicating captive breeding for conservation) in South African permit forms confirmed the operational presence of Article VII(5). The MEC’s reliance on Article III of CITES, applicable to wild specimens, was misplaced. The refusal to issue permits was based on irrelevant considerations and failed to account for the applicant’s lawful conservation efforts.

Findings: It was confirmed that Article VII(5) of CITES is part of South African domestic law. The MEC’s decision was found to be unlawful, irrational, and procedurally unfair under PAJA. The refusal ignored the distinction between wild and captive-bred specimens and failed to apply the correct legal framework. The use of source code “C” in South African practice, the absence of any registered stricter domestic measures with the CITES Secretariat, and the applicant’s non-commercial conservation purpose all supported the applicability of Article VII(5). The MEC’s reasons were based on errors of law and irrelevant considerations. The decision was reviewed and set aside, and the MEC was directed to reconsider the permit applications in accordance with the correct legal principles.

Order: The MEC’s decision to refuse export permits is reviewed and set aside. It is declared that Article VII(5) of CITES is part of South African domestic law. The MEC must decide on the permit applications within 7 days and provide reasons if refused. The respondents are to pay the costs of the review on Scale C, jointly and severally. The costs of the misjoinder application are to be costs in the cause. The respondents must also pay the wasted costs occasioned by the December 2024 postponement on Scale C.

Facts: Centpret Properties owns commercial premises in Pretoria, including several offices and a strongroom, which were leased to Maake, an attorney, under a written agreement concluded in September 2021. By early 2024, Maake had fallen into arrears, prompting Centpret to sue him in the Magistrate’s Court for over R87,000 and to initiate eviction proceedings. Despite receiving notice to remedy the breach, Maake failed to pay. He did not dispute the arrears but raised multiple procedural and substantive objections, including challenges to the authority of Centpret’s deponent, lis pendens, jurisdiction, and improper cancellation. The litigation was marked by delays, non-compliance with directives, and repeated attempts by Maake to derail the hearing.

Application: This was an application for eviction brought by Centpret Properties against Maake, who occupied the premises under a lease agreement. Centpret sought an order evicting Maake and all those occupying through him, citing breach of contract due to non-payment. Maake opposed the application and sought to have the matter struck from the roll, the presiding judge recused, parts of the affidavit struck out, and the hearing postponed. The issue was whether the lease had been validly terminated and whether Centpret was entitled to evict Maake from the premises.

Discussion: Maake’s procedural objections were examined in detail. His request to strike the matter from the roll, based on non-compliance with Practice Directives, was meritless and prejudicial. The recusal application, premised on alleged bias and procedural irregularities, was dismissed after a thorough analysis of the applicable test and facts. His postponement request, made late in the day and without adequate explanation, was refused. The application to strike out parts of the replying affidavit was rejected, as the material was responsive and not prejudicial. On the merits, Maake’s challenge to the authority of Centpret’s deponent failed, as the correct procedure under Rule 7 had not been followed. His lis pendens argument was unsupported by evidence and failed to show that the relief sought in the Magistrate’s Court overlapped with the eviction application. The jurisdictional objection, based on an alleged requirement for informal dispute resolution, was unfounded. The lease allowed Centpret to elect its forum, and the High Court had jurisdiction.

Findings: The lease was found to have been validly terminated. Although the notices referred to a seven-day period, they were clear and unequivocal, and more than twenty business days had elapsed before termination. The notices were sent to Maake’s designated email address and were deemed received. Maake did not dispute receipt or provide any explanation. Even if the termination for breach were invalid, the lease had converted to a month-to-month arrangement, and the application itself constituted clear notice of termination. Maake had ample time to vacate but chose to hold over. His conduct throughout the litigation was obstructive, and his defences lacked merit. The eviction was justified, and Maake had no right to remain in occupation. Given the circumstances, including the abuse of process and delays caused, attorney-and-client costs were warranted.

Order: Maake’s request to strike the case from the roll was refused with attorney-and-client costs. The application for recusal was dismissed with costs. The application to strike out was dismissed with attorney-and-client costs. The application for postponement was dismissed. Centpret’s application for eviction was granted. Maake and all those occupying through him are evicted from the premises. If they fail to vacate by 5 November 2025, the Sheriff is authorised to carry out the eviction, with SAPS assistance if necessary. Maake is liable for the attorney-and-client costs of the application. Centpret is liable for its own costs in respect of 8 September 2025.

Facts: The second applicant, a South African civil engineer residing in Denmark, is the father of a six-year-old boy born in July 2019. The child had lived in Denmark with both parents since birth. In August 2025, the child’s mother, a Zimbabwean national and the respondent in this matter, travelled to South Africa with the child, allegedly to give birth to their second child. The father contended that this relocation was done without his consent and amounted to wrongful removal under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The mother opposed the application for the child’s return, claiming that the father had consented to the move and that returning the child would expose him to grave harm due to the father's mental health and work-related absences.

Application: This was an application brought by the Central Authority of South Africa and the child’s father under Article 12 of the Hague Convention, seeking the return of the child to Denmark. The respondent opposed the application, relying on Article 13(a) and (b) of the Convention. The issue was whether the child had been wrongfully removed from his habitual residence and whether the mother had established a valid defence under Article 13(a) or 13(b) to prevent his return.

Discussion: The respondent relied on an email to argue that the father had consented to her travel with the child. However, the surrounding circumstances, including police involvement, municipal interventions, and a travel warning issued by the Danish Family Court, contradicted this claim. The departure was clandestine, and the father was not involved in travel arrangements. The version advanced by the respondent was improbable and inconsistent with the factual record. On the Article 13(b) defence, the respondent argued that the child would face grave harm if returned, citing the father’s bipolar disorder and frequent travel. However, the curator ad litem reported that the child was unhappy in South Africa and wished to return to Denmark. The father had made arrangements for the child’s schooling and care, and there was no indication that he posed a risk. The psychological and logistical concerns raised by the respondent were insufficient to meet the high threshold of “grave risk” required under Article 13(b).

Findings: The Convention’s objectives, including prompt return and jurisdictional clarity, were reaffirmed, and protective measures available in Denmark were considered adequate to safeguard the child’s welfare. The child was wrongfully removed from Denmark, his habitual residence, and the respondent failed to establish either consent or grave risk as defences under Article 13. The version advanced by the father was accepted as more credible, and the respondent’s conduct was found to be inconsistent with lawful relocation. The child expressed a desire to return, and the father demonstrated capacity and preparedness to care for him. The legal framework of the Hague Convention, including its emphasis on prompt return and jurisdictional integrity, supported the application. Ancillary protective measures were ordered to ensure the respondent and her newborn child would be supported upon their return to Denmark.

Order: The child is to be returned forthwith to Denmark under Article 12 of the Hague Convention. The child’s passport and travel documents must be collected by the Central Authority within five days. The child must be handed over to the father within ten days, failing which the Sheriff and SAPS may enforce the order. The father must arrange and pay for the child’s flight and visa. The Central Authority for Denmark must implement welfare measures upon arrival. In five months, the father must pay for the respondent and the newborn child’s travel to Denmark. The father must provide and prove suitable accommodation for them in Denmark. Upon her return, the child will live with the respondent and spend reasonable time with the father until parenting orders are made. Either party may approach Danish courts to vary or mirror this order. Each party is to pay their own costs.

Facts: Maritz, formerly Executive: Risk & Analytics at Truworths, was interdicted from assuming employment with TymeBank or any of its associated entities for 12 months, based on a restraint of trade agreement. Truworths alleged that Maritz’s new role at Tyme Pte Limited, a fintech firm within the Tyme group, breached the restraint. Maritz denied this, asserting that Tyme Pte operated in a different market and was not a competitor. He applied for leave to appeal the restraint order, which suspended its operation under section 18(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. Truworths then obtained an execution order under section 18(3), lifting the suspension. Maritz appealed that execution order under section 18(4)(a)(ii).

Appeal: This was an automatic appeal against the execution order granted under section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act. Maritz sought to reinstate the suspension of the restraint order pending appeal, arguing that the order was overbroad and that Truworths had failed to prove exceptional circumstances or irreparable harm. The issue was whether the execution order lifting the suspension of the restraint was justified under section 18(3), given the prospects of success on appeal and the balance of harm.

Discussion: The restraint agreement prohibited Maritz from engaging with any competitor of Truworths, but the restraint order extended this to any holding, subsidiary, or associated entity of TymeBank. This wording was overbroad and unsupported by the founding affidavit. Maritz’s employment with Tyme Pte, a Singapore-based digital lender focused on SMEs, was not shown to be competitive with Truworths’ retail credit business. Maritz’s was employed by Tyme Pte, not TymeBank. Truworths had failed to establish that Tyme Pte was a competitor or that Maritz’s employment breached the restraint. The legal principles governing section 18(3) applications were also considered, including the need to prove exceptional circumstances and irreparable harm. Prospects of success on appeal are relevant to the enquiry and restraint orders, due to their short duration, require careful scrutiny before being implemented pending appeal.

Findings: The restraint order was found to be incompetent in part, particularly in its prohibition of employment with entities merely associated with competitors. Truworths had not shown exceptional circumstances or irreparable harm justifying immediate enforcement of the full restraint order. Maritz, on the other hand, would suffer irreparable harm if forced to terminate his employment, including loss of income and medical aid needed for his son’s treatment. It was accepted that some harm to Truworths could arise from Maritz’s proximity to TymeBank employees, but this was addressed by implementing only the confidentiality clause of the restraint. The remainder of the restraint order was suspended pending appeal. Restraint enforcement must align strictly with contractual terms and fairness and proportionality are central to section 18(3) applications.

Order: The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel on Scale C. The execution order is set aside and replaced with: Paragraph 1.3 of the restraint order (confidentiality clause) remains operational and enforceable pending all appeals. Paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of the restraint order are suspended pending all appeals. Each party shall pay its own costs in the section 18(3) application.

Facts: Chauke was employed by Transnet SOC Ltd as a Yard Official at the Ermelo depot. In early 2022, he was temporarily assigned alternative duties due to an injury. Following the death of his partner, who was also a Transnet employee, Chauke was arrested on suspicion of the murder of his life partner and held in custody. Transnet terminated his employment in September 2022, citing his inability to tender services. Chauke was released on bail nine days later, with conditions restricting his access to Ermelo but not prohibiting employment elsewhere. He referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the Transnet Bargaining Council, where the commissioner found the dismissal substantively unfair and ordered retrospective reinstatement with backpay.

Application: Transnet applied to the Labour Court under section 145(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 to review and set aside the arbitration award. It argued that the commissioner committed misconduct, gross irregularity, and issued an award that no reasonable arbitrator could have made. The issue was whether the commissioner’s reinstatement order was legally sound and reasonably practicable under section 193(2)(c) of the Labour Relations Act.

Discussion: Transnet contended that the dismissal was justified due to Chauke’s incarceration and uncertainty around bail. The commissioner had found the dismissal premature, given that Transnet was aware of the upcoming bail hearing and had previously accommodated Chauke in an alternative role. The reinstatement order directed placement at any Transnet operation in Gauteng, based on Chauke’s prior deployments and bail conditions requiring him to report to the Alexandra Police Station. However, the commissioner failed to assess the actual operational feasibility of such placement, including vacancies, budget, and structural capacity. The commissioner’s reasoning was based on hypothetical possibilities rather than concrete evidence. This amounted to a misdirection, as the enquiry under section 193(2)(c) requires a factual determination of whether reinstatement is reasonably practicable, not merely conceivable.

Findings: Reinstatement was found to be unfeasible. Chauke’s bail conditions barred him from returning to Ermelo, and no evidence was presented to support alternative placement in Gauteng. The commissioner had overstepped by substituting Transnet’s managerial prerogative with speculative assumptions. While the dismissal was substantively unfair due to its premature timing, the reinstatement order was irrational and unenforceable. Compensation was deemed the appropriate remedy under section 194(1), given the lack of practical alternatives and the procedural fairness of the dismissal process.

Order: The review application is granted. The arbitration award is reviewed and set aside. The dismissal of Chauke is declared procedurally fair but substantively unfair. Transnet is ordered to pay Chauke compensation equal to 12 months’ salary, calculated at his rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal, within 30 days. There is no order as to costs.

Facts: Sterea Digital CC purchased a property in a secluded residential area of Durbanville with the intention of converting it into offices for Sandenbergh Nel Haggard, a mid-sized law firm. The property had previously been used as a private school under a temporary consent use. In 2019, Sterea applied to rezone the property from Single Residential 1 (SR1) to Local Business 1 (LB1) under the City of Cape Town Municipal Planning By-Law, 2015. The Municipal Planning Tribunal (MPT) refused the application, citing conflict with the Northern District Plan (NDP), which designated the area as a protected residential zone. Sterea appealed to the Appeal Authority (AA), which also dismissed the application. Sterea then sought judicial review of both decisions.

Appeal: Sterea and its attorneys challenged the full bench decision of the Western Cape High Court, which had upheld the City’s refusal to rezone the property. They argued that the AA’s decision was tainted by bias and failed to consider relevant factors, including the property’s prior use as a school. The issue was whether the AA’s refusal to rezone the property was lawful, unbiased, and procedurally sound under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.

Discussion: Sterea alleged that the AA, led by the City’s former executive mayor, had a predetermined mindset against rezoning and rigidly applied the NDP without considering the property’s changed character. It was argued that the prior school use had already eroded the residential nature of the area and that the AA failed to weigh this appropriately. It was examined whether the AA’s decision reflected actual or reasonably suspected bias, and whether relevant considerations were ignored. The AA had considered all appeal grounds, including the school’s prior use, and had applied its mind to the spatial planning frameworks. The AA concluded that the school use was temporary, aligned with SR1 zoning, and did not justify permanent rezoning. Municipal planning decisions must be guided by spatial development frameworks and deviations must be convincingly justified. Sterea’s failure to do so was central to the refusal.

Findings: The AA’s decision was lawful and not tainted by bias. The decision-makers had considered all relevant factors, including the school’s prior use, and had not elevated the NDP to the exclusion of other considerations. The refusal to rezone was based on Sterea’s inability to justify deviation from the NDP, not on any improper motive. The court of first instance had erred by substituting its own views for those of the planning authorities. The full court had correctly reversed that error. Sterea’s allegations of bias were found to be speculative and unsupported by evidence. Spatial planning frameworks are not mere guidelines but binding instruments that require compelling justification for deviation. Temporary consent uses do not automatically alter the zoning character of a property, especially where long-term planning objectives are at stake.

Order: The appeal is upheld in part. The full court’s order is set aside and replaced with the following: The appeal is upheld. The High Court’s order is set aside and replaced with: “The application is dismissed.”

Facts: The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and its Municipal Valuer challenged a decision made by the Valuation Appeal Board concerning 24 units of a sectional title property. Initially categorised as ‘sectional title residential’ in the 2013 general valuation roll, the units were later reclassified as ‘sectional title business’ in a supplementary roll. The owners objected, arguing that the units were used solely for residential purposes and should retain their original categorisation. The Appeal Board upheld the objection and reinstated the residential classification, prompting the City and Valuer to seek judicial review.

Application: This was a review application brought under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), seeking to set aside the Appeal Board’s decision and reinstate the business categorisation. The City argued that the Board had acted ultra vires, misinterpreted legislation, and failed to apply the correct version of section 8 of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 (MPRA). The issue was whether the Appeal Board’s decision to categorise the units as residential was lawful and whether the City and Valuer had standing to challenge it.

Discussion: Multiple preliminary objections were raised. The Appeal Board and owners argued that the City lacked locus standi, as it was acting in its own financial interest rather than the public interest. The Valuer’s standing was also challenged, given his role as an independent functionary. The Valuer was functus officio and had improperly aligned himself with the City, undermining his independence. The City’s standing was accepted on a tenuous basis, but the Valuer’s was rejected. The review grounds under PAJA included alleged errors of law, reliance on the wrong version of section 8 of the MPRA, and improper consideration of the City’s Rates Policy. The Appeal Board’s decision was interpreted as a lawful exercise of its powers under section 57 of the MPRA, based on a de novo hearing. The Board did not declare the Rates Policy unlawful but rather interpreted the MPRA as prevailing over conflicting policy provisions. The Board’s reliance on the amended section 8 was not material, as neither version supported the City’s preferred valuation method of “highest and best permitted use.” The Board’s use of the COGTA circular was limited and non-binding.

Findings: The City’s argument that owners should have submitted declarations to qualify for residential rates was rejected, as it unlawfully shifted the categorisation function from the Valuer to other municipal officials. The Appeal Board acted within its statutory powers and did not commit any material error of law. Its interpretation of the MPRA and the City’s Rates Policy was consistent with established legal principles. The Board correctly found that the Valuer’s reliance on zoning and “highest and best use” was misplaced, and that actual use should determine categorisation. The City’s arguments failed to establish that the Board’s decision was irrational or unlawful. The Valuer’s participation in the proceedings was inappropriate and indicative of bias. Given the conduct of the applicants, including the expansion of arguments beyond the founding affidavit and the late filing of records, a punitive costs order was warranted.

Order: The application is dismissed with costs on the scale as between attorney and client, including the reserved costs of 24 April 2024.

Facts: In April 2020, the Mpumalanga Department of Health appointed Tepa Trading and Projects to supply 220,000 surgical masks during the Covid-19 pandemic. The appointment followed a request for quotation (RFQ) issued under emergency procurement procedures. The Special Investigating Unit (SIU), acting on a presidential proclamation, investigated the procurement process and uncovered widespread irregularities. Tepa Trading was paid over R4,7 million, despite quoting for fewer masks than the RFQ required and without evidence of competitive bidding. The SIU sought to review and set aside the appointment and recover profits earned under the contract.

Application: This was a review application brought by the SIU under the principle of legality, seeking a declaration that the Department’s appointment of Tepa Trading was unconstitutional, unlawful, and invalid. The SIU also sought a just and equitable remedy under section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, including disgorgement of profits. The issue was whether Tepa Trading’s appointment violated procurement laws and whether the company should be compelled to account for and return profits earned under the irregular contract.

Discussion: Tepa Trading raised several defences, including estoppel, hearsay objections, and claims of innocence. It argued that it was unaware of any procedural flaws and had relied on representations made by the Department. These arguments were rejected. The evidence showed that Tepa Trading quoted for a specific quantity of masks without explanation, suggesting prior knowledge of internal procurement decisions. The company had likely been coached by officials and was complicit in the irregular process. The Department failed to follow its own Supply Chain Management (SCM) policies, including obtaining multiple quotations and issuing formal orders before delivery. The appointment contravened National Treasury Instruction Notes and the Public Finance Management Act 29 of 2000. The affidavit of Mr De Jager, relied on by the SIU, was ruled inadmissible as hearsay, but the remaining uncontested evidence was sufficient to support the SIU’s case.

Findings: The appointment of Tepa Trading was found to be constitutionally invalid and procedurally flawed. The procurement process lacked transparency, competitiveness, and fairness, violating section 217 of the Constitution. The RFQ process was manipulated, and the deviation from transversal contracts did not justify bypassing all procurement safeguards. Tepa Trading’s claim of innocence was contradicted by its conduct and the improbability of its quotation aligning so precisely with internal figures. The public interest outweighed any claim to retain profits derived from the unlawful contract. A just and equitable remedy was warranted, requiring Tepa Trading to account for and return its profits.

Order: The delay in launching the application is condoned. The Department’s decision to appoint Tepa Trading is declared unconstitutional, unlawful, and invalid. The appointment and resultant contract are reviewed and set aside. Tepa Trading must, within 30 days, submit a detailed audited statement of income, expenses, and net profit earned under the contract. If disputed, the matter may be re-enrolled for determination. If agreed, the profit must be paid to Safarmex within 15 days, with interest. Tepa Trading is liable for the SIU’s costs on Scale B, including the costs of two counsel.

Facts: Following the death of Mgolombane, who died intestate, his two minor daughters, the Bhes, were excluded from inheriting under the customary law of succession, which applied through section 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 and its associated regulations. The deceased’s father was appointed sole heir and representative of the estate by the Magistrate of Khayelitsha. The estate included a property acquired through state housing subsidies and building materials intended for a family home. The deceased had supported the applicants, who were dependent on him. Fearing eviction and homelessness, the applicants obtained interim interdicts and challenged the appointment and the legislative framework that excluded them.

Application: This was a constitutional challenge brought by the applicants, including the Women’s Legal Centre Trust, seeking confirmation of High Court orders declaring section 23 of the Black Administration Act, its regulations, and section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 unconstitutional. The issue was whether the legislative framework governing intestate succession for African people, and the customary law principle of male primogeniture, violated constitutional rights to equality, dignity, and protection of children.

Discussion: The legislative framework created a racially discriminatory parallel system of succession, 

applying only to African people and excluding them from the protections of the Intestate Succession Act. The principle of male primogeniture, central to customary succession, excluded women and extra-marital children from inheriting. The historical context of section 23, its racist origins, and its role in entrenching inequality were examined. The system imposed a rigid and outdated version of customary law, failing to reflect the evolving nature of living customary law. Customary law must be interpreted in line with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Its patriarchal features had been exaggerated and codified during apartheid. The exclusion of women and extra-marital children was found to be discriminatory and incompatible with constitutional values.

Findings: Section 23 of the Black Administration Act, its regulations, and section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act were declared unconstitutional. The rule of male primogeniture, as applied to inheritance of property, was found to violate the rights to equality and dignity, and to unfairly discriminate against women and extra-marital children. The notion that the rule could be developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis was rejected, citing the need for a comprehensive and uniform remedy. The Intestate Succession Act should apply to all intestate estates previously governed by section 23, with modifications to accommodate polygynous unions and multiple surviving spouses. The judgment also addressed the need for retrospective application of the invalidity, balanced against administrative fairness.

Order: The impugned provisions are declared invalid. Section 1 of the Intestate Succession Act is to apply to all intestate estates previously governed by section 23 of the Black Administration Act, with modifications to accommodate polygynous unions and multiple surviving spouses. Transfers made in good faith prior to this judgment are protected. Estates currently being administered under section 23 may continue under that framework until finalisation. The Master of the High Court is authorised to oversee future estates under the Administration of Estates Act. Specific relief is granted to the applicants in the Bhe and Shibi matters.

Key dictum:

[71] The rights violated are important rights, particularly in the South African context. The rights to equality and dignity are of the most valuable of rights in any open and democratic state. They assume special importance in South Africa because of our past history of inequality and hurtful discrimination on grounds that include race and gender.

[72] It could be argued that despite its racist and sexist nature, section 23 gives recognition to customary law and acknowledges the pluralist nature of our society. This is however not its dominant purpose or effect. Section 23 was enacted as part of a racist programme intent on entrenching division and subordination. Its effect has been to ossify customary law. In the light of its destructive purpose and effect, it could not be justified in any open and democratic society.

[73] It is clear from what is stated above that the serious violation by the provisions of section 23 of the rights to equality and human dignity cannot be justified in our new constitutional order. In terms of section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, section 23 must accordingly be struck down.

[77] Central to the customary law of succession is the rule of primogeniture, the main features of which are well established. The general rule is that only a male who is related to the deceased qualifies as intestate heir. Women do not participate in the intestate succession of deceased estates.  In a monogamous family, the eldest son of the family head is his heir. If the deceased is not survived by any male descendants, his father succeeds him. If his father also does not survive him, an heir is sought among the father’s male descendants related to him through the male line.