Facts: The National Council of and for Persons with Disabilities (NCPD), a voluntary association advocating for the rights of persons with disabilities, challenged the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa’s (ICASA) promulgation of the 2021 Code for Persons with Disabilities Regulations. The Code, published in April 2021, set out accessibility standards for television broadcasting licensees, including closed captioning, sign language, and subtitles. NCPD had submitted detailed proposals during the public consultation phase, including calls for mandatory open captioning and broader definitions aligned with the White Paper on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. These proposals were largely rejected or ignored. NCPD launched a review application six months later, seeking to set aside the Code and have it redrafted to incorporate its submissions.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the Gauteng High Court’s refusal to condone the delay in instituting the review application. The issue was whether the delay was unreasonable under section 7(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), and whether the new relief sought on appeal, a declaration of constitutional invalidity, could be entertained.

Discussion: The appeal turned on whether NCPD had provided a reasonable explanation for the delay and whether the High Court had erred in refusing condonation. NCPD argued that its delay was justified by investigatory steps, including requests for reasons and submissions from other stakeholders. The respondents countered that NCPD had been aware of the Code and its reasons from the outset and had failed to act diligently. The statutory framework under PAJA, the nature of administrative action, and the procedural requirements for constitutional challenges were examined, including rule 16A and joinder of affected parties. The Authority had published the Code and its reasons in April 2021, and NCPD was aware of both from the outset. The delay prejudiced broadcasting licensees who had already begun implementing the Code, and undermined regulatory certainty.

Findings: NCPD had delayed unreasonably in launching the review application. The explanation provided did not cover the full six-month period, and the steps taken, including requests for reasons and stakeholder submissions, were not sufficient to justify the delay. The new relief sought on appeal, a declaration that the Code was unconstitutional for failing to mandate open captioning, was rejected as procedurally unfair. It had not been pleaded in the founding affidavit, and affected parties had not been joined or notified. The Authority was denied the opportunity to justify any limitation of rights under section 36 of the Constitution. While participatory democracy requires meaningful engagement, it does not oblige regulators to adopt all submissions. The Authority had considered NCPD’s proposals but was not bound to accept them.

Order: The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts: Precision Meters has, since 2015, been accredited by the South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) and designated by the National Regulator for Compulsory Specifications (the Specifications Authority) to verify water meters with a nominal bore of up to 100mm. In July 2025, the Specifications Authority issued a new designation certificate limiting Precision Meters to verifying meters only up to 25mm, citing SANAS’s assertion that the company was only accredited for that range. This contradicted SANAS’s own May 2025 accreditation certificate, which confirmed the 100mm scope. In August 2025, SANAS uploaded unsigned documents to its website purporting to reduce the scope of accreditation. Precision Meters, having invested in equipment and operated under the broader scope for over a decade, approached the High Court for urgent interim relief to preserve its status pending a review.

Application: This was an urgent application for an interim interdict to suspend the operation of SANAS’s August 2025 documents and the Specifications Authority’s July 2025 designation certificate. The issue was whether Precision Meters had established a prima facie right to continue verifying meters up to 100mm, and whether the OUTA “clearest of cases” test applied to interim relief against organs of state.

* See National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [2012] ZACC 18. 

Discussion: The respondents argued that the application failed to meet the OUTA threshold for interim relief against public bodies. However, it was clarified that OUTA applies only to cases involving policy-laden, polycentric decision-making at the core of executive function, which this case did not involve. The standard requirements for interim interdicts were applied, which included a prima facie right, irreparable harm, lack of alternative remedy, and balance of convenience. The Accreditation for Conformity Assessment, Calibration and Good Laboratory Practice Act 19 of 2006 requires accreditation certificates to be signed by SANAS’s CEO or delegate, which the August documents were not. The Specifications Authority had relied on these unsigned documents to issue a reduced designation, despite the operative May 2025 certificate authorising verification up to 100mm. SANAS’s conduct, its failure to follow internal procedures for reducing scope, and its unjustified attacks on Precision Meters’ integrity were examined.

Findings: Precision Meters had a clear and enforceable right under the Accreditation Act, based on the signed May 2025 certificate. The unsigned documents uploaded by SANAS in August 2025 were not legally valid and could not alter the scope of accreditation. The Specifications Authority’s reliance on these documents to issue a reduced designation was misplaced and procedurally flawed. SANAS’s conduct, including its failure to follow prescribed processes and its baseless accusations against Precision Meters, was irresponsible and unjustified. Precision Meters demonstrated that it would suffer reputational and financial harm, including potential staff layoffs, if interim relief was not granted. The respondents failed to show any meaningful prejudice or statutory impediment. The OUTA test was inapplicable, and urgency was established based on the swift action taken by Precision Meters following the impugned decisions.

Order: The matter is dealt with as one of urgency. Pending the outcome of part B: The first respondent is directed to remove the unsigned documents concerning the applicant, which were uploaded in August 2025, from its website. The second respondent is directed, within two days of this order, to issue the applicant with a designation verification certificate stating that it is a verification body under the Legal Metrology Act 9 of 2014 for water meters with a nominal bore of up to 100mm. The first and second respondents are to pay the applicant’s costs jointly and severally, including the costs of two counsel on Scale C.

Facts: The applicants contracted Bense Building Contractors CC to construct a dwelling on land near Southbroom, KwaZulu-Natal, for R2,5 million. The relationship was initially cordial, and the applicants were permitted to occupy the incomplete dwelling during the Covid-19 lockdown. However, the relationship deteriorated when the applicants failed to allocate the full loan amount obtained from a financial institution to the construction, resulting in a shortfall. This led to the signing of an acknowledgment of debt in June 2020, in which the applicants admitted owing R670,000, with interest and costs, to be repaid in instalments by June 2023. The applicants defaulted, and the respondent obtained default judgment in May 2024. The applicants later applied for rescission, claiming they had not received the summons and were unaware of the judgment until August 2024.

Application: This was an application to rescind a default judgment under Uniform Rule 42(1)(a), alternatively under the common law. The issue was whether the judgment had been erroneously granted in the applicants’ absence, and whether they had a bona fide defence with prospects of success.

Discussion: The applicants argued that the summons had not been properly served and speculated that it may have been removed by wind or monkeys. They claimed ignorance of the proceedings until the sheriff arrived to execute the writ. Their defence rested on the assertion that the acknowledgment of debt was conditional upon the completion of outstanding work, and that the respondent had breached this condition. They also contended that the acknowledgment constituted a credit agreement under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, which the respondent had not complied with. The respondent disputed these claims, stating that the acknowledgment merely recorded the repayment terms of an admitted debt. It pointed to a subsequent agreement reached in February 2022, facilitated by the Master Builders Association, in which the applicants acknowledged owing R440,000 and undertook to pay R200,000 within two weeks, a promise they failed to honour. The respondent argued that the applicants had acquiesced in the judgment by allowing execution to proceed and making settlement offers, and that the rescission application was brought unreasonably late.

Findings: It was accepted that the applicants may not have received the summons affixed to their door, but this did not affect the outcome. The applicants had perempted their right to rescind the judgment through their conduct. They failed to challenge the judgment when first made aware of it, allowed the sale in execution to proceed without objection, and made settlement offers that acknowledged the debt. These actions were inconsistent with an intention to challenge the judgment and amounted to acquiescence. The delay of 11 months in bringing the rescission application further supported the conclusion that the applicants had abandoned their right to contest the judgment. The principle of finality in litigation required that the applicants be held to their choice, and their conduct pointed indubitably to a decision not to attack the judgment.

Order: The application is dismissed with costs, which may be taxed on Scale B.

Facts: Liberty Group entered into three agreements with Kokerboom Management and its director, Theron, to support the development of a financial services business. These included an Affiliate Operation Agreement, a Funding Agreement, and an Acknowledgment of Debt (AOD). The Affiliate Agreement appointed Kokerboom to perform outsourced activities for Liberty, with fees to be paid as per annexure “D”, which was left blank. The Funding Agreement provided R250,000 upfront, with further payments contingent on performance targets. The AOD confirmed the debt and outlined repayment terms based on target achievement. Theron also signed a deed of suretyship. Liberty later claimed repayment of R409,258.11, alternatively R345,758.11, based on alleged failure to meet targets and commission clawbacks. The defendants disputed liability, raised prescription, and alleged breach of oral terms.

Claim: This was a claim for repayment of funds advanced under the Funding Agreement and commission clawbacks under the Affiliate Agreement. The issue was whether Liberty had proven the defendants’ indebtedness under the agreements, whether any oral terms excused performance, and whether the claim had prescribed.

Discussion: Liberty relied on contractual clauses and reconciliation statements to support its claim. Witnesses testified to the structure and operation of the agreements, including how commission advances and clawbacks were managed. The defendants challenged the accuracy of Liberty’s calculations and the completeness of its documentation, particularly the blank annexure “D” and discrepancies in the reconciliation statements. They also argued that Liberty breached oral promises regarding lead generation and system access. Liberty denied the existence of binding oral terms and maintained that the AOD and written agreements governed the relationship. The prescription defence was countered by reference to an acknowledgment of debt and the nature of the AOD as a promissory note.

Findings: It was accepted that some debt was likely owed under the Funding Agreement, but Liberty failed to present sufficient evidence to quantify the amount. Clause 1.1 of the Funding Agreement required a proportional reduction based on performance shortfalls, yet no clear calculation was provided. The reduced amount of R186,500 appeared for the first time in Liberty’s heads of argument, unsupported by witness testimony or documentation. Regarding the Affiliate Agreement, the absence of annexure “D” and the lack of clarity around commission clawbacks undermined Liberty’s claim. Witnesses lacked personal knowledge of key entries and could not explain post-termination transactions reflected in the reconciliation statements. The certificate of balance initially relied upon was shown to be inaccurate, shifting the burden onto Liberty to prove its claim through contractual terms and supporting facts, a burden it did not discharge. The evidence was fragmented, inconsistent, and insufficient to establish the claimed amounts with the required degree of certainty.

Order: The absolution from the instance is granted with costs, including costs of counsel, on Scale B.

Facts:  The appellants, the Kudoos and Mukharib, are family members. They were convicted in the Regional Commercial Crime Court on various counts of fraud and money laundering. The offences stemmed from a loan application made to a bank, where the first and second appellants misrepresented the purchase of new equipment from a third party. The bank approved the loan and paid the funds into the third party’s account, which were then dispersed into accounts linked to all four appellants. It later emerged that the equipment was not new but owned by the first appellant. The bank attached and auctioned the equipment for a nominal amount. At sentencing, the appellants offered partial repayment, which the bank rejected. Each appellant received a custodial sentence, and the appeal was brought against sentence only.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the sentences imposed by the Regional Magistrate, with the appellants arguing that the magistrate erred in not imposing correctional supervision or a suspended sentence. The issue was whether the sentences of direct imprisonment were appropriate in light of the appellants’ personal circumstances, including caregiving responsibilities for minor children and an elderly parent.

Discussion: The appellants contended that the magistrate failed to adequately consider their roles as primary caregivers and the impact of incarceration on their dependents. They argued that the additional orders issued post-sentencing, directing investigations into the care of the elderly and minor children, should have preceded sentencing and reflected a misdirection. The State opposed the appeal, maintaining that the sentences were appropriate and that the magistrate had considered all relevant factors. The High Court examined the sentencing record, including pre-sentence reports and social worker assessments, and considered whether the magistrate had exercised her discretion properly. Reference was made to authorities on sentencing and the best interests of children. The magistrate had conducted a thorough assessment of the appellants’ personal circumstances, including the care arrangements for minor children and the elderly mother of the first appellant.

Findings: The additional orders were a rational and compassionate supplement to the sentencing, not a misdirection. The offences were serious, premeditated, and involved deliberate misrepresentations over an extended period. The first and second appellants orchestrated the scheme, while the third and fourth appellants willingly participated by allowing funds to be channelled through their accounts. There was an absence of genuine remorse, a lack of full disclosure of motives, and a failure to make meaningful efforts to repay the defrauded funds. Although substantial and compelling circumstances were found to justify deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence, the gravity of the offences and the risk of reoffending, particularly in the case of the second appellant, warranted direct imprisonment. The sentences imposed were proportionate. Additional orders were issued to ensure the wellbeing of the affected children and elderly parent during the appellants’ incarceration.

Order: The appeal by each appellant against sentence is dismissed. The sentences imposed are confirmed, with the final order substituted by additional orders: The Department of Social Development and the National Commissioner for Correctional Services must ensure the care of the elderly mother of the first appellant and the minor children of the second, third, and fourth appellants. The second, third, and fourth appellants must serve their sentences at facilities close to their children. A social worker must visit the children every two months and report on their wellbeing under section 150 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.

Facts: The applicant launched an urgent application to stay the execution of a warrant of arrest issued by the Malamulele Magistrates’ Court, pending the finalisation of a review application and related proceedings under Rule 43(6). The warrant had been issued after the applicant failed to appear in a maintenance enquiry, despite multiple postponements. The applicant also sought to suspend all proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court, including the maintenance enquiry and any action pending the outcome of paternity testing ordered in earlier proceedings. The third respondent, who identified herself as the applicant’s customary wife and mother of the minor child, opposed the application and provided context regarding the applicant’s failure to comply with maintenance obligations.

Application: This was an urgent application for interim relief to stay the execution of a warrant of arrest and suspend maintenance proceedings pending the outcome of a review, appeal, and paternity testing. The issue was whether the applicant had established urgency and a legal basis for the suspension of proceedings under Rule 45A of the Uniform Rules of Court.

Discussion: The applicant’s founding affidavit was vague and lacking in context, with references to multiple proceedings not properly explained or supported by annexures. The third respondent submitted that the applicant had previously been convicted and sentenced for failure to pay maintenance, with the sentence suspended on condition of future compliance. She argued that the warrant was issued to secure his attendance after repeated failures to appear. The applicable legal principles under Rule 45A, section 32 of the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998, and section 170(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 were examined. The applicant had not attempted to cancel the warrant at the issuing court, nor had he shown that no alternative remedy was available. The importance of maintenance enforcement and the constitutional rights of children under section 28 were also considered.

Findings: The applicant had failed to make out a proper case for the relief sought. The founding affidavit lacked sufficient factual detail, and the court was not provided with the necessary documentation to assess the merits. The applicant’s failure to pursue available remedies, such as applying to cancel the warrant at the issuing court or finalising the paternity dispute, undermined his claim to urgency and procedural fairness. The maintenance proceedings were lawful and necessary to protect the rights of the minor child and the third respondent. The warrant of arrest did not automatically result in incarceration, and its purpose was to secure attendance at court. The applicant’s conduct appeared to be aimed at frustrating the enforcement of maintenance obligations. Systemic failures to enforce maintenance orders compromise the rule of law and the dignity of vulnerable dependents. On this basis, the application was dismissed.

Order: The application is deemed urgent as contemplated in Uniform Rule 6(12). The application is dismissed. The applicant is ordered to pay the costs, including the costs of counsel on Scale B.

Facts: Masima pleaded guilty in the Regional Court to the rape of a 16-year-old girl and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The offences occurred in December 2021 at the home of the complainant, who was the daughter of Masima’s long-term partner. Masima admitted to entering her room late at night, initiating non-consensual sexual contact, and subduing her through physical violence, including strangulation. The complainant escaped through a window after the incident. Masima was arrested the following day. He had two prior convictions, theft in 1996 and possession of dagga in 2015, but was treated as a first offender. An extensive correctional services report recommended, after an examination of the appellant's stable income, familial relationships and fixed address, a sentence of correctional supervision, while a victim impact report detailed the severe emotional and academic consequences suffered by the complainant.

Appeal: This was an appeal against sentence only. The Regional Court had imposed a life sentence, taking both counts together and antedating the sentence to the date of arrest. The issue was whether the trial court had misdirected itself in sentencing, particularly by combining charges with different minimum sentencing regimes and antedating the sentence contrary to section 282 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.

Discussion: It was examined whether the trial court had properly exercised its sentencing discretion. The magistrate had imposed a globular sentence despite the charges attracting different minimum sentences, life imprisonment for rape under section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, and 10 years for assault under section 51(2)(b). The magistrate also antedated the sentence to the date of arrest, which is not permitted under section 282 unless done by a reviewing or appellate court. The sentencing remarks were internally inconsistent, with the magistrate simultaneously invoking mercy and imposing life imprisonment. The docket inscription further confused matters by stating “life imprisonment (25 years)”.

Findings: The trial court had committed two material misdirections. First, by antedating the sentence, which it had no authority to do; and second, by imposing a single sentence for two offences governed by distinct statutory regimes. The offences, although committed in close proximity and involving the same victim, required separate sentences. The rape, committed within a familial context, was acknowledged as particularly reprehensible and deserving of a severe penalty. However, the magistrate’s intention appeared to be a tempered sentence of 25 years, not life imprisonment. For the assault, the minimum sentence of 10 years was appropriate given the brutality involved. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently due to the interconnected nature of the offences. The appeal succeeded only to the extent of correcting the sentencing structure and removing the improper antedating.

Order: The appeal is upheld insofar as the sentences imposed are altered to read as follows: In respect of the charge of rape, the accused is sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. In respect of the charge of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, the accused is sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. The sentences are to run concurrently and are antedated to 11 October 2023.

Facts: Capricorn Farms CC, the registered owner of a property in Vanderbijlpark, sought the eviction of Levinson, who had been residing and conducting business on the land since 2009. Levinson claimed a right of occupation based on an alleged oral partnership agreement with Dart, the sole member of Capricorn Farms. Dart was rendered incapacitated in 2009 following a motor vehicle accident, and a curatrix bonis was appointed. After Dart’s death in 2021, his wife and son were appointed as executors of his estate. Despite multiple sale negotiations, no valid agreement was concluded, and Levinson continued to occupy the property rent-free. The eviction application was dismissed by the court a quo due to non-compliance with section 4(2) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE).

Appeal: This was a full bench appeal against the dismissal of the eviction application. The issue was whether the failure to comply with section 4(2) of PIE, which requires written notice to the unlawful occupier and the municipality, was fatal to the application, despite the respondent’s full participation in the proceedings.

Discussion: The central issue was whether procedural non-compliance with the statutory notice requirements could invalidate an otherwise sound eviction application. Levinson had participated fully in the proceedings, had legal representation, and had filed a notice to abide by the outcome. He did not raise any objection to the absence of formal notice under section 4(2) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act. The appellant argued that the purpose of the notice provision, to ensure the occupier is informed and given an opportunity to be heard, had been fulfilled in substance. Levinson’s circumstances were far removed from those of vulnerable occupiers typically protected by the Act. He was a businessman with a second residence and had engaged with the litigation from the outset. The procedural defect, while technically present, had not caused any prejudice or undermined the fairness of the process.

Findings: The procedural defect, the absence of formal notice under section 4(2), did not justify dismissing the application. Levinson had legal representation, participated fully, and never raised the lack of notice as a defence. His continued occupation of the property was unlawful, and the alleged partnership agreement had no legal standing or supporting documentation. Despite multiple opportunities to formalise his position or conclude a sale, he remained on the property without paying rent or contributing to its upkeep. The appellant’s ownership rights had been unjustly restricted for years, and the procedural lapse had caused no prejudice. Levinson’s conduct, including his attempts to negotiate settlement and his notice to abide by the outcome, reflected an understanding of the process and undermined any claim to procedural unfairness. In these circumstances, the dismissal of the application was set aside and replaced with an eviction order.

Order: The appeal is upheld with costs. The order of the court a quo is set aside and replaced with the following: The first respondent or his successors in title are ordered to vacate the property within 60 days of service of this order. Failing compliance, the Sheriff is authorised to evict the first respondent. The first respondent is ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the application for leave to appeal, including costs of counsel.

Facts: The applicant and the respondent are divorced parents of a minor child. In terms of the divorce order, primary care and residence were awarded to the applicant, with phased contact rights granted to the respondent. The applicant later alleged that the child had been sexually abused by the respondent, citing behavioural changes and a specific incident in which the child, then four years old, was found masturbating and allegedly said he had been taught to do so by “the man in the red hat.” Months later, the child identified the respondent as that man. The applicant opened a criminal case, took the child for medical and psychological assessments, and sought to suspend the respondent’s contact rights. The respondent denied the allegations, claimed the applicant was retaliating due to prior contempt proceedings, and submitted expert reports and affidavits from school staff refuting the claims.

Application: This was an application to suspend the respondent’s contact rights with the child under section 28 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, based on allegations of sexual abuse. The applicant also brought an interlocutory application to refer the matter to trial, arguing that material disputes of fact could not be resolved on the papers. The respondent opposed both applications, maintaining that the allegations were unfounded and that the matter could be decided on the existing evidence.

Discussion: The applicant relied on reports from Ms Smith, a psychologist, and Ms Varaden, a clinical social worker, both of whom recommended restricted or supervised contact. However, neither had interviewed the respondent, and their reports were found to lack methodological rigour and objectivity. The respondent submitted reports from Mr Willows, a court-appointed forensic psychologist, and the Family Advocate, both of which found no reliable evidence of abuse and recommended continued contact. A SAPS social worker, Captain Gcabashe, also concluded that the child had likely been coached and that the allegations were not substantiated. The criminal case was withdrawn due to insufficient evidence. The applicant’s failure to cooperate with Mr Willows and her delay in pursuing the matter were problematic. Legal arguments focused on whether the matter should be referred to trial under Rule 6(5)(g), and whether the applicant had met the evidentiary threshold to justify suspension of contact.

Findings: The applicant had failed to establish a prima facie case of sexual abuse. The reports from Ms Smith and Ms Varaden were unreliable due to their lack of objectivity, poor investigative quality, and failure to engage with both parties. In contrast, the reports from Mr Willows, the Family Advocate, and Captain Gcabashe were detailed, balanced, and based on thorough assessments. These reports consistently found no evidence of abuse and highlighted the respondent’s positive relationship with the child. The applicant’s delay in pursuing the matter, refusal to cooperate with the forensic psychologist, and reliance on unsubstantiated allegations were viewed as attempts to frustrate the respondent’s parental rights. The application to refer the matter to trial was dismissed as lacking merit, and the main application was rejected on the basis that the best interests of the child would not be served by suspending contact. The respondent was found to be a committed and caring parent, and the existing contact arrangements were reinstated with a structured schedule.

Order: The interlocutory application for referral to trial is dismissed. The main application is dismissed. The applicant is directed to pay the costs of both applications on an ordinary party and party scale, including counsel’s fees on Scale A. A detailed contact schedule is reinstated, including alternating weekends, Thursdays, holidays, birthdays, and special occasions, with handovers at the Fields Hill Shell petrol station. The respondent is authorised to arrange therapy for the child with specified psychologists, subject to prior notice to the applicant. Both parties are directed to ensure the child attends therapy and to share costs equally, unless otherwise agreed.

Facts: Fire Logic, incorporated in 1994, had traded under the name “Fire Logic” for over 27 years in the Eastern and Western Cape provinces, offering fire protection and maintenance services. It built a substantial reputation in the industry, supported by an average annual turnover of R30 million and consistent marketing efforts. In 2015, Logik Group Africa began operating under the name “Fire Logik” in the same industry and regions. Despite changing its registered name in 2016, Logik Group continued trading as “Fire Logik” for six years. Fire Logic began receiving misdirected purchase orders and inquiries intended for Logik Group, including from Bantry Construction, which had searched for “Firelogic” online and mistakenly contacted Fire Logic. Fire Logic’s director, Ms Scheffer, raised concerns about the confusion and sought undertakings from Logik Group to cease using the name. Although Logik Group initially agreed to change its name to avoid confusion, it continued using “Fire Logik” in its branding and online presence.

Appeal: This was an appeal against the judgment of the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court, which had granted Fire Logic a final interdict restraining Logik Group from passing off its services as those of Fire Logic. The issue was whether Fire Logic had established the necessary reputation and whether the requirements for passing-off had been met, justifying the interdictory relief.

Discussion: The appeal turned on the common law principles of passing-off, which require proof of reputation, misrepresentation, and damage. Fire Logic relied on its longstanding use of the name, its financial performance, and evidence of customer confusion. Logik Group denied wrongdoing and disputed Fire Logic’s reputation, alleging poor industry standing. However, it did not challenge the factual basis of Fire Logic’s trading history or financial metrics. Passing-off protects goodwill from misrepresentation likely to cause public confusion. The evidence showed that Logik Group’s continued use of “Fire Logik” created a likelihood of confusion, especially given its own acknowledgment of the issue and failure to update its website or branding.

Findings: Fire Logic had built a substantial reputation in its name and services over nearly three decades, supported by consistent branding and commercial success. The similarity between “Fire Logic” and “Fire Logik”, combined with the overlap in services and geographic reach, created a clear risk of confusion among customers. This was not merely theoretical, documented instances of misdirected communications and mistaken identity confirmed the practical impact. Logik Group’s denial of Fire Logic’s reputation was unsubstantiated and insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of fact. Its continued use of the name, despite prior undertakings and awareness of confusion, amounted to misrepresentation. The matter was appropriately resolved on the papers, and the reasoning of the High Court was upheld as sound and legally consistent with established principles of passing-off.

Order: The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Facts: Babolaeng was employed by Sol Plaatjie Local Municipality as an intern under the ISDG Mentorship Programme, serving as a candidate Civil Engineering Technician from 2018 until 2022. Her contract, which was extended in 2021 due to registration delays with the Engineering Council, explicitly stated that the mentorship did not create expectations of permanent employment. After her supervisor, Ms Jele, left the municipality, Babolaeng was verbally instructed by the municipal manager, Mr Akharawaray, to perform Jele’s duties as PMU manager. She carried out these functions without receiving an acting allowance and without formal written appointment. Babolaeng testified that she had performed most of the PMU manager’s functions and had dropped out of the mentorship programme due to lack of exposure. She acknowledged that clause 7.1 of the collective agreement required written appointment for acting positions, but believed verbal instruction sufficed. The municipality disputed her claim, arguing that no formal appointment had occurred and that interns were not eligible to act in permanent posts.

Application: This was an application to review and set aside an arbitration award issued by the arbitrator, acting under the auspices of the South African Local Government Bargaining Council, which found that the municipality had not committed an unfair labour practice. The issue was whether Babolaeng was entitled to an acting allowance for the period during which she performed the duties of the PMU manager, despite not having been formally appointed in writing.

Discussion: Babolaeng argued that the arbitrator’s reliance on the absence of written appointment was overly technical and unfair, allowing the municipality to benefit from its own failure to formalise her acting role. She sought review with substitution, claiming R467,707.45 in acting allowance, calculated at 70% of the salary difference between her intern salary and the PMU manager’s commencing notch. The municipality maintained that no acting appointment had occurred and that allowing claims based on informal arrangements would undermine administrative certainty. The arbitrator had found that Babolaeng performed at least 70% of the PMU manager’s duties but held that, without written appointment, she was not acting in the legal sense required by clause 7.1 of the collective agreement. Relevant legal principles were examined, which emphasised the necessity of written appointments for acting allowances. The broader unfair labour practice framework under section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 was also considered. While benefits need not originate from contractual or statutory entitlements, they cannot override explicit legal requirements.

Findings: It was accepted that Babolaeng had performed many of the PMU manager’s functions, but this did not amount to a lawful acting appointment. The collective agreement’s requirement for written authorisation was pre-emptory, and its absence dispositive. The argument that fairness alone should entitle her to compensation was rejected, as it would undermine the legal framework designed to ensure accountability and prevent abuse of public resources. The arbitrator had correctly applied the law, and his decision was not reviewable. Even if Babolaeng had been acting in a de facto capacity, she failed to show comparative unfairness or precedent for similar allowances being paid in analogous circumstances. Her reliance on the salary scale of the PMU manager to calculate the claimed amount was inconsistent with the very clause that required written appointment.

Order: The review application is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

Facts: Molope, a senior technical worker, and Jebetle, a stock controller, were employed by Transnet Engineering. They were dismissed following a disciplinary hearing conducted in their absence, despite having submitted medical certificates to justify nonattendance. The charges against them included contraventions of Transnet’s Acceptable Use and Electronic Communication Policy, insubordination, intimidation, defamation, and misrepresentation. The employees, represented by the union NTM, challenged the dismissals at the Transnet Bargaining Council. The arbitrator found the dismissals both procedurally and substantively unfair and ordered retrospective reinstatement with 18 months’ back pay.

Application: This was a review application brought under section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 to set aside the arbitration award. The issue was whether the arbitrator had misconceived the nature of the enquiry or reached an unreasonable result in finding the dismissals unfair.

Discussion: Transnet argued that the arbitrator had failed to properly consider the evidence, particularly the seriousness of the misconduct and the procedural history. It was submitted that the disciplinary hearing had been postponed multiple times, and the employees had indicated their intention to be dismissed in absentia while launching an urgent Labour Court application. Transnet maintained that the charges were clear and supported by annexures, and that the employees had bypassed internal grievance procedures by sending inappropriate emails to senior managers. The arbitrator had found that the charges were vague, the union lacked recognition, and the medical certificates were not properly considered. Transnet challenged these findings, arguing that the arbitrator had focused on the employees’ emotional state and union rights rather than the actual misconduct.

Findings: The arbitrator had failed to properly assess the nature and impact of the misconduct. The emails sent by the employees were found to be threatening, defamatory, and directed at managers to whom they did not report, undermining workplace discipline. The arbitrator’s focus on the employees’ grievances and union representation diverted attention from the core issue, whether the conduct breached workplace policies and justified dismissal. The arbitrator’s reasoning was found to be materially flawed, particularly in treating the disciplinary chairperson’s description of the charges as “complex” as proof of vagueness, despite the employees never raising such a concern during the process. The procedural fairness finding was also undermined by the arbitrator’s failure to consider the chairperson’s discretion and the repeated postponements. The award was one that no reasonable decision-maker could reach on the evidence presented, and the reinstatement with back pay was deemed unjustified.

Order: The arbitration award is reviewed and set aside. The dismissal of the first and fourth respondents is declared procedurally and substantively fair.  There is no order as to costs.

Facts: Dr Ndlovu was employed by the Western Cape Department of Health (DoH) and faced serious allegations of bullying, intimidation, and unfair discrimination following complaints lodged by colleagues, including Dr Barday and a group of consultants. Despite these allegations, Ndlovu continued working until August 2021, when he was placed on precautionary suspension. The suspension followed the delivery of a letter of demand from Ndlovu’s attorneys to Barday, claiming R3,5 million in damages for alleged defamation. The disciplinary process proceeded, and Ndlovu was ultimately dismissed in May 2022. During his ten-month suspension, he received his basic salary but was not paid his monthly commuted overtime entitlement of R40,228.76, totalling over R400,000. He challenged the arbitration award that upheld the fairness of his suspension and the withholding of overtime.

Application: This was an application to review and set aside the arbitration award issued by the commissioner under the auspices of the Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council. The issue was whether the precautionary suspension and its extension were fair, and whether the withholding of commuted overtime during suspension constituted an unfair labour practice.

Discussion: The review focused on whether the commissioner’s findings were reasonable under the Sidumo standard. Ndlovu argued that the commissioner mischaracterised the timeline of events, incorrectly inferred intent to intimidate from the delivery of the letter of demand and failed to consider his constitutional rights to dignity and access to courts. The DoH maintained that the suspension was necessary to protect the wellbeing of staff. The procedural history was examined, including Ndlovu’s internal grievance, CCMA referral, and legal correspondence with his attorneys. The legal framework under PSCBC Resolution 1 of 2003 was also considered, which requires full pay during precautionary suspension and sets out criteria for its imposition.

Findings: The commissioner’s conclusions were not supported by the evidence, and her reasoning was materially flawed. The suspension was triggered solely by the delivery of the letter of demand, which was part of a civil process unrelated to Ndlovu’s physical presence at work. The commissioner failed to appreciate that Ndlovu had pursued internal remedies before initiating legal action and that his communications with attorneys showed no intent to intimidate. The suspension was punitive rather than precautionary, infringing on Ndlovu’s constitutional rights. The extension of the suspension was also unjustified, relying on hearsay and penalising Ndlovu for exercising his right to cross-examine witnesses. The consultants who claimed intimidation were not called to testify, and their fears remained untested. The withholding of commuted overtime was unlawful, as clause 7.2(b) of the resolution mandates full pay during suspension, including contractual entitlements. The commissioner’s failure to award the withheld overtime and her refusal to recognise the unfairness of the suspension amounted to reviewable irregularities. Compensation for reputational harm was awarded, though limited to one month’s salary due to the absence of detailed evidence.

Order: The arbitration award is reviewed and set aside. It is replaced with the following: The third respondent committed an unfair labour practice by imposing and extending an unfair precautionary suspension. The third respondent is ordered to pay: R171,185.89 as compensation for reputational harm. R402,287.60 for withheld commuted overtime, with interest as per the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act. All amounts must be paid within 15 days of the judgment. There is no order as to costs.

Facts: Dlova, a resident of Mdantsane in East London, experienced repeated disconnections of her electricity supply by Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality. The first disconnection occurred while a dispute over her municipal account was still pending. Although the electricity was later restored, it was disconnected again in March 2025. Dlova had lodged a formal dispute with the municipality but received no response. She claimed that the termination of her electricity supply was unlawful, particularly given the unresolved status of her account and the municipality’s failure to engage with her submissions. The disconnection affected her household’s access to basic services, prompting her to seek urgent relief to prevent further interruptions while the dispute remained unresolved.

Application: This was an urgent application seeking interim relief for the reconnection of electricity and an interdict preventing further disconnection until the applicant’s dispute with the municipality was resolved. The issue was whether the matter remained live given the reconnection, and whether the municipality had acted lawfully in disconnecting electricity despite a pending dispute under section 102 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.

Discussion: The municipality argued that the disconnection had been a mistake and that the electricity had already been restored, rendering the application moot. It also claimed that the applicant’s dispute was not valid or properly lodged, and that the termination notice had been issued long before. The applicant, however, maintained that her dispute had been formally submitted and remained unresolved, and that the municipality had failed to respond or engage with her concerns. She emphasised the impact of the disconnection on her household and the lack of procedural fairness in how the matter was handled. The municipality’s own bylaws require that disputes be considered before any termination of services, and the applicant’s position was that this obligation had been ignored. It was considered whether the municipality had complied with its statutory duties and whether the applicant had been afforded a fair opportunity to have her dispute addressed before her electricity was cut off.

Findings: The prayers relating to reconnection were moot, as the electricity had already been restored and no reconnection fee had been charged. However, the municipality’s failure to respond to the applicant’s dispute was held to be procedurally unfair and contrary to section 102 of the Systems Act. Where a statute confers rights or privileges, such as the right to have a dispute considered before disconnection, those provisions are peremptory. The municipality’s conduct in disconnecting electricity without resolving the dispute undermined the applicant’s right to procedural fairness and participation in administrative decision-making. The view that government bodies must act lawfully and respectfully when exercising power was endorsed, especially in matters affecting basic services. The application succeeded only in respect of the relief compelling the municipality to respond to the dispute.

Order: The municipality is directed to answer the applicant’s dispute regarding her electricity account within 60 days of service of this order. The municipality is directed to pay the applicant’s costs of the application on Scale A.